We must now retrace our steps and examine d’Erlon’s activity on the 16th. We have already seen that he had issued orders during the night of the 15th/16th with the aim of concentrating his command and moving on Gosselies in order to support Marshal Ney. However, despite his best intentions, Quiot’s division was still some way behind and would require time to close up. Houssaye only tells us that the 1st Corps was concentrated at Jumet (2 kilometres south of Gosselies) ‘in the morning’ and that any forward movement was held up by the fact that Reille’s troops still occupied Gosselies itself. Thus, any charge of tardiness against d’Erlon has to be balanced against the fact that he could not move until Reille had done the same, and we have already seen how the latter had been slow to move forward despite Ney’s orders.
Some time before noon, d’Erlon received Ney’s order to advance, but as we have heard, he was forced to delay his march because of Reille’s inactivity. In particular, Prince Jérôme’s division, which had bivouacked on the south of the Lombac wood (which lay east of Gosselies), did not start its move until between 1.30 and 2pm, preventing d’Erlon from starting his own march as long as he planned to use the main road rather than some of the poor quality cross roads. D’Erlon was then held up even further by reports that he was threatened by a substantial allied force to his west, and it was only after he had satisfied himself that this was not the case (in fact it was van Merlen’s cavalry moving to Quatre Bras) that he finally began his own move at about 3pm. The march from Jumet to Frasnes was only about 8 kilometres, but given the length of the marching column it would take up to three hours for all his troops to complete the march and deploy.
A little time after four o’clock, the first two divisions had passed the Roman way when d’Erlon was joined by Colonel Forbin-Janson, a staff officer from Imperial headquarters. He carried an order from Napoleon ordering Marshal Ney to send d’Erlon’s corps to the east and attack Ligny from the heights of Saint-Amand, in line with the emperor’s new strategic design. The order was written in pencil and was almost illegible. Unfortunately, Forbin-Janson was unable to offer either clarification or elaboration, exhibiting a gross lack of military understanding. In fact, he had been promoted straight to colonel after the campaign in France the previous year in recognition of his exploits in commanding a band of partisans against the invading allies. Whilst no doubt this was praiseworthy, it hardly qualified him for such an important mission. What’s more, whilst it was to his credit he had taken a more direct route than Colonel Laurent, the carrier of Soult’s 3.15pm order to Ney, and had thus arrived earlier, inevitably much of the context and imperative of Soult’s order was lost. Forbin-Janson also informed d’Erlon that in passing his troops on the road he had already, in the name of the emperor, directed them off towards Ligny in line with the emperor’s intent.
To make matters worse, the inexperienced officer, perhaps overwhelmed by the enormity of what was going on, and having informed d’Erlon of Napoleon’s order, forgot to continue his mission and deliver it to Marshal Ney! Thus Ney was not only unaware of the order, but also of the fact that d’Erlon’s troops were already marching east. Forbin-Janson hastily returned to imperial headquarters where this error was identified and he was sent back to complete his task. D’Erlon had immediately departed to join his troops, but wisely took the precaution of despatching his chief-of-staff, General Delcambre, to inform Marshal Ney of what was happening.
Unfortunately, the message carried by Forbin-Janson has been lost, so we are unable to examine its exact wording. However, we shall see a little later that General Deselles, commander of the 1st Corps artillery, quotes the message in his own account of what happened. Even if we do not know the exact wording, it was clearly an order direct from the emperor, putting Napoleon’s own stamp on the importance of the order written by Soult and carried by Colonel Laurent in much the same way that Napoleon had sent a reiteration of his orders in the morning of the 15th, using his own personal staff officers to send duplicates of the formal orders sent by the major génèral. He was to use this method throughout the campaign and it was his own way of ensuring the orders got to the right place, often more quickly than through the established process. It is therefore not surprising that on this occasion too Napoleon’s own order reached d’Erlon before that of Soult, which had to go via Ney.
Perhaps most importantly from Napoleon’s perspective, was that d’Erlon was much further south than the emperor expected; with no information on Ney’s dispositions or the delays of his subordinates, Napoleon was expecting the 1st Corps to march down the Namur road from Quatre Bras, where he had directed Ney to take position earlier in the morning. Instead, d’Erlon’s troops turned east at Frasnes and approached the Ligny battlefield from the direction of Villars-Perwin. Far from supporting Napoleon’s final, decisive attack, his unexpected appearance on the left rear of Vandamme’s 3rd Corps caused considerable anxiety that they had been outflanked by Wellington, and it appears that some troops were on the point of panic. The final assault was delayed for an hour and a half before d’Erlon’s troops were identified as such and the attack could go ahead. At this point in the battle, this time gave the Prussians a vital respite in which they could re-establish some order in their wavering troops.
