The basic guide for all Vedānta thought is known under different names, Vedāntasūtras and Brahmasūtras, but its most official name is Śārīraka-mīmā sā-sūtras. It is from the last name that we shall depart and take the members of the compound backwards: “the Threads of the Enquiry into That which is embodied.”
In brahministic usage, the word sūtra has a rather different meaning than it acquired among the Buddhists. With the latter it became a general word for a doctrinaire disquisition, sometimes of considerable length, in which a body of doctrine was explicated in full detail. But in its orthodox use the word denotes something quite sui generis. It means primarily “thread”—the word is distantly related to our verb to sew. A thread, however, only has a provisional existence of its own; its purpose is to be sewn or woven into a cloth. It is this clothout-of-threads that covers the System.
Sūtras, whether of Vedānta or of any other body of knowledge, aim at the briefest possible exposition of the propositions of a topic. Exposition is already saying too much; indication would be closer. Parsimony of statement is pushed to the extreme; a common witticism has it that an author of sūtras takes greater delight in the saving of a vowel than in the birth of a son. In order to understand the phenomenon of sūtras, we must know the method of education. And here we must once more return to the Vedic tradition.
A person’s education begins with his initiation, the upanayana. In return for his pupil’s obedience the teacher vows that he will transmit to him his complete erudition. There is a total loyalty of pupil to teacher and of teacher to pupil. Education proceeds in the greatest possible personal intimacy. Originally, it proceeded without the aid of books; education declined their use. When, later, Śamkara looks for an illustration of the relation between the semi-real world and the supreme, he quotes the relation between the written word and the spoken word. The written book is but a crutch for the scholar, a sign of defective learning or failing memory: there need be no intermediary for the learned man between the possession of erudition and the vocal expression of it. Knowledge is verbal, not typographical, and the teacher makes certain that the pupil is word-perfect.
There are two phases in this instruction. In the first phase is transmitted that which is unalterable and must be remembered perfectly—that is, primarily, if the instruction centers on the Vedas themselves, those texts of any one Veda in the “branch” of which the pupil is born. The pupil’s first task is śrava a “listening” and anuśrava a “repeating.” The second phase is the explication of what now is literally known. In those forms of education where a system is instructed, be it Grammar, or Logic, or Vedānta, generations of teachers have combined to draw from the wealth of material basic statements which, after the formation period of the scholarly discipline is over, will be consolidated by a master into a complete repertory of statements which exhaust the system. These basic statements, collected in a number of lessons, are as concise as possible to facilitate their being remembered. Ideally they should be able to stand by themselves. Step by step the sūtras take the pupil from the most general statements to the most specific as by a system of ordered rules, each one presupposing the previous one, so that the pupil has no difficulty supplying the needed terms to the economically elliptic sentences. Verbs are almost entirely supplanted by nouns, for it is not processes of change that are studied but matters of unalterable fact.
Practically, however, the sūtras do need explanation: examples, references to sources, explications of the arguments which may not have to be recalled perfect to the letter but which would inevitably be triggered by the keywords of the sūtras.
The Śārīraka-mīmā sā-sūtras provide such a System for Vedānta, that is, for the concluding part of the Veda, the Upanisads. They are therefore the System statements for an Enquiry into the Upanisads. But, as such, the system cannot stand on its own. The Upanisads are but the second part of the Veda, the crowning part no doubt, but essentially sequential. Vedānta is therefore also known as the uttaramīmā sā, the “Second Enquiry,” presupposing a First Enquiry into the First Part of the Veda.
Although the relation between the First and Second Enquiries became a matter of profound dispute, still, as a text, the Brahmasūtras presuppose the existence of the sūtras of the first mīmā sā; we shall follow the custom and speak of Mīmā sā and Vedānta.
Mīmā sā pretends to deal with nothing but the canons of exegesis which explain what our tasks are. It therefore deals with acts, that is, with ritual acts; but insofar as a rite is taken to mean a recurrent act on the part of a human agent who is enjoined upon to perform this act by the transcendent authority of Revelation, it is redundant to speak of “ritual acts,” for every act is a rite or immediately subservient to it. Vedānta, however, deals not with rites, but with insight, and the canons of Mīmā sā might therefore seem irrelevant to it. Nonetheless, Vedānta must equally deal with and from śruti, since for it, too, does the argument hold that no insight in matters suprasensible and therefore metaphysical can be had through our ordinary means of knowledge; and hence it, too, must rely on the Vedic texts that are self-validating.
