Up to this point, this book has explored US presidential decision making. Focusing on US leadership has made intuitive sense as the United States is the lone superpower and main guarantor of the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, given the democratic and open information environment, extensive evidence is available to support such an investigation. But if the argument advanced heretofore is correct, we should expect similar dynamics to manifest elsewhere. To briefly investigate this proposition, this last empirical chapter explores a series of Israeli prime ministers and how they dealt with adversarial nuclear proliferation over time.
What follows explores three Israeli prime ministers and their responses to three episodes of nuclear proliferation. The Iraq episode compares the administrations of Yitzhak Rabin (1974–1977) and Menachem Begin (1977–1983). To demonstrate the consistency of Begin’s threat perception regarding nuclear weapons, the Pakistan section examines how Begin responded to Pakistan’s growing nuclear program during his tenure. I examine Israel’s response to Syria’s nuclear weapons program during the tenure of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (2006–2009). The Iraq case receives the most attention, given an abundance of available evidence. The leader-centric argument may also apply in the cases of Syria and Pakistan, but evidence is far more limited and so these cases are discussed in less detail. Despite such limitations, the Pakistan and Syria cases are especially helpful for exploring the role of the third independent variable—the likelihood of success of a preventive military intervention—and the connection of that variable to the outcomes observed.
Collectively, the cases demonstrate how Begin perceived existential threats in the form of adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, and therefore he twice considered (against Iraq and Pakistan) and once used (Iraq) preventive military force to forestall the programs in formation. Olmert felt similarly threatened by Syrian nuclear weapons and used force to destroy the program. Rabin, by contrast, seemingly held no such views about the systemic consequences of nuclear proliferation or its consequences for Israel specifically and at no time explored military options to counter Iraq’s nuclear development. The leader-centric argument does travel to the Israeli context.
The United States has many allies and partners in its campaign against proliferation. One state, however, stands out as substantively important for the use or contemplation of preventive military force. Like the United States, Israel demonstrates significant historical activity to prevent adversarial efforts at proliferation from coming to fruition. Israel is one of the most prolific users of this counterproliferation strategy. Additionally, Israel is a parliamentary democracy, where the prime minister has significant authority over counterproliferation decisions of this nature, making the comparison to the US president a useful one. Finally, internal societal-level characteristics make this an interesting environment for investigation.
Israel is often known as the “inventor” of the “Osiraq” model. The Israelis were the first in recent history to use the strategy of preventive military strikes against an adversary’s nuclear program. Israel was not, however, the historical first: the Allies targeted the Nazi nuclear program during World War II, the United States contemplated attacking communist China (see chapter 3), and Iran and Iraq targeted each other’s facilities during the Iran-Iraq War. Since Osiraq, Israel considered the use of preventive military force against Pakistan in the early 1980s and deployed it against Syria in 2007. Recently, in conjunction with the United States and also independently, Israel has considered using military force against Iran. Given the empirical evidence, Israel presents a worthwhile state for exploration.
Israel is also appropriate for an extension of the leader-centric model because the prime minister has significant, independent authority for counterproliferation strategy, similar in many ways to the US president’s authority. Israel is a democracy with some routinized decision making for matters of national security affairs. The country has a proportional representation system to elect its parliament, the Knesset, and it is through this system that the prime minister takes office. While this system is not analogous to the electoral system of the United States, Israel is useful for comparative analysis, which preliminarily demonstrates the similarities and differences in the ways presidential and prime ministerial systems approach counterproliferation challenges. Thus, in the Israeli case I expect the leader-centric model to offer traction.
Finally, there are internal sociocultural reasons for continuing this investigation with Israel. First, some have argued that preemption and prevention have been important aspects of the security discourse inside Israel since its inception.1 Similarly important have been the related strategic principles of early warning and transferring war to the territory of the adversary (as opposed to fighting at home), understandable given the state’s small size and related geographical vulnerabilities. Second, elements of Israel’s strategic culture may be relevant.2 Israel is considered by some to be prone to preferring military solutions for addressing challenges.3 It has often exhibited a historical preference for deterrence by punishment.4 Yet despite these characteristics, which might make Israeli prime ministers consistently likely to use preventive military force, there is significant internal variation over time. This variation and inconsistency suggest that something other than Israel’s national strategic culture is driving behavior. Others describe this variation as subjective within the Israeli context: “The proposition that the [nuclear proliferation attempt] is directly and immediately threatening a vital interest of the country considering the preemptive strike, is highly dependent on the perception of the preemptor. There is no objective way of measuring it.”5 The Israeli context is therefore useful as a preliminary test of generalizability.
There are evidentiary challenges with conducting research into Israel’s national security policy. First, far less information is available for primary research as compared with what is available in the United States. This stems largely from the more strict governance structure of archival materials in Israel and more recently from the fact that the state archive possesses all relevant information on national security and at the time of writing is closed to outside researchers.6 Second, as these episodes under investigation here are comparatively recent, especially for the Syria case, less information is publicly available in the first place. Thankfully, between the rich secondary source literature, vibrant journalistic records, and available individual accounts, enough material exists for a preliminary test.7 I also conducted background conversations with decision makers and academics to augment the accessible record.
For issues like nuclear proliferation and the concomitant deliberations about whether and how to try to stop it, the cabinet is a relevant starting point for exploring Israeli decision making. The cabinet declares war; authorizes major military operations; and, importantly for my purposes, also delegates to the prime minister and the defense minister the power to “approve immediate military responses.”8 While the cabinet can be seen as the collective chief executive, the prime minister is the central figure and the key subject of analysis.9
Before we explore the role of the prime minister, note that there are a variety of actors, traditionally associated with national security elsewhere, who are of little substantive importance within the Israeli national security decision-making environment. First, the Knesset (legislature) has little role in national security; in contrast, the US Congress shares constitutional foreign policy authority with the president. Second, while the individual minister of foreign affairs might be included in a prime minister’s small decision-making circle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is relatively weak and secondary for national security matters.10 Third, the Ministry of Defense is primarily responsible for arms procurements and defense budgets and plays a limited role in policy decisions.11 Finally, whereas in the United States the National Security Council performs a deliberative function, in Israel such deliberations occur within the security cabinet (a body I return to later), relegating to the Israeli National Security Council coordination and integration responsibilities. Thus, the prime minister remains the main actor for investigation.
Within Israel, one of the main reasons the prime minister leads stems from the overall lack of national security institutionalization and overall decentralization of the national security apparatus. Because of these characteristics, decision making becomes more ad hoc; leaders and their individual preferences therefore become consequential.12 The prime minister in particular can have an outsized influence on the process, and decisions can reflect the prime minister’s own preferences.13 He or she can more easily sidestep strategic planning or information that might emerge from within the rest of the apparatus. While a national “can-do” attitude permeates Israeli society and especially its approach to challenges both foreign and domestic, it is incorrect to conclude that this attitude pushes uniformly toward a preference for preventive war. Empirically, this is not the case; leaders remain critically important, with some considering preventive war and others not.14
In contrast to the US electoral system, in which cabinet positions are political appointments resulting from the outcome of the first-past-the-post presidential election, in the Israeli system, ministerial positions reflect the political parties’ showing in national elections and the subsequent bargain struck when a prime minister forms his or her governing coalition.15 As the threshold for each party to earn its proportional representation in the Knesset is only 3.25 percent of the vote, there is a much more diverse group with more perspectives represented. The fractionalized nature of the political landscape, as well as institutional characteristics of the national security apparatus, thus require that the prime minister hold national security authority.16 Otherwise, it would be incredibly difficult to get anything done on matters in which speed and secrecy are paramount. Israel’s permissive institutional structure and national political environment allow the prime minister to emerge with a critical role in preventive war decision making.
Additionally, there is reason to believe that individual ministers who might otherwise have de facto veto power are instead relatively constrained. The literature on parliamentary actors suggests that ministers may be more deferential.17 Although a minister’s withdrawal of support could indirectly cause a ruling coalition to collapse, he or she might be relatively cautious about triggering such governmental collapse, which could also cost the minister his or her job.
Beyond this institutional reality, the real power of the prime minister’s office comes from the force of each individual occupant’s personality, political skill, and management of the coalitional requirements and constraints at any given time.18 Especially because national security is broad in nature and no one individual ministry’s bailiwick, the prime minister is naturally involved. This reality facilitates his or her ability to gain control over security matters.19
Most prime ministers create their own small group or forum to focus on national security.20 Ehud Olmert had a special collective of former premiers; Benjamin Netanyahu has a “Forum of Eight.” The specific form and format of this deliberative group, as well as the specific individuals who compose it, vary and change over time.21 Other prime ministers, by contrast, have preferred to work on their own, including Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Shamir. Additionally, prime ministers often choose to act as their own staff and rely on their own judgments for critical issues. Rabin followed his own expertise; Ehud Barak famously said, “I do not need experts”; Begin trusted his own intellectual capacity.22 Most have substantial military experience, and some have relevant substantive expertise, which combined may yield strongly held views on matters of national security. There are also no real bureaucratic structures to curb any excesses that result.23
The decision to construct a national security forum or to work alone results not only from the individual prime minister’s proclivities but also as a conscious prime ministerial choice given the larger institutional environment. With the full cabinet containing too many people for useful deliberation and fraught with politicking as the individual ministerial fiefdoms wage battles over their parochial interests and domestic political concerns, this group is ill-suited for sensitive matters such as preventive intervention.24
In addition, in 1991, Israel formally mandated the creation of a security cabinet for national security decision making. This smaller subgroup within the larger cabinet often contains the prime minister; vice prime minister; and ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and finance. While the security cabinet may contain a maximum of half of the members of full cabinet, the security cabinet is itself too large for productive discussion. As the cases demonstrate, successive prime ministers have used their personal deliberative entity first for the most sensitive stages of discussion, before taking matters to the larger security cabinet and then to the full cabinet in succession, given the cabinet’s mandated inclusion in all military mobilization discussions.25 Thus, the prime minister cannot go to war without relevant government approval.