With Forbin-Janson having forgotten to continue his mission to inform Marshal Ney of Napoleon’s order to d’Erlon, it was by Soult’s written order that the marshal first learnt of the 1st Corps’s march towards Ligny. Colonel Heymès, Ney’s ADC/chief-of-staff, wrote:
It was at this time that Colonel Laurent, sent from Imperial Headquarters, came to inform the marshal that the 1st Corps, by the emperor’s order, which had already been given to General d’Erlon, had left the Brussels road instead of following it, and was moving in the direction of Saint Amand. General d’Elcambre [Delcambre], the chief-of-staff of this corps, arrived soon after to announce the action it was taking.
The enemy now had 50,000 men at Quatre Bras. He was pushing us back; and the marshal, a great captain, now judged success impossible. He rallied his troops that were fully engaged and made good dispositions in order to defend Frasnes, waiting and sleeping there, whilst the enemy, although three times the strength, made no attempt to prevent us.1
This order would have arrived at approximately 5.15pm. By this time, the 1st Corps had been marching towards Ligny for over an hour.
General d’Erlon wrote two accounts of the sequence of events; the first was his response to an enquiry from Ney’s son which appeared in Documents inédits sur la campagne de 1815 publiés par le Duc d’Elchingen, and the second in his own book Le Maréchal Drouet, Comte d’Erlon Vie militaire ecrit par luimême.
In the first of these he wrote:
Towards 11 o’clock or midday, M. le Maréchal Ney sent me the order for my corps to take up arms and to move on Frasnes and Quatre Bras, where I would receive further orders. Thus my corps started its move immediately. After having given the commander of the head of the column the order to take the necessary precautions, I went ahead to see what was happening at Quatre Bras, where General Reille’s corps appeared to be engaged. Beyond Frasnes, I stopped with generals of the guard [presumably of Lefebvre-Desnouëttes’s light cavalry] where I was joined by General Labédoyère [one of Napoleon’s ADCs], who showed me a note in crayon which he carried to Marshal Ney, which ordered this marshal to send my corps to Ligny. General Labédoyère warned me that he had already given the order for this movement, having changed the direction of march of my column, and indicated to me where I could rejoin it. I immediately took this route and sent my chief-of-staff, General Delcambre, to the marshal, to warn him of my new destination. Marshal Ney sent him back to me with definitive orders to return to Quatre Bras, where he was hard pressed and counting on the co-operation of my corps. I thus decided that I was urgently required there, since the marshal took it upon himself to recall me, despite having received the note of which I spoke above.
I therefore ordered the column to make a counter-march; but, despite all the effort that I put into this movement, my column only arrived at Quatre Bras as it got dark.
Was General Labédoyère authorised to change the direction of my column before having seen the marshal? I do not think so; but in any case, this single circumstance was the cause of all the marches and counter-marches which paralysed my corps throughout the 16th.
D. comte d’Erlon
Paris, 9 February 18292
His second account, in his autobiography, gives the same information and thus does not need to be repeated.
We must first note that this letter was written fourteen years after the events it describes and thus it is possible that a few mistakes have crept in. For example, d’Erlon names General Labédoyère as the officer that carried the message, though we can be quite sure that it was Colonel Forbin-Janson. Indeed, in his second account, he does not name the officer. It can also be seen that d’Erlon presumed that the message had been forwarded to Marshal Ney as it was intended. More interestingly, d’Erlon claims that he had moved forwards towards Quatre Bras and was not with his troops when the message arrived with him, informing us that the column had already been turned towards Ligny by the time he learnt of the emperor’s order; this does not appear in any other accounts. We shall examine why he might have claimed this later, but as far as the sequence of events is concerned, it is of little importance.
Another useful account comes from General Deselles, who, as the commander of the 1st Corps artillery, would always be found close to the corps commander. He later wrote:
As we slowly closed up on the 2nd Corps, a sous-officier of the Guard arrived with a letter from the emperor which directed,
‘Monsieur le comte d’Erlon, the enemy has fallen headlong into the trap that I have set for him. Move immediately with your four infantry divisions, your cavalry division, all your artillery and the two divisions of heavy cavalry that I put under your command and move, as I say, with all these forces to the area of Ligny and fall on Saint-Amand. M. le comte d’Erlon, you will save France and cover yourself in glory.’
It is well known that the generals of artillery and engineers do not leave their commander-in-chief; I can thus give precise information on these events which had such disastrous consequences for us.
In execution of the imperial order, all the nominated forces directed their march across the plain towards Ligny (or Saint-Amand).
With a weak escort we went ahead of the marching columns, when we suddenly saw General Delcambre, the chief-of-staff of our corps, sent by Marshal Ney to demand our support.
