Thanks to Elizabeth Beaumont for research assistance and to Beaumont and Joshua Cohen for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. International Herald Tribune, 2 February 1996, News section.
2. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 89, 76. See also Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989). It should be noted that Kymlicka himself does not argue for extensive or permanent group rights for those who have voluntarily immigrated.
3. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Liberalism and the Right to Culture,” Social Research 61, 3 (Fall 1994): 491.
4. For example, Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?,” Political Theory 20, 1 (1992): 105–39.
5. Okin, “Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions,” Ethics 108, 4 (July 1998): 661–84.
6. For example, Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture and Multicultural Citizenship (esp. chap. 8). Kymlicka does not apply his requirement that groups be internally liberal to those he terms “national minorities,” but I will not address that aspect of his theory here.
7. See, for example, Kirti Singh, “Obstacles to Womens’ Rights in India,” in Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, ed. Rebecca J. Cook (Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 375–96, esp. pp. 378–89.
8. I cannot discuss here the roots of this male preoccupation, except to say (following feminist theorists Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Jessica Benjamin, and, before them, Jesuit anthropologist Walter Ong) that it seems to have a lot to do with female primary parenting. It is also clearly related to the uncertainty of paternity, which technology has now counteracted. If these issues are at the root of it, then the cultural preoccupation with controlling women is not an inevitable fact of human life but a contingent factor that feminists have a considerable interest in changing.
9. See, for example, Arvind Sharma, ed., Women in World Religions (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987); John Stratton Hawley, ed., Fundamentalism and Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
10. See Carol Delaney, Abraham on Trial: The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Note that in the Qur’anic version, it is not Isaac but Ishmael whom Abraham prepares to sacrifice.
11. New York Times, 5 October 1996, A4. The role that older women in such cultures play in perpetuating these practices is important but complex and cannot be addressed here.
12. New York Times, 26 June 1997, A9.
13. International Herald Tribune, 2 February 1996, News section.
14. New York Times, 12 March 1997, A8.
15. This practice is discussed in Henry S. Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), esp. pp. 240–43, 262–63, 282–84.
16. Agence France Presse, 18 May 1997, International News section.
17. See, however, Bhikhu Parekh’s “Minority Practices and Principles of Toleration,” International Migration Review (April 1996): 251–84, in which he directly addresses and critiques a number of cultural practices that devalue the status of women.
18. Sebastian Poulter, “Ethnic Minority Customs, English Law, and Human Rights,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 36, 3 (1987): 589–615.
19. Amy Gutmann, “The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, 3 (Summer 1993): 171–204.
20. Mahnaz Afkhami, ed., Faith and Freedom: Women’s Human Rights in the Muslim World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Valentine M. Moghadam, ed., Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Susan Moller Okin, “Culture, Religion, and Female Identity Formation” (unpublished manuscript, 1997).
21. For one of the best and most recent accounts of this, and for legal citations for the cases mentioned below, see Doriane Lambelet Coleman, “Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma,” Columbia Law Review 96, 5 (1996): 1093–1167.
22. New York Times, 2 December 1996, A6.
23. See Coleman, “Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism.”
24. See, for example, Nilda Rimonte, “A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence against Women in the Asian-Pacific Community and the Cultural Defense,” Stanford Law Review 43 (1991): 1311–26.
25. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 165.
26. Ibid., pp. 168–72, 195–98.
27. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 92.
28. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, pp. 171–72.
29. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 153, 165.
30. See, for example, Amartya Sen, “More Than One Hundred Million Women Are Missing,” New York Review of Books, 20 December 1990.
31. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 239–62.
32. New York Times, 12 October 1996, A6. Similar views were expressed on National Public Radio.
1. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 223–24.
1. Okin, this volume, p. 11.
2. Ibid., p. 22.
3. Ibid., pp. 13–14. For people of faith, Okin’s “founding myths” are not myths at all.
4. Qur’an, 4:1; 59:13.
5. Ibid., 2:35–36.
6. For more on patriarchal interpretations affecting women, see my “Islam, Law and Custom,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy 12, 1 (1997): 1–44.
