The Netherlands
Marjan Schwegman
When German troops invaded the Netherlands (see Chapter 2, p. 34 for map) on 10 May 1940, the country was unprepared for war. There had been no foreign occupation since the Napoleonic era and no involvement in a European war for more than a hundred years. Thanks to a policy of strict neutrality, the Netherlands had managed to stay out of the First World War. The Dutch government had hoped it could continue to pursue this policy, engendering a sense of immunity that soon turned out to be unfounded. The Dutch capitulation was signed on 15 May 1940, after only five days of combat and bombing, the destruction of the centre of Rotterdam being the most shocking incident. Less than two years later, at the beginning of 1942, the Empire of the Dutch East Indies was taken by the Japanese.
Queen Wilhelmina had been able to leave the country with the Dutch Cabinet on 13 May 1940. She settled in London, where a Dutch government-in-exile was formed. It maintained the Netherlands’ formal existence as an independent state. It was therefore in a position to influence the Dutch under German occupation, with Wilhelmina as the unofficial leader of the government and the main source of inspiration for the resistance.1 In her speeches for Radio Orange the queen did not shrink back from strong language: ‘Wie op het juiste oogenblik handelt, slaat den Nazi op den kop’ (‘He who acts at the right time, will hit the Nazi on his head’).2
In the Netherlands, Hitler appointed a so-called Aufsichtsverwaltung (Supervisory Civil Administration) under the leadership of Arthur Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian who was given the title of Reichskommissar (High Commissioner). He was assisted by four Generalkommissare (General Commissioners) and fourteen Beauftragten (Commissioners) in the eleven provinces and the three largest cities Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam. The Generalkommissare took charge of the Dutch ministries, which since the flight of the Dutch Cabinet to London had been run by the highest civil servants of the departments, the so-called Secretaries General. Although Seyss-Inquart issued decrees that had the force of law throughout the war, the Dutch civil administration was left intact, with Seyss-Inquart and most of his Generalkommissare limiting themselves to outlining policy and supervising the administration. The country was therefore controlled by only several hundred German civil servants.3 The exception to this maintenance of the existing structures was the way the country was policed. SS-Brigadeführer Hanns Albin Rauter was appointed as Generalkommissar für das Sicherheitswesen as well as Höhere SS-und Polizeiführer (General Commissioner for Security and Higher SS and Police Leader). In this capacity he controlled the German Security Police (SiPo), the Security Service, or Sicherheitsdienst (SD), and the Ordnungspolizei, the German civil order police, popularly called Grüne Polizei because of their green uniforms. The Dutch police was also subordinated to Rauter. During the occupation, the role played by the German police in maintaining law and order and in fighting the resistance grew increasingly important. In 1942 Rauter had about 23,000 men of the Ordnungspolizei and the Waffen-SS at his disposal. About a third and later a quarter of all German troops on Dutch territory, then, were tasked with subjugating the population and eliminating internal enemies of the Third Reich.4
The main goals of the German occupying power were to maximize the exploitation of the Dutch economy and manpower resources for the benefit of the German war economy, to realize the Nazification of the Netherlands through the conversion of the Dutch population to National Socialism and the organization of Dutch society along National Socialist lines, and last but not least to solve the ‘Jewish question’.5 The occupying power succeeded in realizing the first and the third goal that it had set itself, of which the success in exterminating the Dutch Jews is the most tragic demonstration: of the 140,000 so-called full Jews, as many as 100,000 did not survive the war.6 However, the occupying authorities did not succeed in their bid to Nazify Dutch society. One could even say that these efforts provided the most important impulse for the growth of the Dutch resistance.
