CHAPTER 25
The actions are divided with regard to their ends into four classes: futile actions, frivolous actions, vain actions, or good and excellent actions. The action that is called vain is that by which its agent aims at some end and that end is not achieved, its achievement being hindered by obstacles. You can often hear people saying: “I tired myself in vain,” on an occasion when he tired himself in seeking an individual without finding him, or when he tired himself in the course of a journey without obtaining a profit in trade. It is also said: “Our effort with this sick man was vain,” when health is not obtained. The same holds for all actions in which ends are sought, and those ends are not achieved. A futile action is that action by which no end is aimed at at all, as when some people play with their hands while thinking and as the actions of the negligent and the inattentive. A frivolous action is that action by which a low end is aimed at; I mean to say that something unnecessary and not very useful is aimed at therein, as when one dances not for exercise or as when one does things in order to make people laugh about those things. Such actions are indubitably called frivolous, but they differ according to the purposes [55a] and the perfection of the agents. For there are many things that are necessary or very useful according to some people, whereas according to others they are not at all needed; as is the case with regard to the different kinds of bodily exercise, which are necessary for the preservation of health according to the prescriptions of those who know the art of medicine, and as is the case with regard to writing, which is very useful according to the men of knowledge. Thus those who accomplish acts exercising their body in the wish to be healthy, engaging in ball games, wrestling, boxing, and suspension of breathing, or those who engage in actions that are done with a view to writing, as for instance the cutting of reed pens and the making of paper, are in the opinion of the ignorant engaged in frivolous actions, whereas they are not frivolous according to the learned. The good and excellent action is that accomplished by an agent aiming at a noble end, I mean one that is necessary or useful, and achieves that end. This is a division against which, as it seems to me, no objection can be made at any point. For one who accomplishes a certain action in all cases either aims or does not aim thereby at some end. Again an end aimed at is in all cases either noble or low, and is either achieved or not. And this is what is necessarily required by the division.
After having explained this, I shall say: A man endowed with intellect is incapable of saying that any action of God is vain, futile, or frivolous. According to our opinion — that is, that of all of us who follow the Law of Moses our Master — all His actions are good and excellent. He says: And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good.1 Consequently everything that He, may He be exalted, has done for the sake of a thing is necessary for the existence of the thing aimed at or is very useful. For instance, the nourishment of a living being is necessary for its preservation, and the existence of its two eyes [55b] is very useful for its preservation. In fact nourishment is exclusively intended to preserve the living being alive for a certain time, and the senses are exclusively intended with a view to the utility of the sensorial apprehensions for the living being. The philosophic opinion is similar, holding as it does that in all natural things there is nothing that may be described as futile; I mean to say that everything that is not artificial consists in actions through which some end is sought, regardless of whether we do or do not know that end.
As for that sect among the people of speculation that holds that God does not do a thing because of another and that there are no causes and no effects, but that all His actions correspond to His will so that one should not seek an end for them or say: Why did He do this? as He does what He wills, and as this2 is not consequent upon wisdom — the actions of God are considered by these people as falling under the class of the futile or held to be even inferior to futile actions. For someone performing a futile action does not aim at an end and is careless of what he does; whereas God, according to these people, knows and intends what He does, but does it without any end whatsoever or without any utility.
That anything among His actions, may He be exalted, should be frivolous is impossible, as is manifest as soon as one thinks of it. No attention should be paid to the ravings of those who deem that the ape was created in order that man should laugh at it. What led to all this was ignorance of the nature of coming-to-be and passing-away and neglect of the fundamental principle: namely, that the entire purpose consists in bringing into existence the way you see it everything whose existence is possible; for His wisdom did not require in any way that it should be otherwise; for this is impossible, since matters take their course in accordance with what His wisdom requires.
