Sarvajñātman (ca. 900 C.E.), a disciple of Sureśvara, is associated primarily with the Vivara a school. He argued for “reflexionism” in understanding the relations that obtain between the individual self (jīva), the world, and Brahman, and favored the view that ignorance resides in Brahman. Sarvajñātman was a very able thinker. He drew a sharp distinction between adhi hāna (the ground of appearances; the true Brahman) and ādhāra (the object to which false appearances refer; Brahman as modified by ignorance). He also set forth rather clearly the relationship between the pari āmavāda (the transformation theory of causality) and the vivartavāda (appearance-only theory of causality), showing how the former is preliminary to the latter.
The following selections are taken from Sarvajñātman’s Sa - k epaśārīraka, as translated by T. Mahadevan in an unpublished manuscript submitted to the University of Madras in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of master of literature.
Nescience, on the strength of the self, which alone is its content and locus, and with the assistance of the capacities of obscuration and projection, after obscuring the luminous self, illusorily manifests (it) in the form of the jīva, Īśvara, and the universe.
That nescience, on the strength of the inner self which alone is its content and locus, stands obscuring the non-dual and absolutely attributeless inner nature, and projecting as external figurations what is within.
Perception, inference and Vedic texts show the painless, eternal and blissful nature of the self; the aforesaid finitude is not possible in this plenitude whose nature is painlessness, eternality, and blissfulness.
After enjoying the bliss of the prajñā-self (during the state of deep sleep) which is devoid of all kinds of objective cognition, and waking thereafter, every jīva is aware of the bliss of that (state), in the recollection, “I was asleep; in that (state) there was bliss.”
The knowers of the definition of bliss describe bliss as that for the sake of which all things exist, and which, by its own nature, abandons the state of existing for others. This (definition) is apt in the inner self; hence, its blissfulness. (I, 20–24)
The word, adhi hāna (real substratum), is prevalent (only) in the entity which is the object of nescience with its figurations, and not in the entity which is the ādhāra (apparent support) of superimposition. Hence, the view of some great people of cloudy vision who assert obstinately that, if reciprocal superimposition be admitted, the universe would have no substratum, and would become a void, is a baseless delusion.
This question would certainly arise, if the adhi hāna were identical with the ādhāra; it is not so. The word, adhi hāna, is universally established as representing the entity which is the object of nescience with its figurations.
Moreover, if two unreal objects were intended to be superimposed here, then, your objection would be pertinent. But, the couple of a real and an unreal object is mutually superimposed. Then, where is the room for the argument of voidness?
The object indicated by the term, “this,” is also superimposed on silver, and the silver-object on the “this,” because of its being manifested in the delusion of silver. If not, it would not have manifested itself in the delusion just as nacre (is not manifest).
Indeed, there is the cognition of “this” in silver, as there is the cognition of silver in “this.” Such being the case, how can there not be the ascertainment of reciprocal superimposition?
The superimposed alone is, indeed, manifested in delusions, and, nothing else is even manifested in delusions. (This is so) because of the non-cognition of the natures of the rope, nacre, desert-land, single moon, etc. (which are not superimposed).
Consequently, reciprocal superimposition alone is proper with regard to the conscious and the non-conscious, because of its being known to be thus in silver-delusions, etc., more elaborate assumption is, in fact, unwarranted. (I, 31–37)
The non-differentiated and the pure consciousness alone forms the locus as well as the content (of nescience); for, what is subsequent (the jīva and Īśvara) can be neither the locus nor the content of the nescience that is antecedent (to this direction).
The state of non-existence for this (nescience) is not intelligible, because of the obscuring nature; the champions of non-existence do not tell (us) that non-existence can obscure. The son of Vāsudeva (K a) has told (us) that nescience is an obscurer (of knowledge). Consequently, we understand that it (nescience) is of the nature of an existent.
O King! Man has only one enemy; and not a second one on a par with nescience; veiled by which, completely deluded he performs acts which are fraught with fear and evil.
In fact, the inertness constant (invariably) in the universe is of the nature of an existent; so, too, the ignorance invariable in man appears as an entity. And, this nescience well known through experience as inertness and as ignorance is, they say, capable of concealing the final beatitude.