Count d’Erlon was unsure and hesitated; he needed advice. General of Engineers Garbé and I thought that the emperor’s order was the one that was definitely more pressing, that if executed we would later be able to take the English in the flank and thus disengage the marshal. But General Delcambre insisted. The Count d’Erlon took a middle course which upset all the plans of the General-in-Chief. He sent Durutte’s division, which was the lead division, Jacquinot’s cavalry division and two batteries, to the heights of Ligny. With the rest, he moved to the support of Marshal Ney . . .3
In a footnote to this account, Deselles added, ‘Not having a map of Belgium in front of me, it is possible that I have got the names of these two villages the wrong way round. I believe it was Saint-Amand to fall on Ligny . . .’ However, as we have already seen, the 1st Corps was approaching Ligny from a different direction to the one that Napoleon was expecting and thus this uncertainty is probably of little consequence. A number of historians have discussed the implications of where d’Erlon understood he was to march to, and what effect he would have had at various places, but the fact remains that this is speculation; d’Erlon did not arrive with his whole corps on the battlefield and it is the reasons why not that need to be understood.
Deselles also claims that it was a ‘sous-officier of the Guard’ who delivered this message and this seems to contradict d’Erlon, Heymès and Houssaye. However, whilst one or more may have had a lapse of memory, it is equally possible that Napoleon sent a succession of officers to ensure this important order got to Ney and d’Erlon. To support this theory, Colonel Crabbé, attached to Imperial Headquarters, but later to serve as Ney’s ADC at Waterloo, wrote:
I am exhausted. I have been on horseback for eighteen hours. Three times I have been sent to Marshal Ney to tell him to seize Quatre Bras at any cost and to arrive before the English who did not cease to send their columns there.4
It is also worthy of note that Deselles claims that both he, and the general of engineers, Garbé, advised d’Erlon to comply with the emperor’s order rather than return to Ney. However, it is wise to be wary of such claims in accounts written with the benefit of hindsight.
D’Erlon’s dilemma can be well understood; on one side, he had the emperor’s order to march to the Ligny battlefield in order to take a key role in the destruction of the Prussian army; on the other, he had his immediate superior demanding his return to Quatre Bras where the left wing was in danger of being overwhelmed. The dilemma should have been settled by a simple appreciation of the situation; although he was not approaching the Ligny battlefield from the direction Napoleon expected, he had a substantial force close enough (3 kilometres) to be able to make a significant contribution to the combat taking place there. On the other hand, he was 12 kilometres from Quatre Bras (about a three to four-hour march for a complete corps) and it was now too late to make a counter-march and arrive in time to have any significant influence on the outcome of the fighting there. Furthermore, he had received a direct order from the emperor himself. The decision should not have been a hard one and yet d’Erlon took a middle course that was to influence neither battle.
Ney seems to have been so absorbed in his own battle that he was incapable of understanding that Napoleon was trying to achieve an infinitely more important strategic outcome. But the succession of orders from the emperor and imperial headquarters should have convinced him that there was now a greater good than the simple seizure of Quatre Bras and that his own battle was now nothing more than a sideshow. However, for whatever reason, the previous messages and orders had either failed to make this clear to him or he had deliberately chosen to ignore them. Napoleon now made a final effort to make Ney understand the importance of carrying out his orders. Colonel Baudus, Soult’s ADC, explains:
At the moment when the affair [Ligny] was closely engaged along the whole line, Napoleon called me and said, ‘I have sent Count d’Erlon the order to move with his entire corps onto the rear of the Prussian army’s right; you go and take a duplicate of this order to Marshal Ney which has to be communicated to him. You are to tell him that, whatever the situation he is facing, it is absolutely necessary that this direction is executed; that I attach no great importance to what happens on his flank today; that the key is what happens where I am, because I need to finish off the Prussian army. As for him, he should, if he cannot do better, to be content with containing the English army. [My italics]
When the emperor had finished giving me these instructions, the major général recommended me, in the most energetic terms to insist with equal force that nothing should hinder the execution of the movement prescribed to Count d’Erlon.5
This message should have made the situation clear to Ney, but we cannot be sure from Baudus’s account exactly what time he was despatched or what time he reached Marshal Ney. However, Baudus continues his narrative thus:
