Questions and controversies about the supply of weapons to Syria have been at the heart of debates about the appropriate and prudent international response to its conflict since 2011. Russian arms transfers to the regime have been widely condemned, but arms embargo proponents failed to neutralize Russian and Chinese opposition at the UN. As the conflict dragged on, the debate in the United States and Europe shifted from embargoing arms transfers to supplying rebel groups. In 2013, the United States announced its intention to arm Syrian rebels, and the EU let its embargo to Syria lapse, enabling it to do the same. These decisions have been praised for showing support for the opposition without putting troops on the ground. They have also come under fire for the potential security costs that arms transfers may bring, including their diversion to terrorist groups, role in conflict escalation, and use in human rights violations. The complex interests, conflicting values, and murky ethics in the Syrian case are symptomatic of the tensions inherent in the contemporary arms trade as a whole.
The Arms Trade Treaty attempts to clarify these dilemmas and encourage export restraint in cases such as Syria. It lays out—for the first time—legally binding principles to restrict small and major conventional arms exports to human rights violators, conflict zones, and recipients that risk of diversion to illicit markets or terrorist actors. This is a dramatic policy achievement once thought impossible. Despite widespread support for the ATT, however, putting these principles into practice is often messier in reality than it seems on paper, as Syria shows. The conventional arms trade has long been seen as necessary for states’ foreign policy, national security, and economic well-being. Yet the effects of arms export decisions can have long-lasting consequences for the states and populations on the receiving end. Arms supplies may enable or prolong conflict and repression, destabilize societies, and undermine human security. In the post–Cold War era, many of these problems with conventional arms—small arms especially—have become more difficult for states to ignore as bloody internal conflicts hit the front page of newspapers and as affected states and NGOs have begun to voice their concerns. Hundreds of thousands of people die each year as a direct or indirect result of armed conflict and by firearms in nonconflict areas. Moreover, extensive research has explored the causal connections between conventional arms proliferation and conflict, human rights, governance, and development in importing states.1
A handful of states export the vast majority of global legal conventional arms, but until recently these states have been subject to little external regulation regarding their export decisions.2 In the past, states have openly or clandestinely supported many conflicts and abusive regimes with arms supplies. Today, although states continue to face decisions about whether to supply arms to buyers who may use those arms to provoke conflict or harm civilians, new rules and norms have introduced human security to the political calculus of arms export decision making. These new “responsible” arms export norms fight against supplier states’ long-held national-security, foreign-policy, and economic interests. Nevertheless, most major democratic exporters in recent years have agreed to restrict their arms transfers to war-torn and repression-prone destinations—at least in theory.
In this book, I have explained why major arms-exporting democracies have committed to multilateral humanitarian export controls, despite their past opposition, and to what effect. First, I have argued that states’ social reputational concerns account for their commitment to the ATT and related multilateral initiatives. Second, I have attributed marginal changes in export practice, amid a persistent gap between states’ arms export policy and practice, to some governments’ concerns for their domestic reputations in the face of arms trade scandal. These findings have consequences for understanding—and possibly improving—conventional arms control and for the broader relationships between commitment and compliance in international affairs. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings of the book, explore their implications for IR theory beyond state reputation, and offer a brief analysis of three additional non-European arms exporters: Israel, South Africa, and Brazil. I end with a series of policy implications for ATT implementation and for how states collectively reconcile their conflicting interests and obligations in world politics more broadly.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The empirical findings suggest reasons for both pessimism and optimism for the prospects of conventional arms control. On the one hand, they demonstrate that past hostility to shared export policies has been replaced with a strong endorsement of them—at least on paper. The states once most resistant to “responsible” arms transfer standards are now among their biggest proponents. Major European exporters that once firmly opposed similar policies on economic grounds today vocally endorse new standards of export control, despite ongoing concerns for the viability of their defense industries. The United States is an exception in that it unilaterally (and temporarily) supported similar policies during the Cold War but was the leading opponent of recent initiatives until late 2009. On the other hand, the findings also reveal a glaring disconnect between states’ “responsible” policies and their often “irresponsible” practices. Accountability can be rare and may require the confluence of pro-control NGOs and arms trade transparency. Commitment can come without compliance: state behavior is hard to change.
