After only a relatively short rest, given the hard marching of the day before, the soldiers were woken before daylight. Even for the men in the ranks who had experienced a wet, but warm bivouac, it seems that the rest was sufficient. ‘The army was able to set off on their march after a rest of five hours; sufficient for the rank and file to recover from the fatigues of the previous day.’1 Breakfast was normally taken during a break in the march if time allowed and therefore, once the diane had been beaten, it took little time for the troops to be ready to march:
Getting to his feet at the first beat of a drum stick, the soldier returns to the front of his squad, where he quickly retakes his place at the arms stacks prepared before they were stood down; on the command he seizes his arms, the columns are formed and they are ready to set off. All this is an affair of a moment.2
When the troops had formed up, the emperor’s proclamation to the army was read out.
Soldiers! This is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, which twice decided the fortunes of Europe. But then, as after Austerlitz, and as after Wagram, we were too generous; we believed the protestations and the oaths of the kings whom we had left on their thrones. Now, however, they have formed a League to overthrow the sacred rights of France. They have decided on the most unjust aggressions. Let us therefore march to meet them, for are not we and they still the same men?
Soldiers! At Jena, the Prussians, so arrogant today, were three to one against you; at Montmirail you were one to six. As for the English, let those who have been their prisoners tell the tale of the miseries and tortures they suffered whilst cooped up on their prison hulks!
Saxons, Belgians, Hanoverians, the forces of the Rhine Confederation, groan at being compelled to assist the cause of the kings who are enemies of justice and of the rights of the people. They know full well that this coalition will be insatiable. After having swallowed 12,000,000 Poles, 12,000,000 Italians, 1,000,000 Saxons, 6,000,000 Belgians, it will devour the second-tier States of Germany. Madmen! A moment of good fortune has made them blind. The oppression and humiliation of France are beyond their powers, if they cross her frontiers it will be but to find their graves.
Soldiers! We shall be called upon to make forced marches, to fight battles, and to face dangers; but, with perseverance, victory will be ours; the rights, the honour, the happiness of our country will be regained.
For every Frenchman who has a heart, the time has come to conquer or to die!3
However rousing the proclamation as we read it today, it is hard to be sure how carefully the tired soldiers listened in the damp, grey dawn, although at least one commanding officer assures us that it had the planned effect. ‘I read the emperor’s proclamation to my regiment . . . The words had the best effect; there was entire confidence in ultimate success that would force Europe to recognise our rights.’4
The Prussian Forces
The first forces the French would meet were those of the 1st and 2nd Brigades of General Zieten’s 1st Prussian Corps (it should be remembered that in the Prussian army a brigade was the equivalent of a British or French division) and some of the Cavalry Reserve. Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade was centred on Fontaine-l’Evêque, covering the crossings at Lobbes, Thuin and the abbey at Aulne. Pirch’s 2nd Brigade, centred on Charleroi, covered the bridges at that place, Marchienne-au-Pont to the west and Châtelet to the east. Despite the efforts that the French troops had gone to in order to shield their bivouac fires from the Prussian outposts, the light was reflected off the low clouds and when the French crossed the frontier on the morning of the 15th, the Prussian outposts were formed up and under arms.
The Left Column
Reille’s corps started off at the time prescribed by Napoleon’s movement order (3am). For many units, the day started in similar fashion: ‘. . . first thing on the morning of the 15th, we had read to us a proclamation that the emperor addressed to his army before starting the campaign. After this lecture, which was our signal to march forwards, we headed for Thuin in Belgium.’5
There were four bridges to the front of 2nd Corps’ front; those at Lobbes, Thuin, L’Abbaye d’Aulne and Marchienne-au-Pont. Of these, only the last was of real importance as the first three had poor access to major roads and the ground and routes were generally unsuitable for cavalry and particularly for artillery. The importance of the first three to the French was that if they were held they would protect the vulnerable left flank of the advancing army. The roads that the French were advancing over were poor; none were paved and they were muddy and rutted. Given that some had been blocked by the Prussians with various obstacles, the plan to move the sappers near the front of the advancing columns was a wise one and they were no doubt kept very busy.