The journey was long, but I went quickly. Hardly had I rejoined the main road between Charleroi and Brussels than I saw it far off covered by a large body of cuirassiers that were retiring in the greatest disorder; it was the brigade consisting of the 8th and 11th Regiments of this arm. This corps had been so badly affected by the fire of some English infantry which occupied the wood of Bossu, that after delivering some beautiful charges they had finished by taking flight, taking several colours that they had taken from the Anglo-Belgian army. I quickly took a different route so that I would not be dragged along by this mass, and soon I found Marshal Ney at the point of most danger in the middle of a terrible fire. I gave him the emperor’s orders, but he was so agitated that I felt at first that he was unlikely to execute them. In fact, he had good reason to be highly irritated, for, in his attack on Quatre Bras, he had not hesitated to commit the three divisions of the 2nd Corps commanded by General Reille, because he was counting on the co-operation of the 1st Corps, under the orders of Count d’Erlon, who was, after the instructions of the marshal placed in the second line at Frasnes. But, when he wanted it to advance, it could not be found because Count d’Erlon, having received the direct order of the emperor, which directed him to move against the rear of the Prussian army, had set off immediately to conform with his orders of which the marshal had not been warned; at least he formally assured me that he had received no other official advice of this order other than that which I had brought him. The words of this illustrious marshal convinced me that this was indeed the truth of the matter, even though the anger that he suffered seeing himself compromised by this manoeuvre was evident. In fairness to the Count d’Erlon, to whom I spoke some years after these events, he confirmed to me that he had warned his superior of the new direction his troops had been given by the emperor. The officer charged with this mission was probably wounded or killed before arriving at his destination. The marshal, desperate at having no reinforcements to support the divisions that had only been committed because he thought he had 20,000 men in reserve, came, when I joined him, to have Count d’Erlon strictly ordered to return to the position that had been assigned to him. I insisted with the greatest force to the marshal not to oppose the emperor’s intentions; I thought I had succeeded; but after the events of the day I saw, as I returned to the rear with him, that Count d’Erlon had returned with his troops . . .6
Given that Baudus met the fleeing cuirassiers on the road, he cannot have reached Ney until after 7pm at the earliest. Ney’s statement to him that this was the first time he had heard of d’Erlon’s flank march cannot be true; either Baudus or Ney having made a mistake, as if he had only recalled d’Erlon at this late hour the 1st Corps could not have arrived until very much later than they actually did.
We must now return to General d’Erlon. Having received the peremptory command from his immediate superior to return to Quatre Bras and the advice of his key headquarters staff to continue towards Ligny, he decided on the compromise outlined by General Deselles: the 4th Division (commanded by General Durutte), three of the four regiments of cavalry from the corps cavalry division (commanded by General Jacquinot) and two batteries were to continue towards Wagnelé, whilst the remaining three infantry divisions and cavalry regiment would turn and march on Quatre Bras. Clausewitz claims that the time now was 8pm; like Ney, d’Erlon seems not to have calculated that his arrival there would be too late to have any significant impact.
General Durutte has left his own account of what happened:
On the 16th, towards 10am, he [General d’Erlon] received the order to set off for Frasnes, on the Brussels road. The 4th Division, under the orders of General Durutte, was in the lead.
Whilst this move was taking place, the order was received to march towards Quatre Bras; the right [of the army] was closely engaged towards Fleurus. The emperor gave the order to Count d’Erlon to attack the Prussian left and try to seize Bry. The 1st Corps passed close to Villers-Perwin to execute this move. Whilst it was on the march, several messengers arrived in haste from Marshal Ney to stop the corps and have it march back to Quatre Bras. The officers who carried these orders said that Marshal Ney had found superior forces at Quatre Bras and that he was repulsed. This second order put Count d’Erlon in a difficult position, for he received at the same time new calls from the right to march on Bry. Nevertheless, he decided to turn back towards Marshal Ney, but, as he could see, with General Durutte, that the enemy was trying to deploy a column onto the plain that lies between Bry and the wood of Delhutte, which would have cut off the emperor’s army from that commanded by Marshal Ney, he decided to leave General Durutte on this plain, leaving under his orders besides his own division, three regiments of cavalry commanded by General Jacquinot.
Before General d’Erlon left, General Durutte asked clearly if he was to march on Bry. General d’Erlon replied that, in view of circumstances, he could not lay down exactly what he should do and that he should rely on his experience and caution. General Durutte sent his cavalry towards the road that went from Sombreffe to Quatre Bras, leaving Wagnée [Wagnelé] and Bry to his right, but bearing towards these two villages; his infantry followed this movement.
General d’Erlon had told him to be cautious because as affairs were going badly at Quatre Bras, General Durutte would do well to observe the Delhutte wood for in the case that Marshal Ney made a retrograde movement, the enemy would be behind him.7
The key point from this passage is the caution with which Durutte stresses d’Erlon ordered him to act. Despite all the confusion surrounding d’Erlon’s march and counter-march, there was still the time and opportunity for him to strike a telling blow at Ligny, even if it was only delivered by Durutte and Jacquinot. Although they were not on the Prussian rear as directed by Napoleon, they still hovered menacingly on the Prussian flank; the one most closely pressed by Vandamme and the one that had suffered most throughout the day. What was required was a determined and audacious attack against an exhausted and demoralised enemy. Durutte described his contribution:
Whilst General Jacquinot moved to within artillery range of the road between Sombreffe and Quatre Bras, he encountered a body of enemy with which he exchanged artillery fire for three quarters of an hour. General Durutte advanced his infantry to support him; there was still heavy fighting towards St-Amand.