The first part of the book assesses broad historical trends in conventional arms trade policy and practice and seeks to account for contemporary changes in international arms trade norms. It highlights the persistent failure during much of the twentieth century to achieve multilateral arms export controls, which were doomed by entrenched norms of sovereignty and the material stakes that major powers attach to their arms trade. Poor human rights records, I show, did not significantly deter arms exports in practice. It was the confluence of four key events in the 1990s, I argue, that created new expectations for interstate cooperation on policies intended to curb the detrimental effects of conventional arms proliferation: Arms to Iraq scandals following the 1991 Gulf War, high-profile civil and ethnic conflicts, the success of the 1997 Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, and the growing role of NGO advocacy in international affairs. These events resulted in a new and dramatically different normative environment for the arms trade, drawing attention to human security and putting in place the conditions to generate widespread support for new humanitarian initiatives.
Nevertheless, these new initiatives are costly for major exporters, limiting their foreign-policy autonomy and the available markets for their defense products. Standard explanations for states’ commitment to multilateral agreements rest on such costs being outweighed by anticipated material benefits or a sense of normative obligation. States may also support low-cost agreements that simply codify existing practice. These explanations therefore expect states’ practice to mirror their policy commitments. Yet statistical analyses examining the SALW and MCW export practices of top supplier states from 1981 to 2010 suggest otherwise. The results indicate that states for the most part have not significantly reduced arms exports in response to recipients’ poor human rights performance, either before or after the advent of their support for “responsible” arms export initiatives. And even as states’ policies have been closely scrutinized in international politics, they have largely escaped international condemnation for non-compliance. States have chosen to adopt and promote new policies despite the fact that these policies require far-reaching changes in their export practice. Yet it does not appear that states perceive a need to implement these policies in anticipation of material gains or to fulfill normative obligations. Explanations that can account for commitment without compliance are therefore needed.
The second part of the book delves more deeply into states’ motives for commitment and compliance using case studies of five major arms-exporting democracies: Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I show that these states have supported “responsible” arms transfer policies in spite of their own material interests, not because of them. Defense industry preferences have followed government support, not led it. Domestic publics have remained largely unaware or disinterested. With high material costs and little to no domestic incentives attached to new policies, what accounts for support from states that once opposed such initiatives? I argue that states’ social concerns for their international reputation—made possible by normative changes begun in the 1990s—instead play a prominent part in explaining their commitment to “responsible” arms export initiatives such as the EU Code of Conduct and the ATT.
Interviews with key players in the arms transfer policy-making process, government documents, and secondary literature demonstrate this concern for social reputation in international politics. The United Kingdom was an early mover, setting a new reference point for other now-supportive states, which have carefully chosen their policies as a means to improve their reputation as “good” citizens of the international community. States (and the diplomats who represent them) have sought to conform to social pressures brought on by the new international environment attached to arms trade norms. International institutions serve as sites of norm development as well as venues in which states engage in reputation-building behavior. Those states whose self-images are strongly tied to international institutions are more likely to respond to social pressures in the context of international institutions, seeking praise and social gain from their peers and avoiding censure for their arms export policies. In other words, reputation provides states with a social incentive to act, despite the material costs of doing so. Moreover, although its exceptionalism creates a more complex relationship with its international reputational concerns, the United States too has turned to support the ATT as a low-cost (given its own strong national export controls, unlike other top exporters) part of a strategy of reputation repair since 2009.3
Where domestic pressures can play a prominent role is in the policy implementation phase. Democratic governments that face both high arms trade transparency and an active pro-control NGO community may fear backlash from the public unveiling of their most “irresponsible” export deals. Although scandals rarely influence elections, they nevertheless draw attention to governments’ arms trade practices and harm their domestic reputations. Past scandals can also induce reforms that enhance transparency and mobilize civil society, increasing the threat of future scandal. Under these conditions—high transparency and pro-control NGO activity—governments can become sensitive to the threat of scandals in cases of deals that showcase the extreme violation of national values or international norms. Even so, this is a relatively small subset of cases in which governments may voluntarily seek to improve policy implementation relative to past behavior. States remain committed to bolstering national defense industries, and overall trends in arms export practice suggest that new norms are not yet broadly influencing state behavior.
