Bolt Action: Campaign: Battle of the Bulge

Whilst the Battle of the Bulge was one of the bloodiest campaigns of the war in northwest Europe, combat losses were augmented by thousands of men who fell casualty to the winter itself. Transport was also affected: roads could vanish entirely in the heavy snowfalls of late December and January, and many vehicles simply were not equipped to deal with the harsh climate.

In rules terms, areas of snow are treated as rough ground (see page 46 of the Bolt Action 2nd Edition rulebook). This means that infantry and tracked vehicles are limited to making advances moves in snow, while artillery and wheeled vehicles may not move at all.

Many of the most famous images of the Ardennes campaign, be they surviving photos or televised accounts, show the ground to be covered in thick blankets of snow. Whilst this was certainly true for the latter part of the campaign, the opening rounds actually saw the rural region dominated by mud, a legacy of the heavy autumn downpours.

In Bolt Action, mud can be treated as difficult ground or, if both players agree, the table below can be used for any vehicle or artillery unit which crosses an area of mud on any part of their move.

History is littered with examples of campaigns where the elements have caused more casualties to an army than the enemy. Cold weather and cold temperature exposure are amongst the deadliest of natural conditions a soldier can face.

For any scenario which lists frostbite as a special rule, every unit must make a morale check at the beginning of the game. If the test is failed, an infantry or artillery unit suffers one casualty for each point the morale check was failed by, whilst vehicles which fail the check are immobilized. If a vehicle is immobilized whilst off table (including outflanking) it is considered destroyed – its passengers may arrive on table on foot but suffer an additional –1 modifier for their test for entering the table.

The hazards of cold weather were well known to every army by the time of the Ardennes campaign. Whilst effective cold weather clothing and protective gear had been developed, the problem lay in the logistical challenge of getting that equipment to the front line where it was needed, in time and in sufficient quantities.

Cold weather clothing may be purchased for any unit in a scenario which includes the frostbite special rule. Cold weather clothing costs 1 pt per model in the unit, and must be bought for the entire unit. Any unit equipped with cold weather clothing may subtract 1 point from their roll for their frostbite check.

For the pilot of a ground attack aircraft, if cloud obscures the ground a target cannot be seen and identified and weapons such as cannons, rockets and small bomb loads do not stand a chance of inflicting any damage on enemy units. The terrain which lies beneath clouds also has a huge impact – undulating terrain is impossible to cater for using instrument flying techniques, and even though primitive radar altimeters were in service during World War II these would only tell a pilot how far he was from the ground directly below his aircraft at any given point; there was no warning of the hill side or cliff face directly ahead of him which was obscured in the fog.

TOP SECRET

OPERATION BODENPLATTE

Plans for an attempt to seize air superiority from the Western Allies in the skies over the Low Countries were being considered as early as September 1944, with Hitler ordering Luftwaffenkommando West to be bolstered for future operations. The big push from the Luftwaffe was originally intended to support Operation Watch on the Rhine but was made impossible by the low cloud and fog which covered the entire area.

However, with better weather forecast for early January, Goering’s Luftwaffe took to the skies en masse to support Operation Nordwind on New Year’s Day 1945. The grand German air offensive – Operation Bodenplatte (‘Baseplate’) – targeted some 16 Allied airfields in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 12 Luftwaffe fighter wings, mainly made up of Bf109s and FW190s, supported by smaller numbers of night fighters, bombers and close air support units took to the skies in a show of force which came as a complete shock to the Allies, achieving complete tactical surprise.

The success of the attacks against Allied airfields was variable at best. A combination of poor planning and inadequately trained pilots led to the Luftwaffe sustaining crippling losses from which they were simply not capable of recovering. Whilst sources vary the exact numbers will never be known, it is generally acknowledged that 200–250 pilots were killed, missing or captured. Allied losses are again impossible to confirm, but are estimated at 200–300 aircraft lost with a further 100–200 damaged.

Whilst Operation Bodenplatte was an impressive achievement given the state of Germany’s air power in January 1945, the casualties inflicted on the Allies were comparatively easy to replace whereas the losses sustained were the final nail in the coffin for the Luftwaffe. General Jagdflieger Adolf Galland summed up the failed operation with the words, ‘we sacrificed our last substance.’