Reille’s advance was led by Bachelu’s division supported by Piré’s cavalry. These were followed by the division of Prince Jérôme and then Foy. Only half an hour after they set off, the advance guard, two battalions provided by the 2nd légère, was in contact with the Prussian outpost at the hamlet of Maladrie on the outskirts of Thuin, a small town built on the French (left bank) side of the Sambre that was occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr. Only a small distance to the west was another bridge, near the village of Lobbes, that was also defended by a Prussian post. Lobbes was on the far (right) bank. This outpost and the village were manned by troops from the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr Regiment commanded by Captain Gillhausen, supported by the 6th Uhlans. In the face of overwhelming numbers these troops could to do little but attempt to impose upon their attackers by making best use of natural defences and their superior knowledge of the ground. After the French started to develop their attack they had no choice but to retire; to stand and fight was to guarantee their destruction. Thuin occupied a particularly strong natural position, situated on a steep hill with old, but useful defences and narrow streets, and Major Monsterberg with his 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr Regiment was able to put up a ‘tenacious’ resistance before being pushed back and practically destroyed; Monsterberg himself was captured. Lemonnier-Delafosse, General Foy’s chief-of-staff, reported:
. . . however, these enemy forces did not stop our infantry, whose prompt and vigorous attack broke them and they ran from Thuin beyond the Rome Wood,6 on the high ground above Marchienne-au-Pont.7
At about 7am, the Prussians attempted to fall back on Montigny where there were two squadrons of the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, who covered their retreat after this village was also taken by Bachelu’s men. Unfortunately for the Landwehr battalion, the dragoons were overwhelmed by a sudden attack by Piré’s troopers and the battalion was almost destroyed before it could reach Marchienne. Reille later wrote:
At 3am on the 15th, it [the 2nd Corps] crossed the frontier and headed for Marchienne-au-Pont; the advance guard came into contact with a post of cavalry and infantry in front of Thuin with a Prussian battalion of about 800 men in the town itself. This battalion, pursued by cavalry, stopped for a time in the wood of Montigny-le-Tigneux, but having been pressed by the lead infantry, and the 200 cavalry it had with it being insufficient to support it properly, it was defeated with the loss of about 100 men killed or wounded and 200 prisoners.8
The remains of Captain Gillhausen’s battalion made its way back to Fontaine l’Évêque where Steinmetz’s 1st Brigade headquarters was located. The bridge at L’Abbaye d’Aulne fell to Reille’s troops between 8 and 9 o’clock.
Once General Zieten was convinced that the whole of the French army was on the march he sent couriers to both Blücher and Wellington warning them of events and sent orders to his two forward brigades. The 1st (Steinmetz) was to retire via Courcelles to a position to the rear of Gosselies on the road to Brussels, and the 2nd was to protect the bridges at Marchienne, Charleroi and Châtelet to cover the flank of the 1st Brigade and hold up the French on the line of the Sambre. His 3rd and 4th Brigades were to move to Fleurus, close to the army’s concentration point of Sombreffe.
Although marked by success, the taking of the bridges at Lobbes, Thuin and L’Abbaye d’Aulne, and the skirmishes with the Prussians along the river were a sideshow to the 2nd Corps’ main advance on the vital crossing point at Marchienne. Whilst Bachelu busied himself with the pursuit of the Prussians along the river, Foy’s division took up the lead towards the vital bridge at Marchienne. Reille had reached this bridge without too much delay, but now he failed to push home his advantage. The bridge was defended by the 2nd Battalion, the 6th Prussian Regiment, belonging to the 2nd Brigade. They had two guns in support and had barricaded the bridge but not destroyed it. Instead of attempting a coup de main against a well-organised but nervous defence, Reille waited until most of his forces had struggled along the poor roads to join him and his first two attempts on the bridge were repulsed. Napoleon’s movement order had anticipated Reille arriving at Marchienne at 9am; at 8.30 Soult wrote to him.