The Brahmasūtras open with four lines stating this inevitable reliance on śruti: athāto brahma-jijñāsā / janmādy asya yata / śāstrayonitvāt / tat tu samanvayāt, “next, therefore, the desire of knowing Brahman; from which [derives] the origin, etc. [i.e., existence and dissolution] of this [universe]; because its [i.e., the knowledge’s] source is scripture; [that Brahman is the cause of the universe,] that in fact [follows] from the total agreement [of the statements of scripture].” These four sūtras not only illustrate how scripture is accepted as the source of Vedānta, they also show the highly elliptic form of the presentation.
If indeed all the scriptural statements agree that Brahman is the cause, what is a statement? It is here that the canons of exegesis, evolved by Mīmāmsā, at once come into play. Vedānta takes them for granted. The rule is laid down in Mīmā sā: “As long as one single purpose is served by a number of words which, if broken up, are found wanting and incapable of effecting this purpose, these words constitute one statement,” which, for this school of thought, is an injunction to do specific acts. This injunction is incumbent upon an individual actively engaged in acts. It is this primary conception of the soul as embodied and involved in acts which from the first has given the “soul” in Vedānta a character which it does not necessarily hold in all Indian thinking, however this entity is conceived of. For Vedānta the soul is agent, the one himself responsible for his acts, who is therefore also the one who undergoes the results of these acts. The soul as agent and experient is an assumption demanded by the Mīmā sā theory of task but productive of profound problems that faced the later philosophers.
In a way a commentary on the Brahmasūtras, in principle, does away with the need for a direct study of the Upanisads themselves; nevertheless, the major philosophers address themselves directly to the Upanisads, either in the form of commentaries or by a treatise about them. In the Brahmasūtras the Chāndogya Upanisad holds the central place, followed by the Brhadāranyaka Upanisad and the Taittirīya Upanisad. These belong to the oldest stratum of the Upaniadic corpus. The next stratum is that of the early metrical Upanisads of which the most important ones are the Katha and Śvetāśvatara; the latter betrays influences from proto-Sāmkhya and from growing theistic thought.
Below follows a synopsis of the topics of the Brahmasūtras without consideration of the relative fidelity of the individual commentaries.
The text is divided into four lessons, each with four quarters. Each quarter is subdivided into a number of topic sections, which may cover a group of sūtras, but also a single one.
1. 1. 1–31
TOPIC: I (1). Brahman is the object of the study of Vedānta.
II (2). Brahman is the origin of the world.
III (3). The relevance of scripture for the study of Brahman.
IV (4). All scripture bears upon Brahman.
V (5–11). Brahman as cause is a spiritual entity different from the non-spiritual causal prakrti postulated by Sāmkhya.
VI (12–19). The Soul of Bliss of Taittirīya Upanisad (Taitt. Up.) 2. 5 is Brahman.
VII (20–21). So is the Golden Person of Chāndogya Upanisad (Ch. Up.) 1. 6.
VIII (22). So is the Ether mentioned in Ch. Up. 1. 9 as world cause.
IX (23). So is the Breath discussed in Ch. Up. 1. 11. 5.
X (24–27). So is the Light mentioned in Ch. Up. 3. 13. 7.
XI (28–31). So is the Breath mentioned in Kau ītaki Upanisad (Kau. Up.) 3. 2.
1. 2. 1–32
I (1–8). The subject of Ch. Up. 3. 14 is not the individual soul but Brahman itself.
II (9–10). So is that of Katha Upanisad (Ka. Up.) 1. 2. 25.
III (11–12). The two beings of Ka. Up. 1. 3. 1 are Brahman and the individual soul.
IV (13–17). The Person-in-the-Eye of Ch. Up. 4. 15. 1 is Brahman.
V (18–20). The Inner Ruler of Brhadāranyaka Upanisad (B h. Up.) 3. 7. 3 is Brahman.
VI (21–23). The Invisible of Mu aka Upanisad (Mu. Up.) 1. 1. 3 is Brahman.
VII (24–32). So is the vaiśvānara soul of Ch. Up. 5. 11. 6.
1. 3. 1–43
I (1–7). That on which heaven and earth are woven according to Mu. Up. 2. 2. 5 is Brahman.
II (8–9). So is the Muchness of Ch. Up. 7. 23.
III (10–12). And the Imperishable of B h. Up. 3. 8. 8.
IV (13). So is the supreme Person of Praśna Upanisad (Pra. Up.) 5. 5.