In short, despite the complaints of many a soldier who had little appreciation of the hazards associated with aviation, there are meteorological conditions which exist when it is both exceptionally dangerous for a pilot to fly at low level and, just as importantly, impossible for ground targets to be visually identified. For this reason, any scenario with the poor weather rule prohibits the use of aircraft in any way, and Forward air observers may not be used.

Fog can appear rapidly and cover wide areas of ground, or can be a concentrated and localized feature which builds up as the direct result of a number of relatively unique factors. So how does this affect the soldier on the ground?

It brings similar hazards to aviation as mentioned above under ‘Poor weather’ and so eliminates the possibility of aerial support.

Then there is the matter of horizontal visibility; just like his aerial colleagues, a soldier cannot shoot at what he cannot see. Even the muzzle flashes which give a good combat indicator of the location of enemy forces during a night firefight will be largely, if not completely, suppressed by a thick blanket of fog.

The modern meteorological definition of fog places visibility at anything less than 1,000 metres; anything more than this is classified as mist. With this in mind, the effects of fog can vary between having no practical effect on the ranges considered in a game of Bolt Action, to being unable to see the other members of one’s own squad or section.

As standard, any scenario which includes fog as a special rule results in all ranges being limited to 18”. Long range remains at over half of the weapon range, not the limited visibility range. Indirect fire can fire at its normal ranges, it is the spotter who has their visibility limited to 18”. If both players agree, a different range can be selected as the limit of visibility.

As described above, fog can thicken or clear based on many factors. These might include air temperature, moisture content, wind, sunlight or local geographical disposition. If both players agree and would prefer a more fluid environment, roll a D6 at the end of each turn and consult the following table.

Defensive positions can range from complex networks of pre-prepared fortifications, right down to making do with what natural terrain is available if time does not permit more substantial preparation. For any defender, the suitability of the ground for digging in effective defensive positions was a key consideration.

Where specified in a scenario brief, some units may begin the game dug in. These units have had time to dig foxholes or other defensive positions. Dug in units can also be hidden. If terrain is not available to represent foxholes or trenches, counters can be used to highlight which units are dug in.

A dug in unit counts as being Down when shot at, even if it has not been given a Down order. If the unit is issued a Down order whilst dug in, the benefits are doubled. Being dug in offers no additional protection against enemy assaults, with the exception of tank assaults as detailed below.

Units are dug in until they leave their positions using an Advance or Run order. If counters are being used in lieu of scenery, use them as markers to record the positions of the foxholes as they can be used later in the game.

Digging in vehicles to form static defensive positions was common practice in several theatres, particularly when fuel was in limited supply. In Bolt Action a dug in vehicle counts as being in hard cover and may not move for the entire game. ‘Immobilized’ damage results count as ‘crew stunned’.

If the scenario brief allows defending units may be both dug in and hidden, representing units who have had time to camouflage their defensive positions. Hidden set up takes precedence over the dug in rule, although the dug in unit does count as down against HE. Once the hidden set up rule no longer applies, the unit reverts to using the dug in rule alone.

Simple foxholes will provide little benefit against the effects of massed, concentrated artillery bombardment. A foxhole will not protect against a direct hit from an artillery salvo, so no additional protection is given.

A foxhole will give some protection for defending infantry against armoured assault, as well as providing some positive effects to morale. However, any soldier unfortunate enough to be caught in his foxhole if a tank elects to stop on top of it and twist in place will suffer a terrible demise.

Models from dug in units automatically pass their morale check and are not moved aside when assaulted by a tank as they can simply duck down in their foxhole and allow the enemy vehicle to pass overhead. However, if a tank ends its assault move on top of any dug in models, these models are removed as casualties and the unit must make a morale check for tank assault as normal.

Digging in during a game is normally not permitted, but if both players agree then units can attempt to do so. Units attempting to dig in are given a Down order and must make an order test at the end of the turn. If the test is successful then the unit remains Down for the next turn, after which they are then dug in.

The Ardennes Offensive saw similar logistical challenges for both sides. The front line fighting occurred miles away from bases of supply, and the routes leading to the front lines were hugely inadequate for the volume of traffic which they were expected to cater for. Narrow country lanes only just wide enough for a single lane of normal traffic were now home to mile after mile of troop lorries, fuel trucks and the much wider medium and heavy tanks.