Beyond the prime minister, Israel’s military, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is also substantively relevant to this decision-making environment, as the actor tasked with carrying out this type of military missions.26 The IDF, led by a chief of staff, is responsible for defense policy, including the size and structure of forces, operational conduct, intelligence gathering, strategic planning, training, doctrine, and logistics. The IDF is large and powerful within the rest of the government bureaucracy and also contains its own internal military intelligence body, the AMAN. Moreover, three of Israel’s twelve prime ministers were former IDF generals, and all but four of eighteen former IDF chiefs of staff have gone into politics, suggesting that an abundance of experience from the IDF travels with leaders who later, in office, apply that experience to substantive political issues. That said, although a strict assessment of the IDF’s bureaucratic portfolio might suggest otherwise, within policy deliberations the IDF is often a moderating voice, stressing diplomatic rather than military solutions.27 In addition to the IDF, the Mossad, or national intelligence agency, bears responsibility for international affairs and matters beyond Israel’s borders. The Mossad also has a research division, often tasked with generating reports and assessments of potential challenges brewing overseas for the prime minister’s office, including for proliferation developments.28
First, the structural alternative to the leader-centric model presented in chapter 2 suggests that states make objective assessments of their rival’s nuclear acquisition and take steps to balance against it accordingly. One variation of this logic indicates that states that anticipate significant losses to the status quo with an adversary’s nuclear acquisition consider preventive action to forestall it. This argument may be of less utility here; although Israel is dominant militarily in the region, it is significantly smaller and at the times relevant to my investigation was less powerful than Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria.29 Consider state population: in 1981, Israel had a population of 3.956 million; in contrast, Iraq and Pakistan had populations of 14.046 million and 80.696 million, respectively.30 Territorially, Israel covers 20,770 square miles; Iraq and Pakistan measure 437,317 and 796,095.31 Only when one looks at gross domestic product (GDP) per capita does Israel appear more powerful: Israel’s GDP in 1981 was US$6,423 per capita; Iraq and Pakistan’s totaled US$2,735 and US$348.32
Finally, using Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores that include military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, and urban and total population, we find something similar.33 CINC measures these indicators in the global arena annually and determines what portion each state possesses in every year.34 In 1981, the CINC scores for Israel, Iraq, and Pakistan, were 0.33 percent, 0.66 percent, and 0.99 percent, respectively. In 2007, Israel measured 0.4 percent; Syria accounted for 0.44 percent. While all four states appear relatively weak compared to the rest of the international system, these numbers indicate that Israel’s counterproliferation behavior could appropriately be categorized as action taken to forestall an even further weakening of the power asymmetry the country faced. Israel was already the weaker state, and its enemies’ nuclear acquisition would only have exacerbated an already sizable disadvantage. Moreover, given that Israel did not use the preventive option in each case and that Israeli leaders approached each adversary differently, something beyond basic structural considerations must be operating.35
A second structural argument might expect that any behavioral change from one leader to the next should follow changes in the adversary’s nuclear development. If, for example, the later national executive uses force and the earlier one does not, this change could be explained by the nuclear program’s advancement between time periods. Although the Iraqi nuclear program had just been discovered during Rabin’s tenure, the fact that Rabin sought only diplomatic options reflects more than just the program’s development. Rather, the behavior reflects Rabin’s worldview, approach to problem-solving, and nuclear views. Begin, by contrast, encountered a more developed nuclear program on the verge of going “hot,” but his worldview and approach to enemies took him down a more aggressive and proactive path. His personality and perspective, I suggest, would have inclined Begin toward prevention even if he had preceded Rabin rather than following him. Thus, neither structural argument offers compelling logic.
Next, because Israel has something akin to a classic bureaucratic model of decision making within the whole government, a bureaucratic explanation might offer traction.36 If true, policy should reflect logrolling interest groups or the negotiation between actors whose position reflects their place in government.37 Coalition politics are often how competing agendas are reconciled within the Israeli polity, and parochial concerns appear to trump any notion of a state-level national interest.38 Despite this bureaucratic reality, scholars argue parochial interests are far less relevant for decisions to use force and should therefore be less consequential for preventive war decisions.39 This minor role for bureaucratic interests is empirically borne out: while there are disagreements concerning the nature of threats and the appropriate responses to them, the contours of these debates do not reflect partisan divides akin to the hostility between the Republican and Democratic Parties that often plagues the United States. In addition, there are various examples of actors making recommendations opposite to what their bureaucratic position might suggest. For instance, despite being the defense establishment, the IDF preferred a diplomatic approach to the nuclear issue in Iraq. Furthermore, despite the bureaucratic power of the IDF, Prime Minister Begin went against its recommendation and ordered the Osiraq attack. Such instances further call into question that a bureaucratic model offers explanatory power here.
Finally, though one might expect party ideology to be significant, it appears largely inconsequential for decisions about the use of force.40 While we might expect right-leaning parties to be tough on adversaries and support prevention, the empirical record demonstrates that prime ministers from across the political spectrum considered the strategy. Furthermore, within particular administrations, support and opposition have cut across party lines. For example, under Begin’s right-wing coalition led by Likud (the historically center-right to right-wing secular party) in 1981, both support for and opposition to the Osiraq attack came from both the right and the left. In addition, Ehud Olmert conducted the 2007 operation in Syria as leader of Kadima, a centrist and liberal party. These national security matters therefore appear to transcend strictly partisan politics.41
Thus, the structural explanations, a bureaucratic political model, and a partisanship-based logic do not offer sufficient explanation of Israel’s variation in consideration and use of preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy. As the cases that follow demonstrate, focusing on leaders and their nuclear beliefs offers comparatively more explanatory power.