A EUROPEAN PHENOMENON? OUTSIDE THE TOP FIVE
This book has focused on cases of top democratic arms exporters in order to examine state support of humanitarian arms control despite strong material incentives to maintain more liberal export policies—precisely what states had done in the past. However, these cases cannot explore whether state support and the reputational pressures I use to explain it are simply a European or Western phenomenon. I argue that although domestic culture and the forces of integration in the EU have made these dynamics stronger, they reach beyond the EU to other exporting democracies as well. A brief look at the politics of arms transfers in Israel, South Africa, and Brazil—democracies that have been late to develop their defense industrial bases but are now medium-size exporters—helps to demonstrate this point.
ISRAEL: CONCERN FOR INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION?
The Middle East and Asia are the only two regions without their own arms transfer control regimes. As a result, Israel—unlike European suppliers—has not been subject to an additional layer of regulatory and socializing pressures to adopt new arms export policies. Indeed, as both an importer and an exporter of conventional arms, Israel has resisted external controls.4 As an importer, it is intensely concerned about its ability to acquire arms because of its heightened military insecurity (Naaz 2000; Rodman 2007). As an exporter, it takes a market-based approach to arms transfers, often selling arms where other exporters will not (D. Clarke 1995). With hostile neighbors and potentially unreliable suppliers, it perceives an acute need to support the economic viability of its domestic arms industry through exports as a matter of national security (D. Clarke 1995; Naaz 2000). Moreover, a distinct lack of arms trade transparency and NGO activity has prevented any sustained attention to the issue in domestic politics. The government—to an even greater degree than most democracies—is free of reputational concerns attached to the perception of “irresponsible” arms export policy and practice at home.
However, Israel has not been free of reputational concerns in international politics. Despite its resistance to shared export controls and domestic disinterest in the issue, it has wanted to avoid being grouped with the “lowest common denominators” out of concern for its international reputation. In this way, Israel has used the United States as a reference point for its own policies. Its choice has not followed from a perceived need to coordinate and curry favor with the United States. Instead, Israel’s instructions to its diplomats for its 2006 ATT vote “were to do one better than the US” (interview 48207002). After 2001, it was clear that the United States would set the low bar for multilateral policy, a position that came with international condemnation and reputational costs. So when the United States voted against initiating the ATT process in 2006, Israel abstained.
In its 2007 ATT statement to the UN secretary-general, the Israeli government asserted that its abstention should be understood “as a call for prudence … rather than an objection to the application of a robust and responsible control of the sale and transfer of arms” (UN General Assembly 2007:16). It also stated that Israel “has, for many years, exercised strict control over arms exports through a comprehensive export control mechanism” (15). Like the other cases in the book, the government emphasizes that its policies are in tune with international standards—although many experts would disagree with such a characterization of Israeli arms trade policy and practice. Once the United States changed its vote to a “yes” in late 2009, Israel too joined the ranks of supporter states. It voted in favor of the final ATT in 2013 but has so far not signed it.
In short, Israel has chosen its policy in order to avoid sharing in the international criticism attracted by U.S. opposition. Although Israel is close to the United States and depends on it for substantial advanced weaponry (D. Clarke 1995; Rodman 2007), it nevertheless recognized the broader social costs of aligning with it on the issue. Israel may not have opted for reputation building through policy support, but it was strategic in evading the reputational damage associated with opposing the initiative. As such, the Israeli case highlights two important factors: first, international policy pressures at work in the absence of existing regional norms or policies and in the presence of strong military insecurities and, second, the extent to which the United States sets the standard of policies to avoid and detracts attention from those “less irresponsible” but still not “responsible” policies followed by nonsupportive states.
SOUTH AFRICA: CONCERN FOR DOMESTIC REPUTATION?
International reputational pressures have also likely helped South Africa transform from an early opponent of shared export controls during UNPOA negotiations to a firm ATT supporter as it seeks to legitimate its role in world politics.5 What South Africa contributes to the analysis more significantly, however, are its vivid domestic debates about arms trade practice.6 In the opening of the book, I described the angry protests that erupted in 2008 in response to the government’s decision (later reversed) to allow the transit of Chinese arms through South Africa to Zimbabwe. Despite an active network of NGOs, the incident demonstrated the government’s initial lack of sensitivity to arms scandals absent arms export transparency. It also showed the public’s intolerance of transfers—once revealed—that are perceived as “irresponsible” and contrary to South African values.
