CHAPTER 13

Often the minds of perfect men have grown perplexed over the question of what is the final end of that which exists. Now I will explain that in all schools this question is abolished. I say then that in the case of every agent who acts with a purpose, the thing he has done must necessarily have some end with a view to which it has been done. According to philosophic speculation, this is clear and is not in need of demonstration. It is also clear that a thing that has been done in this way with a purpose must have been produced in time after [22b] not having existed. Among the things that are clear also belongs the fact, and this fact universally admitted, that He whose existence is necessary, who has never and will never be nonexistent, does not need an agent, as we have already made clear.¹ And as He has not been made,² no question as to the final end arises with reference to Him. For this reason, one does not ask: What is the final end of the existence of the Creator, may He be exalted?; for He is not a created thing. Through these premises it has become clear that a final end can only be sought with regard to all things produced in time that have been made through the purpose of an intelligent being. I mean to say that with regard to that which has its beginning in an intellect,3 one necessarily must seek to find out what its final cause is. On the other hand, one must not, as we have said, seek the final end of what has not been produced in time. After this preamble, you should know that the final end of all that exists ought not to be sought — neither according to our opinion who assert that the world has been produced in time nor according to the opinion of Aristotle who holds that the world is eternal. For according to his opinion as to the eternity of the world, no ultimate end should be sought for any part of the world. For according to his opinion, it is not permitted to ask: What is the final end of the existence of the heavens, and why have they such and such dimensions and such and such numbers? or: Why is matter as it is? or: What is the final end of this particular species of animals or of plants? For all things derive, according to him, from an eternal necessity that has never ceased and will never cease. Though natural science seeks to find out the final end of every natural being, that end is not the ultimate end of which we treat in this chapter. For it is manifest, according to natural science, that every natural existent must necessarily have a final end; but that final cause, which is the noblest among the four causes, is hidden as far as the majority of species are concerned. Aristotle constantly states in an explicit way that nature does nothing [23a] in vain, meaning thereby that every natural act has a certain final end. Aristotle also states in express terms that the plants have been created for the sake of the animals.⁴ Similarly he explains with regard to certain beings that some exist for the sake of others; he does this in particular with regard to the limbs of animals.⁵

Know that the existence of this final end in natural things has of necessity led the philosophers to a belief in a principle other than nature; namely, the one that Aristotle calls the intellectual or divine principle, that being the one that makes one thing for the sake of another. Know too that to the mind of an equitable man, one of the strongest proofs for the production of the world in time is the fact, demonstrated with reference to natural beings, that every one of these has a certain final end, some of them existing for the sake of others; for this is a proof of purpose on the part of a being possessing purpose. And purpose can only be conceived with reference to the production in time of something so produced.

I shall return to the subject of this chapter, namely, to the discussion of final end. I say then: Aristotle has made it clear that in natural things the agent,6 the form, and the final end, are one and the same thing; I mean to say that they are one and the same thing in species. For, to take an example, the form of Zayd is the agent producing the form of the individual ʿUmar, who is his son; the thing it does is to give to ʿUmar’s matter a form pertaining to its species, the final end of ʿUmar consisting in his having a human form. According to him, this is the case with regard to all individuals belonging to natural species, which are in need of reproduction; for in these, the three causes⁷ belong to one species. However, all of this refers but to the first finality.⁸ Regarding the ultimate finality of every species, all those who discourse on nature deem that it is indispensable, but that it is very difficult to know; all the more is this so of the finality of what exists as a whole. What appears to result from the discourse of Aristotle is that, [23b] according to him, the ultimate finality of these species consists in the permanence of coming-to-be and passing-away, which is⁹ indispensable for the continuance of coming-to-be in this inferior matter, since it is impossible that the individuals composed out of it should endure. Still, the end that can be generated, I mean the most perfect thing that is possible, is generated from it. For the ultimate purpose consists in bringing about perfection. And it is manifest that the most perfect thing, whose existence out of this matter is possible, is man; he is the last and the most perfect of these compounds. Accordingly even if it is said that all sublunar beings exist for his sake,¹⁰ that would be true from this point of view; I mean because the movement of changeable things exists for the sake of coming-to-be in order that what is as perfect as it is possible to be should come about. Aristotle ought not to be asked concerning the finality of man’s existence, seeing that he holds the doctrine affirming the eternity of the world. For, according to him, the first finality for every individual produced in time consists in the perfection of the form of the species. Consequently every individual in whom the acts necessarily deriving from that form are perfected, has achieved its finality perfectly and completely. The ultimate finality of the species is the permanence of this form through the continuance of generation and corruption so that there should always be a new process of generation in which the greatest possible perfection is sought. It is accordingly clear that, according to the doctrine of eternity, the question of ultimate finality for being as a whole does not arise.