V–VI (14–21). The Tiny Ether of Ch. Up. 8. 1 is in fact Brahman.
VII (22–23). The Luminous One of Ka. Up. 2. 5. 15 is Brahman.
VIII (24–25). The Thumb-sized Person of Ka. Up. 2. 4. 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman itself.
IX (26–33). Miscellaneous discussions starting from the question whether gods can know Brahman; the relation of words to their contents.
X (34–38). Śūdras are disqualified for the study of Brahman.
XI (39). The Breath of Ka. Up. 2. 6. 2 is Brahman.
XII (40). So is the Light of Ch. Up. 8. 12. 3.
XIII (41). The creative Ether of Ch. Up. 8. 14 is really Brahman.
XIV (42–43). So is the Soul of Knowledge of B h. Up. 4. 3. 7.
1. 4. 1–28
I (1–7). The unmanifest of Ka. Up. 1. 3. 10–11 is not the unmanifest prakrti of Sāmkhya but the subtle and gross body.
II (8–10). The three-colored Unborn One of Śvetāśvatara Upaniad (Śve. Up.) 4. 5 is not the Sāmkhyan prakrti but the creativeness of the Lord.
III (11–13). The Five Tribes of Five in B h. Up. 4. 4. 17 are not the 25 principles of Sāmkhya.
IV (14–15). Scripture is not self-contradictory concerning the spiritual Brahman as cause of the world.
V (16–18). The Maker of Kau. Up. 4. 19 is Brahman.
VI (19–22). The “soul that must be seen” of B h. Up. 2. 4. 5 is likewise Brahman.
VII (23–27). Brahman is not only the efficient but also the substantial cause of the world which develops through internal modification.
VIII (28). This refutation of Sāmkhya covers other views on the origination of the world.
2. 1. 1–37
I (1–2). Sāmkhya may not quote sm ti against Vedānta.
II (3). Neither may Yoga quote its sm ti against Vedānta.
III (4–11). Brahman, though spiritual, may well be the cause of the non-spiritual world and still not be affected by its qualities when the world merges back into Brahman.
IV (12). The above arguments also hold against Vaiśe ika.
V (13). It is not true that this makes Brahman subject to experience and thus to karman.
VI (14–20). The product is nondifferent from its cause.
VII (21–23). Identity of the soul with Brahman does not make Brahman a cause of evil.
VIII (24–25). Brahman needs no instrumentation for world production.
IX (26–29). Brahman does not entirely become world and remains one and undivided.
X (30–31). Brahman creates without instruments and by its own power.
XI (32–33). Brahman has no motivation in creating the world.
XII (34–36). As Brahman creates with a view to the souls’ karman it cannot be imputed with partiality and cruelty.
XIII (37). Brahman’s qualities enable it to create the world.
2. 2. 1–45
I (1–10). Arguments against the Sāmkhyans.
II (11–17). Arguments against the Vaiśe ikas.
III (18–27). Arguments against the Buddhist Realists.
IV (28–32). Arguments against the Buddhist Idealists.
V (33–36). Arguments against the Jainas.
VI (37–41). Arguments against theists maintaining that God is only the efficient cause.
VII (42–45). Arguments against the Pāñcarātra.
2. 3. 1–53
I (1–7). Ether springs from Brahman.
II (8). Wind from Ether.
III (9). Brahman cannot have originated.
IV–VI (10–12). Fire springs from Wind, Water from Fire, Earth from Water.
VII (13). This successive generation is due to Brahman.
VIII (14). Dissolution takes place in reverse order.
IX (15). Senses and mind originate and dissolve with the elements.
X (16). Birth and death apply only to the body.
XI (17). The individual soul is not created.
XII (18). The soul is intelligent.
XIII (19–32). On whether the soul is atomic in size or omnipresent.
XIV–XV (33–39; 40). The soul is an agent.
XVI (41–42). This agency is dependent on the supreme soul who impels it.
XVII (43–53). The soul is a portion of the supreme soul, which does not mean that Brahman is affected by the qualities of the soul or that one soul shares the experiences of others.
2. 4. 1–22
I–III (1–4; 5–6; 7). The sensory faculties, the motoric faculties, and the mind spring from Brahman; there are eleven faculties, and they are atomic.
IV–VI (8; 9–12; 13). Breath is derived from Brahman; it is different from wind and the faculties, and it is atomic.
VII–VIII (14–16; 17–19). The faculties are supervised by specific deities, and are independent of Breath.