The wise declare that the non-dual consciousness depending upon this phenomenal (nescience) is the cause of transmigration. And this (nescience), because it is phenomenal, is only of the channel in respect of the cause of transmigration. But causality belongs only to consciousness.
What is held by others (the Sāmkhyas, the Naiyāyikas, etc.), that something other than consciousness is the cause of the worldly illusion, is not admitted by the advocates of the Vedānta system because of (its) inertness. For, concerning this, the author of the aphorisms (Bādarāya a) tells (us) clearly that whatever is inert cannot be the cause of transmigration.
All inert things are the means in respect of the causality of the noninert (i.e., non-dual, consciousness); but (they themselves) are not the causes. Thus have the Upanisadic scholars told (us) while refuting Kapila’s (the Sāmkhya) system.
The qualified (consciousness) is declared by the word “the self (Ātman).” And there is a śruti (text) that “all are the products of the self.” Consequently the qualified self is the material cause of the world; thus some other scholars have declared.
(Just as) it is only the reflection of the conscious (and not the qualified) self in the internal organ which comes to have the agency in respect of good and bad deeds, similarly it is only the reflection in nescience of the Supreme Self (and not that as qualified by nescience) which comes to have (the agency) in respect of the universe.
Just as the qualified conscious Self is the material cause in respect of good and bad deeds, similarly, the material cause in respect of the manifestation of ether, air (etc.) is the Supreme consciousness in its qualified form.
By the word, “Ātman” (and its synonyms), the qualified is not expressed, but only the Pure Consciousness. The qualified adjunct is (only) to impose expressibility in respect of the self, because of the latter being encompassed by the qualification.
The Pure Consciousness is denoted by the word, the Self, because of its wearing the garb of qualifications. Hence proceeds this delusion of people that the qualified (alone, and not the Pure Consciousness) is denoted by the word, the Self. (I, 319–330)
And this Brahman-knowledge can be known (only) when Brahman is known; and, not otherwise. If this Brahman-reality has been known, (then), release is attained; there is nothing to be done by the injunctions (thereafter).
Those established in the Vedānta declare that for consciousness, reciprocal superimposition which has for its sphere the macrocosmic and the microcosmic body, and which is a product of nescience, is an evil. Hence, release is contemporaneous with knowledge.
The cognition which is caused by the Vedānta, which is firm, and which has the self for its content, controls with its very origination the beginningless nescience, which is like the cloth-bandage for the eye, and thoroughly burns it so that the root of sa sāra is destroyed (with the vāsanās) , thus, verily, (says) the śruti. (I, 452–454)
It is thus: the saguna Brahman is of a combined nature as consisting of the real and the non-real; similar is the knowledge thereof. Similarly, the purport of the Vedic text having that (saguna Brahman) as content is of this nature. Hence, it is stated on the basis of a distinction (of content) that the secondary purport of the Vedic text is of one kind and the other (primary purport) having for its content the real nirguna entity (is of a different kind).
A single silver-cognition arising in the form, “This is silver” manifests the real and the non-real objects as identical. Similarly, it is beyond doubt that this single pramā a which has the saguna for its content, and, which is a presentation of the real and illusory, manifests two objects related to each other. (I, 464–465)
“That One consciousness which is made probable (by inference) as the material cause of this (universe), understand That to be Brahman”; this text syntactically relating to the text, “That thou art” unequivocally states the definition of the Supreme Brahman established (by inference) in right earnest, differentiating the nature of Brahman, (from pradhāna, etc.) implied in the word, “That.”
It is well-known in this world that the definition of the defined is three-fold; viz., one’s own nature, attribute per proprium, and attribute per accidens. I shall explain these distinctly with definitions. Know that.
That (characteristic) which inheres in the lak ya object and which, when apprehended, makes known the real entity thoroughly different from other objects, this, they say, is the definition. This is the general definition for (all) the three definitions.
Svarūpalak a a: That which while itself being the nature of the lak ya directly differentiates it from other objects—this definition they declare to be the svarūpalak a a of that (lak ya) the object which is to be defined. “The sky is hollow,” “the water is liquid,” are of this group in worldly usage.