On the import side, the government has also faced ongoing scandal over allegations of widespread bribery connected to its 1999 Strategic Defence Procurement—known as “the arms deal”—with numerous European firms. Arms deal corruption charges against Jacob Zuma were dropped just prior to his election to the presidency in 2009. In 2011, Zuma suspended broader investigations into the matter but reversed his decision later that year after an activist brought suit against the government, “forcing it to revive the investigation on the grounds that it had failed to meet its constitutional obligation to fight corruption” (M. Cohen 2011). Media attention has sparked public interest and outrage regarding government accountability, leading to investigations into fresh revelations of corruption and political meddling in 2012 and 2013.
The domestic politics of arms transfers in South Africa complement those of Germany, with historical experience prompting general public and organized civil society concern about the human rights implications of arms exports. Unlike Germany, however, South Africa lacks the transparency to consistently advertise “irresponsible” deals. SAS (2007) counts South Africa among the least transparent small arms exporters. What information has been released in recent years has come too late to affect decision making and has been largely ignored by the media as “only of historical interest” (Lamb 2007).7 In turn, according to Laurie Nathan, “South Africa’s export of conventional armaments has been its foreign activity least consistent with stated policy,” which lays out a commitment to human rights on paper but has often turned a blind eye to them in practice (2005:371).8
South Africa has numerous organizations dedicated in part or in full to arms trade issues9 as well as religious and labor groups willing to monitor arms trade activity as they are able and a public willing to mobilize when opportunities arise. But because there are no regular sources of arms trade information, the government can more easily hide less palatable trading partners from critical eyes and reputational damage. Yet its ability to maintain arms trade secrecy may be crumbling as it is forced to address ghosts of arms deals past. And as it seeks a regional leadership role, attempts to cope with gun violence within its own borders and reputational costs of this policy–practice gap and legacy of corruption may grow.
BRAZIL: SEPARATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
Brazil developed its defense industrial base in the 1970s and 1980s. Although it is not a large exporter of MCW,10 it has become a key exporter of SALW in the past decade (SAS 2006). The Brazilian case is particularly instructive as a counterpoint to the United States. It shows that public support for civilian gun possession in domestic politics need not spill over into opposition to arms export controls in international politics. As in the United States, public debates in Brazil over questions of domestic arms control have been intense. Unlike in the United States, however, these debates have not been deployed in foreign-policy debates on conventional arms control. In fact, Brazil has been a strong supporter of “responsible” arms export policies in both regional and international fora.
Gun violence in Brazilian society is notorious (see SAS 2007). In response, Brazil proposed to outlaw commercial arms sales to civilians in 2005. One month prior to the referendum, polls suggested 73 percent favored the proposition, largely because of support from the federal government, the Catholic Church, and a major media conglomerate (Morton 2006). Yet although only a small fraction of the civilian population is thought to own guns, the proposition ultimately failed by a nearly two-to-one margin, primarily because of the intense campaign run by pro-gun groups in the three weeks prior to the election that caught pro-control groups off-guard (interviews 65209140, 66209140; Morton 2006). Clifford Bob (2012) describes a domestic election battle with international participants on both sides and pro-gun groups desperately seeking American resources (albeit without success). In the end, pro-gun groups won by mimicking NRA campaigns, designed to remind voters of their historic fight to overcome dictatorship and to stoke public anxiety about trust in government, human rights, and personal security.