IX (20–22). Brahman, not the soul, evolves names-and-forms.
3. 1. 1–27
I (1–7). The soul when departing from the body at death is enveloped by subtle elements in which the soul’s faculties subsist.
II (8–11). The souls, having enjoyed the rewards of their good acts on the moon, have a remainder of karman left as they return to earth, which determines the quality of their rebirth.
III (12–21). Those who did not sacrifice may also go to the moon, others go to hell, of which there are seven varieties. There is a third class of heat-born animals that have no interval between death and rebirth.
IV–VI (22; 23; 24–27). The subtle body of the soul when descending from the moon goes through a number of phases, similar but not identical with natural phenomena. This descent is brief. The soul at last lies waiting in plants until the plants are eaten by a man who then impregnates a woman with it. Thus it is reborn.
3. 2. 1–41
I (1–6). The visions of the dreaming soul are illusions; the soul cannot create, though it is a portion of the supreme soul, because it is limited by its body.
II (7–8). In dreamless sleep the soul merges with the Brahman in the heart.
III (9). The awakening soul is the one that fell asleep.
IV (10). On the swoon.
V (11–21). The fact that the supreme soul sojourns in the individual soul does not affect its perfect nature.
VI (22–30). How the soul can have a double nature, that of the supreme and that of the individual soul.
VII (31–37). On the correct interpretation of passages apparently implying the existence of something different from Brahman.
VIII (38–41). The operations of karman are not self-fructifying; the supreme soul allots the rewards.
3. 3. 1–66
I–II (1–4; 5). On the construction of vidyās (a particular body of knowledge).
III (6–8). On the distinctness of apparently identical vidyās.
IV (9). On the udgītha-vidyā of Ch. Up. 1. 1. 1.
V (10). On the unity of the prāna-vidyās.
VI (11–13). In a meditation on a vidyā the specific qualities of Brahman there set forth should be meditated upon, along with the qualities of knowledge and bliss.
VII (14–15). Ka. Up. 3. 10. 11 constitutes one vidyā.
VIII (16–17). On the vidyā of Aitareya Āra yaka 2. 4. 1. 1.
IX (18). On the Discourse of the Faculties.
X (19). On the Śā ilya-vidyā.
XI (20–22). On the two distinct vidyās of B h. Up. 5. 5.
XII (23). On the Rā āyanīya-vidyā.
XIII (24). On the distinction of two purusa-vidyās.
XIV (25). On the exclusion of mantra and brāhma a passages from the contiguous vidyā.
XV (26). On the extension of certain passages to others.
XVI (27–28). Good and evil acts vanish at once on the soul’s departure from the body to the world of Brahman.
XVII (29–30). On the propriety of this view.
XVIII (31). Those who meditate on the vidyās follow the Course of the Gods.
XIX (32). On the possession of a body by those who have knowledge.
XX (33). Negative qualities of Brahman are part of all meditations.
XXI (34). Ka. Up. 3. 1 and Mu. Up. 3. 1 constitute one vidyā.
XXII (35–36). B h. Up. 3. 4 and 3. 5 constitute one vidyā.
XXIII (37). But Aitareya Āra yaka 2. 2. 4. 6 comprise two vidyās.
XXIV (38). B h. Up. 5. 4. 5 is a single vidyā.
XXV (39). Ch. Up. 8. 1 and B h. Up. 4. 4. 22 comprise two different vidyās.
XXVI (40–41). On Ch. Up. 5. 11 ff.
XXVII (42). Vidyās mentioned in connection with rites are not part of these rites.
XXVIII (43). The Vāyu and Prāna of B h. Up. 1. 5 and Ch. Up. 4. 3 are to be separated.
XXIX (44–52). The altars of the Agnirahasya chapters of the Śatapatha Brāhma a are not ritual ones, but objects of meditation.
XXX (53–54). On the body of the one engaged in meditation.
XXXI (55–56). The udgītha and other meditations apply to all śākhās.
XXXII (57). The vaiśvānara-vidyā of Ch. Up. 5. 11 ff. is a vidyā as a whole.
XXXIII (58). Vidyās about one object but differently qualified are different vidyās.
XXXIV (59). Vidyās having the same reward are optional.
XXXV (60). Vidyās providing for special desires may be accumulated or treated as optional.
XXXVI (61–66). This applies also to meditations such as the udgītha one and others.
3. 4. 1–52
I (1–17). Knowledge of Brahman does not subserve rites; it is independent.
II (18–20). This is shown by the pravrājikas (“hermits”) for whom knowledge is prescribed, not ritual.