Problems were exacerbated by poor weather leading to thick mud or ice, both of which caused huge delays. Retreating troops – sometimes in a full state of panic – would also attempt to move against the flow of traffic along routes which were not wide enough. Add poor communications to the mix and now the situation is further confused by multiple units attempting to use the same routes in the belief that it has been designated for their use alone. There is little surprise, therefore, that accounts of the Battle of the Bulge from both sides detail generals dismounting from their command vehicles to personally direct traffic!

Any scenario involving the chaos in the reserves rule means that players rolling to bring their vehicles onto the table will do so with a –2 modifier rather than the standard –1. If that player has any unit off table which has the traffic direction special rule (i.e. most Military Police units), this modifier is reduced back to the normal –1. The American Traffic Direction rule is cancelled by chaos in the reserves.

By the last years of World War II, the fuel situation for the forces of Germany and Japan were becoming catastrophic. Allied bombing had targeted key areas of infrastructure resulting in fuel reserves becoming critically low, and what fuel was available was very often in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The situation was better for the Western Allies, but still presented problems. Whilst fuel supplies were certainly healthier, the forces of the Western Allies often had longer routes to negotiate to get the fuel to the front line vehicles which needed it. However, the seemingly endless demand for fuel on the front lines often resulted in the requirement for aerial transportation, which ironically resulted in a greater volume of fuel being used in transportation than was actually delivered – so great was the need for fighting units.

For any scenario which details the fuel shortage rule, each player must roll a single D6 for each motorized vehicle in his force and add 2. For example, three vehicles would result in 3D6+6. This number is the player’s fuel units. He can then divide his fuel units between his vehicles in any way he sees fit. The number of fuel units given to each vehicle must be recorded, but does not have to be declared to the opposing player. Every unit of fuel which each vehicle has allows that vehicle to move once per turn. If the vehicle remains stationary, it does not use a unit of fuel. Attempts to enter the game from off table (including unsuccessful attempts) count as movement and use up a unit of fuel. Once any vehicle uses its last unit of fuel, it is immobilized for the rest of the game. Again, this does not have to be declared to the opposing player.

Whilst in reality different vehicles had different consumption rates and might have used petrol or diesel, this gross oversimplification does at least give the player some basic idea of the challenges faced by force commanders over the prioritization of their assets. This simplification is deliberate as a good game is a fast-paced game!

Mines are explosive devices which are designed to be concealed from the enemy, and then detonated as an enemy unit passes close by or directly over. Mines can come in a variety of forms for a variety of purposes – anti-personnel mines which are designed to kill and injure personnel, for example, are very different from the more concentrated effect of anti-tank mines. Not only do the effects differ markedly but also the triggering mechanisms can be delivered in a variety of forms. Whilst the most common triggering mechanism for mines in World War II was pressure (which again would vary depending on the target), several other mechanisms could be employed such as trip wires or command initiation.

Whilst the term ‘mine’ is often used to cover Improvised Explosive Devices used by partisans and guerrillas, the rules below are intended to cover factory-built mines designed to be used by recognized military forces.

Unless specifically stated in the scenario or agreed by players beforehand, minefields are either marked or have already been discovered, therefore both players are aware of the locations and dimensions of any minefields.

The default minefield section in Bolt Action is a 6” x 6” area. Different sizes may be detailed in a scenario brief or agreed by players. If a scenario defender wishes to use minefields, they cost 50pts per section and up to two may be purchased for every 1,000 points of his force. If minefields have already been issued to the defender as part of the scenario special rules, they do count towards his total allocation, even if they do not cost any points.

When any unit (friend or foe) enters a minefield, the opponent can interrupt their movement once at any point within the minefield section, as if an Ambush had been carried out. If the unit survives, it may complete its movement after the attack. The attack itself is resolved by rolling one die to hit: a 3+ is required to hit an Inexperienced unit, a 4+ to hit a Regular unit and a 5+ for a Veteran unit. A player can force his opponent to re-roll a successful hit if the target unit are engineers or pioneers, or if a friendly unit is attempting to cross its own minefield. This re-roll is only permitted if the unit crossing the minefield is doing so on an Advance order. If any unit attempts to cross a minefield on a Run order, three dice are rolled to hit instead of one. A single unit can only be attacked by a minefield section once per turn; however, a section can attack multiple targets if crossed.

Any hits scored by a minefield are resolved with a +2 Pen value against non-armoured targets and +3 against armoured targets. In both cases, the unit suffers D3 pin markers rather than the normal 1.