Recall from the previous chapter that the Iraqi nuclear program began in 1956 under the auspices of Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace. The program first proceeded slowly but accelerated following the 1968 coup that eventually brought Saddam Hussein to power.42 The Soviet Union provided an initial, small reactor; soon, Iraqi delegates traveled to Paris to purchase a more powerful one.43 In the early 1970s, internal advocates suggested Iraq pursue a weapons option. Following the oil crisis in 1973 and the growing rivalry with Iran, a dedicated plan went into motion.44
Israel had previously flagged Iraq’s nuclear ambitions and mobilized an effort to confront them.45 By 1974, Israel observed significant communication between Iraq and France. Initially, the Iraqis asked France for a gas graphite reactor—a reactor type especially well suited for plutonium production and inappropriate and inefficient for the production of energy or facilitation of civilian research.46 France refused as it had stopped selling this class of reactor,47 in part because of its proliferation sensitivity. Instead, Iraq begrudgingly took an Osiris class reactor, also useful for generating plutonium and therefore capable of generating materials for weapons. Osiris was designed for states producing nuclear power reactors indigenously; Iraq had no such program. With large oil reserves, there was no need for large-scale power generation.48 The choice of the Osiris-type reactor, insistence on military-grade uranium, and ancillary installations needed for the fuel cycle removed any uncertainty about the military nature of the program.49 In addition to the reactor itself, the sale included two research reactors, hot cells from Italy, and other elements of a nuclear program.50 The French deal significantly expanded what had previously been a fairly limited and haphazard program and solidified for Israel the direction of Iraq’s nuclear program.51
Thus by 1975, the Iraqi nuclear program was a top priority for Israel, which sought ways to delay it. Israel knew about the Osiraq reactor’s existence by 1976 or 1977. It was then that the Mossad began an extensive intelligence-gathering program; over time the Mossad’s interventions and sabotage efforts delayed the program by two and a half years.52
The historical animosity between Iraq and Israel stems from the Iraqi leadership’s pan-Arab sentiments, which reject claims of Jewish nationalism. The two states have been at war since 1948, and Iraq does not recognize Israel’s legitimacy. Iraq has sent its military to fight in three wars against Israel; the 1948 War for Independence, the 1967 Six-Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Using newly available Iraqi records, historian Hal Brands notes that even before Saddam Hussein became president, he advocated for Iraq to lead a “long, bloody war against the Jewish state.”53 After what he viewed as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s outrageous decision to make peace with Israel in 1979, Saddam convened two summits in Baghdad for the purpose of resurrecting a united front against Israel.54 This hostility did not go unnoticed. Israel recognized that Saddam saw Israel as an injustice to be eradicated.55 From 1973 until the end of the decade—as Iraq undertook a massive arms buildup, nearly doubling its already sizable military forces—Israelis were watching.56
Yitzhak Rabin was the first native-born prime minister in the state of Israel. His family was committed to Labor-Zionism and encouraged both his academic excellence and, later, his decorated military career.57 As a teenager, Rabin joined the Palmach, the commando forces of prestatehood Israel. Eventually he rose to chief of its operations during the Israeli war of independence. Rabin continued his military service in the newly formed IDF; he climbed the ranks to chief of staff and oversaw Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War. Rabin was ambassador to the United States from 1968 to 1973, during a formative time in the US-Israel relationship. Subsequently, he served as prime minster first from 1974 to 1977 and again from 1992 to 1995, until an assassin ended his life. In between, Rabin served as defense minister under multiple unity governments (1984–90; 1992–95).58
Rabin had a no-nonsense attitude. He was gruff toward others and was terribly shy from childhood.59 He had an incisive mind and a diagnostic brain.60 As part of the Palmach generation, Rabin was patriotic, theistically agnostic, and deeply anchored in Hebrew culture. He brought these characteristics to his view of international affairs and was wholly dedicated to Israel’s defense.61 Rabin was also pro-American in his global orientation and viewed solutions to policy challenges, such as military procurement, as best resolved by going through Washington. He believed that only the Americans could lead an effort to stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.62 Rabin was also cautious by nature. He did not embrace bold solutions, but rather moved cautiously and deliberately.63 Rabin refused to authorize the Israeli raid on Entebbe, Uganda, to rescue 246 passengers whose plane had been hijacked by a Palestinian terrorist group (headquartered in Baghdad) “before he was absolutely certain it was likely to succeed.”64
Rabin was responsible for the postindependence military build-up that assisted Israel’s victory in the 1967 war. He viewed military might as a precondition for Israel’s ability to survive the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. He was criticized for relying only on military tools to determine outcomes in conflicts, especially during the earlier phases of his career. Rabin advocated for a “defensive strategy” involving maintaining a strong offensive capability that would win decisively in conflict should deterrence fail.65 Nevertheless, Rabin preferred limited uses of force and was sensitive to the political ramifications of military action, risks of escalation, and potential casualties. Whereas Israeli leaders like David Ben Gurion, Shimon Peres, and Moshe Dayan initiated and supported Israel’s own nuclear development, Rabin opposed such nuclearization.66 Overall, he appeared averse to risk, preferring to rely on deterrence instead of initiating larger actions. Significantly, Rabin believed in conventional deterrence and preferred to allocate Israel’s limited defense budget to augmenting the IDF’s capabilities instead of building an expensive nuclear endeavor.67
Collectively, these qualities suggest a realpolitik perspective, especially concerning regional and global enemies: Israel should be powerful, but military options should be used only sparingly, reactively, and with caution.68 Rabin biographer Itamar Rabinovich describes Rabin as prone to act like a “military hawk and a political dove.”69 While Rabin advocated for defensive preparedness and deterrence, he hesitated with offensive and bold undertakings, given their potential risks.
To date, I have found no evidence of Rabin’s early views regarding the threat from Iraq’s nuclear program or its leader Saddam Hussein. Rabin’s memoirs mention Iraq only briefly, in the context of Iraq’s participation as a belligerent against Israel in the Six-Day War.70 On some level, it might seem puzzling that Rabin makes no mention of Iraq’s nuclear program or Israel’s attempts to delay it, especially since its existence was known during his administration. Rabin himself ordered some political initiatives to delay the program’s development. The omission of Iraq from Rabin’s early thought becomes less problematic, however, when viewed from the perspective of the leader-centric argument, which recognizes that Rabin paid far less attention to nuclear matters and nuclear threats than his contemporaries, including Menachem Begin. Moreover, as Rabin preferred incremental approaches to problems and avoided bold, proactive solutions, it seems unlikely that he would have felt strongly enough about the Iraqi nuclear threat to address it in his memoirs. The absence of such discussions fits with the portrait of Rabin articulated here.71
Iraq did, however, demonstrate threatening behavior toward Israel during Rabin’s time in government. Even before formally assuming the presidency, Saddam Hussein sought to confront Israel. By 1970–71 Hussein was understood to be the strongman of the regime; by 1975, he was the primary decision maker in security and foreign affairs. During this period, he sought to contain Israel, weaken its influence, and force it to yield some (if not all) of the territorial gains from the wars in 1967 and 1973.72 Hussein nationalized foreign-owned oil companies in order to use oil as a weapon to separate Israel from its backers, supported Palestinian terrorist groups financially and morally, and attempted to restrict Jewish migration to Israel.73 When Egypt signed the Camp David Accords with Israel, Iraq was a vocal critic of the move.
Rabin’s preference for reactive instead of preventive operations, combined with his general risk aversion, may have made him less likely to consider the preventive military option generally but also specifically against the Iraqi nuclear program. The leader-centric argument therefore expects to find no evidence of the consideration of preventive military force against the Iraqi nuclear program by Prime Minister Rabin. Given the paucity of data concerning Rabin’s general nuclear views, however, this expectation is at best preliminary.
Menachem Begin had a survivor’s sense of guilt that he carried from Poland, where much of his family perished.74 Some would say he was obsessed with the Holocaust.75 Driving Begin was a mixture of the Jewish religion and Zionism, but compared with his contemporaries, he often approached these issues with a more dramatic and theatrical flair.76 His oratorical skills recognized from a young age, Begin lived life as a politician twenty-four hours a day. He could be convivial though seldom relaxed; he had no hobbies or interests outside of politics.77
Begin saw himself as a rebel and a revolutionary, and he was a maximalist in his approach.78 From his time within the Soviet Union, he championed Zionism, opposed competing forces within the Zionist movement, and worked diligently to establish the Jewish state. A complicated personality, Begin saw dualities in a variety of places—defeat and victory; the “Holocaust and rebirth [perhaps of the Jewish people]; fatal attack and rise to office; and peace and war.”79
Begin’s worldview was largely molded by the interwar era. He was almost mechanistically rational and held a particular fascination with Jewish martyrdom80 of the late eighteenth century,81 which for Begin, represented the historical struggle for Jewish national liberation. He had a personal interest in foreign affairs but, like many Israelis of the time period, preferred focusing on the local.82 As Daniel Gordis describes, one cannot understand Begin without understanding Ze’ev Jabotinsky.83 Jabotinsky was a Russian, Jewish, Revisionist-Zionist leader and early force in the Polish Jewish defense organizations. He created battalions of Jewish volunteers in the British Army whose purpose was expelling the Ottoman Empire from an eventual Jewish homeland. His right-wing principles imbue Israel’s Likud Party and have influenced Likud leaders from Begin to Benjamin Netanyahu. Along with Joseph Trumpledor, who allegedly said on his deathbed, “It is good to die for our country,” Jabotinsky embodied the Revisionists’ commitment to Jewish military power, self-defense, and national pride—notions Begin wholeheartedly endorsed.84
Begin’s positions on strategic matters derived from the conviction that Israel had a nearly permanent and historical requirement for consistent offensive posturing, given the state’s strategic realities. He favored offensive or counteroffensive maneuvers, rather than limited retaliatory action. He preferred preventive or preemptive war in response to any offensive enemy intentions. Such notions were consistent in Begin’s strategic thinking from the Israeli war of independence until the 1982 Lebanon War.85
Interestingly, in 1936–37, Begin and Jabotinsky had a major disagreement about the military actions of the Etzel or Irgun, a Zionist terrorist group that operated in Mandatory Palestine from 1931 to 1948. Jabotinsky, with his original Revisionist credo, favored attack purely in self-defense. Begin by contrast argued that preemptive action was necessary.86 In September 1938, over Jabotinsky’s objections and with his career on the rise, Begin revised the Betar oath to prioritize armed defense as well as preemptive conquest.87 These favorable views of preemptive action remained consistent through his government service. When minister without portfolio, Begin voted in favor of a preemptive strike in the 1967 Six-Day War.88 In 1973, he criticized Prime Minister Golda Meir for not ordering a preemptive strike when the government had intelligence of invading armies marching toward Israel.89
Writing in a December 1954 article, Begin listed three factors that determine a state’s national security: manpower, weapon power, and the country’s strategic situation (control of territory). Because Israel’s small size posed a strategic disadvantage, the country needed some qualitative advantage.90 To Begin’s mind, political or territorial concessions led to additional concessions; he opposed all peace initiatives and doubled down on this thinking after invading Arab armies surprised Israel in 1967.91 Broadly, Begin drew parallels to the Jewish heroism of the Second Temple Era and vowed “rebellion against any foreign ruler and war against any aggressor.”92
During the early Cold War, Begin doubted that nuclear weapons eliminated the importance of territory or conventional weapons for states that possessed nuclear arms. He believed this was true even for the United States, though Soviet numerical superiority was a significant challenge in Europe.93 In 1954, Begin wrote that territory and infantry, two of three main state security elements in his view, remained consequential even in the nuclear age.94 Over time, it appeared that Begin believed nuclear deterrence meant that world wars were less likely because of the dangers of annihilating the human race. This perspective could suggest elements of a nuclear optimism focusing on the costs of nuclear use and deterrence. He seemed quizzically not to focus on the nuclear aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. Following the wars between India and China in the 1960s, however, Begin changed his mind, deciding that war remained conceivable even in the nuclear age.95 This recognition could indicate a growing nuclear pessimist’s perspective. By 1963, Begin was adamant about weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the Knesset he said, “Don’t even ask whether unconventional weapons are a greater threat to our future than conventional weapons—in my mind there is no doubt regarding the answer. The greatest and gravest threat we can anticipate: to our future, our security, our existence, is from unconventional weapons.”96
Collectively, this evidence does not offer a clear portrait of Begin’s thinking on nuclear matters before he became prime minister. On the one hand, his early thoughts and writings suggest both a belief in the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and a sense of their limitations in terms of conventional and territorial requirements. On the other hand, his later remarks suggest someone quite threatened by weapons of mass destruction and the challenge they pose. What is clear, however, is his consistent and vociferous support for preventive strategies to confront enemies and security challenges. Therefore, it might be the case that Begin’s general proclivity toward military options including preemptive and preventive strategies suggested a belief in the need to confront the threat of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, head-on.