7. For a discussion of how Orientalist colonialist attitude affected various populations, especially women, see Rana Kabbani, Imperial Fictions (London: Pandora, 1994), esp. preface to New Edition. See also Marnia Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence (New York: Routledge, 1994), esp. chaps. 1–3 and 6.
8. Okin, this volume, pp. 9–10, 14–15.
9. For more on this, see my “Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 24, 1 (1992): 1–27, esp. 4–7, 21–24.
10. For more on Muslim women mujtahids (i.e., those who engage in ijtihad), see my “Islamic Law and Muslim Women in America,” in One Nation under God? Religion and American Culture, ed. Marjorie Garber and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (New York: Routledge, 1999).
11. Al-Hibri, “Islamic Constitutionalism and the Concept of Democracy,” pp. 6–7. See also al-Hibri, “Islam, Law and Custom,” pp. 6–7.
12. Qur’an, 49:13
13. Al-Hibri, “Islam, Law and Custom,” pp. 6–7.
14. For an excellent discussion of this phenomenon, see the article by David Smolin, “Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of Cultural Genocide? The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender,” Journal of Law and Religion 12, 1 (1995–96): 143–71.
15. Ibid., pp. 165–67.
16. Ibid., p. 165.
17. Okin, this volume, p. 21.
18. Ibid., p. 24.
19. Ibid., p. 21.
20. All personal status codes in Muslim countries recognize the right of the wife to judicial divorce for reason of harm. Some countries defined harm specifically to include verbal abuse. For more on this, see al-Hibri, “Islam, Law and Culture,”p. 13 n. 58. Furthermore, traditional jurists, such as the tenth-century jurist Ibn Hazm, have whole chapters on the punishment of Qisas. Qisas punishments are based on the biblical/Qur’anic principle of “an eye for an eye.” They are applied only in specific kinds of crimes when the victim declines to forgive or accept monetary damages. See al-Hibri, “The Muslim Perspective on the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 29 (June 1996): 1726–30. For example, according to Ibn Hazm, a man who intentionally harms a woman (even if she is his wife) by causing a tear to the opening of her vagina will be punished by the infliction on him of a similar tear in the corresponding area of his body. Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhalla Bi al-Athar (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah; reprint, 1988), 11:88. Numerous other types of injuries and punishments are detailed in Ibn Hazm’s chapter on Qisas.
21. On this point, see, e.g., Ibn Hazm, Al-Isal fi al-Muhalla Bi al-Athar, pp. 8, 423–24 (quoting and commenting on Qur’anic verse 3:104, which enjoins Muslims to promote the good and prohibit evil).
22. Ibid.
23. Qur’an, 3:104.
24. For more on this point, see, e.g., Taha Jabir al ‘Alwani, The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam, 2d ed. (The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1996), esp. pp. 91–107.
25. For one account of this incident, see Subhi Mahmassani, Al-Awda’ al-Tashri’iyah Fi al-Duwal al-Arabiyah, 3d ed. (Beirut: Dar al-‘Ilm li al-Malayin, ed. 1965), p. 159.
1. I have developed this argument is greater detail in “Against Collective Rights,” in Multicultural Questions, ed. Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
2. Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,’ in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 58–59 (my emphasis).
3. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 149.
4. Ibid.
1. Paolo Mantegazza, The Sexual Relations of Mankind, trans. Samuel Putnam (New York: Eugenics Publishing Company, 1938), p. 99.
2. Susannah Heschel, “Jüdisch-feministiche Theologie und Antijudaismus in christlich-feministicher Theologie,” in Verdrängte Vergangenheit, die uns bedrängt: Feministische Theologie in der Verantwortung für die Geschichte, ed. Leonore Siegele-Wenschkewitz (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1988), pp. 54–103.