On the other hand, it is sometimes thought that, according to our opinion and our doctrine of the production in time of the world as a whole after nonexistence, this question is obligatory — I mean that it is obligatory to seek out the finality of all that exists. It is likewise thought that the finality of all that exists is solely the existence of the human species so that it should worship God, and that all that has been made has been made for it alone so that even the heavenly spheres only revolve in order to be useful to it and to bring into existence [24a] that which is necessary for it. Some passages in the books of the prophets, if taken according to their external sense, give strong support to this thought. Thus: He formed it to be inhabited;11 If My covenant had not been with day and night, I would not have appointed the statutes of heaven and earth;¹² And spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in.¹³ Now if the spheres exist for the sake of man, all the more is this the case for all the species of animals and of plants. However, if this opinion is carefully examined, as opinions ought to be carefully examined by intelligent men, the flaw in it becomes clear. This result is achieved through posing to him who believes this opinion the following question: The final end being the existence of man, is the Creator able to bring him into existence without all these preliminaries, or was it possible for him to be brought into existence only after they were carried out? If someone answers that this is possible and that, for instance, God was able to bring man into existence without there being a heaven, the following question may be posed. What is the utility for him¹⁴ of all these things, which are in themselves not the final end, but exist for the sake of a thing that could have existed without all of them? Even if the universe¹⁵ exists for the sake of man, and the final end of man is, as has been said, to worship God, a question remains to be asked regarding the final end of his worship. For He, may He be exalted, would not acquire greater perfection if He were worshipped by all that He has created and were truly apprehended by them, nor would He be attained by a deficiency if nothing whatever existed except Him. If the answer is given that this is not with a view to His perfection, but to our perfection, for that is the most excellent thing for us — namely, our perfection — the same question follows necessarily: namely, what is the final end of our existence with that perfection? Necessarily and obligatorily the argument must end with the answer being given that the final end is: God has wished it so, or: His wisdom has required this to be so. And this is the correct answer. Accordingly you will find that the Sages of Israel have inserted into the text of their prayers:¹⁶ Thou hast set man apart from the beginning and acknowledged him [24b] that he should stand before Thee. Yet who shall say unto Thee, What dost Thou? and if he be righteous, what boon is this to Thee? Thus they have explicitly stated that there does not exist a final end, but only the Will alone.¹⁷ Now this being so and, in addition, given the belief in the production of the world in time — thus making it indispensable for us to say that what exists, its causes, and its effects, could be different from what they are — an incongruity follows necessarily with reference to the existence of everything brought into existence except man. It follows, namely, that all the beings in question have been brought into existence without any final end at all, inasmuch as the only purposed final end, namely, man, could have existed without all of them.

For this reason, to my mind, the correct view according to the beliefs of the Law — a view that corresponds likewise to the speculative views — is as follows: It should not be believed that all the beings exist for the sake of the existence of man. On the contrary, all the other beings too have been intended for their own sakes and not for the sake of something else. Thus even according to our view holding that the world has been produced in time, the quest for the final end of all the species of beings collapses. For we say that in virtue of His will He has brought into existence all the parts of the world, some of which have been intended for their own sakes, whereas others have been intended for the sake of some other thing that is intended for its own sake. Just as He has willed that the human species should come to exist, He also has willed that the spheres and their stars should come to exist; and He also has willed that the angels should come to exist. In respect to every being He intended that being itself; and whenever the existence of some thing was impossible unless it was preceded by some other thing, He first brought that thing into existence — as in the case of the senses, which precede reason.

This view too has been expressed in the prophetic books. Thus it says: The Lord hath made everything lamaʿanehu [for His sake or for its sake],18 where the third person¹⁹ may refer to the complement.²⁰ If, however, it refers to the subject, the interpretation of the word²¹ would be: for the sake of His essence, may He be exalted — that is, [25a] for the sake of His will, as the latter is His essence, according to what has been made clear in this Treatise.22 We have already explained that His essence is also called His glory, as in its saying: Show me, I pray Thee, Thy glory.²³ Thus his saying here, The Lord hath made everything lamaʿanehu [for His sake], would be like saying: Everyone that is called by My name, and whom I have created for My glory, I have formed him, yea, I have made him.²⁴ It says that everything whose making is ascribed to Me,²⁵ has been made by Me solely because of My will. The expression, I have formed him, yea, I have made him, refers to what I have explained to you, namely, to the fact that there are beings whose existence is only possible after that of something else. Thus He might say: I have created that first thing, as for instance matter, which must indispensably have come prior to everything material. Then I made in that thing which came first or after it that which I intended to bring into existence, without there being anything²⁶ except will alone.