In terms of how Begin perceived the threat from Iraq prior to entering executive office, “Arab” was a stereotype for Begin, expressing threat, danger, and the historical possibility of annihilation of the Jewish people. While he did not have much personal contact with any Arab individuals, he saw Arabs as the collective enemy from the East seeking to undermine and destroy Israel’s independence. Begin’s biographer describes his image of the “Arabs” and approach to confronting them as “among the most unchanging features of his world view.”97 Begin worked from the Mossad’s psychological portrait of Saddam Hussein as a “hard-headed megalomaniac, cunning, sophisticated, and cruel.… [He was] willing to take high risks and drastic action to realize his ambition for self-aggrandizement.” Especially problematic was the Mossad’s assessment that Saddam’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would allow him “to threaten and strike Israel, and thereby win supremacy over the Arab world. He is prepared to act at an early opportunity, even in the awareness that retaliation might follow.”98 Writing well after the Osiraq episode, academics similarly note that Saddam appeared “if not undeterrable, then at least more likely to engage in risky aggression than Soviet or Chinese leaders, potentially willing to accept serious retaliatory damage to Iraq in order to achieve the destruction of Israel, and with it the presumptive leadership of the Arab world.”99
Together, this evidence suggests that Begin may have seen in Saddam Hussein a dangerous and power-hungry leader who was risk acceptant. Given Iraq’s historical animosity toward Israel and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Begin might have concluded such a leader armed with nuclear weapons would pose an undeterrable and existential threat of the highest order. Additionally, with his awareness of the risks from unconventional weapons, including nuclear, it seems likely that Begin would have considered the use of preventive military force to forestall Iraq’s nuclear program. When Begin became prime minister, it appears he felt his responsibility was to block the genocidal capability. “He began to take action against what he called ‘the bloodiest and most irresponsible of all Arab regimes.’ ”100
Some describe the bombing of the Osiraq nuclear facility as the culmination of a long siege, as opposed to a pinpoint operation. The roughly six-year campaign included covert sabotage, economic sanctions, preventive attack, and diplomacy both before and after the intervention.101 Events began in 1974 when the AMAN and Mossad both ranked Iraq’s nuclear program as high intelligence priorities. The program was not yet classified as an imminent threat, however. The Rabin administration observed French and Italian technical sales to Iraq in 1975 and 1976 and chose to confront the development via diplomatic engagement with European and other partners.102 Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Shimon Peres pursued the best political and diplomatic options available, those most likely to delay the program’s development. Only if those strategies failed were they willing to investigate military options. In the background, the air force prudentially explored military plans, though the leadership never considered or requested anything specific.103 In February 1976, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon discussed the possibility of joint cooperation with Iran, a main enemy of Iraq; the Iranian response was lukewarm, and nothing further developed. By 1977, outgoing prime minister Rabin outlined his concerns over the Iraq-European cooperation and the diplomatic work underway to confront it.104 Peres later wrote to Begin and expressed his opposition to any military action.105
Following Begin’s election in June 1977, destruction of the Iraqi reactor was high on his agenda. In November, Begin formed the “new era” committee, tasking its members with quietly assessing how best to confront the threat and hinder Iraq’s nuclear development. Personally, Begin was deeply troubled by the substantial threat he perceived. As Israel’s founding father Ben Gurion had before him, Begin worried: “All night I could not sleep.… What is Israel? … Only a small spot! One dot! How can it survive in this Arab world?”106 Twenty-three years later, Begin observed Iraq’s enormous military potential. By 1980 Iraq had thirteen million people, a gross national product of $18 billion, and an annual defense budget of $3.5 billion. Iraq’s military consisted of 190,000 troops across twelve divisions; 2,200 tanks; three thousand air force personnel with 450 attack aircraft; and an army and navy.107 The threat of “a Nazi like Saddam” was obvious to Begin. His personal trauma in the Holocaust and in several gulags were fresh in Begin’s mind as he imagined the death of five hundred thousand Jews from an Iraqi nuclear weapon he had no doubt Saddam would use. While the risks to Israel were apparent, it was the combination of this threat with the Jewish historical tragedy and trauma—both collective for the nation and for Begin personally—that pushed him to act.108
By 1978, the Iraqi nuclear program was progressing quickly.109 Israel observed work on bomb designs and plutonium development. On August 23, Begin convened the first security cabinet meeting to discuss the threat. From the outset, a divide separated the participants. Begin, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, and Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich favored using all means necessary, including military attack. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, and Weizman’s deputy argued that the costs of a strike outweighed any potential benefits. For this latter group, there was still time to allow other levers to have an impact. The meeting concluded without resolution. It would be the first meeting of dozens held to determine Israel’s approach, indicating the seriousness with which the administration treated the situation.110
The year 1979 commenced with economic and sabotage strategies yielding fruit as part of the counterproliferation campaign. Prior to their shipment from France, key technological components bound for Iraq mysteriously exploded dockside in French ports. Similar explosions happened at Italian facilities that were producing exports to Iraq’s nuclear program. Likewise, Egyptian scientists assisting with the Iraqi program’s development were assassinated.111 Israel was the prime suspect. In October, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan resigned from Begin’s government for reasons related to the Palestinian conflict and was replaced by Yitzhak Shamir. Security Minister Ezer Weizman quit the following May, for similar reasons. Between Begin’s assuming the defense post and his addition of the hawkish Shamir to the cabinet, the balance now favored the military option.
Throughout 1980, Israeli deliberations continued while the Iraqi program gained momentum. In February, Saddam issued his “National Charter” describing how “the Zionist entity is not included [in regional assessments] because the Zionist entity is not considered a state, but a deformed entity occupying an Arab territory.”112 Against this background, an independent committee issued a report assessing the merits of a potential military campaign. Headed by Major General (reserves) Aharon Yariv, the former head of the AMAN, the committee’s report warned of significant direct and indirect costs of a military attack: Iraqi revenge, including attacks on sensitive targets inside Israel like the Dimona nuclear complex; hostile global public opinion, especially if Israel targeted a “hot” reactor and released radioactive contamination; international sanctions stemming from any perceived norm against attacking nuclear reactors; intensified anti-Israel activity within the Arab world; disruption of the ongoing, fragile peace process with Egypt; combined military action with Soviet backing; and damage to the US-Israel relationship.113
Participants debated the consequences of military action and the likely international political costs that would follow.114 Key members of the security cabinet—Yadin, Weizman, and Yehoshua Saguy (director of military intelligence)—considered the risks and costs and recommended diplomatic and covert action only. Sharon, Ehrlich, and Begin rejected their conclusions.