The enemy troops that exchanged artillery fire with General Jacquinot having withdrawn, General Durutte, receiving no more bad news from the left, decided to march on Bry.
By the movement of our troops, he presumed that we were victorious at Saint-Amand. His skirmishers clashed with Prussian light troops who were still at Wagnelée [Wagnelé]; he took this village as the day ended and being convinced that the enemy were in full retreat, he sent two battalions into Bry who found only a few Prussian stragglers there.
During the night, General Durutte received the order to return to Villars-Perwin on the 17th . . .8
This action could hardly be described as determined and audacious and it is fair to conclude that Durutte’s contribution to the French victory at Ligny was negligible at best. However, Durutte clearly felt he was operating in accordance with his superior commander’s intent by not committing his troops more than he did.
Durutte’s caution, which may well have been endorsed by d’Erlon, was witnessed with growing frustration by his troops. These were able to see what was going on before them and burned to get into action. Captain Chapuis, who commanded a grenadier company in the 85th Line, which led the 4th Division’s column, was a witness to what happened:
Located at a short distance from the hamlet of Wagnelé, which lies close to the village of Saint-Amand, and awaiting the order that would have us march on Wagnelé, we were all convinced that the 1st Corps had been called on to play a great role in the struggle that was engaged.
. . . Our situation behind Wagnelé gave us the absolute assurance that a few minutes would suffice to put the whole of the Prussian right wing between two fires, and there was not one of us, soldier or officer, who could not see that acting with promptitude and vigour, the salvation of the enemy would be gravely compromised.
This order, on which we expected to obtain such admirable results, arrived, but unfortunately, it was not executed because, on one part, General Drouet d’Erlon had left to return to join Marshal Ney at Quatre Bras, under the orders of whom was found the 1st and 2nd Corps, and on the other, General Durutte did not dare to take it upon himself to order such a movement; refusing the responsibility as a divisional commander rather than the commanding general of the 1st Corps. Consequently, he sent an officer to Quatre Bras carrying this order and demanding instructions that others, put in his position, would not have hesitated to carry out.
. . . This intense struggle [Ligny], that we were able to follow through its various phases by the rising and falling intensity of the firing, electrolysed our soldiers; they impatiently awaited the moment that they would enter the fray, and they expressed their surprise in loud voices that they remained with downed arms when their assistance would render such great services. This order, carried and given in the presence of the whole of the head of the 4th Division, but ignored, was, shortly after, followed by a second so imperative, that General Durutte finally took the resolution to execute it.
Everything was ready for the attack, which we awaited with the highest enthusiasm; but our hopes were to be dashed. [Chapuis goes on to explain the prevarication of Durutte and the excuses he used not to launch his division into the fray] . . . During this interval, we watched the Prussian corps quietly executing their retreat, of which not a single man would have escaped us. Also, since the two voltigeur companies of the 85th, supported by the grenadier company that I commanded, penetrated into the hamlet of Wagnelé at the end of the day, these companies only found there a weak rearguard which made little resistance before retiring.
Master of this position, the 4th Division established itself there.
Whilst this position was being taken, an angrier scene was taking place between our divisional commander, Durutte, and our brigade commander, Brue. The latter, frustrated at the hesitation of his superior, criticised him loudly. He shouted, ‘It is intolerable that we witness the retreat of a beaten army and do nothing, when everything indicates that if it was attacked it would be destroyed.’
General Durutte could only offer as an excuse in response to General Brue; ‘It is lucky for you that you are not responsible!’
‘I wish to God that I was’ said this last, ‘we would already be fighting!’
This altercation was overheard by the senior officers of the 85th that were at the head of the regiment . . . It proved, besides, to those who reflected on it, that an enormous fault had been committed in employing certain chiefs for whom, for many years, the words ‘glory’ and ‘la Patrie’ no longer had the same significance as to their subordinates.
