Daniel M. T. Fessler, Jason A. Clark, and Edward K. Clint
Evolutionary psychology (EP) is a paradigm, not a discipline, and from its inception, it has both drawn on and influenced practitioners in a variety of academic fields. Many chapters in this volume testify to the contributions evolutionary anthropology (EA) has made to EP. Here, rather than catalog past interplays, we underscore the positive affordances of EA for the practice of EP and vice versa.
The student of EP interested in learning what EA has to offer encounters an assortment of approaches and findings, including:
Given the range of topics addressed by EA, we cannot provide a full accounting of the interface, or potential for interface, with EP within a single chapter. We ourselves work on but a small subset of these topics, limiting our ability to comment on the full scope of EA. We instead focus on what we consider some of the most exciting and promising areas in this regard, an accounting that overtly reflects our own interests. Seeking to outline opportunities to advance the study of human behavior, we present examples of how some existing approaches are challenged by the intersection of the EP perspective and the knowledge base and methods of EA.
We begin with the study of hominid evolution through fossil remains and archeological materials. While specific paleoanthropological discoveries will often be relevant to particular EP enterprises, for the purposes of advancing EP in general, several overarching implications transcend such specifics.
Skeletal features are well preserved in the fossil record, and skeletal adaptations present ideal case studies of the transformation of traits that is the hallmark of natural selection. For example, paleoanthropologists have documented in detail the modifications of the hip, pelvis, knee, and spine that occurred in the course of the evolution of bipedality (e.g., Lovejoy, 2005). Our species' particular form of locomotion may raise discrete questions for the evolutionary psychologist, such as, for example, the correspondence between the frequency of oscillation that infants find soothing (Vrugt & Pederson, 1973) and the cadence of human walking (MacDougall & Moore, 2005); the absence of motion sickness in young infants (Gordon & Shupak, 1999), who must be carried; and the nature of locomotory experience required for the development of visual cliff responses in infants (Witherington, Campos, Anderson, Lejeune, & Seah, 2005). However, as interesting as such topics may be for the specialist, they hinge only on the fact that humans are bipedal, and do not depend on the specifics of how bipedality evolved. In contrast, the latter is relevant for all evolutionary psychologists, be they interested in locomotion or not, because it reveals the importance of path dependence in natural selection, the kludgy nature of the adaptations that natural selection constructs, and the conflicts that can arise between multiple adaptations, along with the higher-order adaptations that can evolve as a consequence. For example, the S-curve in the human spine reflects the determinative influence of the original function of the spine as a suspensory beam in a quadrupedal mammal, in contrast to its current function as a load-bearing pillar: Whereas the original design functioned efficiently in a horizontal position, the transition to bipedality required the introduction of bends in the spine to position weight over the pelvis (Lovejoy, 2005). The resulting configuration makes humans prone to lower-back injury, illustrating how path dependence can both set the stage for kludgy designs and constrain their optimality. Moreover, the combination of bipedality and pressures favoring large brain size in humans exacerbates a conflict between the biomechanics of locomotion (favoring a narrow pelvis) and the need to accommodate a large infant skull during parturition. This increases the importance of higher-order adaptations such as relaxin, a hormone that loosens ligaments during pregnancy, allowing the pelvic bones to separate.
The take-home lesson is not that understanding the human mind starts with understanding our mode of locomotion, but rather that the evolution of bipedality, a well-documented progression, reveals (a) the importance of phylogenetic history in understanding extant traits; (b) the jury-rigged nature of many adaptations; (c) the degree to which optimality can be constrained; (d) the fact that most adaptations are not isolated responses to discrete challenges, but rather the confluence of numerous evolutionary trends (opposing and synergistic), many of which are independent of ultimate function; (e) the importance of phylogenetically appropriate comparative studies; and (f) the manner in which adaptations can spawn higher-order adaptations. Though none of these observations are new to EP, in practice they are frequently overlooked, as evolutionary psychologists often adopt optimality assumptions, focusing on selective pressures that pertain to the postulated ultimate function of the trait to the exclusion of constraints and affordances that play a strong role in shaping its final form. Relative to evolutionary anthropologists (see, for example, Nunn, 2011), scholars from other disciplines who employ the EP paradigm are also more prone to either underestimate the importance of comparative studies or employ comparative evidence distant from the human phylogenetic tree that (at best) reflects analogies rather homologies. This is illustrated by the fact that, particularly in the United States, EP and comparative psychology proper remain, in practice but not in principle, distinct in both disciplinary and conceptual senses. Inattention to the points mentioned above unnecessarily limits the scope, richness, and complexity of inquiry into evolved psychology.