Right from the beginning, some people developed resistance activities on a very small scale. Producing primitive illegal news leaflets was one example. Until 1942, these activities posed no real danger to the German authorities. It was only from 1942 onwards, with the growing hope for (and, on the German side, fear of) an Allied invasion, that the resistance grew in numbers, along with a hardening in the German policy of repression. Still, according to the Dutch historian Louis de Jong, ‘unwilling adjustment was the rule, intentional resistance the exception’ throughout the occupation, as was indeed the case in other European countries.7 De Jong calculates that, until September 1944 (when the Allied forces liberated the southern part of the Netherlands), 25,000 people were active in ‘the’ organized resistance. Out of a population of about 9 million, this is a very small number.8
There is more to say about numbers, however.9 De Jong bases his calculation on a very limited definition of ‘resistance’, counting only those activities that developed in secret and that were carried out in a structured organization. He therefore implicitly excludes the big strikes of 1941, 1943 and 1944 (on which, see below). The same goes for all public expressions of patriotism, which the German authorities punished rather severely. Examples include the mass wearing of a carnation (the favourite flower of Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Wilhelmina’s daughter Juliana) on the occasion of Bernhard’s birthday on 29 June 1940, or the hanging out of laundry in the colours of the Dutch flag. De Jong’s calculation also excludes all those activities that were part of the ever-growing infrastructure that made resistance possible. According to estimates, this infrastructure comprised about 500,000 people who supported the resistance by small acts, like the baker giving more bread than allowed to a family that took care of people in hiding. Moreover, one could say that those individuals, mainly women, who took care of people hiding in their houses, resisted the policy of the occupying power even though they did not consider themselves as members of an illegal organization. Even the act of going into hiding may be considered an act of resistance, since those who did it thwarted the goals of the German authorities: Jews who evaded deportation, for instance, or students who opposed Nazification by not signing the required declaration of loyalty to the regime. The total number of people who went into hiding has been calculated as 350,000. If one includes all these categories in a definition of the Dutch resistance, the number of people involved would be much higher than 25,000. Still, on the whole, it is undoubtedly true that only a minority of the Dutch population was active in any form of resistance.10
Alongside familiar elements like the creation of an illegal press, the stirring up of strikes, the organization of escape routes, help for those evading forced labour and persecution, espionage, sabotage and paramilitary activities, the Dutch resistance had its own peculiar variations. Due to the country’s geographical position and topography—there were no mountains and very few large continuous forest areas within the total of 33,000km2—a partisan movement did not develop. Moreover, the Netherlands had no common frontier with a neutral country, while the North Sea was heavily guarded by the Germans. Escaping by land was complicated, because several countries had to be traversed. Escaping by sea was very dangerous also, indeed almost impossible. Only 200 people successfully crossed the North Sea in small boats, whereas in comparison 80,000 Norwegians managed to arrive in neutral Sweden.11 In the densely populated Netherlands, the creation of secret airfields for the dropping of secret agents or supplies for resistance groups was almost impossible. Thus the Dutch resistance was largely cut off from outside help. More than elsewhere, people were forced to act alone, especially in the countryside. According to Henri Michel, this explains why the Dutch resistance was ‘primarily a moral and intellectual resistance’,12 while organized military resistance was virtually non-existent.
The necessity of acting alone also accounts for one of the most fascinating aspects of the history of the Dutch resistance. Until the German occupation, Dutch society had been a segmented society. Calvinists, Roman Catholics, Social Democrats and Liberals were neatly separated from one another. These sociopolitical arrangements in the Netherlands are usually referred to as verzuiling (pillarization). Individuals were used to following the leaders of their zuil (pillar) in all matters, and were inexperienced in making their own decisions. With the German authorities’ elimination of most pre-war social, political and religious bodies, the deep segregation of Dutch culture was ended, at least institutionally. Of the various resistance groups and organizations that developed during the occupation, none was directly instigated by the pre-war leadership of political parties or social and religious movements. As a consequence, people had to rely on their own conscience instead of on the moral authority of traditional leadership. Whereas this may be seen as the biggest challenge for Dutch society during German occupation, this is especially true for the resistance, in which people had to decide matters of life and death.