If you consider that book which guides all those who seek guidance toward what is correct and therefore is called Torah,²⁷ the notion that we have in view will become manifest to you from the commencement of the Account of the Beginning²⁸ till the end. For with reference to none of them²⁹ is the statement made in any way that it exists for the sake of some other thing. He only says that He brought every part of the world into existence and that its existence conformed to its purpose. This is the meaning of his saying: And God saw that it was good [tob].³⁰ For you know what we have explained with regard to their saying: The Torah speaketh in the language of the sons of man.³¹ And good [tob] is an expression applied by us to what conforms to our purpose. About the whole,³² it says: And God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good [tob meʿod].³³ For the production in time of everything that was produced conformed to its purpose, and nothing went wrong. And that is the meaning of the expression: very [meʿod]; for sometimes a thing is good and conforms for a time to our purpose, whereas afterwards the goal is missed. Accordingly it gives the information that all the things made, conformed to [25b] His intention and purpose and that they continued without ceasing to correspond to what was intended with regard to them. Be not misled by its saying with regard to the stars, To give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night,34 so that you think that it means: in order that they should do this.³⁵ It is merely information about their nature, which He willed to create thus — I mean to say, giving light and ruling. Similarly it says of man, And have dominion over the fish of the sea, and so on,³⁶ which dictum does not mean that man was created for the sake of this, but merely gives information about man’s nature with which He, may He be exalted, has stamped him. As for its saying with regard to the plants³⁷ — namely, that they are given over to the Adamites and the other animals — Aristotle³⁸ and others have made explicit statements about this; and it is manifest that plants were brought into existence only for the sake of the animals, for these must of necessity be nourished. However, this does not apply to the stars; I mean to say that they do not exist for our sake and so that good should come to us from them. For, as we have made clear, its dictum, to give light and to rule, merely gives information about the utility of what comes from them and overflows toward that which is below, according to what I have made clear to you concerning the nature of the constant overflow of the good from one thing toward another. As far as what is reached by the good that is always coming is concerned, it may seem that what receives the benefit is the final end of the thing that caused its good and its liberality to overflow toward it. Thus an individual from among the people of a city might think that the final end of the ruler consists in safeguarding his³⁹ house at night against robbers. And this is true from a certain point of view. For since his house is safeguarded and this benefit comes to him because of the ruler, the matter looks as if the final end of the ruler were the safeguarding of the house of that individual. We must interpret in this sense every text whose external sense we find indicates that something sublime has been made for the sake of something inferior to it; this text means that this act follows necessarily from the nature of the sublime.

Thus we are obliged [26a] to believe that all that exists was intended by Him, may He be exalted, according to His volition. And we shall seek for it no cause or other final end whatever. Just as we do not seek for the end of His existence, may He be exalted, so do we not seek for the final end of His volition, according to which all that has been and will be produced in time comes into being as it is. Hence be not misled in your soul to think that the spheres and the angels have been brought into existence for our sake. For it has explained to us what we are worth: Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket.40 Consider accordingly your substance and that of the spheres, the stars, and the separate intellects; then the truth will become manifest to you, and you will know that man and nothing else is the most perfect and the most noble thing that has been generated from this [inferior] matter; but that if his being is compared to that of the spheres and all the more to that of the separate beings, it is very, very contemptible. Accordingly it says: Behold, He putteth no trust in His servants, and His angels He chargeth with deficiency [tahalah]. How much less in them that dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust!⁴¹ Know that His servants that are referred to in this verse do not belong at all to the human species; this is proven by its saying: How much less in them that dwell in houses of clay whose foundation is in the dust! But His servants mentioned in this verse are the angels. Similarly also, His angels referred to in this verse are indubitably the spheres. The same notion is made clear and repeated by Eliphaz himself in different terms and in another text, saying: Behold, He putteth no trust in His holy ones; yea, the heavens are not clean in His sight. How much less one that is abominable and impure, man [ish] who drinketh iniquity [ʿavlah] like water!⁴²

Thus it is made clear that His holy ones are identical with His servants and that they do not belong to the human species. His angels, which are referred to in this verse, are the heavens. And the word deficiency [tahalah] means the same thing as are not clean in His sight. I refer to their being endowed with matter. And though they have [26b] the purest and most luminous matter, it is — if compared to the separate intellects — obscure, dark, and not clear. As for its saying regarding the angels, Behold, He putteth no trust in His servants, it means that they have no trustworthy existence. For, according to our opinion, they are made; according to the opinion of those who profess the doctrine of the eternity of the world, they are caused. And their part in existence is not trustworthy or fixed if compared with Him, may He be exalted, the absolutely necessary being. The words, How much less one that is abominable and impure, correspond to the words, How much less in them that dwell in houses of clay. It is as if it said: How much less one that is abominable and impure, the human being [ha-adam] with whom obliquity43 is mingled, spread, as it is, through all his members. I mean to say that privation is his concomitant. ʿAvlah means iniquity: In the land of uprightness will he deal iniquitously [yeʿavvel].⁴⁴ Its saying ish [man]⁴⁵ is like its saying adam [human being]; for sometimes the human species is called ish [man]: He that smiteth a man [ish], so that he dieth.⁴⁶

This is what one ought to believe. For when man knows his own soul, makes no mistakes with regard to it, and understands every being according to what it is, he becomes calm and his thoughts are not troubled by seeking a final end for what has not that final end; or by seeking any final end for what has no final end except its own existence, which depends on the divine will — if you prefer you can also say: on the divine wisdom.