Emotions provide one opportunity to apply to the study of mind the phylogenetic and comparative perspectives that are central to paleoanthropology in particular and EA in general (Fessler & Gervais, 2010). For example, ethological, cross-cultural, and cross-species analyses suggest that the uniquely human emotions shame and pride are derived from ancestral pan-primate emotions that regulate dominance and subordinance in hierarchical interactions (Fessler, 1999, 2007; Weisfeld, 1999). Moreover, the coexistence of both the ancestral and the derived forms of these emotions in contemporary humans reveals the importance of serial homology in the study of mind, the process whereby traits are duplicated, with both the duplicate and the original retained in the same organism, and one or both then available for cooptation into a derived trait (Clark, 2010a, 2010b). The need for such biologically informed phylogenetic analyses of psychological adaptations is further illustrated by the case of disgust. Disgust has multiple forms, operating in such distinct domains as pathogen avoidance, sexuality, and morality (cf. Fessler & Navarrete, 2003; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). Although progress has been made in understanding how, over the course of human evolution, a single emotion came to address such diverse adaptive challenges (see, for example, Kelly, 2011), nevertheless, much remains to be done. Also of relevance here, one form of disgust, pathogen disgust, functions in part as a third-order adaptation, as disease-avoidance responses are up-regulated in a manner that compensates for the increases in vulnerability to pathogens that accompany pregnancy and preparation for implantation—changes that are themselves a second-order adaptation addressing the conflict between maternal immune defenses and the parasitic behavior of the half-foreign conceptus (Fessler, Eng, & Navarrete, 2005; Fleischman & Fessler, 2011; Jones et al., 2005). In sum, the model provided by paleoanthropologists' studies of morphological evolution provides a rich source of insights regarding analogous aspects of psychological evolution.
By its nature, paleoanthropology is concerned with the relationship between particular traits evident in a given species and particular features of the environment. Although paleoanthropologists (and evolutionary biologists more broadly) productively explore such relationships without employing the concept of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA), this notion is not inherently inconsistent with said enterprise. Evolutionary psychologists who have advanced the concept of the EEA have been careful to stress that it is not a particular time or place, but rather a set of selective pressures relevant to explaining a given trait (Symons, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). This articulates well with paleoanthropology given the role the latter can play in reconstructing the EEA for a given human trait. Notably, despite the aforementioned efforts by promoters of the EEA concept, there is a strong temptation for evolutionary psychologists to conceptualize it as a unified set of circumstances. Consider, for example, how Kanazawa introduces the concept: “This environment—African savanna where humans lived in small bands of fifty or so related individuals as hunter-gatherers—is called the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA),” (2004, p. 42). Such reification is a critical error, as, far from being unified, there are actually many EEAs, depending upon which trait is at issue (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998). For example, periovulatory reductions in caloric intake, arguably the product of an adaptive mechanism that solves the time-allocation conflict between foraging and mate-seeking in favor of the latter, are found across a wide range of mammals, including humans (Fessler, 2003). The key features of the EEA for this adaptation are the combination of food resources that require time and attention to procure and a social/spatial distribution of prospective mates wherein finding and attracting a valuable partner requires time and attention. These features occur in the environments of many mammals, likely including a long succession of hominid species. Hence, while humans' hunting and gathering on the African savanna during the Middle Paleolithic era maintained the EEA for this trait, it by no means uniquely defined it.
A careful reading of the EA literature is often fundamental to the proper reconstruction of the EEA for a given trait, a goal that, in turn, influences assessments of both function and phylogeny. Consider again the case of disgust. Disgust was clearly originally focused on the mouth, as oral incorporation of contaminated matter is a primary disgust elicitor, and both oral rejection and nausea/emesis remain characteristic responses to a broad range of elicitors, whether ingestible or not (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Seeking to explain how an emotion so centered on oral incorporation has as one of its principal domains of operation the avoidance of contact—oral or otherwise—with cues of the presence of pathogens, Kelly (2011) posits that meat-eating played a central role in the evolution of disgust. Building on prior work on the ultimate functions of dietary preferences and avoidances, Kelly reasons that, while a rich source of nourishment, meat is also a primary source of pathogens. He argues that two separate mechanisms, one regulating oral incorporation, the other focused on cues of the presence of other pathogens (e.g., ectoparasites, etc.), became “entangled,” meaning that they fused into a single adaptation in humans. This occurred, Kelly asserts, because our ancestors adopted meat-eating too quickly for more conventional physiological defenses to evolve in time. While the centrality of meat-eating in Kelly's explanation is both cogent and consonant with other evidence regarding the unique salience that meat holds for humans as both a resource and a threat, nevertheless, his account runs afoul of a realistic reconstruction of the EEA for the postulated adaptation. Paleoanthropology provides abundant evidence that meat-eating evolved over a period of at least 3 million years (McPherron et al., 2010), hence Kelly's need-for-speed explanation cannot be correct—the EEA for this trait was not merely human meat consumption, but rather meat consumption practiced by a succession of hominid species (Clark & Fessler, n.d.). This matters because if we abandon this aspect of Kelly's account, we must direct our attention to other facets of the EEA for this trait, prominent among which are the longstanding sociality of hominids and the corresponding progressive increases in encephalization, a feature that reduces the costs of brain-based (i.e., psychological) adaptations relative to physiological adaptations (Clark & Fessler, n.d.)—a pattern of likely importance in explaining many aspects of human evolved psychology.