As for those who say that no end is intended in any of the acts of God, they were led [56a] to this by necessity, namely, by considering the totality of what exists in accordance with their opinion. For they say: What is the end of the existence of the world as a whole? Hence they assert of necessity what everyone asserts who maintains that the world was created in time: He willed it so, there being no other cause. Thereupon they proceed to apply this assertion to all the particular things in the world. They go so far as not to concede that the hole in the uvea and the transparency of the cornea exist for the sake of letting the visual spirit pass so that it might apprehend, and do not even regard this at all as a cause of sight. According to them it was not for the sake of sight that this membrane was perforated and the one above it made transparent, but He willed it so, even though sight would be possible if things were otherwise. We have some texts whose external sense might be fancied to suggest this meaning at the first glance. For instance his saying: Whatsoever the Lord willed, that hath He done, and so on;3 and for instance his saying: And what His soul desireth, even that He doeth;4 and for instance his saying: And who may say unto him, What doest thou?5 The meaning of these texts and of others of the same kind is that the things willed by God are necessarily accomplished, there being no obstacle to hinder the carrying-out of His volition; but that He, may He be exalted, wills only what is possible, and not everything that is possible, but only that which is required by His wisdom to be such. Similarly no obstacle intervenes between Him, may He be exalted, and the exceedingly excellent action that He wishes to accomplish, and nothing can hinder it. This is the opinion of all those that adhere to the Law and also the opinion of the philosophers, and it is also our own opinion. For while we believe that the world has been produced in time, none of our scholars and none of our men of knowledge believe that this came about through the will and nothing else. For they say that His wisdom, may He be exalted — the apprehension of which is beyond us — obligatorily necessitated the existence of this world as a whole at the moment when it came into existence, and that [56b] the selfsame immutable wisdom necessitated nonexistence before the world came into existence. You will find this notion frequently repeated by the Sages when they interpret the verse:6 He hath made every thing beautiful in its time.7 All this was meant to avoid that which should be avoided: namely, the thought that the agent8 may accomplish an act whereby he does not aim at any end at all. Such is the belief of the multitude of the men of knowledge in our Law, and this was explicitly stated by our prophets: namely, that the particulars of natural acts are all well arranged and ordered and bound up with one another, all of them being causes and effects; and that none of them is futile or frivolous or vain, being acts of perfect wisdom, as it says: How manifold are Thy works, O Lord! In wisdom hast Thou made them all.9 And it is said: And all His works are done in faithfulness.10 And it is said: The Lord by wisdom founded the earth, and so on.11 This opinion occurs frequently; and the opposite ought not to be believed. Philosophic speculation similarly requires that there should not be anything futile, frivolous, or vain in all the acts of nature, and all the more in the nature of the spheres, for they are better arranged and ordered because of the nobility of their matter.
Know that the majority of the false imaginings that call forth perplexity in the quest for the end of the existence of the world as a whole or the end of every part of it have as their root an error of man about himself and his imagining that all that exists exists because of himself alone, as well as ignorance of the nature of inferior matter and ignorance of what is primarily intended — namely, the bringing into being of everything whose existence is possible, existence being indubitably a good. It is because of this error and of the ignorance of these two notions that the doubts and the perplexity arise, so that some of God’s actions are imagined to be frivolous, others futile, and others vain. Know that those who [57a] put up with this incongruity so that His acts, may He be exalted, became in their opinion like futile acts that aim at no end at all, abhorred making His acts consequent upon wisdom in order that this should not pass into the assertion maintaining the eternity of the world; accordingly they shut the door upon this opinion. However, I have already made known to you the opinion of our Law about this and the fact that this opinion ought to be believed. For there is no incongruity in our saying that the existence and nonexistence of all these acts are consequent upon His wisdom, may He be exalted; we, however, are ignorant of many of the ways in which wisdom is found in His works. It is upon this opinion that the whole of the Torah of Moses our Master is founded; it opens with it: And God saw every thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good;12 and it concludes with it: The Rock, His work is perfect, and so on.13 Know this. If you consider this opinion and the philosophic opinion, reflecting upon all the preceding chapters in this Treatise that are connected with this notion, you will not find any difference between them regarding any of the particulars of everything that exists.14 You will find no difference other than that which we have explained: namely, that they regard the world as eternal and we regard it as produced in time. Understand this.