3. Humphrey Carpenter, A Serious Character: The Life of Ezra Pound (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), p. 362.
4. Gabriel Groddeck, De Judaeis praeputium attrahentibus ad illustrandum locum I, Cor. VII. 18 (Leipzig, 1690), reprinted in Horae hebraicae et Talmudicae, ed. Christianus Schoettgenius (Dresden: Thomam Fritsch, 1733), p. 1163 (flesh); p. 1166 (small number of Jews).
5. Edward O. Laumann, Christopher M. Masi, and Ezra W. Zuckerman, “Circumcision in the United States: Prevalence, Prophylactic Effects, and Sexual Practice,” Journal of the American Medical Association 277 (1997): 1052–57.
6. J. R. Taylor, A. P. Lockwood, and A. J. Taylor, “The Prepuce: Specialized Mucosa of the Penis and Its Loss to Circumcision,” British Journal of Urology 77 (1996): 291–95.
7. Helene Deutsch, The Therapeutic Process, the Self, and Female Psychology: Collected Psychoanalytic Papers, ed. Paul Roazen (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), pp. 49–61.
1. See Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im and Francis M. Deng, eds., Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1990); and Abdullahi A. An-Na‘im, ed., Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: Quest for Consensus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992).
2. Other sources include the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights of 1981, the ILO Conventions of 1957 and 1989, as well as the European Framework Convention of 1995.
1. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 36.
2. Ibid., p. 84.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. Ibid., p. 194.
5. Ibid., p. 36.
1. I discuss this literature in “Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy,” in Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the Mobility of People and Money (New York: The New Press, 1998).
2. See, for instance, “Whose City Is It? Globalization and the Formation of New Claims,” in Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents.
1. New York Times, 18 November 1998, A7.
I am grateful to Joshua Cohen, Catharine MacKinnon, and Martha Nussbaum for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
1. Of course there can be tensions between minority cultures and other equality concerns, for example the interest in racial equality; I restrict my discussion to sex equality here.
2. The term “religious institutions” can cover many things—from churches and temples themselves, to religious schools, to private sphere employers who act on their religious convictions. I am deliberately leaving the term vague here.
3. American law makes the basic prohibitions on employment discrimination inapplicable where religion, sex, or national origin is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e). The prohibition is generally inapplicable “to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” 42 USC 2000e-1.
4. Of course the American Constitution applies only to the state, and not to private institutions; hence the asymmetry thesis has its force when government goes beyond the Constitution to apply a prohibition on sex discrimination to most private institutions but not to religion.
5. See EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 856 F. Supp. 1 (DDC 1994), affirmed, 83 F.2d 455 (DC Cir. 1994).
6. Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7563 (15 May 1998).
7. See the discussion in Okin, supra.
8. See, e.g., Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994).
9. EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1994).
10. To say this is not to deny that norms of sex equality are often an outgrowth of religious beliefs as well, nor is it to offer a general view about whether the world’s religions promote or deny sex equality; it is doubtful that any general view would make much sense.
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chaps. 1 and 2.
12. Employment Division, Department of Human Services v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Technically, Smith holds that a facially neutral law will be upheld so long as it has a “rational basis,” unless it is discriminatorily motivated. The Court did not overrule Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state may not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired because she would not work on Saturday) or Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing Amish teenagers to be exempted from a requirement of school attendance until the age of sixteen); but it did read those cases extremely narrowly. It should be noted that the Smith decision was surprising as well as controversial, and that it remains an object of continuing debate, not only in political and academic circles but also within the Supreme Court itself.
13. In EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (DC Cir. 1994), the court held, without much explanation, that Smith did not undermine previous holdings that there was an exception for ministers from the general sex discrimination law.
1. For my own views, see “Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective,” in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
1. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2. Ibid., pp. 35–44.