As the above case illustrates, paleoanthropology provides vital time depth in the reconstruction of EEAs. Nevertheless, the richness of the portraits of the past that paleoanthropology can provide is necessarily limited given that past behavior cannot be observed, but rather must be inferred. Paleoanthropology thus provides one of two pillars needed to operationalize the concept of the EEA for many features of mind, the second being anthropologists' observations of contemporary small-scale societies that provide points of reference with which to approximate ancestral humans' ecological and social conditions. Traditionally, the study of small-scale societies was the heart and soul of anthropology, with cultural anthropologists playing the central role. Over the course of the past four decades, cultural anthropologists have increasingly focused on large societies, while sometimes also eschewing the objective methods—and scientific objectives—most likely to produce findings of relevance to EP. However, even as cultural anthropology has retreated some from the investigation of small-scale societies, evolutionary anthropologists have increasingly taken such groups as their central objects of study. Anthropologists—evolutionary or otherwise—thus generate a rich corpus of material offering many positive affordances for EP. When exploring a particular EP hypothesis, operationalizing the concept of the EEA can be greatly enhanced through the use of observations of life in small-scale societies in general, and extant hunter-gatherer groups in particular. The importance of this is illustrated by two topics of extensive debate in the current literature: (1) the evolution of cooperation, and (2) the relationship between disease avoidance and social attitudes.
First, viewed in comparison with the vast majority of other species, humans are remarkable for the degree to which they cooperate in large groups of unrelated individuals, a feature that must play a central role in explaining human history (Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, Chapter 30, this volume; Norenzyan, Chapter 35, this volume). Considerable disagreement surrounds the processes whereby the capacity for such cooperation arose, with postulated positions ranging from various forms of biological group selection (e.g., Sober & Wilson, 1999; Wilson, 2012), to combinations of biological and cultural group selection (e.g., Bowles, 2006), to gene-culture coevolution (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Chudek, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013), to the scaling up of mechanisms and processes operating in dyadic interactions due to evolutionarily novel increases in the scope of social life in contemporary societies (e.g., Burnham & Johnson, 2005; Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006). Recent work synthesizing diverse studies of extant hunter-gatherers indicates that such societies characteristically involve co-residence among many unrelated individuals (Hill et al., 2011) combined with high rates of contact with members of other bands (Hill, Wood, Baggio, Hurtado, & Boyd, 2014)—including ephemeral interactions (Chudek et al., 2013). Taken together, the resulting portrait of the likely social dimensions of the EEA calls into question the thesis that the evolved psychological mechanisms governing human cooperation at larger scales derive principally from kin selection and reciprocal altruism, as such a position is more consistent with an EEA characterized by high degrees of relatedness within groups, more restrictive social networks, and a paucity of short-term interactions (reviewed in Brown & Richerson, 2014).
Second, findings from EA underscore the importance of the extensive variation in ecologies and social structures likely characteristic of our species throughout its history and beyond (Foley, 1995). It is vital to understand that, for many traits of interest, the relevant features of the environment have been variable. This is because, depending on the nature of that variation, it is likely that one of two classes of adaptations will have evolved, namely, either (1) adaptations that facultatively adjust their output in light of local environmental cues or (2) adaptations for cultural acquisition. Illustrating this, one rapidly expanding area of research concerns the relationship between pathogen prevalence and social attitudes. In a series of influential papers, Fincher, Thornhill, Schaller, Murray, and colleagues have argued that pathogen prevalence predicts the extent of individualism versus collectivism (Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008) and conformism (Murray, Trudeau, & Schaller, 2011) across cultures; ingroup homophily and outgroup avoidance (Fincher & Thornhill, 2012) and resulting speciation in cultural evolution (Fincher & Thornhill, 2008); cross-national differences in personality (Schaller & Murray, 2008; Thornhill, Fincher, Murray, & Schaller, 2010); and a wide range of related social phenomena (Thornhill & Fincher, 2014). The core thesis, termed the parasite-stress theory (PST), holds that the mind contains adaptations that regulate social behavior to optimize disease avoidance (see Schaller, Chapter 7, this Handbook, Volume 1). The PST then argues that, in the relevant EEA, members of outgroups constituted a key source of unfamiliar—and thus dangerous—pathogens. However, the extent of the threat posed by pathogens varied across the ecologies inhabited by ancestral populations. As a consequence, selection produced psychological mechanisms that adjust the degree to which individuals preferentially assort with members of the ingroup, and avoid and are hostile to members of the outgroup, as a function of cues indicative of the density and virulence of socially transmitted pathogens in the local ecology. Aggregated across the members of a society, the outputs of these mechanisms then produce a wide variety of sociocultural concomitants, including phenomena as diverse as political orientation and religiosity.
The PST elegantly deploys the notion of adaptations that, by virtue of having ecological variation as a central feature of the relevant EEA, incorporate facultative adjustment to local circumstances. While the authors are to be applauded for their sophisticated thesis, and while their rapidly growing corpus of findings demonstrates that there are important phenomena to be explained here, when examined in terms of a more complete reconstruction of the EEA for the postulated adaptation, there are many reasons to doubt the theory, at least in its strictest form.
