Science is highly esteemed. Apparently it is a widely held belief that there is something special about science and its methods. The naming of some claim or line of reasoning or piece of research ‘scientific’ is done in a way that is intended to imply some kind of merit or special kind of reliability. But what, if anything, is so special about science? What is this ‘scientific method’ that allegedly leads to especially meritorious or reliable results? This book is an attempt to elucidate and answer questions of that kind.
There is an abundance of evidence from everyday life that science is held in high regard, in spite of some disenchantment with science because of consequences for which some hold it responsible, such as hydrogen bombs and pollution. Advertisements frequently assert that a particular product has been scientifically shown to be whiter, more potent, more sexually appealing or in some way superior to rival products. This is intended to imply that the claims are particularly well founded and perhaps beyond dispute. A recent newspaper advertisement advocating Christian Science was headed ‘Science speaks and says the Christian Bible is provedly true’ and went on to tell us that ‘even the scientists themselves believe it these days’. Here we have a direct appeal to the authority of science and scientists. We might well ask what the basis for such authority is. The high regard for science is not restricted to everyday life and the popular media. It is evident in the scholarly and academic world too. Many areas of study are now described as sciences by their supporters, presumably in an effort to imply that the methods used are as firmly based and as potentially fruitful as in a traditional science such as physics or biology. Political science and social science are by now commonplace. Many Marxists are keen to insist that historical materialism is a science. In addition, Library Science, Administrative Science, Speech Science, Forest Science, Dairy Science, Meat and Animal Science and Mortuary Science have all made their appearance on university syllabuses.1 The debate about the status of ‘creation science’ is still active. It is noteworthy in this context that participants on both sides of the debate assume that there is some special category ‘science’. What they disagree about is whether creation science qualifies as a science or not.
Many in the so-called social or human sciences subscribe to a line of argument that runs roughly as follows. ‘The undoubted success of physics over the last three hundred years, it is assumed, is to be attributed to the application of a special method, “the scientific method”. Therefore, if the social and human sciences are to emulate the success of physics then that is to be achieved by first understanding and formulating this method and then applying it to the social and human sciences.’ Two fundamental questions are raised by this line of argument, namely, ‘what is this scientific method that is alleged to be the key to the success of physics?’ and ‘is it legitimate to transfer that method from physics and apply it elsewhere?’
All this highlights the fact that questions concerning the distinctiveness of scientific knowledge, as opposed to other kinds of knowledge, and the exact identification of the scientific method are seen as fundamentally important and consequential. As we shall see, however, answering these questions is by no means straightforward. A fair attempt to capture widespread intuitions about the answers to them is encapsulated, perhaps, in the idea that what is so special about science is that it is derived from the facts, rather than being based on personal opinion. This maybe captures the idea that, whereas personal opinions may differ over the relative merits of the novels of Charles Dickens and D. H. Lawrence, there is no room for such variation of opinions on the relative merits of Galileo’s and Einstein’s theories of relativity. It is the facts that are presumed to determine the superiority of Einstein’s innovations over previous views on relativity, and anyone who fails to appreciate this is simply wrong.
As well shall see, the idea that the distinctive feature of scientific knowledge is that it is derived from the facts of experience can only be sanctioned in a carefully and highly qualified form, if it is to be sanctioned at all. We will encounter reasons for doubting that facts acquired by observation and experiment are as straightforward and secure as has traditionally been assumed. We will also find that a strong case can be made for the claim that scientific knowledge can neither be conclusively proved nor conclusively disproved by reference to the facts, even if the availability of those facts is assumed. Some of the arguments to support this skepticism are based on an analysis of the nature of observation and on the nature of logical reasoning and its capabilities. Others stem from a close look at the history of science and contemporary scientific practice. It has been a feature of modern developments in theories of science and scientific method that increasing attention has been paid to the history of science. One of the embarrassing results of this for many philosophers of science is that those episodes in the history of science that are commonly regarded as most characteristic of major advances, whether they be the innovations of Galileo, Newton, Darwin or Einstein, do not match what standard philosophical accounts of science say they should be like.
One reaction to the realisation that scientific theories cannot be conclusively proved or disproved and that the reconstructions of philosophers bear little resemblance to what actually goes on in science is to give up altogether the idea that science is a rational activity operating according to some special method. It is a reaction somewhat like this that led the philosopher Paul Feyerabend (1975) to write a book with the title Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. According to the most extreme view that has been read into Feyerabend’s later writings, science has no special features that render it intrinsically superior to other kinds of knowledge such as ancient myths or voodoo. A high regard for science is seen as a modern religion, playing a similar role to that played by Christianity in Europe in earlier eras. It is suggested that the choices between scientific theories boil down to choices determined by the subjective values and wishes of individuals.
Feyerabend’s skepticism about attempts to rationalise science is shared by more recent authors from a sociological or so-called postmodernist perspective.
This kind of response to the difficulties with traditional accounts of science and scientific method is resisted in this book. An attempt is made to accept what is valid in the challenges by Feyerabend and many others, but yet to give an account of science that captures its distinctive and special features in a way that can answer those challenges.