3. For Kymlicka’s analysis of this case, see ibid., pp. 43–44.
4. See D. S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), esp. pp. 93, 115, 119, and 124–55.
5. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 161, discussing Hofer v. Hofer, 13 DLR (3d) 1 (1970).
6. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 82–92.
7. Ibid., p. 23. In the past Kymlicka did acknowledge this range of problems associated with common land—see his book Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 144–46 and 197—but his more recent defense of cultural rights omits them.
8. 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (1977). The Supreme Court held that the tribe had sovereign immunity from suit under the Indian Civil Rights Act and dismissed all claims against the individual defendant on grounds that the ICRA did not create a private cause of action upon which the plaintiffs could sue.
9. The tribe’s rule also prohibited the second child from ever being naturalized as a member of the tribe. 98 S.Ct. at 1674.
10. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 41–42.
11. Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–73, 40–41 n. 16.
12. K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in Gutmann, Multiculturalism, pp. 149–63, 157.
I am grateful to Joshua Cohen, Charles Larmore, Michael McConnell, Richard Posner, Richard Ross, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for their comments on an earlier draft, and to Abner Mikva, Sara Nussbaum, Stephen Schulhofer, and Arnold Wolf for related discussions of the history of Judaism. For further clarification of my own views about religion, see my “Judaism and the Love of Reason,” in Among Sophia’s Daughters: Reflections on Philosophy, Feminism, and Faith, ed. Marya Bower and Ruth Groenhout (forthcoming).
1. The salient exceptions are John Stuart Mill and John Rawls (see his “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” University of Chicago Law Review 64, 3 [1997]: 765–807).
2. For this reason, Reform and Reconstructionist Jews carefully avoid the masculine pronoun in referring to God, either replacing it by “you,” changing third person to second, or simply repeating the word “God.” Nor is this simply a revisionist ploy: many classic sources (for example, the central prayer “Adon Olam”) depict God as without body, therefore without gender. For discussion of the history of Reform Judaism on issues of both feminism and cosmopolitanism, see my “Judaism and the Love of Reason.”
3. My use of these terms follows that of John Rawls.
4. Mill’s understanding of Calvinism is superficial; he does not understand, for example, that the absolute character of God’s sovereignty strips earthly monarchs of their claim to absolute rule; thus Calvinism supported struggles for liberal republicanism in Holland, Scotland, and New England.
5. I believe judgments about polygamy should be highly contextual. In some circumstances, a woman’s choice to enter a polygamous marriage should be seen as that, and respected. For example, I believe that the United States behaved unwisely, and on the basis of prejudice and superstition, in its assault on Mormon polygamy, in the face of evidence that Mormon women freely endorsed the system. In Kerala in South India, polygamous marriages for women have historically been one factor in women’s attaining higher status and a better life quality than they enjoy in other regions. In the case of Hindu polygamy, however, which was so closely bound up with a more general denial of marital consent and with a denial to women of educational and employment opportunities, the state was probably correct in taking the step it took. It was understandable that the state allowed polygamy to remain legal for Muslims, given the more central place of polygamy in the Islamic tradition and the special sensitivity of minority rights; and yet in principle the change should not have been made in a way that discriminated among religions.
6. Two other changes introduced by the reforms—the abolition of child marriage and the granting to Hindu women of a right of divorce—were also attacked by Hindu leaders on free exercise grounds. In the case of divorce, one should not grant that a substantial burden has been applied. It is never a legitimate instance of free exercise to compel another person to obey a religious commandment against his or her will. The case of child marriage is more complicated, as is any case involving parents’ control over the religious upbringing of young children. Either we should say that denying parents the right to marry off their young daughters without consent imposes no substantial burden on their free exercise, or we should grant that it does so, but insist (as with polygamy) that the state had a compelling interest in the change.
7. None of the reforms has been adequately enforced. Child marriage remains common in some regions; dowry giving is ubiquitous, as is the associated violence that the laws aimed to curtail; and the rate of polygamy among Hindus is exactly the same as among Muslims (both around 5.8 percent).