In October, Begin instructed the IDF’s chief of staff to start planning for an attack, confirming the seriousness of the consideration. This directive operationalized something Begin had been personally contemplating for some time, though the cabinet remained divided.115 Four options eventually emerged for discussion. First was the diplomatic route. As it had failed previously, diplomacy was considered unlikely to succeed in the future. Second, a clandestine option was also rejected because it had the potential only to limit and delay and could only marginally affect long-range Iraqi nuclear ambitions. The third option was a full ground assault with Israeli troops attacking Iraq. This option was also rejected as too complicated and risky given the geographic distance between Israel and Iraq and Israel’s general strategic vulnerability. The final option, the surgical attack, was the only option left.116
Meeting again on October 14, the security cabinet remained divided. Some members believed they still had time until Iraq got the bomb, so that military action was not yet necessary. Others indicated that forceful Israeli action would unite the Arabs, cause a US arms embargo, and be an impermanent solution to boot. The prime minister listened to this opposition but remained wedded to the use of force. By October 28, the AMAN indicated that a window of opportunity had emerged: the unsuccessful Iranian attack in September gave Israel potential cover for its own mission.117 The French nationals previously on the ground had left because of Iraq’s ongoing war with Iran. For the time being, the Iraqi air defenses were still only partial, suggesting that mission feasibility (IV3) would decrease over time as Iraq’s defensive capabilities expanded. Furthermore, hostile reaction to military action would take time to build, while many in the West might even tacitly support the mission. After extensive deliberation, Begin secured the cabinet’s standby approval for the military intervention, conditional on the approval of the prime minister, Foreign Minister Shamir, and the IDF chief of staff.118
The threat from Iraq continued to crystallize during the same period. Following the Iranian attack on the Osiraq facility that fall, Saddam Hussein issued a statement indicating that “the Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist entity.”119 Iraq’s military spending more than doubled between 1975 and 1980, and Iraq appeared to be the dominant power in the Iran-Iraq War.120 Israel was quite concerned at the prospect of a victorious Iraq emerging as the undisputed regional hegemon, with the world’s third-largest oil reserves and a military more than four times larger than Israel’s.121
With the military mission ultimately selected, the intervention included F-16 Fighting Falcons and F-15 Eagles, the aircraft with the most advanced navigational capabilities in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) at the time.122 Given the distance to the target, these aircraft offered the potential longer fuel range, even with larger payloads; the ability to fly closer to the ground to avoid Iraqi air defenses; and greater speed and maneuverability to the target.123 Nevertheless, even with the best aircraft in the fleet undertaking the mission, unavoidable difficulties remained regarding mission feasibility (IV3). The twelve-hundred-kilometer distance to travel across enemy territory, the need to fly dangerously low to avoid radar detection, and the possibility of being shot down necessarily put the pilots’ lives at risk.124 “Yet failure, as far as Begin was concerned, meant risking the future of the Jewish people.”125 The risks of the mission’s failure and the risks of doing nothing consumed Begin. As a former Irgun commander, he valued the lives of his fighters but understood that some would die during the mission. “That was the price of revolt,” Begin said, referring to the struggle for a Jewish national state. “If struggle was worthwhile, so was the sacrifice.”126 Presumably, Begin would have felt similarly about the risks to the pilots conducting the mission. Likewise, he did not relish the international community’s reaction, but his own life story—his experiences in Soviet Poland and the loss of his family in the Holocaust—convinced him that inaction was exponentially more dangerous. For Begin, it was “better condemnation without a reactor than a reactor without condemnation.”127
At 18:35 local time, the F-16s climbed to their target and dove into position to destroy the reactor. “Supreme national self-defense” was how Begin described the mission of June 7, 1981, once it was accomplished. Saddam had plotted to destroy Israel’s existence and future, with expected casualties estimated at six hundred thousand. “What other country would tolerate such a danger? There won’t be another Holocaust in the history of the Jewish people. Never again. We shall defend our people against any enemy.”128 Following Israel’s action, Begin highlighted Iraq’s repeated history of hostility toward Israel, refusal to accept the state’s existence, and lack of deterrability as the reasons for targeting the facility. He spoke of “existential” and “mortal” danger from a hostile tyrant with Israel in its crosshairs.129 Begin understood the risks—political, military, diplomatic, and economic—but was first and foremost concerned with the safety and security of the Israeli people. Everything else was peripheral.130 To Begin’s mind, the Osiraq raid was nothing short of life-saving: Israel, facing the risk of a second Holocaust, chose to act before it was too late.131 The Begin Doctrine holds that Israel will not tolerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any Arab state or other enemy and will take all means necessary to defend the citizens of Israel against the threat of proliferation.132
While the episode just described suggests that Menachem Begin held deep-seated concerns over existential threats to the state of Israel—especially in the form of nuclear-armed Arab enemies—skeptics might argue that domestic electoral considerations drove Begin’s decision to order the attack. In early 1981, Begin’s governing coalition was crumbling, and elections were scheduled for September. Polling from the time indicated that the Labor Party was likely to be victorious, and with it Shimon Peres would come to power. Because of this concern, some have suggested that Begin conducted the intervention in order to secure his reelection.
This electoral logic is unconvincing or at least incomplete for three reasons. First, to the extent that a traditional electoral motivation was operating, we would expect to see evidence that Begin pursued the military option because he believed that it would help him win the upcoming elections that he was otherwise expected to lose. Rather, we find that Begin was more concerned about Peres’s election than his own loss. It was well-known that Peres—then the head of the Labor Party and the former defense minister under Rabin—opposed the military campaign to target Iraq’s nuclear facilities; he had previously attempted to convince Begin to abandon the use of force. When Begin met with Peres as the head of the opposition in December 1980, Peres was unconvinced of the strike’s necessity. Later, he “called the possibility of such a strike stupid and reckless.”133 Rather than support the military option, Peres favored pursuing diplomatic strategies to delay the Iraqi nuclear program, as he had while serving under Rabin. When the mission was originally ordered in May 1981, and Peres got wind of it, Begin postponed the attack, citing concerns that the operation was at risk.134 Begin noted following receipt of a letter from Peres, “Here we are awaiting news that could mean life or death for Israel, and Shimon Peres has the temerity to ask me to desist from taking action.”135
Instead of awaiting the possibility that Peres would become prime minister and allow Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons, Begin ordered the mission himself.136 He did so seemingly not because the move would improve his chances for reelection, but instead because of the nuclear threat that would remain after he left office. Begin himself disputed potential electoral motivations: “Would I risk the life of a single one of our pilots for electoral purposes, I ask you? I’m convinced that if we lose the election, Peres will be incapable of deciding on such a raid, and then I would never forgive myself for not having acted when I could. The future of our people is at stake. All the responsibility is on our shoulders.”137
Second, former members of Begin’s cabinet dispute the electoral motivation. Government Secretary Arye Naor publicly described how Begin was deeply aware of the risks and costs associated with the mission and chose to act anyway, indicating perhaps an expected low or at least problematic likelihood of success. These risks included first and foremost that Israeli pilots and fighter planes would not return; also, he might lose the election. A costly mission, Begin thought, could actually harm his chances for reelection. Despite these concerns, Naor said, the prime minister was determined to hit the reactor “even if it was the last thing he did as prime minister.”138 Naor elaborated that Begin could accept relinquishing power; he could not accept “condemning the children of Israel to living under the nuclear shadow.” Another former member of the Begin government notes that planning for the mission was underway far before elections were called for the fall of 1981, further casting doubt on the electoral alternative.139
Third, the Iraq episode is not the only time Begin would consider the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. Instead, when Pakistan, a second adversarial state, edged closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, Begin again took steps to proactively confront the threat. This continuity in threat perception and consideration of similar strategies to forestall nuclear threats is more compelling than any electoral motivation.
To the extent that the argument about Menachem Begin is compelling, we should expect some consistency in his behavior in other potential counterproliferation episodes that occur during his prime ministerial tenure. While the primary source evidence is thin, it is still possible to review Begin’s approach to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and observe a similar threat perception during the same period that likewise pushed Begin to explore preventive intervention. This evidence suggests that Begin viewed nuclear weapons in the hands of undeterrable, adversarial Muslim states as deeply threatening to Israel’s security. Those beliefs led him to consider preventive military options to forestall the nuclear programs in formation.
As the Iraq episode unfolded, Begin saw another manifestation of a similar threat: Pakistan was building nuclear weapons and, if successful, would transfer those weapons to the hands of another undeterrable dictator hostile to Israel’s existence. As he had before, Begin connected the memory of the Holocaust to the threat of nuclear weapons.
Like Iraq, Pakistan started its nuclear program in the 1950s, benefiting from Atoms for Peace.140 From the outset, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the program’s major champion. When he became prime minister, Bhutto accelerated the program significantly, following his country’s devastating loss of the territory of Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan pursued a nuclear weapon to counter the threat from neighboring India, which was simultaneously pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.141
During Begin’s tenure as prime minister, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program developed substantially. This effort concerned Begin, not because of direct hostility between Pakistan and Israel, but because of the states assisting Pakistan’s efforts. As George Perkovich writes, “Israel had concerns that Pakistan was colluding with Libya to develop [an] ‘Islamic Bomb,’ so had interest in removing the threat.”142 Libyan hostility toward Israel was direct: Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s principal foreign policy goal was Israel’s destruction. Gaddafi supported the 1973 oil embargo in the hopes of ending the West’s support for Israel; in 1981, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated, Gaddafi noted that the assassination was punishment for Sadat’s landmark peace agreement with Israel.143 Previously, Gaddafi encouraged Egypt’s then president Gamal Abdel Nasser to attack Israel. When Nasser declined because of Israel’s nascent nuclear capability, Gaddafi vowed to get atomic bombs for the Arabs to balance the Israeli capability.144
Begin was thus particularly concerned that Bhutto would share the fruits of Pakistan’s labor with Libya. Bhutto had befriended Gaddafi and the two discussed nuclear cooperation. Feroz Khan describes the relationship as a quid pro quo: Libya wanted full access to the Pakistani nuclear program in return for critical financial and material resources. Gaddafi provided financial aid to the tune of approximately $500 million and about 450 tons of yellow cake uranium imported from Niger between 1976 and 1982.145 Given Gaddafi’s pan-Arab aspirations, it is unsurprising that he might have been readily willing (and able, given Libya’s sizable oil wealth) to help achieve an Islamic bomb.146 Libya had long-held nuclear aspirations of its own, first trying to buy nuclear weapons directly from China, then from the Soviets, who had previously assisted with their conventional capabilities and basic nuclear infrastructure.147 As their own indigenous attempts never developed, Gaddafi ultimately chose to invest in another state’s program. Libya has yet to get a return on its investment, though Pakistan did train Libyan scientists at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) facility.148
With this Pakistani-Libyan cooperation in mind, it is understandable that Begin was concerned by Pakistan’s nuclear development. The available evidence suggests not only that Begin was threatened by Pakistani nuclear weapons but also that he took steps to consider and plan for a preventive military intervention to destroy the weapons. This consistency of beliefs and subsequent behavior is indicative of the strength of the leader-centric argument.