Letter from Soult to Reille, bivouac of Jumignon,9 8.30am, 15 June. M. le comte Reille, the emperor orders me to write that you should cross the Sambre if you do not have any enemy in front of you and to form in several lines, one or two leagues beyond in order to be across the main road to Brussels and to reconnoitre in strength towards Fleurus. M. Le comte d’Erlon will cross at Marchienne and form up in battle order on the Charleroi to Mons road, from where he will be able to support you if required.
If you are still at Marchienne when the present order reaches you, and that the move on Charleroi has not been possible, you are to operate via Marchienne, and to take up the position given above.
The emperor is moving beyond Charleroi. Immediately send a report to His Majesty of your operations and of what you are facing.
Le Maréchal d’empire, major général, Duc de Dalmatie10
The only new direction in this letter is the requirement for Reille to form up ‘one or two leagues’, that is 8 to 10 kilometres, up the Brussels road. This would take him to just beyond the town of Gosselies. It also informs him that the 1st Corps will cover his left flank and rear by facing and scouting towards Mons.
While Reille hesitated before Marchienne, d’Erlon’s 1st Corps was slowly following him up. D’Erlon, who had been ordered to start his march at 3am, had not instructed reveille to be sounded until 4am.
Solre-sur-Sambre, 14 June ‘Evening’.
The diane [reveille] is to be beaten at 4am precisely; the Order of the Day of the Army, dated the 14th, is to be read to the troops.
Signed d’Erlon
He could not, therefore, have started his march much before 4.30am, an hour and a half after he had been ordered. Although he gave no reason for this, the criticism he has received for this from some writers – Ropes is particularly damning – seems a little unfair. The 1st Corps had to wait until the whole of the 2nd Corps, which they were to follow, had moved off before they could start their march. As they both had the same start time and their bivouac areas were relatively close together, even if 1st Corps had been ready to move at 3am as ordered, it is unlikely that the whole of 2nd Corps would have set off. D’Erlon’s troops had to wait for three infantry divisions, a cavalry division and all their artillery to start their march before they could follow. It is estimated that a corps covered 15 kilometres of road, that is, about a four-hour march from front to rear. In addition, the 2nd Corps were inevitably held up by the actions at Lobbes and Thuin and the poor road network did not allow the 1st Corps to take an alternative route.
It was a bleak start for some of 1st Corps’s soldiers:
On the 15th, before daybreak, we entered Belgium in gloomy, wet weather. The ground, soaked from the day before, sunk under our feet and tired out our infantry, for, when you advance to the attack, the roads are reserved for the artillery and cavalry, and the infantry has to march across the fields.11
As he advanced, d’Erlon relieved the 2nd Corps detachments that had continued to hold the various bridges along the Sambre after they had been captured, allowing those detachments to rejoin their parent formations. Captain Duthilt, ADC to General Bourgeois who commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, tells us how part of the 1st Corps was thus deployed:
On the 15th two divisions of the 1st Corps marched on Marchienne-au-Pont, the 1st Division remained as the rear-guard . . . Our division slept at Thuin, a town where 7 to 800 Prussians had been beaten and put to rout by some of our companies of voltigeurs. Maréchal de Camp Gobrecht [commander of the 2nd Brigade of Piré’s cavalry division] was left at Solre-sur-Sambre and Bienne-sur-Thuin, the 3rd Lancers at the first of these posts, and the 4th Lancers at the second, to maintain communications with Maubeuge . . . and also to watch out for any movement from the direction of Mons. This cavalry was to push patrols along the roads to Mons and Binche, and if it was forced to retire, either by the presence of the enemy or by an order of recall, it was to destroy the bridge at Solre and to move promptly to Thuin where the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division would wait for it.12
It was to be a dull day for d’Erlon’s troops, but they were not to be completely sheltered from the horrors of war, as Lieutenant Martin explained.
Our corps was not engaged on this day; it followed that of Reille, who led the advance, and it was in their wake that I saw once more, for the first time for 18 months, the wounded and dead spread on the ground. This spectacle, which so vividly announced the upcoming return of such bloody scenes, made a big impression on me: my heart beat faster, it recalled it all. Why do I say this, since it did not prevent me from doing my duty?13
Sometime around 11am, d’Erlon received a similar letter to the one Soult had addressed to Reille at 8.30am.