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The history of occupation and resistance in the Netherlands is distinguished by four phases. During the first phase, which lasted until the spring of 1941, the actions of the German occupiers, partly reflecting the Germans’ on-going military success, were both confident and relatively mild. They hoped to convert the Dutch population to National Socialism by employing a moderate approach. Nevertheless, immediate measures were implemented to achieve the first of the objectives mentioned above, the restructuring of the Dutch economy to benefit the German war economy: a distribution system was introduced and the Dutch were called upon to volunteer for employment in Germany. The first anti-Jewish measures were also implemented.
During this period, the vast majority of the Dutch population tried their best to continue their life as it had been before. However, an examination of war diaries shows that outward passivity concealed a wounded national pride, as well as a dislike of National Socialism and anger at the curtailment of personal freedom.13 Numerous attempts were made to escape to Britain: across the sea, or across land to Belgium, France, Switzerland and Spain, or via Sweden. It is therefore not surprising that the first forms of clandestine activities, such as the falsification of papers and the development of an international network of safe contacts, evolved from these escape attempts. The resistance was still unstructured and chaotic, and usually the work of independently operating individuals. Their general motivation was a dislike of National Socialism and of the regime’s attempts to Nazify the Netherlands.
This aversion was expressed in a number of ways. For instance, there were all sorts of expressions of patriotism, both in the personal and in the public sphere. People vented their frustrations by writing anti-German poems for the feast of St Nicholas,14 and by telling anti-German jokes. Anti-German slogans appeared in public spaces. The Germans did not take this undermining of their authority lightly. For instance, during the summer of 1940, the Landesgericht (a German justice of the peace court) in The Hague sentenced a nurse to three years in prison for chalking an anti-Hitler slogan on a tree in a park.15
There was a need, right from the beginning, for information and news untainted by German propaganda, and as a result people listened secretly to the BBC and to the special Dutch-language broadcasts of Radio Orange, transmitted under the aegis of the government-in-exile. The first clandestine newspapers also appeared: De Waarheid, Vrij Nederland and Het Parool.16 The illegal media in turn created other forms of resistance: clandestine print shops were established, while other people secretly tried to gather news from reliable sources using primitive equipment.
A striking aspect of the early phase of organized resistance was the extensive involvement of Dutch military personnel in it. Many of the military who were demobilized after capitulation were deeply hurt by the defeat and frustrated by their enforced passivity. The first organized form of resistance, the Geuzenaktie, which started on 15 May 1940, was the work of servicemen: a handwritten pamphlet, referring to the legendary Geuzen (‘the Beggars’) who stood up against the Spanish during the Dutch Revolt of 1566 to 1579, incited the population to resist.17 In addition, the much larger Orde Dienst (OD, Order Service) came into being; this was a military style organization in which many high-ranking servicemen took part.18 Founded to prevent a revolution after the occupiers were defeated, this was a resistance group motivated by love for the House of Orange, hatred of National Socialism and distaste for the ‘spirit of capitulation’. The latter was expressed, for example, by ex-Prime Minister Hendrik Colijn. Among other things, the OD committed sabotage, smuggled weapons, developed espionage activities and established illegal telephone connections. The fact that such military personnel, along with practically everyone else active in the resistance movement during this period (with the exception of the communists), lacked any kind of experience with regard to the development of clandestine activities and the associated need for absolute secrecy became apparent during the spring of 1941. It was at this point that the German authorities struck a huge blow against them and made a series of arrests among the Geuzen and the OD. These arrests resulted in a mass execution in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in May 1941. Those who escaped arrest went underground.