The main piece of documentary evidence concerning the seriousness with which Begin perceived the Pakistani nuclear threat comes from his diplomatic communication. In May 1979, Begin wrote a letter to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, describing the threat emerging from Pakistan.149 The letter spoke of Pakistan’s one-man, autocratic rule, which Begin saw as dangerous for Southeast Asia. Then, the letter described “the mortal danger” that would arise should Pakistan succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. The letter also detailed the close partnership between Libya and Pakistan, especially in the nuclear realm. This letter indicates that for Begin, the Pakistani nuclear threat emanated from the nature of the autocratic regime in Pakistan and its relationship with the Libyan dictator, who publicly advocated an aggressive policy to destroy Israel. Begin concluded, “The specter of what could happen to the Middle East, and particularly to the men, women and children in Israel, should the lethal weapons of mass killing and destruction be put at any time into the hands of an absolute ruler like Colonel Gaddafi.”150
The notes from Prime Minister Thatcher’s staff regarding Begin’s letter are also telling.151 They assessed Begin’s concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear intentions and the alleged cooperation between Pakistan and Libya. Significantly, the notes also indicate that “the Israelis are well informed about Pakistani program and Libyan contacts with Pakistan,” suggesting that Israel had accurately assessed the cooperation and development.152
So what happened? This book’s model expects that given Begin’s view of the Pakistani nuclear program as threatening and dangerous for the security of Israel, he would have taken steps to seriously consider the use of preventive military force to forestall the program in formation. At a high level, the available evidence suggests that this is exactly what happened: Israel engaged in a series of conversations, meetings, and joint exercises with the government of India for the express purpose of destroying the Pakistani nuclear program.
The secondary literature sheds light on the various activities underway during this time period. As Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark note, Pakistan feared an Israeli or Indian attack, or both, knowing that Israel saw the Pakistani program as a “clear and present” threat. As an early potential indication of Israeli activity, Pakistan believed the Mossad targeted the Abdul Qadeer Khan supply networks supporting the Pakistani program’s development.153 This occurred in parallel to Begin’s letter-writing campaign.154 In August 1979, the Carter Administration also discussed military strikes, though seemingly not at an advanced level.155 Then secretary of state Cyrus Vance asked a staffer for an unofficial memo on available options; it highlighted the difficulty, uncertainty, and complexity of such an undertaking.156
As time progressed, there is evidence of serious consideration and planning that Begin undertook in concert with Indian partners. By 1982, India’s Indira Gandhi grew more serious in her consideration of joint operations.157 Indian scientists and air force officers traveled to Israel to share intelligence and acquire critical technology. The Indians purchased ground-based and airborne electronic warfare equipment from Israel with which to neutralize Pakistan’s F-16 aircraft and Bofors RBS 70 air defense guns protecting Pakistan’s critical Kahuta nuclear facility.158 Israel also provided details on the F-16’s capabilities, radio frequencies, and other important information that would serve efforts to jam Pakistani capacity. In return, India offered details of the Russian MiG-23 aircraft, similar to many flown by Arab forces.
By the next year, Gandhi asked Air Chief Marshall Dilbagh Singh to ready a strike mission.159 Subsequently, the air force’s director of operations planned for a surgical strike on the centrifuges and other critical components housed at Kahuta. Squadrons of Jaguar aircraft practiced low-level flying routes to the target, bombing techniques to target the facilities, and spoofing defenses.160 An Indian newspaper article suggests that Prime Minister Gandhi ultimately rejected the plans, though for what reason remains unknown.161
In 1983–84, a new opportunity emerged.162 According to Bharat Karnad and his interview with the late Aharon Yariv, the former head of Israel’s Military Intelligence, a new plan involved Israeli F-16 strike aircraft and F-15 air superiority fighters for escort and combat patrol. Flying from Israel, the aircraft would refuel at India’s Jamnagar air base, top off the fuel in North India, and fly via Kashmir to target the Kahuta facility. Flying at high speeds, the attack would leave Pakistani defenses only three to five minutes to react.163 Although Karnad notes that Yariv indicated that Israel, though it could have performed the mission alone using only aerial refueling, preferred the international cover that working with India’s assistance would provide. This remained merely a plan, however, as Gandhi again canceled the mission, perhaps this time because of US intelligence tipping off the Pakistani government and threatening to defend Pakistan against such an attack.164 Sources suggest that India canceled any further operation because of the US role.165
In light of the aforementioned planning and the threat Begin perceived, it is fair to ask why Begin did not order an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear program. Given the lack of primary evidence documenting this episode, it is difficult to answer this question. It is challenging to assess both how serious the planning actually was and also what terminated any mission. Nevertheless, there are a number of potential avenues for speculation, each of which relate to mission feasibility, the third independent variable. First, it is conceivable that the mission against Iraq’s nuclear program took precedence between 1979 and 1981. This consideration seems plausible because, compared to Pakistan, Iraq presented a much more direct threat. The consequences of a closer, undeterrable nuclear-armed Iraq with its own nuclear weapons are different from the indirect threat posed by an undeterrable Libya that might have had access to someone else’s nuclear weapons. In the history of the nuclear age, no nuclear-armed state has given or sold its nuclear weapons to another state, so the threat from Libya remained hypothetical. Second, the deliberations concerning Israel’s use of force took place in collaboration with India, meaning that there was another actor involved in the decision-making process. In this instance, given the options, which involved either Indian planes flying directly or flying Israeli planes using Indian bases for the mission, India had the ability to veto the mission. Barry Schneider points to this difficulty in 1982, when Gandhi refused to grant landing and refueling rights, fundamentally compromising the intended mission.166 While aerial refueling was possible, it was a complex option with no guarantee of success. Third, the risks of an attack against Pakistan were significant.167 Potentially prohibitive was that Pakistan might respond in kind by targeting Indian nuclear facilities. The fact that even a surgical strike could escalate to a costly wider war, and that the United States might impose punitive measures on Pakistan’s behalf, complicated the scenario. That the CIA might have tipped off Pakistan to the ongoing planning suggests that the United States was not inclined to sit idly by.
It is nearly impossible to adjudicate between these possibilities, because the evidence concerning the Pakistan case is scant. Remarkably, no former Israeli government official I have asked has given any indication that he or she was aware that Begin was conducting serious consideration of preventive attack. Nevertheless, the existing material suggests that Begin’s threat perception was largely consistent across the Iraqi and Pakistani episodes. Fearing the dangers of adversarial nuclear proliferation in both contexts, Begin’s nuclear beliefs encouraged him to consider the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.
The model predicts correctly that Begin would consider the use of preventive force in both cases. It also accounts for variation in the third independent variable—the likelihood of mission success—by explaining why Begin pursued prevention against Iraq but not Pakistan. Begin’s concern for an Iraq ruled by Hussein and armed with nuclear weapons was echoed with respect to Libya, which Begin saw as similarly threatening because of Gaddafi’s dangerous nuclear potential. These views led Begin to consider preventive military options to thwart both programs from coming to fruition. In both episodes, we observe the leader-centric perspective at work.