A player deploying minefields may replace any anti-personnel minefields as detailed above with anti-tank minefields. This should be noted down before the game and does not need to be declared to his opponent until the first Ambush is attempted. As a greater pressure is required to detonate an anti-tank mine, infantry and artillery units may cross as normal. However, hits inflicted on a vehicle by an anti-tank mine are resolved at +5 Pen.

Anti-personnel and anti-tank mines can be used together in one minefield section. This must again be noted before the game begins, and uses up two minefield sections for each single mixed minefield section deployed – the player may lay a single anti-personnel minefield section and a single anti-tank minefield section, or may combine both into one mixed minefield section. Mixed minefields have a +2 Pen hit against infantry and artillery, and +5 Pen against vehicles.

A minefield section may be replaced with two dummy minefields. These are deployed as normal, and must be noted down before the game commences. Any unit moving through a minefield must make its normal to hit roll, but if a hit is scored then the minefield is revealed as a dummy section and counts as cleared (see rules below).

Whilst not applicable for the scenarios detailed in this book, some scenarios may call for placing mines in water. These are intended for use against boats and amphibious vehicles and so must be either anti-tank mines or dummy mines.

Some scenarios give players concealed minefields – in contravention of the Geneva Convention! The location and composition of these minefields must be noted down before the game commences, but cannot be located in the enemy set up zone unless specifically stated in the scenario brief. The minefield section is revealed as soon as any unit moves into it. For scenarios which do not specifically state the allocation of minefields, a concealed minefield counts as two normal minefield selections, in the same way as a mixed minefield.

After a minefield section has hit a unit, the opposing player rolls a single die. On the roll of a 6, the section is now cleared. A roll of only 4+ is required to clear a section if the unit hit by the mines was a vehicle with a damage value of 8 or greater.

A cleared minefield remains on the table, but due to troops having found a path through, or vehicles leaving track marking behind, hits are now scored on a 6 regardless of the quality of the unit crossing it. Only a single die is rolled, even if the unit is crossing using a Run order, and re-rolls for friendly units and engineers still apply.

Any infantry unit with at least five models inside the minefield may attempt to clear it. The unit must be given a Down order and rolls a single die. An unmodified result of 1 will result in the minefield attacking the unit (even if it is an anti-tank minefield) and an unmodified 6 is always a success. The following modifiers apply.

Indirect fire weapons may target a visible minefield section. Roll to hit as normal with the normal process for ranging in. Roll for the HE value of the weapon – if 6 hits are scored with a single attack, the minefield section is cleared. When resolving an artillery barrage, roll a die for each minefield section in range of the barrage (including concealed minefields). On the roll of a 6, that section suffers a heavy howitzer hit and is cleared if 6 hits are scored. For preparatory bombardments, roll a single die for each minefield section in the defender’s set up zone. On the roll of a 6 the minefield section is cleared.

Whilst certainly not an integral part of the iconic engagements of the Battle of the Bulge, some of the new units presented in this book use the mountaineers rule first presented on the Warlord Games website. This rule is repeated here for ease of use.

All units with the mountaineers rule treat all rough ground as open ground. The players should discuss and agree before the game if the gaming table includes some terrain that they think this rule should not apply to, such as water features and other terrain elements that obviously mountain troops would have no advantage in crossing.

MUD TABLE
D6 roll	Result
0	Buried deep: The unit cannot move for the rest of the game.
1–2	Bogged down: The unit has to stop, losing grip on the ground. The unit moves into the mud and then immediately stops (or does not move at all if it started the move in mud). The unit also suffers an extra –1 modifier to this roll the next time it moves.
3–4	Struggle: The efforts to cross this section of mud are very trouble for the vehicle's traction. Vehicles continue with their move normally, but can only move through a maximum of 6" of mud as part of their move, after which they must stop. Artillery units can only move up to 2".
5–6	Fairly solid going: The unit continues with its move normally.
Modifiers: Fully tracked vehicle: +1 Half-track: +0 Wheeled vehicle or artillery: –1

D6 roll	Result
1–2	Thickening: Reduce the visibility range by 2D6 inches (to an absolute minimum of 12")
3–4	No change
5–6	Clearing: Increase the visibility range by 2D6 inches

Veterans	+1
Inexperienced	–1
Engineers	+1
Mine-clearing gear*	+2
Per pin marker on unit	–1
* Any engineer unit may be equipped with mine clearance gear at a cost of +1pt per model