First, the PST assumes an EEA for the proposed mechanism in which (a) interactions between neighboring groups were rare and (b) such groups were sufficiently geographically and ecological disparate as to allow distinct pathogens to evolve independently in each group, such that, upon contact, members of one group would lack a history of prior exposure—and thus immunity—to the given strain. As discussed above, studies of extant hunter-gatherers indicate high rates of contact between bands. The PST concerns relations between groups that possess distinct, bounded cultural identities (termed ethnies in anthropology); as such, at first glance, interband interactions might seem irrelevant, as, in most cases, the two bands will belong to the same ethnie. However, from an epidemiological perspective, frequent interband contact unites all members of a given hunter-gatherer ethnie into a single group, as infectious disease contracted by members of one band will rapidly spread to other bands. The archeological record provides extensive evidence of long-distance trade during the Paleolithic (see Blades, 2001; Chalmin et al., 2007; d'Errico et al., 2009), indicating that both intra-ethnie and inter-ethnie contact occurred with some frequency. Viewed with regard to the interests of the various members of a group, the costs and benefits of intergroup contact are unevenly distributed. Individuals who elect to interact with members of another group (be they of the same ethnie or a different one) stand to reap the benefits of trade, as well as expanded access to territorial resources, mating opportunities, knowledge transfer, and so on. Such individuals are also at risk of both disease transfer and aggression or exploitation. Notably, while both the benefits of intergroup interaction and the risks of aggression and exploitation are primarily limited to those individuals who elect to interact with outsiders, the same is not true of the risk of disease transfer. In a world with minimal hygiene, little knowledge of disease transmission, extensive food-sharing, and intimate physical proximity, if one individual in a band contracts a transmissible illness, all members of the band become exposed, and, if bands interact regularly and band composition is fluid, then the same holds true for the entire ethnie. This creates an evolutionarily unsustainable dynamic from the perspective of the PST. For highly transmissible diseases (precisely the type assumed by the PST), if individual A interacts with outgroups and thereby both reaps fitness gains and suffers pathogen-inflicted costs, while individual B avoids outgroups but suffers the same pathogen-inflicted costs due to intragroup disease transmission from A, then A's fitness will be higher than B's fitness. Thus, following the dictum that reconstructions of the EEA for a given trait should leverage the findings of EA regarding present and past behavior, it appears that the portrait of the world of our ancestors that can be compiled using ethnographic and archeological sources is inconsistent with that EEA required for the evolution of an adaptation that would facultatively adjust attitudes toward ingroups and outgroups as a function of pathogen prevalence.
Reconstructions of EEAs should employ all relevant material. Historical and archeological evidence indicates that infectious disease decimated the New World in the initial stages of colonialism. Does this speak to the EEA required by the PST? No. Extensive direct contact between previously widely separated groups only occurred following the evolutionarily recent development of transoceanic sailing technology. Paleolithic pedestrian hunter-gatherer groups, inhabiting similar ecologies to those of their neighbors and linked to them through trade, would have coevolved with endemic pathogens, precluding the devastation recorded during historical times (R. Thornton, personal communication). Indeed, in many areas, the depopulation of Native American tribes due to European diseases is thought to have predated direct contact with Europeans (Thornton, Miller, & Warren, 1991), revealing the population-level networks that preclude both substantial intergroup variation in pathogen types and the utility of ethnocentrism and xenophobia as prophylactic measures.
Many evolutionary psychologists assume that the human mind has changed little since the Paleolithic (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1989). While this is a reasonable heuristic, a heuristic is not an inviolate rule, and EA presents evidence of rapid genetic evolution since the domestication of plants and animals (Hawks, Wang, Cochran, Harpending, & Moyzis, 2007), including genes relevant to pathogen defense (see Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles, 2010). Might life in the Neolithic therefore fit the PST's requirements for an EEA? On the one hand, agriculture, animal domestication, and increases in population density led to new diseases and large-scale epidemics (R. Barrett, Kuzawa, McDade, & Armelagos, 1998), while network size probably shrank due to lesser reliance on far-flung partners for risk management. However, trade increased dramatically (e.g., Bradley & Edmonds, 2005; Hirth, 1978; Robb & Farr, 2005). Combined with the greater transmissibility and virulence characteristic of pathogens that evolve to exploit high-density hosts (Ewald, 1994), the elevation of trade—and the increase in the profits to be reaped thereby—would have enhanced the fitness advantages of those who interacted with outgroups relative to those who eschewed doing so. Hence, while we encourage investigators to entertain the possibility of relatively recent EEAs for some traits, in this case, neither the Paleolithic nor the Neolithic provide the requisite features of an EEA for the adaptation postulated by the PST.