According to intelligence records, the United States appears to have had insight into Syria’s nuclear weapons development beginning in the late 1990s.168 During this period, Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad sought to purchase nuclear research reactors from Argentina and Russia; under US pressure, both deals fell through.169 Fast forward to the spring of 2007: in conjunction with its Israeli partners, the United States had conclusive evidence that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor that was nearing operational capability.170
Military cooperation between Syria and North Korea dates back to the 1960s. North Korean troops aided the Syrian government in multiple Arab-Israeli wars, trained Syrian officers at DPRK institutions, and provided significant military technology.171 The “love affair” deepened to include WMD technology when Assad invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to Syria prior to the Gulf War.172 The two leaders signed a military and technology cooperation agreement focusing on chemical and biological weapons development. Senior North Korean leaders subsequently visited Syria.173 When the senior Assad died, his son Bashar continued the conversation and elevated nuclear matters to a priority. By June 2002, the parties finalized a three-way deal, with North Korea agreeing to build a nuclear reactor in Syria and Iran pledging approximately $2 billion for the construction.174
By 2005, North Korean activities inside Syria appeared to cluster in the eastern Deir el-Zor region. Over time, an unidentified building located in al-Kibar became the focus.175 Images of the suspicious facility indicated that it was not configured to produce electricity: it had no power lines to connect it to the power grid and had none of the switching facilities necessary for energy generation.176 The installation also appeared unsuitable for scientific research, especially when compared with existing research facilities that the Syrian government had disclosed.177 Given these discrepancies, Israel grew concerned about ongoing developments. Structural features had been partly obscured by an earthen wall or mound; the location itself was remote, away from curious eyes. Such characteristics are inconsistent with peaceful intentions.178
In February 2007, an Iranian defector, General Ali Reza Askari, revealed to US intelligence that Tehran was both encouraging and funding the establishment of the Syrian reactor.179 In July, the Mossad infiltrated a Syrian official’s computer via spyware. The laptop provided specific details of Syria’s nuclear program, including blueprints of a nuclear reactor, correspondence with North Korean officials, and photographs of the reactor in construction. Such information complemented prior Israeli intelligence.180 Little doubt remained that the North Koreans were building a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert.
Syria and Israel have been at war since 1948. The Assad regime provides weapons and other support to the Shiite militant group Hezbollah for its “struggle for independence … from the Zionist regime.”181 According to Israeli intelligence, before North Korea assisted Syria with its nuclear project, the DPRK aided Syria with medium-range ballistic missiles and the chemical weapons sarin and mustard gas. These details, coupled with evidence of intense nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s billion-dollar support for the nuclear endeavor, made the threat quite severe.182 Defense Minister Ehud Barak referred to the prospect of Iran, a regional neighbor and outspoken enemy of Israel, acquiring the ability to destroy the country as a “sword on Israel’s neck.”183 Prime Minister Olmert himself told the Washington Institute’s David Makovsky that “Israel cannot tolerate an enemy with militarized nuclear power. We did not tolerate it in the past, whether it was in Iraq or Syria, and we cannot tolerate it in Iran.”184
This narrative portrays a development significantly threatening to Israel.185 The history reflects long-standing animosity between Syria and Israel, Syria’s support for a terrorist group that denies Israel’s right to exist, and Syria’s connection with Iran—another adversary that has pledged to see Israel “wiped off the map.”186 Prime Minister Olmert likely perceived the Syrian nuclear development, coupled with the dangers that proximate regional actors armed with nuclear weapons pose, as deeply threatening. Evidentiary limitations notwithstanding, we do observe the serious consideration of preventive force, an assessment of a high likelihood of success (IV3), and its actual use in September 2007. This outcome accords with the leader-centric model’s expectations in such a situation.
Following the intelligence revelations, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert convened his security chiefs for a special meeting where they agreed that Israel must act urgently to acquire credible proof of the reactor’s existence. It was clear that Israel could not accept the prospect of Syria—a “bitter, belligerent” Israeli rival—turning into a nuclear-armed power.187 Therefore, Olmert ordered a dangerous intelligence raid into Syrian territory, and in August 2007, the elite Sayeret Matkal reconnaissance unit collected soil samples from the reactor site containing radioactive materials. The prime minister and his security leaders concluded that the threat was substantial.188
Simultaneously, Israel reached out to its US partners.189 In April, Defense Minister Amir Peretz traveled to Washington to meet Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The head of Mossad, Meir Dagan, briefed CIA Director Michael Hayden. Former president George W. Bush recounts the discussions in his memoirs. The United States received a classified report from an “intelligence partner,” including photos of the suspicious, well-hidden building in the eastern Syrian desert.190 The facility had striking resemblance to Yongbyon, a critical nuclear site in North Korea’s own program. The partner concluded that the structure contained a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. Significantly, North Korea was the only country that had built this reactor model in the past thirty-five years. Bush’s strong suspicion was that Syria had been caught red-handed attempting to build nuclear weapons with assistance from North Korea. As Bush notes, that was certainly the conclusion of Prime Minister Olmert, who said in a phone call shortly following the report’s delivery, “George, I’m asking you to bomb the compound.” Bush responded by asking for some time to explore the intelligence; he would later return to Olmert with an answer.191
Prime Minister Olmert and other high-ranking Israeli officials reached out to their US counterparts regarding the Syrian nuclear reactor. This move offers evidence of the seriousness with which Olmert viewed the situation and the high-level dedication afforded to it. These actions catalyzed a simultaneous decision-making process within the Bush administration as the Americans assessed the situation and contemplated potential policy options. In this way, a United States–Syria dyad could also be usefully explored.192 Because this chapter focuses on Israeli decision making, however, the US deliberations are only relevant inasmuch as US military action would have obviated the need for Israeli intervention. The leader-centric theory accounts for third-party involvement within the third independent variable—the likelihood of conducting a successful intervention—which assesses the extent to which Israel had outside options that could stop the Syrian program.
The next section describes US behavior to shed light on the parallel process underway in Israel and highlight the divergent perspectives Bush and Olmert held regarding the severity of the threat and the potential costs of military inaction. In particular, the discussion elucidates the fact that Olmert felt he had no outside options likely to be successful. Once the United States passed on using force, the ball rested in Olmert’s court.
Bush instructed his intelligence community to verify the Israeli claims. On the heels of the Iraq intelligence disaster, Bush indicated that the investigation “gotta be secret, and gotta be sure.” A CIA crisis task force was established to investigate. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency compared the Israeli photographs with the agency’s own satellite overflights and determined that the pictures were valid. The CIA’s “red team” concluded, “If it’s not a nuclear reactor, then it’s a fake nuclear reactor.”193
The interagency deputies committee established the “Drafting Committee” to explore policy options. The name and small circle were designed to keep discussions secret.194 The group included Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams; James Jeffrey, a top Middle East specialist from the State Department; Eric Edelman, a senior aide to Secretary Gates and former ambassador to Turkey; and Elliot Cohen, counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Their mission was to assess the information and provide options to the president. Bush highlighted the sensitivity of the undertaking: “If this stuff leaks, I’m going to fire all your asses.”195
The decisive meeting of the national security team occurred in June, including the secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, national security advisor, and director of national intelligence, along with the president and vice president. During the discussion, Bush asked CIA Director Hayden for his assessment. Hayden noted with high confidence that the plant housed a nuclear reactor. The team could conceive of no alternative uses for the facility. By early June, intelligence data came into focus: “[It] still looked like a Walmart warehouse from above, but there was nothing other than a nuclear reactor that would create enough heat to warrant that kind of cooling. And the fact that the Syrians opted for the low-profile underground pipes and cooling system rather than the large cooling towers fit the clandestine nature of the facility.”196 That said, the CIA could not confirm the location of the necessary facilities to weaponize the plutonium. There was no reprocessing plant or work on a warhead that the agency could identify.197 The CIA therefore had only low confidence that there was a Syrian nuclear weapons program of which the nuclear reactor would be a critical component. While the agency identified the reactor itself with high confidence, the CIA remained unable to certify the existence of a surrounding weapons endeavor, casting doubt on the regime’s intentions.
Few US decision makers were inclined toward military action despite its feasibility. The United States knew the location and the specific makeup of the facility, making it easy enough to target either using Stealth B-2 bombers or land- or carrier-based assets in the region. The Syrian air defenses “were respectable but not prohibitive” and had not yet been augmented around the reactor.198 General Peter Pace assured the president that “this was not much of a military challenge.”199 The larger issue was the prospect of the United States again opting for preventive war in the Middle East. The Bush administration had already used military force in Iraq, and the administration was coming to the end of its tenure. In this environment, “many in the Administration were deeply reluctant to start what they thought would be a third Middle Eastern war. They thought the American people would have no patience for it, quite apart from their own aversion to such a prospect.”200
In contrast, Vice President Cheney and Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams advocated the use of force, though Abrams supported an Israeli mission while Cheney thought the Americans should attack.201 To Abrams, attacking would help Israel reestablish regional deterrence. Tolerating a Syrian (or Iranian) nuclear program would undermine the entire US position in the Middle East.202 In Cheney’s view, attacking the Syrian program would send a strong message to Syria, North Korea, and Iran about the consequences of their actions. “We were serious,” according to Cheney, “when we warned … against the proliferation of nuclear technology to terrorist states.”203 In addition, ongoing diplomatic discussions with Iran and North Korea regarding their own nuclear projects would have a higher likelihood of success if the two states understood the possibility of military action should diplomacy fail. In Cheney’s mind, the dangers of allowing the nuclear project to continue in Syria with North Korean assistance were “far greater than the prospect of wider conflict.” He also did not share others’ concerns that Syria would strike US troops in Iraq. During a private lunch with the president on June 14, 2007, Cheney indicated that he saw the dangers of nuclear proliferation as the greatest long-term security challenge facing the United States.204 Nevertheless, Vice President Cheney remained the only member of the administration keen for the United States to pursue the military option.