This suspicion received further confirmation when we learnt the next day, the 17th, that Colonel Gordon, chief-of-staff of the 4th Division, and chef de bataillon Gaugler, first ADC to General Durutte, had passed to the enemy the previous morning9 and this had been hidden from us for the last twenty four hours [He goes on to say that this was interpreted as implicating Durutte himself as he worked so closely with them]. The desertion of two men in positions so close to General Durutte, his hesitation a few hours later to execute orders which previously he would have done quickly, produced such an impression on the 85th Regiment, that it took all the efforts of the officers to restore the soldiers’ morale.10
Chapuis’s view was endorsed by maréchal de camp Brue, who later wrote in a letter:
If General Durutte had attacked the Prussian army at the moment when, beaten at Ligny and retiring, this army would have been annihilated; all those who were not killed would have been forced to lay down their arms and would have been captured.11
It might be considered doubtful that an infantry division and three regiments of cavalry might have had this much impact on the outcome of the battle of Ligny, particularly as it was made by someone who might be accused of promoting his own contribution to the debate. However, the Prussian right was occupied by Zieten’s I Corps, the corps that had already taken quite heavy casualties during the day before, had borne the brunt of fighting during that day and was withdrawing in a state of some disorganisation. Pressed more rigorously by Durutte, there is certainly an argument that this corps may have been so disorganised that it was unable to take any further part in the campaign. The claim that the whole army would have been destroyed is certainly fanciful.
Whilst Durutte dithered, the rest of the 1st Corps retraced its route back to Quatre Bras, arriving tired and frustrated just as darkness fell and the fighting had come to an end.
D’Erlon’s Dilemma – Analysis
French writers generally agree that if Ligny had been a decisive victory for Napoleon, Waterloo would not have been fought and the campaign could have been won. The reason they give for why Ligny was not a decisive victory is that d’Erlon’s 1st Corps did not make the contribution Napoleon planned, and it is hard to deny that if the 1st Corps had continued its march to the battlefield a major part of the Prussian army could well have been destroyed. Equally, if d’Erlon’s 20,000 men had continued their original march and arrived at Quatre Bras at about 5pm, it is also possible that Wellington could have been overwhelmed. It is therefore unsurprising that the French postmortem of the events of the day has focussed on this issue. Although we can only speculate on just how decisive d’Erlon’s arrival at either battlefield would have been, we can make a considered judgement, based on the considerable evidence that is available, on who was really to blame for this catastrophic failure.
There is no doubt that Napoleon’s basic strategic plan was excellent and based on a sound anticipation of the likely reactions of his opponents, the natural aggression and urge to engage of Blücher and a certain caution in Wellington. However, at the end of the 15th, and even well into the morning of the 16th, the situation was not so clear that Napoleon was confident that a major battle was going to be fought against the Prussians. Therefore his plan evolved with the developing situation and it was only at about three o’clock, after his reconnaissance of the Prussian position, that he fully developed the idea of a part of Ney’s force falling on the right rear of the Prussians. Napoleon cannot be accused of coming up with the plan too late for its execution.
By 3pm Napoleon expected Ney to have seized Quatre Bras in pursuance of his previous orders, and would have been able to march d’Erlon’s corps down the Nivelles to Namur road, which would have brought him onto the Prussian right rear. However, as we have seen, at that time d’Erlon had not yet reached the battlefield of Quatre Bras, let alone been able to take the route Napoleon expected. This was the result of Ney’s failure to concentrate his entire force and seize the vital crossroads, but this might not have been significant if d’Erlon had pursued his course from Villers-Perwin; this would have brought him onto the Prussian flank, rather than right rear, but still early enough to strike a telling blow. Even the delay that this unexpected direction of advance had on the launching of Napoleon’s final attack need not have prevented a significant contribution if he had not turned back towards Quatre Bras, leaving only a relatively small force with orders to be cautious close to the Ligny battlefield.
If Ney had already concentrated his wing when Napoleon’s orders arrived, the 1st Corps would have been close to, or even on the battlefield; he might even have been partially committed. But at least Ney would have been better placed to decide how to proceed. Whilst he may well have decided to ignore the order, he would also have had the ability to adapt the way he was fighting, perhaps by going on to the defensive, and to take the final decision on whether he could afford to send d’Erlon to Napoleon. But at least he would not have been put in such a difficult position at a critical time in his own battle. In a calmer state of mind, he might well have realised the importance of supporting Napoleon whilst he blocked Wellington and could also have conferred with all his key commanders. It is still impossible to conclude that he would have sent d’Erlon, but at least he would have had the opportunity to make a far more rational and considered decision.
In his book Swords Around a Throne, the respected American author, John Elting, suggests Ney was badly hungover on the 16th, having stayed the previous night at an inn with a reputation for a good wine cellar, and that this accounts for his lethargic performance. However, this is mere speculation as no eyewitnesses, supporters or detractors, mention it. But as we have already discussed, Ney’s personal situation was certainly a difficult one, and there is plenty of evidence that he was distracted. Colonel Crabbé, who had been sent to Ney by Napoleon, wrote:
He hardly returned my salute, read his orders without saying a word and dismissed me.