Viśe a a: On the other hand, that which is the cause of the generation of a cognition of its relation with the lak ya-entity is its definition per proprium, just like mane, etc., for objects like horse, etc.
Upalak a a: That which, while abandoning the causality of the generation of a cognition of its relations with the lak ya, becomes its definition in spite of its being not of its nature—that, they say, is the qualification per accidens, like the crow (for Devadatta’s house).
(That nature of) being the material cause of the origination, sustentation and dissolution of the universe, of this conscious-reality which accepts no accessories,—that (nature) should be termed as the qualification per accidens. Why? In order that there may be no contradiction in the significant capacity of the word which indicates the secondary sense, viz., “Brahman.”
If the definition of the single (the non-dual impartite) stated here (in the Veda), viz., being the material cause of the origination, sustentation, and dissolution of the universe, be admitted as the qualification of Brahman per proprium, then, there would be the diminution of the word denoting lak ya, viz., “Brahman.”
They say that the word expressing the lak ya-object is primary here in the text aiming at the lak a a and the rest are secondary. And, the word, Brahman, denoting the lak ya is capable of stating only the infinite, and not the mortal finite.
Hence, because of the fear of the principal word being injured it is reasonable to take the secondary words in the sense of attribute per accidens; and, this (word) Brahman to supply the upalak ya. Thus, in this (sentence) this collocation of words is appropriate.
The (texts setting forth) definitions are not (intended) to mention the nature of the lak ya; nor only (to make known that) this word is expressive of this. Indeed, the definitions are to tell (us) only this—that this is different from all other objects.
For, it is recognized that this person cognizing the nature of lak ya (by the sense of sight) and seeing the definition as existent in that alone, is capable of teaching by this definition the same lak ya as different from other objects.
Nowhere is it admitted that the definition is for the sake of the cognition of the relationship between the word and its sense. It is but the cause of the apprehension of difference from anything else in respect of the lak ya; for, the disputants in the world collect the various definitions in right earnest and differentiate the lak ya from others by means of these definitions.
Hence, the śruti did not state the definition of Brahman, namely, “(whence) the origination, etc., of the visible world” for the establishment in respect of Brahman, the relation between the word and its sense; nor even is it stated with the intention of making known Brahman’s own nature, but, for the establishment of its difference from all non-Brahman elements. (I, 513–526)
All pramā as, exclusive of the Vedāntic texts, have for their content only the external world; and, from the example of light manifesting color, it is well-known that whatever manifestor is elemental is itself elemental.
Whatever manifestor is seen in the world is observed to be similar in generic nature to the object manifested; for lamp-light known in the world as manifestor (of color) is well-known to be similar to color in respect of light-nature.
The intellect bent upon the cognition of all objects is also of the same generic nature as the object manifested. It is well-known in the śrutis that intellect is elemental. Hence, let that, too, have elemental contents.
Thus, all the pramā as, excluding the Vedāntic texts, relate for the above-said reasoning, to the objects (alone) and they do not have the inner self for content. The śruti, too, has clearly told us the same above-stated sense in the text, “parāñci,” etc. (Ka. Up. IV, 1, 1).
The self-born forced the senses outwards. Hence (the person) cognizes the external and not the inner self. A wise man desirous of immortality and with his senses turned back sees (directly) the inner self.
The pramā a which is well-known in the world as the means of a cognition in respect of its object not divested of its objectivity should be accepted here, as having only inert objects for its content and not the inner self for content, because of the aforesaid reason.
The pramā a which endeavors to make known its object divested of its objectivity is competent to have the inner self as its content. Such a pramā a is texts like “That thou (art)” and not any other pramā a. (II, 9–15)
Now, it seems that this view of the revered (Śamkara) is similar to that of the Śākya mendicant. If the external object be unreal, how, indeed, could these two views be not similar?
If the cognition alone be accepted as real, and not the cognized, surely, the view of the sage, Buddha, alone has been wholly adopted by the Vedic sa nyāsins (the followers of Śamkara).