The purely diplomatic route also never got much traction, despite advocacy from Secretaries Gates and Rice. Naming and shaming would not be effective, nor would condemnatory language from the United Nations, if the United States could secure it. Assad could stonewall inspectors until the reactor went hot, and any diplomatic démarche would tip the United States’ hand without being decisive.205 Secretary of State Rice, for her part, felt that Israel’s war with Hezbollah in 2006 had undermined the judgement of the Israeli military. She also feared that military action would lead to a wider regional conflict with Syria and Hezbollah. Moreover, Rice was invested in two diplomatic initiatives at the time—the Six-Party Talks regarding North Korea’s own nuclear weapons and a conference on Middle East peace to be held in Annapolis, Maryland.206 A war could undermine both efforts.
The discussion led ultimately to a hybrid option in which the United States would publicize the facility’s discovery and demand that Assad prove it was not a nuclear reactor via international inspections. This declaration would be paired with a time line and an ultimatum. Such a strategy demonstrated restraint and respect of international institutions but gave Assad time to prepare defenses and other steps to cover his actions.207 While imperfect, Bush nevertheless decided on the diplomatic route backed by the threat of force. The choice, Bush believed, protected Israel’s interests and the Israeli state and made it more likely that the United States would achieve its interests as well.208 As a result, Bush told Prime Minister Olmert, “I cannot justify an attack on a sovereign nation unless my intelligence agencies stand up and say it’s a weapons program.” Bush did not feel he had political cover for a “preemptive” attack absent such a declaration of imminent threat.209
Prime Minister Olmert was disappointed with the American decision. He thought it would allow Assad to stall and continue developing the nuclear reactor until it was fully online. Thus, Olmert continued to pursue options for Israel to deploy on its own. According to retired brigadier general Shlomo Brom, who served as deputy national security advisor under Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s earlier administration, “Israel would not have acted against the Syria program if it hadn’t been convinced there was a threat. It may have been a perception of a conviction, but there was something there.… It was the beginning of a nuclear project.”210 As Prime Minister Olmert made clear to President Bush when Bush suggested the diplomatic route, Olmert would not wait for the International Atomic Energy Agency to respond. For Israel, the threat was existential. Olmert told Bush, “If America would not act, Israel would.”211
Little evidence exists to document Olmert’s prior nuclear beliefs. This lack of evidence could reflect a pre–prime ministerial career largely focused on domestic issues, including time as a lawyer, minister of the Knesset, cabinet minister (without portfolio; Health; Industry, Trade, and Labor; and Communication), and mayor of Jerusalem. Details may be forthcoming as additional materials become available. Nevertheless, Olmert came to leadership on a platform of peace, even if he would grow more hawkish with time. If there is an Olmert Doctrine, it is that Israel can act forcefully to neutralize threats while simultaneously pursuing peace no less forcefully.212 Early in his administration, Olmert sought secret peace talks with Assad, using Turkey as an intermediary. Though Assad agreed to meet, events intervened.
According to the present model’s logic, the leaders most likely to seriously consider preventive military force are proliferation pessimists who possess little confidence that they can deter a nuclear-armed adversary from bad future behavior. What we can observe in Olmert’s case is that he seriously considered and then used force in the Syria episode. Significantly, in 2006, upon becoming prime minister following Ariel Sharon’s debilitating stroke, Olmert also delegated significant resources to the Mossad to stop or at least delay the Iranian program, suggesting again a serious commitment to preventing Iranian proliferation through at least covert means. At the time, Olmert did not believe the threat from Iran was immediate enough to warrant military intervention.213 In 2007, he described sanctions as imposing effective pressure on Iran but also noted the potential need to increase Iran’s burden over time. Olmert was also clear in putting Iraq, Syria, and Iran in the same category: enemies in whose hands Israel could not tolerate nuclear weapons. In making the case for US preventive action against Syria, “Olmert argued that a U.S. strike would ‘kill two birds with one stone,’ allowing Bush to remind the international community of Assad’s villainy and send a message dissuading Iran from pursuing its own nuclear program.”214 Olmert’s position is noteworthy for indicating a threat perception that views adversarial nuclear proliferation as extremely dangerous for Israel and because, in both cases, Olmert preferred US action. When such military force was unavailable, then he would order the attack himself, at least against Syria. To date, Olmert, like many inside Israel, has opposed unilateral action against Iran. If history is any guide, absent other international action, at some point Olmert may change his mind.
Returning to the Syrian case, evidence of the seriousness with which the Olmert administration handled the Syrian nuclear development began in August 2007. Olmert responded to the initial intelligence indicating a nuclear reactor had been discovered by ordering a dangerous mission into Syrian territory to collect soil samples for confirmation.215 The mission was meant to remove any doubt about the purpose of the facility under construction. Also in 2007, Olmert and officials in his inner circle began a series of discussions with the United States. These discussions included intelligence sharing and the discussion of options to confront the Syrian nuclear program. While the al-Kibar facility was not an immediate threat to Israel’s security, Olmert was still inclined toward a preventive attack, especially once the United States declined to intervene.216 Following Bush’s decision, Olmert notified the United States of his intention and gave the Israeli military staff authority to bomb the reactor.
The IDF and IAF considered three military strategies. The first was a wide-ranging IAF military strike, nicknamed “Fat Shkedi” after the IAF chief. A second, narrower strike option involved a limited target set and was nicknamed “Skinny Shkedi.” A third option involved a ground attack undertaken by special forces. The key consideration in weighing these three options was the desire to minimize the potential for a military response from Damascus. Psychologists consulted by the IDF to get a better understanding of the Syrian leadership argued that retaliation could be avoided if Israel did not corner President Assad by publicly claiming credit for a strike, preserving a “zone of denial” for Assad. This element gained credibility in the deliberations when it was noted that Assad had avoided taking any direct military action against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War, instead opting to work indirectly through Syria’s Hezbollah proxy. While still hostile, this choice indicated that Assad perhaps saw value in avoiding a direct military confrontation with Israel.217
Beyond the risks of retaliation, Israel weighed other considerations related to the likelihood of success. First, it was helpful that the North Koreans assisting with the program did not work at the nuclear site overnight. No North Koreans would be killed, and it would therefore be less likely that North Korea would encourage Syrian retaliation. Second, Assad was likely to conclude that the attack had US support—tacit or otherwise. A Syrian counterattack thus posed the risk of engaging the Americans. Third, Israel had little confidence in the United Nations or the IAEA.218 Despite the discovery of an illicit nuclear program in Iran, for example, the international community had been unable to shut the Iranian program down by 2007. There was therefore not much of an alternative if Israel failed to take action itself.219
In light of these options and considerations, the head of the IDF, the Mossad chief Meir Dagan, and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni all favored a low-signature attack on the reactor, or the “Skinny Shkedi” option. When Dagan visited the White House in May 2007, he reported that “all Israeli policymakers who saw the evidence agreed that the reactor had to go away,” suggesting near consensus among key decision makers.220 Though there is conflicting evidence on this point, some accounts suggest that Defense Minister Barak was afraid an attack would cause a repeat of the 2006 war or might fail to destroy the reactor. Barak thus preferred to delay an attack and take time to prepare for any possible Syrian retaliation, as well as develop alternative approaches.221 By contrast, Prime Minister Olmert thought that the 2006 war had established Israel’s deterrent; there had been no Hezbollah attacks since. Olmert also thought that self-interest was behind Barak’s position.222 The report on Israel’s conduct during the Second Lebanon War was forthcoming, and its findings might have triggered Olmert’s ouster.223 If that happened, Barak would assume the mantle of leadership and could launch the attack himself.224
Nevertheless, on September 5, the security cabinet met and voted to strike. Cabinet members acknowledged an explicit risk of war but recommended attacking that night. Only Avi Dichter, then minister of internal security, abstained. Just before midnight on September 5, 2007, four F-15 and four F-16 fighter aircraft flew north along the Mediterranean coast, turned east, and followed the Syria-Turkey border toward their target. The aircraft used electronic means to scramble Syria’s air defenses, paving the way for an unadulterated arrival. Somewhere between 12:40 and 12:53 a.m., seventeen tons of explosives dropped onto the target. The operation was a total success: the reactor was destroyed, and not a single pilot was lost. Prime Minister Olmert called President Bush with the news: “I just want to report to you that something that existed doesn’t exist anymore.”225
The analysis demonstrates that the leader-centric argument offers explanatory power beyond the US context. It preliminarily documents the nuclear beliefs of Prime Ministers Rabin, Begin, and Olmert and shows how those leaders inclined to view nuclear weapons as negatively consequential for the international system and threatening to Israel were those inclined to consider (and use) preventive military force. Begin and Olmert viewed nuclear weapons in the hands of undeterrable adversaries as existential threats to Israel. These prime ministers therefore considered (in the case of Pakistan) as well as used (in Iraq and Syria) preventive military force to destroy hostile nuclear programs in formation. By contrast, Rabin held no such view, and did not take these actions. Although there is admittedly less information available for analysis, we can be confident that even preliminarily, the leader-centric argument improves our understanding of the circumstances when both US and Israeli leaders will consider and use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.