THE “VISION THING,” BY HIS own admission, eluded George H. W. Bush, at least manifestly. Oratory was not a strong suit, nor would it ever be. His ability to publicly articulate his aspirations was limited and generally uninspired, just as his syntax was often garbled and his manner awkward, sometimes goofy. Bush was never one to grandstand and speechify, anyway, but was more apt to reveal himself through small, quiet gestures that made a deeper impression. While it meant that he was an unexceptional communicator to the masses, it’s also what made him a great statesman, which would come to bear in the months ahead in what would become Bush’s finest hour as president.
But Bush did have a vision. The wheels in his mind turned as the Cold War wound down with the slow, irrevocable crumbling of the Soviet empire and the emergence of the U.S. as the world’s lone superpower. America could lead the world, he believed, through the building of a coalition of the disparate powers throughout the globe. The Soviet Union and economic strongholds like Germany and Japan could partner with the U.S. toward mutual interests and in staving off tyranny that might threaten regional stability and economic prosperity—and he saw the mobilization of nations around the liberation of Kuwait as a chance to forge that coalition. On September 11, 1990, eleven years to the day before the attacks on American soil that would define his son’s presidency, Bush addressed Americans with a view toward a “new world order,” which he called “an historic period of cooperation . . . stronger in pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace . . . in which nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.” He also stated in no uncertain terms America’s goal in Kuwait: “Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately and without condition.”
Throughout the balance of 1990, Bush used personal diplomacy to manage an unprecedented coalition of nations. Over his time in public life, especially in the presidency, he had cultivated the relationships with foreign leaders. The letters, notes, and photos he had sent and the phone calls he had made for no reason but to check in were small deposits that added up to a reservoir of trust with people who now came to his side. He and his team enlisted the Soviet Union in the cause. Gorbachev agreed to the use of military force in adherence to UN Resolution 678, passed by the UN Security Council in November, calling for member states to use “all means necessary” to compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Just as remarkable, King Fahd relented, allowing U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia, where they would remain even after the Gulf War.
By early November, 400,000 American troops were stationed in the Saudi kingdom. The U.S. was joined by forces from twenty-six other countries, later twenty-eight, forming a defensive front called “Desert Shield,” comprising the greatest military alliance since the Second World War. Despite the condemnation of the world’s strongest nations and the buildup of troops ready for battle against the 140,000 Iraqi troops now in Kuwait, Saddam defiantly held firm.
The forty-first president was roundly praised for his leadership around the crisis. “Bush, unlike Ronald Reagan, was no lone cowboy singlehandedly dispensing rough justice but a sheriff rounding up a posse of law-abiding nations,” Time magazine wrote at year’s end. “All along he has retained tight control of virtually every detail of U.S. action, revealing as little as possible about his plans to the American people and to Congress.” By that time, Bush was determined to drive Saddam out of Kuwait with or without congressional support. If Congress failed to pass a resolution authorizing military force, Bush was prepared to be a “lone cowboy” after all. In November, he told his diary, “It is only the United States that can do what needs to be done. I still hope against hope that Saddam will get the message, but if he doesn’t, we’ve got to take this action, and if it works in a few days, and he gives up, or is killed or gets out, Congress will say, ‘Attaboy, we did it; wonderful job; wasn’t it great we stayed together.’ If it drags out and there are high casualties, I will be history; but no problem—sometimes you’ve got to do what you’ve got to do.”
By Christmastime, Bush’s resolve around the cause deepened, becoming a moral imperative. An Amnesty International report made a profound impression on him, revealing the atrocities inflicted on the Kuwaiti population by the Iraqi invaders. After an Oval Office plea for peace from the Right Honorable Reverend Edmond Browning, the presiding bishop of the Episcopal Church of the United States, Bush handed him the report. Given the human rights violations cited, Bush asked, “[W]hat do we do about peace? How do we handle it when people are being raped?” The same month he expressed his determination to Bob Gates, his deputy national security adviser. “If I don’t get the votes” for war, he told Gates in an Oval Office meeting, “I’m going to do it anyway. And if I get impeached, so be it.” As he explained in a letter to George W. and the other Bush children on New Year’s Eve, just after they left Camp David where the family had spent Christmas together, “Principle must be adhered to—Saddam cannot profit in any way at all from his aggression and from brutalizing the people of Kuwait—and sometimes in life you have to act as you think best—you can’t compromise, you can’t give in . . .”