He appeared very demoralised, without willpower, almost lacking courage and resolution. I had a disagreeable impression.12
Later, Baudus described Ney exclaiming in the heat of battle, ‘What! Is there neither a bullet nor a ball for me!’13
When Ney heard about the march of d’Erlon’s corps towards Ligny, his frustration can be well understood; he was impatiently awaiting its arrival at Quatre Bras to turn the tide of that battle in his favour, his attacks up to that point having been countered by the opportune arrival of a succession of allied reinforcements. However, he should not have been too surprised by Napoleon’s actions. After all, just that morning the emperor had twice referred to the option he reserved of drawing on the troops of one wing to strengthen his own, writing in his letter to the marshal, ‘You should dispose your troops in the following manner: the first division at two leagues in advance of Quatre Bras, if there is no hindrance; six divisions of infantry about Quatre Bras, and one division at Marbais, so that I may draw them to me at Sombreffe if I want them’ [my emphasis] and ‘I shall draw troops from one wing to strengthen my reserve’.
We can also see that Napoleon, convinced that d’Erlon’s manoeuvre would deliver the crushing victory over the Prussians that he desired, sent a number of officers to ensure this march was carried out. Laurent, Forbin-Janson, Baudus, Crabbé and Labédoyère are all mentioned by eyewitnesses or in their own accounts as having done so. Although it is suspected that naming Labédoyère was a mistake on d’Erlon’s part, the rest all seem genuine enough. Surely, such a succession of staff officers from the emperor’s headquarters should have been enough to convince Ney not to overturn Napoleon’s orders, even if they had been delivered in an unconventional way in bypassing the chain-of-command. Although the written orders carried by Forbin-Janson did not reach Ney until the evening, the other messengers would also have been briefed not only to deliver a written order, but also to impress on Ney the importance of d’Erlon’s march. We have heard Baudus’s brief from Napoleon and its clarity in impressing on him the secondary importance of a victory over Wellington, and as another example we may refer to General Flahaut’s mission in the morning; he wrote:
But as regards orders for the movement of troops, I was directed to give them to Marshal Ney by word of mouth. I therefore gave him as from the emperor the order to move to Quatre Bras, to hold this important point in strength and (should the enemy allow him to do so) to support with every man at his disposal the emperor’s offensive against the Prussian army.14
Though his frustration may be understood, we must conclude that Ney totally failed to grasp the critical importance of d’Erlon’s march towards Ligny and made a fatal error in demanding its return.
Heymès wrote of Quatre Bras:
One can see that with 17,000 men, plus Kellerman’s brigade of cuirassiers, the marshal had come close to victory and that one can judge what would have been achieved if the 1st Corps had arrived!15
However, Heymès is missing the point. Napoleon had made it clear that the action at Quatre Bras was of little importance if he succeeded in destroying the Prussian army. Napoleon never planned to fight two major battles on the same day and Wellington’s army was in no danger of being destroyed. Two partial victories were no use to him; he needed to concentrate sufficient force against one enemy army in order to destroy it and then turn on the other. This was always his aim and Ney was well aware of it. Ney’s mission was not to defeat Wellington’s army, but to seize Quatre Bras to facilitate the move of part of his force to ensure the destruction of the Prussians. This in turn would prevent any of Wellington’s troops supporting Blücher. Ney was angry and frustrated at losing the services of d’Erlon’s troops and it is clear he did not fully grasp the importance of the opportunity that Napoleon had been offered at Ligny. But it is also true to say that both he and Colonel Heymès were guilty of not keeping Napoleon informed of the situation on the left wing, despite Soult writing at 2pm, ‘Immediately inform the emperor of your dispositions and what is happening to your front.’ There is no evidence that Ney passed any information to Napoleon upon which the emperor could base a considered decision.
Ney was clearly so absorbed in his own battle that he catastrophically failed to understand the strategic importance of d’Erlon intervening at Ligny. His decision to recall his subordinate was rash and made in frustration and anger, not the cool, detached and calculating demeanour of an experienced senior commander.
We must now examine the decision making of Count d’Erlon. If Ney had made a rash and ill-considered decision to recall d’Erlon, this general, a very experienced commander, still had the opportunity to use his own judgement and initiative and decide which course he should follow. By his own account, he claims he was not involved in the decision to turn towards Ligny because this change of direction was made in his absence; he claims he had ridden ahead of his own troops towards Quatre Bras. He was later to claim that the emperor’s ADC had no authority to change the march of his corps without his own consent, but even if it was the relatively junior and inexperienced Forbin-Janson who ordered this, d’Erlon’s position is not sound.
A commander’s personal staff officers (ADCs and officiers d’ordonnance) spoke with their superior officer’s authority, despite the fact that they were almost inevitably delivering an order to an officer of higher rank and experience than themselves. Napoleon’s ADCs certainly had the authority and influence to take the initiative and give orders and had done so throughout the Napoleonic wars. Any senior officer was risking Napoleon’s wrath if he ignored or contravened orders given by one of the emperor’s personal staff officers. Having said that, Forbin-Janson was an unfortunate choice for such a critical mission and perhaps he should not be blamed for an inability to expand on the message he was carrying.