The resounding failure of Brazil’s 2005 proposition was lauded as a global triumph by the NRA and used as a global call to arms against UN initiatives (Bob 2012:180). Even so, pro-gun groups in Brazil have not connected the debate about civilian possession to export policies.11 And although the government has not sought a leadership role on the ATT or on other UN initiatives (interview 66209140), its support for multilateral export controls has not been contested. Brazil sees its foreign policy as grounded in cooperation and compromise, soft power, and international law, connected to its identity as an intermediate power and mediator in regional and international politics (interview 65209140; Lafer 2000; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006). Brazil may also not have the luxury of shrugging off concern for its international reputation in the way the United States as a superpower can. Conforming to international expectations rather than publicly flouting them, Brazil voted in favor of successive ATT resolutions and signed the day it opened for signature in 2013.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The spread of “responsible” arms transfer standards presents IR theory with a difficult task. The gap between states’ policy and their practice casts doubt on explanations expecting commitment and compliance to go hand in hand. Ripe with potential costs to economic profits and military power and largely ignored by the public, “responsible” arms export controls are also unlikely to win domestic political gains or future profitable agreements. Weak implementation of new controls suggests that policy changes have not come about because of a deep internalization of new humanitarian standards, either. Even so, states’ eagerness to endorse such policies despite the material costs of doing so indicates changing policy expectations in a new normative environment. Explanations must therefore accommodate both states’ widespread commitment to popular new policies as well as their relatively consistent noncompliant arms trade practices. By understanding reputation as a social incentive, this book bridges rationalist and constructivist approaches to IR and provides additional theoretical insights for reputation and government accountability, norm diffusion and socialization, and regime formation.
REPUTATION IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
This book’s core argument is that states’ concern for social reputation in international fora explains their commitment to otherwise costly “responsible” arms transfer policies. In this case, reputation serves as a social incentive for states to choose policies that conform to international norms in public—even norms they have not internalized in private. In particular, where diplomats meet regularly to discuss specific issues, expectations for appropriate policies can be communicated and states’ policy choices easily observed. States may therefore choose their policies strategically as a means to preserve, enhance, or repair their reputations in the social context of international institutions. A good reputation can itself be a goal in international politics, bringing positive feedback on a state’s identity, or be sought out for other social benefits it can confer, such as legitimacy. Reputation as a social concept can extend beyond the arms trade to other issues, such as states’ commitment to climate change initiatives, human rights treaties, development, and humanitarian intervention. In turn, these social incentives can help explain the diffusion of new norms beyond their initial norm entrepreneurs.
In this context, the five case studies examined in this book highlight the importance of political leadership and ministries of foreign affairs in driving states’ social reputational concerns in international politics. In many states, arms export policy and its implementation are the responsibility of multiple government ministries (e.g., foreign affairs, commerce, defense, and perhaps others). Although ministries of finance and economics might be more invested in protecting states’ material interests with more liberal arms export policies, ministries of foreign affairs or high-level leaders typically take the lead when it comes to shaping and promoting states’ policies abroad. These actors interact frequently with diplomats and leaders from other states. Ministries of foreign affairs may also be charged explicitly with shaping the state’s image abroad through public diplomacy and related programs. As the state’s representatives in multilateral fora, these actors are often more in tune with changing international norms, more subject to international pressures for social conformity, and more deeply invested in maintaining a state’s reputation. They may therefore be more sensitive to appeals to “good international citizenship” to commit to such regimes as the ATT and to the reputational costs of opposing them.
The book also argues that domestic reputation can play a role in policy implementation and government accountability. The compliance literature typically looks to international politics to provide states with the incentives—whether material or nonmaterial, formal or informal—to comply with their policy commitments. Yet in some cases domestic politics may also motivate compliance, even when the international community lacks the tools and authority to monitor and enforce state practice. Although hard treaty law can broaden and formalize the domestic mechanisms available to facilitate compliance (Simmons 2009), the prospects of public backlash can also generate some compliance. Scandals impose domestic reputational costs by spotlighting severely “irresponsible” export deals and capturing intensely critical public attention.12 Scandal sensitivity, I argue, requires both information about a government’s arms export activity and an active civil society willing to call attention to “bad” export deals in domestic politics. Where governments perceive a high threat of scandal, they may exercise (comparatively) more restraint in their export practices. Even so, this dynamic may be rare and slow to develop.
Acknowledging reputation as a social concept opens the door to consider states’ acceptance of new norms without the internalization of those norms. States can be concerned with the public appearance of social conformity, but the private acceptance and “taken-for-granted” status of norms may take more time to emerge, if they do at all. As a result, when states’ policies are highly visible but their practices are not, commitment can more easily come without compliance. In this way, states may strategically respond to changes in the international normative environment out of concern for the social consequences of reputation in the present, despite the potential material costs of doing so in the future. Yet if their compliance remains limited, further questions arise for the processes of socialization and regime formation.