Bivouac at Jumignon, 10am, 15 June.
M. le Comte, the emperor orders me to write that Comte Reille has received the order to cross the Sambre at Charleroi, and to form in several lines one or two leagues in front of this town across the main road to Brussels.
The intention of his Majesty is that you should cross the Sambre at Marchienne, or at Ham [Ham was 6 kilometres from the river!], to move onto the main road from Charleroi to Mons, where you are to form up in several lines and to take position close to those of Comte Reille, maintaining your communications and sending patrols in all directions: Mons, Nivelle, etc. . . .This movement should also be followed if Comte Reille is obliged to cross at Marchienne. Keep me informed of your operations and what you are facing; the emperor has passed Charleroi.14
Reille was not ready to attack Marchienne again until around midday. Under Foy’s direction, ‘the bridge was crossed by our skirmishers at the charge, supported by a deep column of infantry and the enemy started his retreat.’15 However, most of the Prussian defenders had withdrawn in compliance with their orders and the small rear-guard defended the bridge without determination. By this time the central column had already seized the bridge at Charleroi over an hour before and Napoleon himself had crossed there. Although Reille could now start to get his corps across the river, this was to be a long and painful process. Not only was there a single, narrow bridge, approached by equally narrow streets, but he was still waiting for all his detachments covering the other captured crossings to be relieved by d’Erlon’s men and to rejoin him.
The Centre Column
The morning did not get off to a very auspicious start for the centre column. Although Pajol’s cavalry, who were to lead the advance, departed on time, the 3rd Corps, who were to follow them ahead of the Imperial Guard and 6th Corps, were not ready. The commander of this corps, General Vandamme, had taken lodgings in Beaumont on the 14th, but was told to leave and move closer to his corps on the arrival of imperial headquarters. He had left in a bad humour and moved to a country house that was difficult to find. Soult had sent only a single officer to Vandamme with the army’s movement order and this officer searched in vain for Vandamme’s headquarters, finally suffering a fall from his horse that broke his leg. With no one to pass the important message to, the morning found the 3rd Corps still quiet in their bivouacs.
General Rogniat, who had been ordered to join Vandamme’s column, found this general ignorant of his orders. Expressing his astonishment at the inactivity, he informed Vandamme that he should immediately start his move on Charleroi. The abrasive Vandamme, indignant at Rogniat’s tone, explained that he had received no orders from imperial headquarters. However, he immediately took the necessary steps to get his corps on the move, but it needed time to get 17,000 men up, concentrate them and get them moving. Despite his determination, this unfortunate incident put the 3rd Corps about three hours behind schedule and they did not set off on their march until about 6am, according to an officer of the 37th Line.16 Not waiting for the 3rd Corps to get ready, the imperial guard started its march; the 6th Corps waited for Vandamme to get on his way before moving off themselves. To be fair to Vandamme, he marched his corps hard, despite the difficult country and poor roads, but a large proportion of the army suffered a long delay and this ensured that Napoleon’s timetable was immediately undermined. The implications of only a single set of orders being sent to the 3rd Corps were to be significant.
The centre column was to be led by Grouchy’s cavalry and, unlike those of the left and right, the centre had a number of parallel routes to choose from. Grouchy received specific instructions from the major général:
Beaumont, 15 June.
. . . Several routes lead to Charleroi from Beaumont; that of the right passes through Boussu, Fleurieux, Vogines and Yve, where it joins the main road from Philippeville to Charleroi. It is this route that you are to take so as not to interfere with the other columns; but, before moving, ensure this route has been reconnoitred, and control your movement to conform with that of the left column, at the head of which General Pajol will be moving. I have warned General Gérard of the route you are to follow; his corps is formed up in front of Philippeville and will be moving on Charleroi from the same direction.
I must also inform you that a Prussian corps of 6,000 infantry is reported to be established at Jumignon. If this is true, the emperor wants this corps taken; manoeuvre accordingly . . .