Answer : How can this Vedic sage accepting the cognizer, the pramā a, the object, and the cognition as different from one another’s be similar to the Buddhist sage?
In our system, we certainly recognize the cognizer, the pramā a, the object, etc., as permanent, reciprocally distinct products of darkness (nescience) located in the Supreme self.
The Supreme self, immutable, consciousness, and non-dual, perceives as a witness, and without the aid of instruments, the four-fold universe created by nescience.
The purusa encompassed by his own māyā which is nonautonomous, becomes the witness by seeing the entire illusory universe by his own light (consciousness).
If that valid recognition making known the permanence of the apprehended and the apprehender were not intelligible, then, there would have resulted the similarity between our final views. But, since it (recognition) can be intelligible, there results the permanence which is the nature of the universe as also of consciousness in my view, just as momentariness is the nature of everything in your view.
Now, if the waking state be an imposition, tell (us) what kind of difference you have admitted to distinguish it from a dream. (For, superimposedness is common to both).
So long as the cognizer exists, (the objects) of the waking state are not sublated like the objects seen in a dream; for, the darkness (nescience) is negated only together with the cognizer, the pramā a, the object and the cognition.
Indeed, the darkness (nescience) causing the waking state is destroyed simultaneously by the knowledge of the self generated by the Vedic text together with (its products, viz.) place, time, finite self and state (intervening time).
The object seen in a dream is sublated, like a rope-serpent, when place, time, and cognizer exist. But, the object of the waking state does not find such a sublator, because it is not so seen.
Consequently, people understand that the waking state with attributes opposed to those of dream and delusion is real till the realization of the real, Supreme self. What is sublated by it (knowledge) is not real anywhere.
The intellectual psychosis related to the Supreme self-reality, being steady, destroys what is superimposed there (on consciousness) in different forms as real and unreal, by the darkness (nescience) located in the inner self.
Just as Arjuna kills the line of the Kauravas (already) killed by Vāsudeva, so also, the psychosis generated by the (Vedāntic) texts destroys the world-delusion (already) annihilated by consciousness (which, though) eternal, (is reflected in and manifested by psychosis).
Outside the system of the Brahmavādin, it is difficult to conceive of the real and the unreal. If the unreal be something distinct from the real, then, there is the contingence of that, too, becoming real.
If the unreal be not different from the real, then, all the more would it have to be accepted as real. The unreal cannot be held to be of the nature of both (different and non-different from the real) because of the aforesaid refutations on the two views. (II, 25–40)
After climbing the lower step, it is possible to climb the higher step; thus, the śāstra, too, at first sets forth the relationship between the cause and the effect through the declaration of transformation (by the aphorism, “Bhoktrāpatte ”) and, now (in the āra bha a section) denies (it) to establish the illusoriness of change.
In the Vedāntic view, the transformation theory is indeed the preliminary step to the transfiguration theory. When this transformation theory is established, the transfiguration theory follows of its own accord (without any difficulty).
Just as people first resort to the means to successfully secure the fruit, so too, the śruti and the eminent sage propound the transformation theory to establish transfiguration.
The origination theory is Ka āda’s position; while the aggregation theory is the Buddha’s position. The position of the Sāmkhyas, etc., (the Yogas) is the transformation theory; while the position of the Vedāntins is the transfiguration theory.
Assuming for discussion the transformation theory of Kapila, etc., the Sūtrakāra and the śruti standing on the previous step declare (this) in order to expound (the theory of) transfiguration.
The wise say that transformation is the capacity in the case of what is non-different, and has parts, to exhibit real diversity of form, just like the earth’s (capacity) to create crops.
The meaning of the word, transfiguration, is well-known here (in the world) as the capacity of what is non-different and changeless to exhibit many illusory forms just like a diversity of moons caused by a diversity of waves.
Stating transformation at first (by the text) “I shall myself be born (as the universe, and, consequently) become many” and, then, stating the illusoriness of the change the śruti brings in the transfiguration theory.