Resistance against persecution of Jews only took place on a small scale: in October 1940, when all Dutch civil servants were forced to sign the so-called Aryan Declaration, only 2 per cent refused. However, when all Jewish employees were subsequently dismissed, six Protestant churches protested. There was particular unrest in university circles: a student strike was organized in Delft and on 26 November 1940 Professor Rudolph Cleveringa, in a now-famous speech, protested against the dismissal of his Jewish colleagues at Leiden University. These protests and the closing of two universities (Leiden and Delft) formed the basis for the subsequent participation of a relatively large number of students in resistance activities. The resistance of Erik Hazelhoff Roelfzema, known as the ‘Soldier of Orange’ since his memoirs published under that title were turned into a very popular film, had its origins here.19
The most noticeable forms of resistance against the first anti-Jewish measures took place in Amsterdam. Young Jewish men organized themselves into assault groups to counter the increasing anti-Jewish street violence by the Weer Afdeling (the WA, the militia of the Dutch National Socialist Movement, the NSB).20 The strike that broke out on 25 February 1941 is well known.21 Several individual communists played an important role in organizing the strike. Thousands of Amsterdam labourers responded to their strike call, and protested against the manner in which 400 Jewish boys and men had been transported to Mauthausen concentration camp after being publicly humiliated and abused in the centre of Amsterdam. The strike lasted two days and contributed to a hardening of the German regime: in March 1941 three of the strikers were executed along with fourteen arrested Geuzen, including their leader, Bernardus IJzerdraat. These were the first executions in the Netherlands. They mark the end of a period in which the regime tried to convert the Dutch population to the National Socialist ideal via a moderate approach. The executions also ushered in a new phase in the history of the Dutch resistance: a new generation of resistance fighters stepped forward, one with more experience than the first. The mass arrests that took place in the spring of 1941 also forced many more individuals to go underground. This development stimulated the foundation of new resistance activities on a larger scale than before.
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At the same time, the occupation of the Netherlands entered its second stage, one that would last until spring 1943. The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States entered the fight increased hope for an Allied victory among the population, and diminished the confidence of the German occupier. This development was reinforced by the successes of the Allied forces in North Africa at the end of 1942, and by the German defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943. The regime in the Netherlands hardened: punishments for acts of resistance became more severe and the number of executions increased. In May 1942 it was decreed that mere membership of a resistance organization merited the death penalty. The distribution system was also expanded during this period, and regulations for the Arbeitseinsatz (labour deployment in Germany) were tightened. Moreover, mandatory identity cards were introduced, and in July 1942 the first deportations of Jews to Poland took place.
Playful, symbolic expressions of protest, such as Dutch citizens wearing carnations in a public display of affection for the House of Orange, were now a thing of the past. Anti-German sentiments most certainly increased, but were expressed only in the private sphere. Civil disobedience, such as listening to the BBC and Radio Orange, now took place on a large scale.
The most spectacular collective protest during this period was the wave of strikes that erupted in April and May 1943. The strikes were a reaction to the announcement that soldiers of the Dutch army, released from captivity and demobilized in June 1940, would be transported to Germany as prisoners of war and put to work there. Strikes took place in the industrial regions of Twente in the east of the country, in the mines in the south and at the Philips factories in Eindhoven. Even rural areas responded with strikes: in the north, for example, milk deliveries stopped. It was evident from the large number of participants in this wave of strikes (about 500,000) that this was a manifestation of pent-up anger that had been simmering for quite some time. The regime reacted with a heavy hand: a state of siege was declared, and during the first week of the strikes 175 individuals were summarily executed.22
Besides this public protest, the underground resistance also increased in size and activity during this period. A certain degree of professionalization took place as a result of the tragic experiences of the early stages of occupation. For example, cell systems and other measures were designed so that resistance fighters knew as little as possible about each other, thereby preventing strings of arrests. Experiences with betrayal led to the establishment of an underground information system, which alerted resistance groups to possible infiltrators. This resulted in the first assassinations of these dangerous individuals and, of course, the inevitable moral dilemmas for those who planned and carried out these assassinations.