Le Maréchal d’empire, major général, Duc de Dalmatie
General Pajol had his corps mounted and ready to move at 2.30am. His mission was to clear the route for the central column. This followed, as far as Jumignon and Bommerée, the valley of the River Heure and the tracks on both sides of this valley. To achieve this he had the divisions of Soult (the marshal’s younger brother) and Subervie from his own corps, as well as Domon’s cavalry divison that was attached to him from Vandamme’s corps. Less than two leagues from their bivouacs they encountered the Prussian outposts which were centred on Ham-sur-Heure. These outposts were not surprised; despite the precautions that Napoleon had prescribed a deserter, a drummer from the Imperial Guard no less, had presented himself to the outposts the previous night and warned them of the coming storm. This information had been sent back up the chain of command and had resulted in Marshal Blücher ordering the concentration of his army at Sombreffe. The desertion of General Bourmont in the early hours of the morning had confirmed this information.
Using subsidiary routes, each division advanced on a slightly different axis. Some of these were extremely difficult, but this avoided any mix-ups and confusion. Pajol himself marched at the head of Soult’s division, where he was well placed to communicate with Vandamme to his right and the emperor to his left. The divisions on each flank were also ordered to maintain communications with the formations on their flanks. Warned of the Prussian post at Ham-sur-Heure, Pajol’s deployment approached this position from left, right and centre, and in this way he hoped to capture it as he had been ordered by Marshal Soult’s earlier message.
The first contact with Prussian sentries and weak patrols was made near Cour-sur-Heure; these withdrew quickly as Pajol advanced and it was at Hamsur-Heure, where Pajol arrived towards 6am, that the first serious contact was made. Here the route was barricaded and defended by a Prussian battalion. A vigorous charge was sufficient to compel them to retreat, leaving a hundred prisoners in French hands.
Colonel Biot, one of Pajol’s ADCs, had been attached to Subervie’s division to lead its advance. Going ahead of the foremost troops into Thy-le Chateau, Biot found Napoleon there with his escort conducting his own reconnaissance. The emperor, learning of Vandamme’s late start, had taken the sappers and marines of the guard, as well as part of the Young Guard, and taken a lateral route to the left. Napoleon wanted to interrogate the burgmestre (the mayor), and Biot was ordered to find him. However, he returned with a young man whom he had recognised earlier and spoken to, feeling he would have the information the emperor was interested in. Napoleon immediately recognised the man, who was called Duhaut, and said, ‘Have you not served in the Gardes d’Honneur?’
‘Yes, Sire.’
‘And what do you do now?’ replied the emperor.
‘I am married, Sire.’
‘Ah, Ah! You have done well; would you like to serve again?’ The young man hesitated, but before he could properly answer, Napoleon pressed him and he was made a lieutenant in the cavalry. Biot, who recorded this story, comments, ‘He was probably killed, for I did not hear of him again’!17
An hour later, at 7am, Pajol approached Jumignon where soon after he met the emperor accompanied by the four Service Squadrons. No Prussians were found at this place and Soult continued his march towards Bommerée, where he met Domon’s division. These two divisions continued their march side by side. It was at about this time that cannon fire was heard to the west; this was from Reille’s engagements. Moving up onto some high ground, Pajol was able to watch this action, and while he was there he noticed some Prussians concentrating at the farm of La Tombe, near the village of Couillet to his east. Sending the 4th Chasseurs, commanded by Colonel Desmichels and supported by the 9th, to this place, the Prussian infantry took refuge in the buildings where the cavalry could not touch them. However, Colonel Biot, seeing the situation, sent over a howitzer, and, faced by this, the Prussian force, which turned out to be a company of the 28th Prussian Regiment, surrendered.18
Whilst this action held up Domon’s men, Soult continued his advance as far as Marcinelle, on the southern outskirts of Charleroi. This village was connected to Charleroi by a dyke 300 paces in length, terminating at a bridge, the head of which was barricaded. Pajol wanted to take this post at a rush, but a strong force of Prussian skirmishers, hidden behind the hedges, the garden walls and in the houses, engaged the 1st Hussars that led the advance and a man was even killed and several wounded in Pajol’s escort. Pajol had no option but to wait for some of Vandamme’s infantry to come up, but he used the time to turn the Prussian position and to send General Amiel to try to find a ford where his cavalry could cross and continue the advance. Unfortunately, there was none. If Vandamme had started his march on time, Charleroi could have been in French hands at 7am. The full implications of his delay were now beginning to be felt.