NORM DIFFUSION AND SOCIALIZATION
Although arms trade accountability has been left in the hands of civil society, international institutions have two integral roles in the diffusion of “responsible” arms trade norms. First, they provide formal settings in which states face social pressures to commit to new policies as diplomats interact and behavioral expectations evolve over time. In the case of arms transfers, domestic political pressures in most states cannot do the same. Unlike the landmine campaign, which benefited from popular and interest-group support, “responsible” arms transfers have faced an inattentive public and an initially hostile or reluctant defense industry. Rather, it has been in the context of international institutions that commitment pressures have increased and caused states to rethink their policies. Second, states’ support for multilateral initiatives can make rhetorical entrapment13 a viable means to promote government accountability. Support for agreements makes explicit states’ commitment to certain values and norms. In doing so, agreements—whether they are legally binding or not—make incidents of hypocrisy easier for domestic NGOs and the media to spot and spotlight. Both the policy commitment itself and the publicity of that commitment in international institutions enable accountability and concern for reputation to begin to emerge in domestic politics.
So far, however, international institutions have not generated a significant sense of social obligation among states to comply with the norms these institutions articulate. State practice has proven difficult to change, suggesting that norm internalization will be a slow and uncertain process. Defense industry interests, a multitude of bureaucratic interests involved in arms export decision making, and a general lack of public attention reduce material and social incentives to institute broad changes in practice. At times, these factors may even work against deeper socialization. Norm diffusion has been rapid and widespread. But although norm emergence has been highly successful in the short term, scholars, policy makers, and activists must all take a long-term view of how “responsible” arms trade norms will evolve and take hold over time. Norm internalization is not inevitable; it will take concerted effort and attention from governments and civil society alike.
Nevertheless, social obligation does win out over material interests as states weigh whether to commit to popular policies. Indeed, it lays the foundation for states’ reputational concerns linked to their legitimacy and standing in international politics. In contrast, where shared social obligations to commit to policies are absent, reputation fades as a motivation for policy support. This is possible where a state is less dependent on international institutions and “good international citizenship” to define its role in the international community. As the U.S. case illustrates, a hard-power-oriented hegemon may see itself as above or exempt from international social obligations.14 Yet it may also face greater public scrutiny of its willingness and ability to meet its obligations. The resulting gap between a hegemon’s material power and the social foundations of its ability to exercise that power can generate a deep crisis of legitimacy and authority (Reus-Smit 2007). Research finds that U.S. reputation—and with that reputation, its standing, credibility, and legitimacy—took a hit from its widespread opposition to multilateral initiatives throughout much of the 2000s (American Political Science Association 2009; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009). In response, the United States attempted to engage in reputation repair and reshape its international leadership role, with potential consequences for the structure and content of global governance for years to come.
REGIME FORMATION
U.S. treatment of international law also has consequences for regime formation and norm diffusion. International regimes may form more readily under the leadership of a hegemon able to coax (or coerce) others to join and continue to cooperate over time (Keohane 1984). When the hegemon is uninterested in or actively opposes cooperation, the prospects for regime formation are uncertain. Some scholars cast grave doubt on regime creation without a willing hegemon acting in its own material interest to facilitate interstate cooperation (Krasner 1983). Others counter that the landmine treaty formed in the hands of middle-power leadership and succeeded without bending to U.S. preferences. In the case of “responsible” arms export controls, U.S. opposition until late 2009 both helped and hindered regime formation and norm diffusion.
Certainly, the absence of one of the most powerful players in the creation of an international regime might cast doubt on that regime’s legitimacy (Franck 1990), and opposition from any state will stall cooperation when institutional rules require consensus. Lead states and NGOs have made a particular effort to accommodate U.S. “red lines,” hoping to create a treaty that covers a significant portion of the global arms trade by including the United States. In doing so, they simultaneously increase the final product’s legitimacy but weaken its contents.15 Yet despite initial U.S. opposition and in part because of U.S. opposition, lead states were able to initiate the process to form a legally binding regime. In fact, when the hegemon’s reputation is damaged, its opposition may not be wholly detrimental to regime formation. The opportunity to “look better” than (or not as bad as) the United States has helped garner support for (and lessen opposition to) shared arms transfer controls. The negative perception of a hegemon by a majority of states for eschewing its social obligations may therefore provide an opportunity for others to advance their social standing by behaving “better” than the most prominent objector.