The illegal press expanded during this period and there was an increase in espionage and sabotage activities. Falsification of identity documents and other papers also took place on a much larger scale. However, the most important type of resistance was helping individuals go into hiding. It was during this period, in autumn 1942, that the Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers (LO, national organization for assistance to people in hiding) was founded. It would later become the largest organization of its kind. This body illustrates the way in which separate, dispersed resistance activities were grouped into a larger, professionally structured unit during this period. The LO was founded by two individuals: Helena Kuipers-Rietberg, known in the resistance as ‘Tante Riek’ (‘Aunt Riek’) and Frits Slomp, a Reformed Church minister, known as ‘Frits de Zwerver’ (‘Frits the Nomad’). Helena Kuipers lived in the east of the Netherlands, in Winterswijk, where a camp was located for the Dutch Arbeidsdienst (employment service), in which men who were mobilized for the Arbeitseinsatz were trained for labour in Eastern Europe. A number of these men tried to go into hiding in the region. Helena Kuipers and her husband helped by finding safe houses for them. Helena Kuipers was a deeply religious woman who was at the same time gentle, unrelenting and uncompromising. After the war, Slomp related in a television interview how Helena had convinced him to establish the LO. Up until that time, Slomp had been travelling through the region like a nomad, inciting people to resist. He was terrified of being picked up by the SD and for that reason did not travel by train, but got around by bike. One day, when he was in Winterswijk, he met Helena. According to Slomp the conversation that ensued went as follows:
‘Say Frits, we should found an organization so that we can find places for these people who want to hide. Now I was thinking that you should be the one to do it; that you should travel around the country to get people interested in the idea.’ And I said: ‘I don’t have the nerve for that. The places where I go, I meet people and I go there by bicycle, but I don’t dare to travel by train.’ She looked at me and said something I shall never forget. ‘Listen old man, would it be so terrible if you were to die while thousands of boys would be saved?’ And that was that.23
Thus, the LO arrived on the scene and soon developed into a national organization with local branches, in which representatives exchanged addresses of safe houses. Helena was the leader of the LO, but in August 1944 she was arrested. By way of the German concentration camp in the Dutch town of Vught, she arrived in Ravensbrück in September 1944, where she succumbed to typhoid late that year. She managed to throw a note from the train that was to transport her to Ravensbrück, and it was delivered safely to her husband and her children: ‘Dear Piet and children. We are on the train, waiting to be taken away. Where to? We don’t know. May God protect you. Pray for each other. Your loving mother.’24
The LO also helped Jews, but finding safe houses for them was significantly more complicated than for non-Jews. Smaller resistance groups focused specifically on saving Jews, and primarily on saving Jewish children. It was easier to find places to stay for them than for adult Jews. A resistance network that smuggled children was created around the Jewish nursery school located opposite the Hollandsche Schouwburg, a theatre in Amsterdam from where the city’s Jews were deported to the Westerbork transit camp. Babies were transported in backpacks, and larger children travelled on the backs of bicycles to safe houses in other parts of the country.
One of the factors that made it difficult to find safe houses for Jews and non-Jews was that it was often necessary to change addresses due to imminent danger. This caused major problems, especially before the autumn of 1942 (that is, when help for individuals in hiding increased). For instance, Pim Boellaard, a member of the OD who went into hiding in the autumn of 1941, was compelled to find his own safe houses. During the eight months in which Boellaard was in hiding, he used nine safe houses on a fairly regular basis, and occasionally slept at other addresses also. Because food aid had not yet been organized at that point, Boellaard often went hungry.25 It was typical for a resistance fighter in hiding, like Boellaard, to remain active in the resistance. This was also true for others, like Gerrit Jan van der Veen.26 He was at the head of an organization, the Persoons Bewijzen Centrale (PBC, Identity Cards Centre), which specialized in falsifying identification papers. As was the case quite frequently, one thing led to another, and Van der Veen gradually radicalized and started to carry out acts of sabotage. It became necessary to adopt a false identity and leave his wife and children. As a consequence he led a nerve-wracking nomadic existence.