Earlier, we stressed the importance of comparative and phylogenetic analyses. Commendably, PST advocates have sought to employ these more than is typical in EP, arguing that the requisite social and epidemiological dynamics have precursors in other animals. However, here too, details matter. We noted previously that when evaluating comparative evidence, investigators must take phylogenetic distance into consideration. Many of the species cited by proponents of the PST are phylogenetically removed from humans, making parallels explicable in terms of analogy rather than homology. While analogies can illuminate the possibility space of adaptations, they do not aid in reconstructing the history of a postulated trait. PST advocates do note possible precursors in primates, citing Freeland (e.g., 1976), who provided initial evidence concerning the possible effects of pathogens on primate behavior and group structure. However, Freeland's hypothesis has not been tested, and the evidence is equivocal. The closest primate correlate of xenophobia and ethnocentrism is territoriality, yet territoriality appears to primarily function to protect resources rather than avoid disease, and can actually increase pathogen stress (see Nunn & Altizer, 2006).
How, then, can we account for the evidence amassed by proponents of the PST, which almost certainly reflects an important pattern of cultural differences? These correlations may reflect factors unrelated to the postulated adaptation, such as the effectiveness of government institutions (Hruschka & Henrich, 2013a) and the broad impact of differing life history trajectories (Hackman & Hruschka, 2013a). Research and debate continues (see Cashdan & Steele, 2013; Hackman & Hruschka, 2013b; Hruschka & Henrich, 2013b; Pollet, Tybur, Frankenhuis, & Rickard, in press; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014; van Leeuwen, Koenig, Graham, & Park, in press); hence, the jury is still out on these questions. However, one possibility neglected in these debates is that the correlations at issue may reflect the interaction of individual-level evolved disease-avoidance adaptations and group-level cultural evolution.
In addition to our remarkable cooperativeness, humans are unique in our reliance on socially transmitted information in addressing adaptive challenges. While a variety of adaptations likely undergird this capacity, one class in particular is relevant here. Whenever a critical challenge is present in all environments historically inhabited by humans, but differs in key attributes across environments, we can expect natural selection to have crafted domain-specific culture-acquisition mechanisms (Fessler, 2006; Fessler & Machery, 2012). Consider, for example, H. C. Barrett's work (Chapter 9, this Handbook, Volume 1) concerning dangerous animals. All environments occupied by humans contain dangerous animals. Some features, such as a sinuous legless body, prominent teeth, or large size, reliably predict the hazard posed by an animal in most environments; hence, natural selection can build sensitivity to such cues into mechanisms that address this challenge. However, many dangerous animals lack these features (e.g., scorpions). Cultural evolution involves the cumulative accretion and refinement of locally relevant information (Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, Chapter 30, this volume). Dangerous animals pose an important threat; hence, all cultures can be relied upon to contain information about avoiding or addressing endemic dangerous species. Natural selection has exploited this reliable feature of culture by crafting mechanisms that motivate and support early, rapid acquisition of cultural information regarding dangerous animals. Importantly, for the same reasons, selection can be expected to have crafted culture-acquisition mechanisms in many other domains as well. Hence, paralleling Barrett's work, similar considerations apply to the question of disease avoidance.
Disgust and related disease-avoidance motivators play a prominent role in some PST work. These responses are elicited by two distinct classes of stimuli. First, disgust is evoked by cues that, across all ecologies, have uniformly been associated with the presence of pathogens: feces, vomit, odors of putrefaction, and so on are reliable indices of disease risk, and thus appear to be either hardwired, or privileged with regard to learning (Curtis & Biran, 2001). Second, disgust is also evoked by information the meaning of which is entirely cultural in origin: For example, whether decayed or fermented items are viewed as disgusting or delectable depends in part on cultural framing (Rozin & Fallon, 1987); the same is true of the perceived disease risk of drinking untreated water, having unprotected sex, and so on. This is understandable given the parochial nature of some avenues for disease transmission, and the inventive countermeasures that cultures devise using locally available technologies. Evolved human disease-avoidance mechanisms thus contain an important culture-acquisition component. Though functional in many instances, this feature also creates an opportunity for cultural evolution to highjack this system for other purposes.
While paralleling biological evolution in a number of respects, cultural evolution importantly differs in that it does not necessarily maximize individual fitness, instead operating to maximize the spread of a given set of ideas, often by increasing the size of a corresponding culture-bearing group; this process is sometimes parallel to, and sometimes orthogonal to (or even opposed to), individual fitness maximization (see Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, Chapter 30, this volume). Relations with other groups are often a central determinant of the size of a cultural group: Ceteris paribus, belief systems that motivate their holders to direct their cooperative efforts toward ingroup members, and their exploitative efforts toward outgroup members, will outcompete belief systems that are less ethnocentric in this regard (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Neuberg & DeScioli, Chapter 28, this volume). Behavioral avoidance and a desire to expel targeted individuals are adaptive responses to persons posing a risk of disease transmission. Cultural evolution can therefore achieve group-functional (but possibly individually costly) ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility by depicting outgroup members as posing a disease risk (witness outgroup derogations such as “cockroaches,” “rats,” “scum,” or “vermin”).