Although the ATT process was pushed forward by U.S. opposition, it nevertheless entered a holding pattern without U.S. support—or at least had to decide how to move forward without U.S. support. This suggests that the conditions under which regime formation may occur and the outcome itself may still be circumscribed in the face of hegemonic opposition. Leaders reduced the scope of the ATT—by excluding regulations on transfers to nonstate actors, ammunition, and civilian possession—simply to keep the U.S. engaged in the process and in hopes of its eventually coming on board. And even as U.S. support in late 2009 catalyzed formal negotiations, behind the scenes the United States sought to maintain the more limited treaty scope and create some wiggle room in the language of treaty obligations.
The strength of changed expectations for “responsible” policy choices may affect lead states’ ability to rally a critical mass of supporters in addition to the hegemon’s reputation. When consensus over norms becomes more widely diffused through regional initiatives and UN discussions,16 these conditions can work together to the regime leaders’ advantage: the hegemon’s reputation will visibly suffer as a result of its opposition, and other states will perceive greater social obligations and reputational consequences linked to their own policy choices. The social pressures to cooperate therefore may be strong even when the hegemon does not contribute to them. If the spread of new norms becomes truncated, however, lead states may have difficulty inspiring cooperation in the absence of hegemonic support.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In October 2009, the United States announced its support for the ATT initiative as long as the process remained ruled by inclusion and consensus. This announcement was game changing. Rather than indefinite working groups to keep the process alive as leaders considered how best to move forward without the support of the world’s largest arms exporter, formal treaty negotiations were scheduled for 2012. In 2013, with U.S. support, the UN voted by wide margins to approve the final ATT, which will go into effect after the fiftieth state deposits its instrument of ratification on December 24, 2014. As lead states and NGOs now consider how to move from negotiation to implementation, the empirical and theoretical findings of this research carry important implications for legalizing “responsible” arms export controls and similar policy initiatives in the future.
First, how will the ATT achieve substantive behavioral change among major exporters? This question looms large and ultimately affects the treaty’s ability to reduce the lives lost and human insecurity generated by “irresponsible” arms proliferation. As I have shown, arms trade practice is slow to change, and the ATT secretariat will have no enforcement authority. Article 14, the treaty’s sole formal enforcement provision states, “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that implement the provisions of this Treaty.” Much as before, enforcement must therefore fall to domestic politics. Indeed, the ATT’s preamble explicitly recognizes “the voluntary and active role that civil society … can play in raising awareness of the object and purpose of this Treaty, and in supporting its implementation.”17
Yet compliance that relies on electoral accountability will be limited even in established democracies. Because the ATT is a legally binding document, domestic courts may formally enforce its provisions and provide additional incentives for compliance (Simmons 2009). This method of enforcement may nevertheless rely on the spread of NGOs as agents of government accountability and arms trade transparency if it is to become an effective path to compliance. It may require financial support from the international community as well as training in ATT provisions, export reporting, and export policy. Lead states and NGOs may also need to nurture domestic NGOs elsewhere so that they are able to engage with government decision makers and national judicial systems on the issue. But even where these conditions are present, consistent and sustained compliance will likely still be difficult and will require both domestic efforts to raise awareness and international efforts to consolidate the interpretation of new standards over time.
Second, initiative leaders must continue to consider how to bring skeptical states on board—especially major arms exporters, such as Russia and China. Understanding the nature of their interests and their perceptions of their roles in the international community may help in doing so. For Russia, reputational pressures may be insufficient. Widespread international criticism over its arms transfers to the Assad regime have been ignored and perhaps may even have strengthened its resolve. Arms exports are seen as vital to its struggling economy. Emphasizing an ability to engage in technology sharing and coproduction—and with them, access to more profitable arms markets—as a benefit of common export controls may be more effective in Russia’s case. Conversely, China may respond better to reputational arguments as it seeks social standing, validation, and integration into the international community (Johnston 2008; M. Miller 2013). Indeed, its role in the final ATT negotiations was said to be more constructive than expected, thanks largely to its increasing engagement with supportive African governments.