For resistance fighters like Van der Veen, hiding was only one of many measures they had to take in order to lead an illegal existence. Adopting a false identity and breaking all contact with family, relatives and friends was a given. Other than an occasional note or a brief encounter, no contact with loved ones was possible. That this was one of the most difficult sacrifices is apparent from the ingenuity with which the aforementioned Pim Boellaard succeeded, despite everything, in meeting his wife and his son Willem. On 12 January 1942 he went on a skating trip with them: ‘Always with 100 metres between us, yet together on deserted stretches. It’s wonderful to be able to see each other this way’, said Boellaard in his memoirs.27
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The second phase in the history of Dutch resistance ended with the wave of strikes of April and May 1943. This led to a new influx of people going into hiding, because many demobilized servicemen wanted to avoid becoming prisoners of war again. As a result the third phase, which lasted from spring 1943 until September 1944, was characterized by ever-increasing disruption of Dutch society. Moreover, the German occupation regime radicalized in the spring of 1943 as a consequence of the defeat at Stalingrad and the Allied successes in the Mediterranean region. Acts of resistance were punished more severely and traitors, male and female, were increasingly employed in order to round up resistance groups. Recruitment for the Arbeitseinsatz was heavy-handed, to say the least. Students were obliged to sign a loyalty declaration, demobilized soldiers were taken away as prisoners of war, shortages became ever more severe and the deportation of Jews continued until September 1944, by which time they had virtually been eliminated from Dutch society.
The prospect of an imminent Allied victory and the hardening of the regime motivated many more people to join the resistance. The role of women became more important, because men increasingly ran the risk of being picked up for the Arbeitseinsatz if they showed themselves in the street. Sympathy for the resistance also increased, which among other things made it somewhat easier to find addresses for people in hiding. Resistance organizations became more specialized. Radicalization also took place and during this period all types of armed resistance became more significant. This was in response to specific measures by the occupier, who for instance tried to make it more difficult to go into hiding by decreeing that all individuals must collect their ration cards personally at the distribution office. As a result, resistance groups began raiding distribution offices to seize ration coupons for people in hiding. This type of activity was increasingly the work of special assault groups, nationally organized into the Landelijke Knokploegen (LKP, National Federation of Assault Groups), which worked closely with the LO. Between May 1943 and September 1944, 233 raids on distribution offices took place, of which about two-thirds were successful.28
Raids also took place on registry offices, in order to prevent the occupier from accessing the personal information of wanted individuals. A famous example of such a raid is the one on the Amsterdam Registry Office, which took place on 27 March 1943, under the leadership of Gerrit Jan Van der Veen. As more and more resistance fighters were imprisoned, raids on prisons also increased in order to free incarcerated comrades. Two of the best-known Dutch resistance fighters lost their lives in mid-1944 as a result of failed rescue attempts: the Calvinist farmer and Assault Group leader Johannes Post, and the aforementioned van der Veen. They were arrested and executed by firing squad.
In brief, radicalization took place in many different ways during this period. This is also apparent from the increasing number of assassinations committed by resistance members. Although much discussion took place in the clandestine media about the pros and cons of killing dangerous opponents, little if anything is known about discussions on this sensitive topic among resistance fighters themselves. Decisions to assassinate individuals were accompanied not only by moral objections against the killing of fellow human beings, but also by the question of whether the risk of retaliation and the consequent death of innocent civilians were worth the ‘benefits’ of an assassination. Statements from resistance fighters who survived the war indicate that assassinating someone was viewed as an extremely difficult assignment. The resistance fighters who participated were frequently shaken by their actions, even to the extent of becoming psycho- logically unbalanced. This caused them to take risks, leading to their arrest. For instance, Hannie Schaft, the legendary red-haired girl who had killed several Dutch Nazis and collaborators, knew very well that she was one of the most wanted resistance fighters. She nonetheless went out to transport illegal papers, which were discovered at a German checkpoint. There had been no need to take this risk, because other messengers had been available.29
The increase in the number of assassinations was the result of another characteristic phenomenon during this third phase: betrayal became an almost overwhelming factor in the history of the Dutch resistance. Using the help of traitors, who were sometimes recruited from among resistance fighters themselves, the Germans succeeded in infiltrating the very core of the resistance. One of the most tragic examples of this development is the so-called ‘Englandspiel’.30 Of the Dutchmen who succeeded in reaching Britain via the North Sea or over land, approximately 200 individuals returned to the Netherlands as secret agents. After the Germans had captured several of these agents and got one of them to establish radio contact with Britain, German military intelligence (the Abwehr) tried to convince London that the network of secret agents in the Netherlands was functioning normally. All through the period March 1942 to November 1943, the British Special Operations Executive continued sending weapons, explosives and secret agents to the Netherlands. All were captured by the Germans. The Englandspiel cost the lives of 132 individuals and led to the arrest of many others. The result was that the Dutch resistance movement remained isolated. And yet, the Englandspiel did not provide the Germans with the information they were looking for: the time and place of the planned invasion of north-west Europe.