In his own analysis of the campaign, Ropes feels that d’Erlon made the claim that he was not with his troops when their march was diverted to absolve himself of any responsibility for his corps making this move without the consent or knowledge of his immediate commander (Marshal Ney). However, in his second account, d’Erlon writes,
There is no doubt that if the emperor had addressed his orders directly to me, as he said in several accounts of this battle, they would have been punctually executed and that this battle (Ligny) would have had the most important results.16
This suggests that d’Erlon blames the mix-up on the fact that Napoleon’s orders were addressed to Ney and therefore, until Ney had ordered the move, no one should have taken it upon themselves to redirect the march of his corps. He clearly states that if the orders had been addressed to him, he would have carried them out without hesitation. But it seems clear that Napoleon did address his orders directly to d’Erlon and ordered Forbin-Janson to then deliver them to Ney to keep him informed. He had taken this sensible step to inform the marshal of what he was doing, but would certainly not have expected him to countermand his orders.
In the protocol and standard military procedures of the day, the chain of command must always be followed to avoid just this sort of misunderstanding and mix-up. However, there are many occasions when standard operating procedure was ignored and individuals used their initiative. When this turned out for the good, it was conveniently overlooked, but when it had bad results, as in this case, the blame is quickly laid at the door of the officer concerned. A useful example is the concentration of Perponcher’s division at Quatre Bras in direct contravention of Wellington’s orders; this disobedience of orders was overlooked by Wellington, normally a stickler for military protocol, because it certainly avoided a crucial strategic mistake that could have had huge consequences. If d’Erlon’s corps had continued to Ligny and sealed a crushing victory for Napoleon, having been directed there on the initiative of Forbin-Janson, both these officers would have become national heroes; in the event both have been desecrated.
But ultimately, we must put aside the various means by which the orders were delivered. The fact is that Napoleon’s orders made it clear that d’Erlon’s corps was to play an absolutely pivotal role in the destruction of the Prussian army, and yet d’Erlon decided to put Ney’s orders before those of the emperor. What’s more, by the time he received Ney’s orders to return, d’Erlon must have realised that if he turned back towards Quatre Bras he would hardly arrive before it got dark and he would be too late to make any contribution at all. By continuing his march towards Ligny, he still had a chance to strike a telling blow. Whatever the circumstances, d’Erlon catastrophically failed to make a rational and fully considered decision that had fatal consequences for the outcome of the campaign.
Even d’Erlon’s compromise course of leaving Durutte’s division with cavalry support might have been able to make a significant contribution, if ultimately less decisive, if his prevarication had not led him to urge caution on his subordinate.
Durutte’s inactivity on the periphery of the battlefield is perhaps understandable given the orders he had received from his senior commander to be cautious. The frustration of his troops, and even his junior commanders, is also understandable, although doubtlessly fuelled in part by their suspicion of his complicity in the desertion of his chief-of-staff. However, what is less explicable is the fact that, whilst hovering on the edge of the battlefield, watching the disordered withdrawal of the Prussians before him, that he did not send an officer to Napoleon, giving details of his strength and location and seeking orders. Some 4,000 relatively fresh infantry, about 1,000 cavalry and two batteries must have been capable of making a significant impression on an exhausted, withdrawing force. Although some Prussian units had maintained their cohesion, some had clearly not; a Prussian unit commander wrote:
The enemy pursuit broke off, but all order had been lost. Even individual sections could not maintain order in that terrain . . . There was no chance to rally the men, because everybody was being carried along in a great stream of humanity . . . The retreat went in wild disorder to the village of Tilly . . .17
Even Hofschröer, a renowned Prussian apologist, wrote, ‘The command structure of the Prussian army had now broken down.’18 Durutte’s relatively small force could undoubtedly have struck a telling blow if, even constrained from immediate action by d’Erlon’s entreaties to be cautious, he had sought direction from Napoleon; the thrust of whose orders can easily be imagined. Well might French historians speculate on what the whole of d’Erlon’s 20,000 men could have achieved.
Ney and d’Erlon must share the blame for the catastrophic failure of the 1st Corps to intervene at either battle. Ney made a rash and illogical decision to recall the corps to Quatre Bras, where its intervention would not have had the strategic advantages Napoleon so desperately sought. D’Erlon made an equally irrational decision to turn away from the battle where the strategic gain would have been incalculable and return towards a battlefield that he could not reach in time to intervene and where tactical defeat was irrelevant if the Prussian army had been destroyed.