Finally, continued U.S. participation seems uncertain at best. Its domestic political climate all but ensures that Senate ATT ratification will be impossible for the foreseeable future. Divisive partisan politics and NRA influence in Congress suggest that arguments emphasizing that the ATT will not impose any additional restrictions beyond current U.S. policy will be largely ineffective. Regardless, the eventual inclusion of all top exporters will be necessary to create a regime able to restrict arms flows to problematic areas. If this does not occur through formal treaty signature and ratification, perhaps eventual informal adherence to ATT provisions, as the United States has largely done with the Ottawa Treaty, will lead to changes in the absence of formal legal obligations. For this scenario to be plausible, however, arms trade norms will have to be greatly strengthened. Work by civil society groups can attempt to increase public awareness and interest to enhance accountability, but this work can be difficult and unreliable, especially given other pressing domestic concerns and the complexity of the issue itself. Clarifying international expectations and boosting material and nonmaterial international pressures may also be essential in the long run.
Ambitious policies are an important start, but without the means to expose and punish noncompliance, they do little more than enhance states’ reputations without improving human rights and conflict conditions on the ground in recipient states, as ostensibly intended. Adherence to “responsible” arms export norms has so far been weak, even within longer-established regimes such as the EU Code of Conduct. This weak adherence raises serious questions for the ATT and beyond. How can international institutions, state policy makers, and civil society effectively persuade, inspire, coerce, or cajole states to meet their human security obligations in world politics? The evidence here suggests that the ATT faces a hard road ahead and that reliance on domestic accountability may not be sufficient. The norm life cycle does not guarantee that new norms will reach the widespread internalization phase. Keeping compliance in the public eye and ensuring that the social and material costs of noncompliance are clear and certain will require hard work from both the international community and domestic actors.
The “last area of freedom” in arms control is no longer as free as it once was. Rules and norms of small and major conventional arms transfer controls are proliferating. Joining prohibitions on the production and use of “inhumane” and nuclear weapons, conventional arms regulations complete a spectrum of weapons regimes ranging from the protection of individuals’ human security to the protection of states’ military security. Certainly, compliance on the conventional arms front leaves much to be desired. But the success of new initiatives to set global legally binding standards based on humanitarian principles to govern the conduct of the conventional arms trade is unprecedented in both its reach and its achievements to date.
The role of conventional arms transfers in world politics has clearly shifted in line with changing foreign- and security-policy priorities and practices in the post–Cold War era. This trend may not be irreversible, however. Countermovements associated with the war on terror and new austerity measures indicate that states may be adopting a renewed security and economic mentality with respect to arms transfers. Without further developments to improve government accountability, the policy–practice gap on the arms trade could widen even as major exporters express their support for more “responsible” policies. Reputation can help to explain states’ seemingly contradictory behavior, but it can go only so far in reconciling those contradictions in practice.
States’ concern for reputation links normative shifts in the international community to strategic policy choices intended to serve state interests—in the case of arms trade, interests that are defined not only by material goals but also by social goals in international politics. Acknowledging reputation as a strategic and social concern may also provide insights into states’ behavior elsewhere. For example, reputation may help to explain how donor states choose to dedicate and disperse international aid. States may also perceive reputational incentives to support popular multilateral initiatives, such as climate change or human rights, despite potential material costs. Clearly, some states do internalize the rules and norms they publicly endorse. Many others, however, adopt the accepted line in public but not in private, especially where monitoring is poor. Reputation attached to states’ international legitimacy and standing helps explain such discrepancies and states’ desire to keep up with expectations for “good” or “responsible” policies, even if their private preferences remain otherwise unchanged.
At the intersection of states’ material interests and social obligations, conventional arms export controls present policy makers with an especially complex and sensitive task. Small and major conventional arms are the basic building blocks of states’ security. At the same time, many see small arms as the “real weapons of mass destruction,” killing millions of people each year. On paper, conventional arms transfers have become a tool by which exporters can promote international humanitarian and human rights norms. Yet the gap between states’ policy commitments and their less-restrictive practices has gone largely unaddressed in international discussions. Instead, domestic political actors in some cases have sought to constrain states’ arms transfers. As ATT signatories prepare for implementation, however, tough questions about monitoring and enforcement remain. Answering these questions will depend on the signatories’ ability to strike a balance between states’ continued notions of sovereignty and security attached to their arms trade and their evolving ideas of what it means to be “responsible” citizens in the international community. This task will not be easy, but its outcome will have profound consequences for security and human rights around the world.