Earlier, we stressed the importance of attending to trade-offs. Disease avoidance is not free. It entails time, energy, and attention costs, and comes at the expense of dietary efficiency and social exchange. We have already seen that mechanisms governing this behavior are sensitive to changes in individual vulnerability, and the same considerations of efficiency make it likely that, as is presumed by the PST, these mechanisms are calibrated in light of the incidence of disease (see Schaller, Chapter 7, this Handbook, Volume 1). If so, and if the upregulation of these mechanisms involves increased attention to, and importance placed on, socially transmitted information regarding disease, then individuals occupying environments with high pathogen prevalence will be particularly vulnerable to those factually inaccurate messages concerning disease threats posed by outgroup members that promote xenophobia and ethnocentrism. In turn, this will produce the patterns of correlations documented by PST proponents. Although the correlations alone do not adjudicate between the original PST and our alternative formulation, experimental avenues for doing so exist. To exploit the power of cultural information in navigating adaptive challenges, individuals must be credulous, as the rationale for cultural practices is often unknown or opaque (Legare & Watson-Jones, Chapter 34, this volume), while the costs of individual trial-and-error learning will sometimes be high, especially when the information concerns hazards (Boyd & Richerson, 2006; Boyd & Richerson, 2009). However, credulity entails the risk of falling victim to both manipulative actors and, as our proposal presumes, inaccurate information (Kurzban, 2007). Accordingly, we can expect selection to have crafted mechanisms that adjust credulity in light of expected benefits and costs (Fessler, Pisor, & Navarrete, 2014). Cues of the prevalence of a given class of hazards should therefore shift the balance toward greater credulity in that domain. Specifically, our proposal predicts that individuals living in (or, perhaps, who were raised in) high-pathogen environments should evince elevated credulity toward cultural information relevant to disease avoidance. This is a testable prediction.
Whether our proposal is correct or not, this discussion serves to illustrate a number of important points central to the intersection of EP and EA. The first of these concerns the distinction between evoked culture and transmitted culture. Although classically defined in anthropology as information acquired through learning from one's group, the term “culture” is often used simply to refer to behavioral and psychological features that are shared within a group but differ across groups—whether or not there is evidence that such patterns stem from socially transmitted information. Tooby and Cosmides (1992) noted that such commonalities need not be the product of such information, but can instead result from the output of shared adaptations responding to the same environmental input, a pattern that they termed evoked culture, in contrast to transmitted culture. Hence, the PST argues that patterned differences across groups that correlate with differences in pathogen prevalence constitute evoked culture, being the aggregate of the output of each individual's biologically evolved disease-avoidance mechanisms. In contrast, the alternative explanation that we have proposed assumes that such patterned differences constitute transmitted culture, as individuals acquire the given beliefs and attitudes by learning them from other members of their group. Note, however, that, in both models, both biologically evolved psychological adaptations and processes of cultural evolution must be adduced.
In the PST, psychological adaptations generate attitudes toward ingroup versus outgroup members, traditional versus novel practices, and so on, but such adaptations do not create specific beliefs or practices; rather, these must be the product of cultural evolution. Religious fundamentalism, for example, may exhibit common features the world over, and may hold particular appeal for individuals in high-pathogen environments, but the identities of the deities, the rituals performed for them, and so on must all necessarily be the product of transmitted culture; the PST seeks to explain why some beliefs are more attractive than others in a given environment, but it in no way promotes the (untenable) notion that evolved mechanisms specify the details of beliefs. Our proposal that cultural evolution promotes within-group solidarity by exploiting psychological disease-avoidance mechanisms similarly does not presume a tabula rasa mind, instead arguing that an adaptation that exists specifically for the purpose of acquiring cultural information in a particular domain can be hijacked such that it operates in ways that do not serve its ultimate function.
Viewed more broadly, in both proposals, psychological adaptations create attractors (Sperber, 1996) such that some ideas are more likely to be attended to, acquired, retained, and transmitted than other ideas, thereby influencing which possibilities succeed and which fail in the marketplace of ideas (see Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, Chapter 30, this volume). Thus, as this case illustrates, as tempting as it is to interpret the dichotomy between evoked and transmitted culture in terms of nature versus nurture, doing so is a grave misstep—there are likely few cases in which evoked culture alone can explain humans' rich beliefs and practices, while even what seem the purest cases of transmitted culture will necessarily involve an underlying set of evolved adaptations. Moreover, while we have argued in the above case that the relevant adaptations focus on information acquisition, the set of likely possibilities is far larger than this, as cultural evolution often exploits or bootstraps evoked preferences and ideas produced by a variety of adaptations. For example, military history reveals increasing refinement of procedures for recruitment, training, and deployment of troops, techniques that harness the evolved mechanisms that generate small-group affiliation in the service of fielding effective armies of millions (Richerson & Boyd, 1999); likewise, incest taboos and, more broadly, marriage rules (key components of the social structures of small-scale societies) extrapolate sentiments generated by evolved inbreeding-avoidance mechanisms; and so on.