George W. saw his father’s stance on Kuwait as the clear path of righteousness, one George H. W. felt viscerally and for which he was willing to act unilaterally, putting his presidency on the line, much as George W. saw his own position in Iraq a little over a decade later. It was an important similarity between the two that he saw as little appreciated. When historian Jon Meacham asked to interview him for his 2015 biography of George H. W. Bush, Destiny and Power, George W. initially declined. Meacham, he believed, would write a “pro-41, anti-43” book that would keep Meacham in good standing with the Manhattan media and literati set. He changed his mind when Meacham allowed him to read the manuscript, which highlighted his father’s resolve around military action against Saddam despite the threat of impeachment.
Meacham’s was a departure from the accepted thesis, and George W. thought aligned him more closely with his father. “It’s conventional wisdom today that George W. Bush shoved aside doubt and debate in pursuit of war with Iraq in 2002,” Meacham wrote in Politico after his book was published. “In a commonly accepted narrative, observers have long held that George H. W. Bush would have been more measured, less driven by gut and gut alone. It’s become clear to me that George H. W. Bush was emotionally and morally attached to the idea of the Gulf War in the way that his son was to be about Iraq a decade later—even to the point of risking impeachment absent the approval of Congress.”
It didn’t come to that. On January 9, just under a week before the UN’s deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal, Bush got authorization to use military force. On January 16, at 12:30 a.m. Baghdad time, Operation Desert Storm began with dual bombing offensives from the air as U.S. and British aircraft pummeled targets in the Iraqi capital and against Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The White House announced the inception of the war at 7:00 p.m. eastern time, while the world watched it unfold on CNN, whose comprehensive coverage bested its major network rivals for the first time.
Over the next six weeks, U.S.-led coalition forces drove through Iraqi troops in Kuwait like a knife through butter. Saddam’s only significant response was the launch of Scud missiles targeting Saudi Arabia and Israel, which had remained out of the war at the urging of the U.S. to prevent the risk of alienating Arab allies. When ground forces were deployed in Kuwait on Sunday, February 24, Iraqi forces quickly surrendered, were killed, or limped impotently across the border. By Thursday the 28th, it was all over. Saddam agreed to honor a peace agreement drawn up by the UN, after which Bush ordered a cease-fire. The war had come off with a minimal sacrifice of blood and treasure. American troops had prevailed with few losses; 125 soldiers died in the conflict, and another twenty-one were missing in action. The bulk of the war’s $61 billion cost was incurred by the Arab states, principally Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, to whom Saddam posed the most immediate threat.
As American forces drove Iraqi troops out of the country, the question in the media became, Why not continue into Baghdad and take out Saddam? But Bush’s objective was clear-cut: to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Regime change in Iraq was never part of the plan or the often-impassioned discussions around the war within the Bush White House. “I was in those meetings, in all those rooms,” Dick Cheney stated, “and I don’t recall a single person among that group that the President looked to for advice ever suggesting that we go in and take down Saddam Hussein.” There was also a general belief, promulgated by U.S. intelligence, that Saddam wouldn’t survive politically, especially after his humiliation in Kuwait. Bush sustained criticism for refraining from hunting down Saddam. But as Time magazine’s longtime president-watcher Hugh Sidey wrote later, “I had spent much of my time in Washington writing about wars of one kind or another that never seemed to end—the cold war, and wars on Korea, Central America and Vietnam. Bush had achieved his objective in Kuwait brilliantly. He refused to enlarge and prolong the war, an act that took more courage than launching Desert Storm.”
Bush’s victory in the Gulf came on the heels of another diplomatic coup: Within a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bush and his team helped engineer the reunification of Germany, a feat that was expected to take at least several years. Despite resistance to the idea by Margaret Thatcher and French president François Mitterrand, Bush staunchly supported German integration, becoming the first Western leader to do so. He viewed it as “the final chapter in the transformation of Europe.” In early October, a united Germany was reborn as a member of NATO, an act Bush quietly managed to balance, as he had with his muted reaction to the Berlin Wall, without isolating or compromising Gorbachev as the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations remained in a tenuous state of transition.
On February 27, 1991, as he addressed a joint session of Congress, George Herbert Walker Bush seemed invincible. “Kuwait is liberated,” he began. “Iraq’s army is defeated.” Throughout his speech, the House chamber erupted in a series of thunderous ovations for the hero of the Gulf War, the man who drew a “line in the sand,” and led a fragile coalition of foreign powers toward a clear victory over tyranny. Any fears of the operation becoming “another Vietnam” were put to rest. American pride skyrocketed; so did Bush’s approval ratings, which stood at 89 percent, the highest for a president since Harry Truman’s after V-J Day.
But Bush would find that popularity, like military glory, was fleeting. After the parades were over and the confetti was swept up, the country went back to worrying about domestic issues at a time when the economy was sagging and crime was on the rise. At home, Americans increasingly came to believe Bush’s vision was lacking.