8. I understand these goals as a set of capabilities or opportunities, not actual functions: thus if religions teach that their members should not vote, or if a given religious order imposes on its members a vow of poverty, or silence, or urges strenuous fasting, these restrictions do not run afoul of my understanding of basic political principles, so long as the political conception continues to extend to all citizens the full menu of rights and opportunities, and the choice to enter the religious group is fully voluntary.
9. By this I mean just that, opportunity: i.e., jobs are open to women on an equal basis, women are not threatened or intimidated when they attempt to go out and work (as they often are in India), and the like. I do not mean that the state should promote female employment; indeed I think the state should make sure women really have a choice in this matter—for example, by taking the financial value of domestic labor into account when calculating settlement after divorce, a suggestion that is central to Okin’s argument in Justice, Gender, and the Family.
Many thanks to Joshua Cohen and Cass Sunstein for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of both my essay and my reply, and to Elisabeth Hansot and David Tyack, for their support and inspiration as I embarked upon writing the reply.
1. For an extreme example of enculturation for servitude, see Elinor Burkett, “God Created Me to Be a Slave,” New York Times Magazine, 12 October 1997, pp. 56–60. Burkett reports of Mauritania’s ninety thousand slaves that “[t]he possibility of rebellion, like the possibility of a world made up entirely of free men and women, is inconceivable among people who have lost their collective memory of freedom” (p. 57). I shall discuss explanations of less extreme examples of indoctrination into subordinate status below.
2. See, for example, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) and Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
3. Susan Moller Okin, “Liberty and Welfare: Some Issues in Human Rights Theory,” in Human Rights, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, NOMOS XXIII (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 230–56.
4. For a recent argument to this effect, see James Hamilton, Channeling Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
5. The chairman of the religious council in Jerusalem, Rabbi Yizhak Ralbag, was recently quoted as resisting the inclusion of Orthodox women, as well as all non-Orthodox Jews, on the rabbinical councils that make many important rulings in Israel, because such inclusion “gives them legitimacy” (“Battle Looms in Israel over ‘Mixed’ Religious Councils,” New York Times, 2 December 1998, A3). Of course, there are many Jews in Israel and elsewhere who think more like Nussbaum than like this, but one cannot reasonably claim the stances of Jews at the antifeminist end of the spectrum as “defective historical practices” and the stances of those at the feminist end as “a more authentic [or orthodox] realization of Judaism.”
6. See, for example, Abdullahi An-Na‘im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Azizah al-Hibri, “Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women’s Rights,” American University Journal of International Law and Policy 12, 1 (1997): 1–44.
7. Of course, this was only her impression, but at least she, unlike Western feminists who defend polygamy as good for women, lives in the midst of many women in polygamous marriages and is more likely to know what they think.
8. Avishai Margalit, “Israel: The Rise of the Ultra-Orthodox,” New York Review of Books, 9 November 1989, pp. 38–44.
9. For explanation of this point, see Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation: A Call for Global Action (New York: Rainb and Women, Ink., 1995), p. 9.
10. On adaptive preferences in general, see, for example, Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and Cass Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), chaps. 1–2. On such preferences and self-conceptions in women, see, for example, J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), esp. pp. 14–17. On adaptive preferences specifically in the context of Third World women, see Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985), chap. 6 and appendix B; Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1997), chap. 1; Martha Nussbaum, “Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Options,” in Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2000), chap. 2.
11. For an excellent autobiographical account that mentions all of these factors, see Narayan, Dislocating Cultures, chap. 1, esp. pp. 6–12.
12. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 404 U.S. 872 (1990).
13. See Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 89–90, for discussion of how U.S. courts have been unwilling to make such judgments.
14. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 199–200.
15. Recently, after I taught classes on Luther’s and Calvin’s ideas about religion and politics, a college senior who had attended a public high school in an affluent suburb came up to me and asked, “Did these people’s ideas actually have much effect on anyone?”