III (21–22). Certain vidyās are not mere glorifications but actual injunctions.
IV (23–24). On the other hand certain legends are not subservient to ritual, but glorify the injunctions involved.
V (25). Thus ascetics need no ritual, only knowledge.
VI (26–27). Yet ritual action encourages the rise of a vidyā in one’s mind.
VII (28–31). Indulgences in matters of purity only apply to emergency cases.
VIII (32–35). The rites of a particular stage of life are incumbent on one who is not an aspirant to release.
IX (36–39). Those without a life stage through no fault of their own are yet entitled to knowledge.
X (40). The ascetic may not renounce his vow.
XI (41–42). If he does, he may be expiated.
XII (43). Or in certain cases excluded.
XIII (44–46). The udgītha, etc., meditations are incumbent on the priests, not the yajamāna (“patron”).
XIV (47–49). B h. Up. 3. 5. 1 dictates Silence in addition to Childlikeness and Learning.
XV (50). Childlikeness betokens innocence of mind.
XVI (51). A vidyā that produces good fortune fructifies in the present life, unless there are karmic obstacles.
XVII (52). Hence there is no binding rule as to the time of fructification.
4. 1. 1–19
I (1–2). The meditation on the Spirit is not once and for all, but is to be repeated.
II (3). The Brahman meditated upon is to be regarded as one’s own soul.
III (4). Except for the pratīka meditations.
IV (5). There the pratīkas are to be viewed as Brahman, not contrariwise.
V (6). In the udgītha, etc., meditations, the udgītha, etc., are to be viewed as the relevant deity, not contrariwise.
VI (7–10). One should sit while meditating.
VII (11). Anywhere and anytime, whenever circumstances are conducive.
VIII (12). Until death.
IX (13). One who has thus obtained knowledge is exempt from past evil karman.
X (14). As well as from past good karman, when he dies.
XI (15). This exemption applies to the results of such acts as have not yet fructified.
XII (16–17). This exemption does not apply to perpetual rites, which encourage knowledge.
XIII (18). Also those rites encourage knowledge which do not include vidyās.
XIV (19). Acts that have already fructified must be lived out, then the knower merges with Brahman.
4. 2. 1–21
I–III (1–6). On the knower’s death his faculties merge in mind, mind in breath, breath in soul, soul with the subtle elements.
IV (7). Up to this point the course of one who knows and one who does not are the same.
V (8–11). The dissolution of the subtle body takes place at release, not on death.
VI (12–14). An apparently conflicting passage in fact states that the faculties, etc., do not depart from the soul.
VII–VIII (15–16). The faculties eventually dissolve in Brahman.
IX (17). The soul of the knower passes into the heart and from there into the suśum ā channel, while that of the non-knower passes through a different channel.
X (18–19). From this suśum ā channel it passes by way of a ray to the sun, day or night.
XI (20–21). During the southern course of the sun as well as the northern.
4. 3. 1–16
I–III (1–3). The way stations on the road to Brahman.
IV (4–6). These stations include also the psychopomps.
V (7–16). Discussion of whether the Brahman reached is the effected Brahman, thus Bādari; or the supreme Brahman, thus Jaimini. The latter is in the case, while Bādarāya a further holds that those who meditated on the effected Brahman as well as on the supreme Brahman are both led to Brahman.
4. 4. 1–21
I (1–3). The soul does on release merge in its own form.
II (4). On merging it is inseparate.
III (5–7). Discussion on whether the soul merges while possessing all divine perfections, thus Jaimini; or solely possessing spirituality, thus Audulomi; Bādarāya a decides with both.
IV (8–9). The released soul is active in a state of release on the strength of its will alone, and enjoys divine sovereignty.
V (10–14). It may assume bodies at will.
VI (15–16). The soul may animate simultaneously multiple bodies; the soul retains a general knowledge.
VII (17–21). While the Lord is active in world operations, the released soul shares in his perfection, and no more returns to transmigration.
This necessary summary synopsis does not pretend to bring out the original intention of the Sūtras, nor even the original number of the topics. The later commentators hold such diverging views about both that certainty is impossible to come by. On the whole it is assumed that when Śamkara and Bhāskara agree on a topic, that view is traditionally held. If Bhāskara and Rāmānuja agree, and if Śamkara’s difference is prompted by his particular division of reality, the former view is probably more original. But this list of topics does not aim at more than to give the reader at least some table of contents of the Brahmasūtras.