Luckily, the sappers and marines of the imperial guard, led by Generals Haxo and Rogniat, arrived at Jumignon just as Napoleon learnt of Pajol’s dilemma, and he sent them forward. Arriving with Pajol at 10.30am, he immediately ordered them to attack Marcinelle. Despite their relative numerical weakness, the élan of their attack was irresistible and the Prussians fell back into Charleroi and prepared to defend the barricade and palisade that blocked the bridge over the Sambre. However, the French quickly followed up their advantage and the sappers and marines stormed over the bridge, followed by Soult’s cavalry with Pajol at its head. No attempt had been made by the Prussians to destroy the bridge and by 11.30am Charleroi and its precious bridge were in French hands.
Whilst Pajol’s troopers and elements of the guard were pushing back the Prussian advance posts and seizing the bridge at Charleroi, Vandamme’s troops were closing the gap between them. His lead elements approached the bridge at midday19 and the whole corps took an hour to defile across the narrow bridge.
In contrast to the lukewarm reception even Napoleon himself had received at Beaumont, which was in France, there was a warmer welcome in Charleroi. Gourgaud noted that after crossing the border they were, ‘received as friends’20 and one of the staff officers in imperial headquarters reported:
A great number of women in a crowd, moved in front of the troops, shouting, ‘Long live the French, long live our compatriots! Give us the tricolour!’ . . . Having heard from the inhabitants of Charleroi that some Prussian officers who were garrisoned in the town had only managed to escape without having time to put on their breeches, I told the emperor this story which made him roar with laughter.21
The Right Column
Gérard’s 4th Corps, three infantry divisions and a cavalry division, was furthest from Charleroi and not expected to be involved in any fighting that day. Gérard was to have concentrated forward of Philippeville and have set off at 3am, regulating his move with that of the 3rd Corps to his left and followed by Delort’s 14th Cavalry Division. One of his main tasks was to protect the right flank of the advance, covering the approaches from Namur, around which it was known there was a corps of Prussians. The 4th Corps were to cross the Sambre at Charleroi.
However, not all Gérard’s troops had reached Philippeville the day before and these required time to close up. Thus they were late forming up and did not gather on the heights of Florenne, their concentration point, until 7am. Gérard’s movement orders did not leave his headquarters in Philippeville until 2am, only an hour before the troops were due to move out! Worse was to come. Gérard’s 14th Division was commanded by General Bourmont, a noted royalist (he had once been imprisoned for being complicit in an attempt on Napoleon’s life!), but one that had fought under Napoleon and had proven his combat ability the previous year in his successful defence of Nogent-sur-Seine, which had seen him promoted to général de division. Napoleon had only reluctantly agreed to give him a command after being urged to do so by Ney and Gérard, who had both sworn to answer for him. It was a decision all three of them were to regret.
Early in the morning of the 15th, before the corps was due to begin its advance, General Bourmont, accompanied by his chief-of-staff, Colonel Clouet, two of his staff officers and two ADCs, left his headquarters at Florenne and deserted to the Prussians. When Colonel Rumigny, who carried the movement orders for this division, arrived at that village, he was surrounded by soldiers shouting, ‘We are betrayed, down with the traitors!’22 This news had an almost catastrophic effect on the division as well as the corps, and it required passionate speeches by Gérard and General Hulot (the senior brigade commander who took over command of the division) to restore order. By this time there was no hope of the corps crossing the Sambre at 8am as Gérard’s orders prescribed, and the best that could be hoped for was to march hard and try to make up as much time as possible.
Despite the impressive planning of Napoleon and his headquarters, and the detail laid down in their orders, a succession of problems had already disrupted their intended timetable; the result of accidents, incompetence and treachery. Many historians, mostly those who set out merely to criticise Napoleon, emphasise the incompetence, but those familiar with war will quickly realise that it was the inevitable ‘friction’ that comes with military operations. It is fair to conclude that a commander as familiar with the friction of war as Napoleon was probably satisfied with the morning’s work.