And, thus, in the light of transfiguration there is intelligibility for all śruti and sm ti texts which declare māyā and have for purport the denial of reality in the case of everything analyzable into cause or effect and formerly held to be absolutely real, because of being cognized. (II, 60–68)
The nescience of the jīvas which are reflections, as it were, of Brahman which is the prototype, as it were, is like the generic nature in particulars, the originator of all delusions; it abandons the man of knowledge, (but) resorts to the man devoid of knowledge, just as the generic nature (abandons) the particular object which has perished, (but, resorts to the particular object) which has not perished. (Thus), have said some. (II, 132)
Just as there is a bird in the sky, and, (at the same time) there is no (bird in the sky), similarly, there can and there cannot be nescience in the Supreme Brahman which is pure, of the nature of consciousness, spotless by nature, devoid of association, devoid of qualities, eternal, differenceless, birthless, deathless and partless; and, thus, (this argument) is faultless, say (some) others eager to establish (their) position.
Though darkness (nescience) penetrates (only) into the pure entity, still, it will enter into Brahman only after taking another causal condition in the shape of the mind. And, this internal organ (mind) while persisting even in the sleep-state in an extremely subtle form always regulates nescience in relation to consciousness externally (i.e., as an accidens).
The nescience-associated Brahman is reflected in the intellects, and, then, becoming the movable and the immovable through its own nescience (it) at one place is released through knowledge, and, at another (place) is bound (through the absence of knowledge). And that nescience has perished (through knowledge); but, still, the same (nescience) persists, because of the intelligibility of the difference of aspects. Thus (through the perishing and the non-perishing of nescience) in relation to the different aspects all (these) distinctions in relation to the Supreme Being greatly stands to reason; thus (say) some.
Māyā, the binding capacity of Hari, and the generator of things external and internal, spreads out like the net of the fisherman, in respect of ignorant jīvas, and contracts (in the case of jīvas with knowledge) through the will of the Lord. Be this māyā real or illusory, (but) contraction and the opposite (expansion) are natural (therefore); and, thus, too (say some).
Some have accepted that in respect of the Supreme Brahman as content, there is nescience beginningless like a stream consisting in a succession of residual impressions and delusions different from each human being. Uprooting this through the combination (of knowledge and rites) a person can attain to release; in the absence of that (combination) a person transmigrates. And, that (nescience) has jīva for (its) locus.
Because of self-luminosity, the inner self is established for us as ignorant, (in the experience) “I am ignorant.” But, how can the unknown Brahman be established for you? (Is it) from valid knowledge, or from delusion, or from self-luminosity? (II, 134–139)
That Supreme Īśvara devoid of the bondage, viz., egoity, is really omniscience being free from nescience; for, His knowledge is admitted to be without any obscuration; the jīva’s being with obscuration, it is ignorant.
The supreme purusa, and not the jīva, supports the entire galaxy of cognitions (reality to all objects), the fruit of all pramā a s, whatsoever. Hence, the knowledge of Īśvara is without obscuration; and, the jīva’s is with obscuration, because of its distinction (from that of Īśvara).
The (Supreme) self of the nature of reality permanently illumines nescience, and the product thereof, viz., the entire universe, being proximate thereto, because of its luminosity; while, the jīva is not thus; hence, its knowledge is with obscuration. (But) Īśvara’s, indeed, is said to be without obscuration.
What is there which is uncognized in this world for Him (Īśvara), who is of the nature of knowledge, who is the free embodiment of pure sattva, wherefrom all defects are removed, who is ever immediately manifest, and who resides in the hearts of all human beings?
This omnipresent (Īśvara) stretches out māyā thus (in the form of the universe). The Supreme Īśvara (controller) controls this (māyā) permanently. These statements in the purāna are highly intelligible. Nescience (too) is dependent on Him, because of its being dependent on consciousness (Īśvara). (II, 183–187)
“Except myself, there was, there will be, and there is no other person to experience bondage or release, etc.,” this aforesaid statement I am not at all able to apprehend, because of its conflict with one’s own experience.
What is it that is said to conflict? Is it experience of duality, or, is it the (experience), viz., “I am the Supreme (Brahman)?” Or else, is there any other experience here which will, in your view, import conflict? “The experience of non-duality brings about conflict”: this statement does not stand to reason; nor does the experience having duality for content (cause the conflict), for, there is sublation of this latter by the former.
