In the early hours of 6 June 1944 a gliderborne party of the 2nd Ox and Bucks Light Infantry seized the bridge across the River Orne in a daring coup-de-main operation. The capture of what became known as Pegasus Bridge was seen as a textbook airborne operation, and was regarded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory as one of the most outstanding flying feats of the war. Elsewhere the British 6th Airborne Division took all of its objectives and played a vital role in securing the eastern flank of the Normandy landings.
Yet just over three months later, in an operation riddled with errors and mistakes, the British 1st Airborne Division virtually ceased to exist as a formation after an epic struggle at Arnhem. Out of over 10,000 men who landed in Arnhem less than 2,000 withdrew across the River Rhine at the end of the battle. How did Allied airborne planning go from such a successful operation as those that took place in Normandy, to the debacle at Arnhem?
Although three months may appear to be a short space of time, the Allies had fought an extremely hard and complex series of battles between D-Day and Arnhem. Of course many people are familiar with the events of Operation Market Garden, thanks to the film A Bridge Too Far, a term which has passed into common currency. In the film the commander of the British 1st Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning, refers to a string of cancelled operations that the Division had been slated to take part in since D-Day.
It is intriguing that these cancelled operations, which form something of a lineage between the successful Normandy operations and the errors of Market Garden, have received such little attention from historians. Not only do they explain how airborne planners lost sight of fundamental principles of warfare, but they represent a central spine amongst – and are irrevocably woven into – the historiography of one of the most controversial campaigns in military history. To what extent did this string of cancelled operations shape the way Operation Market Garden was planned and subsequently fought? And what can they tell us about the wider campaign?
I must confess to having more than a cursory interest in studying the airborne operations of 1944. My grandfather, Private Henry Miller, was serving in the 11th Parachute Battalion in the 1st Airborne Division. It is all too easy to relegate military history to dates, places and names, but it is also important to remember the human element. On the decisions of generals rested the fate of many thousands of men. Every cancelled operation had an impact – albeit widely varying – on thousands of men. For some operations units and formations were placed at readiness, and in some cases briefed and even assembling at their take-off airfields before the operations had been cancelled. Even before taking off for Arnhem in September 1944, the lives of the men of the 1st Airborne Division were dominated for over three months by a constant process of preparing for and then standing down from operations.
Planning for airborne operations in North West Europe did not take place in isolation. Although airborne warfare was relatively new to both Britain and the United States, both armies had developed their airborne capabilities rapidly. Airborne operations were increasingly key elements of campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, and of course in Normandy on D-Day. General Sir Bernard Montgomery, the commander of the British 21st Army Group and the commander of Allied land forces for the assault phase of Operation Overlord, was also a convert to the use of airborne troops. There is evidence that Montgomery’s planning staff and that of the commander of the British Second Army Sir Miles Dempsey had considered how to use airborne forces not only in the initial assault on D-Day, but also to reinforce the beachhead after the invasion, and then aiding the breakout.
Writing about things that did not happen is aways going to be difficult, especially if we wish to avoid ‘whataboutery’ and to remain relevant to what transpired in 1944. But I hope that it is clear that things that were thought about, and planned, can tell us much about not only the Allied approach to airborne warfare, but also Allied strategy more generally.
Many of the individuals featured in this book held higher rank after the end of the war. For simplicity personnel are referred to by the rank that they held at the time in question.
Such a complex chain of events is not always easy to explain neatly. As many of these operations overlap in time, I have decided to follow the planning of each operation in isolation to its cancellation. Therefore some of the events may at times appear to take place out of sequence. If anything, this should be an indication of how complex the situation was for the planners in the summer of 1944. We have the luxury of time to pore over records: they were working on multiple operations at once in what was a relatively short period of time. I am minded to quote the Duke of Wellington’s comments on the history of a battle being like the history of a ball.
I hope, as well, that this book shows that whilst D-Day and Arnhem have been very well covered by historians, there are almost always new sources that we can interrogate. The campaign from 6 June until 25 September 1944 lasted for over three months, but the vast majority of writing has focused on a handful of days. There are still thousands of sources in archives and museums that are yet to be interrogated, or would benefit from re-assessment.
I had hoped to write about the full gamut of operations that were planned. However, the amount of sources were so vast that the period from the end of the Battle of Normandy until before Operation Market Garden will be considered in a future publication. Equally it is not proposed to write about D-Day here, only in so much as it relates to the relevant planning of the operations under consideration.