Consonant with the complexity described above, neither cross-cultural variation nor cross-cultural uniformity is uniquely indicative of the processes generating observed patterns. Variation can reflect divergent pathways of cultural evolution acting in different societies, or it can reflect diverse evoked cultures produced by divergent physical or social ecologies. Uniformity can reflect uniform functioning of panhuman adaptations across different ecologies, or it can reflect convergent cultural evolution. In exploring these possibilities, the question of the relevant EEA again becomes central. Is it likely that variation in the relevant features of the environment characterized the EEA required for a postulated adaptation? If so, then selection may well have crafted mechanisms for facultative adjustment, in which case evoked culture may play a central role in cross-cultural variation. For example, due to differing ecologies and degrees of intergroup competition, the environments occupied by ancestral populations will have varied in rates of extrinsic mortality and the reliability of resources. Such variation is directly linked to fitness, and therefore likely favored adaptations that calibrate future orientation, risk-taking, mating strategy, parental investment, cooperativeness, and aggression in light of local circumstances. This topic has been productively explored in EP, often by evolutionary anthropologists (see Del Giudice, Gangestad, & Kaplan, Chapter 2, this Handbook, Volume 1; Mace, Chapter 22, this Handbook, Volume 1). When viewed at the level of societies, the resulting evoked cultures may drive much observed variation along these and related dimensions. In contrast, the Neolithic Revolution brought about forms of social organization and related adaptive challenges that were largely unprecedented. These radical departures make it likely that corresponding axes of cultural variation reflect a greater proportion of transmitted relative to evoked culture. For example, although hunter-gatherer groups vary in the degree to which individuals must defend resources against theft, or the degree to which present labor yields returns far in the future, these considerations loom vastly larger in pastoralist versus agriculturalist societies. The correspondence between these modes of subsistence and locally functional values and social orientations (Edgerton & Goldschmidt, 1971) is therefore best explained principally in terms of cultural evolution (albeit plausibly bootstrapping evolved mechanisms). Likewise, cultural evolution likely applies in the case of adjacent regions in which people pursue either rice or wheat agriculture: These crops entail different levels of interdependence, and reliance upon each is matched by corresponding differences in social orientation (Talhelm et al., 2014). Lastly, phylogeny is again important, albeit here in terms of the histories of the cultures at issue, as cultural phylogenetic inertia (driven by the self-reinforcing nature of institutions and values) can create differences between groups that persist after the respective selective pressures have vanished (e.g., differences between formerly pastoralist and formerly agriculturalist U.S. subcultures—Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).
As the above examples illustrate, while the complexity of the relationships between biological and cultural evolution makes the investigator's task more challenging, the range of possibilities means that there is much to explore in any area of behavior. We view all of these as within the purview of EP. At a minimum, questions of cultural variation, uniformity, and the causes thereof must always be considered given the risk that reliance on parochial samples may lead to erroneous assumptions of universality (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010); indeed, some of the most compelling EP research has long contained a substantial cross-cultural component (e.g., Buss, 1989). More broadly, given that we are a highly social species that is fundamentally reliant on socially transmitted information, many processes operating outside the skull fall squarely within the mandate of EP. We are thus encouraged by ventures, such as the PST, in which nonanthropologists increasingly explore such dynamics.
Given the principal audience for this book, the above discussion focuses on how EA can enhance EP. The chapter would be incomplete, however, without considering how EP can enhance EA.
Central to EA research exploring gene-culture coevolution (see Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, Chapter 30, this volume) is a focus on the question of when it pays to imitate successful individuals versus imitate the majority, as the consequences of these choices ramify across diverse social phenomena. Though defined in behavioral terms, these are psychological processes, hence EP can illuminate them. Although investigators have begun to explore cues operating in such imitation (e.g., Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012; Chudek, Muthukrishna, & Henrich, Chapter 30, this volume), the underlying psychological mechanisms remain largely unexplored. Earlier, we stressed the importance of emotions as evolved drivers of behavior, yet the psychology of cultural imitation remains largely divorced from the psychology of affect. Likewise, we emphasized the importance of understanding adaptations as kludgy mechanisms colored by their phylogeny, yet, beyond laudable efforts to compare learning biases across humans and apes (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2012), no research addresses how the structure of learning mechanisms reflects their evolution. Lastly, the nature and ramifications of domain-specific culture-acquisition mechanisms remain largely overlooked. There are thus many ways in which EP can further gene-culture coevolutionary EA.
The late introduction of EP into work on gene-culture coevolution reflects the centrality of population-level models in the latter field. In contrast, EP shares with human behavioral ecology (HBE) a focus on individual behavior. However, HBE differs from EP in that it generally eschews exploration of mechanisms (psychological or otherwise) in favor of outcome measurements used to test optimality predictions. Far from engendering harmony, the shared focus on individual behavior instead witnessed acrimonious debates between proponents of HBE and advocates of EP (Smith, Borgerhoff Mulder, & Hill, 2001). Central to these was the criticism by the latter that HBE's assumption that behavior maximizes fitness—termed the behavioral gambit—is unreasonable in highly variable contemporary environments. The behavioral gambit is problematic, advocates of EP argued, given the combination of the domain-specific nature of adaptations and the slow rate of their evolution relative to the rapidity of recent socio-ecological change (i.e., the problem of evolutionary disequilibrium, or adaptive lag). Proponents of HBE, in return, criticized practitioners of EP for underestimating both the range of environmental variation characteristic of our species' history and the attendant adaptive plasticity to be expected of behavior. Advocates of EP pointed to the apparently maladaptive nature of much contemporary behavior; supporters of HBE countered that fitness outcomes cannot be merely presumed. And so on.