If it is said that there is rise of sublation for this (singleness of the jīva), because of the experience having duality-cum-non-duality for content, then, (we say) there is no such experience for anybody in all the three states (of waking, dream, and deep sleep). Indeed, in this world, none is seen as having the experience whose content is the sun as well as darkness. If this (dual non-dual experience) were possible, why should not that (the sun-darkness experience) be possible? (II, 218–220)
The māyā which is well-known here, in the waking state is determined, indeed, to be nescience alone. It alone should be known from the Veda and from inference, because of the establishment in respect of that, of the cognitions of the significant capacity and invariable concomitance.
In the dream, too, as here, there is established no other māyā except the sole nescience (located) in the dream-consciousness. Consequently, in respect of that alone, and nowhere else, does this word, māyā, of the Sūtrakāra apply.
The Sūtrakāra standing on (resorting to) dream which is but the nescience (located) in the inner self, and causing to cognize the significant capacity and invariable concomitance, began, as in the world, to bring in, by the word, māyā, the Veda and inference (in respect of the illusoriness of the waking world).
It was formerly stated by Hari, the Supreme Īśvara, that nescience is the obscurer of the conscious-reality, and, that māyā is the obscurer (of the conscious-reality). Knowing this, we understand unequivocally that the reality (of māyā and nescience) is one. By ignorance is knowledge obscured; thereby are creatures deluded.
The Lord has said out of compassion in the Gītā that knowledge is the remover of these both (māyā and nescience). Thereby, too, there comes in the cognition that this reality (of these) is (only) one, because of the aforesaid similarity between the definitions. (III, 105–109)
What is in the waking state does not exist during dream; because of the illusoriness of dream. They declare that what exists during waking is real. Unreality is declared in regard to dream on the strength of sublation (by the waking state). Consequently, consciousness alone is your nature; anything other than this is perishable. (III, 115)
“For a man in deep sleep, there is no nescience.” “This man in deep sleep was in dense darkness (nescience).” What is thus stated should be apprehended by you as being without conflict after reflection and through experience and reasoning.
Thus, during deep sleep, there was no nescience at all. In other words, the jīva, indeed, has become the supreme purusa. Because of the absence of relationship (with the causal condition) it (the jīva) has attained to the state of being devoid of the seed (of transmigration); for, here, there is not the clear experience of nescience.
During deep sleep, because of the absence of nescience and its product, viz., the mind, you are the Pure, Supreme, eternally released Lord. At that time, how can desire, activity, and all (their products) be in you who are an ocean of consciousness, who are limitless, and who are perfect?
There was the egoity produced by your own nescience. It brings in and shows to you extreme misery (and pleasure), while you are awake and while you are in dream. It does not exist during deep sleep, because of the destruction of its seed. Hence it is that you were very pure (during deep sleep).
The wise declare thus:
This nescience, like the darkness of the night, is admitted to be of the nature of an existent, because of its being experienced as what obscures self-consciousness. Like the sun, knowledge which is of the nature of an inert luminary, is the remover of it (nescience).
By the disputants, too, it should be admitted only thus—(by them) who admit previously non-manifestation in regard to consciousness. Indeed, in regard to consciousness, nescience which is of the nature of the absence of consciousness is not admitted; nor is the absence of buddhi.
Consequently, the Upanisadic texts and the great sages have stated in various places that it is not conflicting that nescience has the self for its content, nescience which is the single primary cause of the entire world. Hence, there is no conflict. (III, 125–131)
That consciousness of the self which persists in the changing states, viz., waking, dream, deep sleep, swoon, and the extinction of the body—that, indeed, is real. Whatever is changing, is, indeed, illusory, like garland, serpent, stick, etc. It is impossible to say that the persistent conscious reality, like the rope, is illusory.
This citta, whose qualities are waking, dream and deep sleep, has arisen from your nescience; hence, it is always you alone. It does not differ from you. Your nescience is established on the strength of your experience (and) it is, in fact, illusory. Since it did not, does not, and will not exist (in consciousness), your perfect consciousness (alone) remains. (III, 139–140)