While outcome measurement remains the central pillar of HBE, behavioral ecologists increasingly recognize the importance of attending to mechanisms, as (a) doing so illuminates trade-offs and other constraints on optimality ignored by the behavioral gambit (Monaghan, 2014), and (b) cultural evolution can account for the particular form of a local configuration (via cultural phylogeny), account for behavior that may be maladaptive at the individual level but adaptive at the group level (Brown, 2013), and, given the possibility of adaptive lag in cultural evolution itself, account for behaviors that may be maladaptive at both the individual and group levels (Mace, 2014).
Against the above backdrop, Nettle, Gibson, Lawson, and Sear (2013) recently advocated employing the behavioral gambit in HBE until it fails in a given case, and only then resorting to the examination of mechanisms. While their prescription for HBE is defensible, it unnecessarily limits the range of phenomena that HBE addresses. HBE presents polished methods and strategies for assessing real-world behavior and its somatic correlates, tools that can be productively deployed in exploring many of the challenges facing societies today. Contemporary epidemics of addictions to alcohol, tobacco, and drugs of abuse, or the spread of obesity, osteoarthritis, or cardiovascular disease—to name but a few—are fitness-reducing behaviors that cry out for the careful methods of HBE. Happily, some of these same investigators are beginning to explore such problems from a decidedly EP angle (cf. Pepper & Nettle, 2014), investigating, for example, how evolutionarily novel environments present cues to evolved mechanisms that calibrate future discounting in light of mortality risk (Nettle, Coyne, & Colléony, 2012). Whether explicitly acknowledged or not, HBE is thus starting to expand its scope, and its impact, by incorporating EP—a promising trend.
Having examined ways in which EP can benefit EA, we return to the central thrust of this chapter, our effort to encourage nonanthropologists who practice EP to take advantage of EA to enhance their research. Exhortations are most effective when accompanied by road maps, hence we close by discussing tangible steps toward this end.
First, consonant with our emphasis on the importance of plausible reconstructions of EEAs, regardless of discipline, evolutionary psychologists should take full advantage of the rich literatures in paleoanthropology and comparative psychology (especially primatology), as well as the ethnographic and behavioral-ecological depictions of contemporary small-scale societies in general, and of hunter-gatherer societies in particular. Granted, some reliable assumptions about life in the worlds of our ancestors can indeed be made on the basis of casual observation alone (e.g., babies were helpless and required care; paternity could not be determined with certainty; etc.). However, in many cases, the relevant facts cannot be so readily inferred. When this applies, scientific due diligence in EP should include conscientious efforts to utilize available literatures to reconstruct the relevant EEAs and plausible phylogenies, a principle that editors and reviewers—regardless of discipline—should enforce.
Second, of relevance to the above, an important scholarly resource that is arguably both the most accessible to, and the most underutilized by, evolutionary psychologists is the Electronic Human Relations Area Files (eHRAF), a collection of digitized ethnographies spanning the full range of human societies. This remarkable archive allows for comparisons relevant not only to attempts to reconstruct EEAs (e.g., Wrangham & Glowacki, 2012), but, in addition, efforts to test for cultural patterns predicted to arise from postulated psychological adaptations (e.g., Fessler et al., 2014), examine hypotheses concerning large-scale phenomena (e.g., Kline & Boyd, 2010), and pursue similar goals that go far beyond questions of EEAs.
Third, while the eHRAF provides a valuable avenue for testing a broad range of hypotheses, because the information contained therein was collected for a wide variety of reasons, investigators will often find that there is no substitute for direct measurement of behavior. Importantly, as we hope to have conveyed, rapid, evolutionarily recent culture-based changes in lifestyle constitute both a challenge and an opportunity for the evolutionary psychologist. Small-scale societies in which state regulation of behavior is minimal, kinship and longstanding social ties are central pillars of the social structure, economic activities are intimately linked to subsistence, access to health care—including contraception—is limited, and life is less awash in the sea of global electronic media provide important points of contrast for studies conducted in large-scale technologically sophisticated societies. Increasingly, evolutionary anthropologists working in small-scale societies are incorporating the EP paradigm into their work, seeking to test hypotheses—such as the facultative calibration of sexual and emotional jealousy in light of paternal investment (Buss, Larsen, Westen, & Semmelroth, 1992)—that predict patterned differences or similarities across divergent cultures (e.g., Scelza, 2014). Often, such work is collaborative, incorporating the complementary expertise of scholars from multiple disciplines (e.g., Bryant & Barrett, 2007). Indeed, as is evident in the composition of this edition of the Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, cross-disciplinary collaborations and exchanges are increasingly generating a fertile syncretic paradigm in the evolutionary behavioral sciences. The future of the relationship between evolutionary psychology and evolutionary anthropology is thus a bright one indeed.