Another characteristic of this period was that people were looking ahead: the clandestine press published extensive discussions about the political, social and cultural transformation of Dutch society. Articles were written about the desirability of breaking down its segregated structure, and of the creation of a united progressive party, but also about the question of what the moral standards and values of a post-war society would be now that pre-war certainties had been shattered. These discussions included topics on public affairs, such as the question of what the principle of justice in the ‘new’ Netherlands would be, but also issues at the personal level, such as marital fidelity, euthanasia and others.
A strong plea was issued in the clandestine press, in the context of a longing for social renewal, for the amalgamation of resistance forces. This plea fell on deaf ears among many resistance groups. Not until the summer of 1944, when the Dutch government-in-exile emphasized the necessity of increased coordination, did a secret meeting in Amsterdam of representatives of twenty-two different resistance groups lead to the formation of a relatively small ‘Contact Committee’. This committee was intended to provide some sort of coordination between the various resistance groups. It appears that the desire to unite forces originated mostly from the top of the resistance movement. Amalgamation was not a big step for these resistance leaders, because they had been involved in creating nationally organized resistance groups such as the LO, the LKP and the Raad van Verzet (RVV, Council of Resistance). However, many groups remained independent, retaining a strong local character.
After the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Dutch government in London and the Allied forces urged the Dutch population not to revolt against the German occupier. This call was not addressed to resistance organizations, who had ‘their own instructions and [knew] what to do’, as Prime Minister P. Gerbrandy added in his pre-recorded radio speech. In anticipation of Operation Market Garden (the Allied air-ground offensive to gain control of the bridges crossing the branches of the River Rhine at Nijmegen and Arnhem) new instructions were issued in September 1944. These wide-reaching orders to protect vital parts of the infrastructure against German destruction demonstrate that the Allied authorities had no realistic idea of the capabilities of the resistance organizations.31 Initially the Allied advance appeared to progress smoothly. Maastricht was liberated on 14 September and Allied airborne forces arrived at Arnhem on 17 September. However, the subsequent failure of Operation Market Garden halted the Allied advance and divided the Netherlands into two. The liberated south developed completely differently from the north and the west of the Netherlands, which were not liberated until the spring of 1945. With the liberation of the southern part of the country, occupation and resistance in the northern part entered its fourth and final stage.
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The contrast between north and south was reinforced by the railway strike, which was called by the Dutch government-in-exile on 17 September in order to support the Allied advance. As a countermeasure against the strike the Germans prohibited the transportation of food and fuel by ship to the western part of the Netherlands, resulting in a winter that came to be characterized by hunger and hardship. An additional consequence of the failure of Operation Market Garden was that 30,000 railway strikers now had to go into hiding. This increased the demand for illegal assistance to them in the occupied part of the Netherlands.
Another crucial development during this last phase of the occupation was the amalgamation of (armed) resistance groups into the Nederlandsche Binnenlandsche Strijdkrachten (Dutch Forces of the Interior, abbreviated as BS). This occurred after the Allied forces and the Dutch government-in-exile had called for it on 5 September 1944. Only if the desired merger took place would the Allied forces look after the delivery of weapons and explosives. The LKP, the RVV and the OD amalgamated to form the BS, under the supreme command of Prince Bernhard. The task of the BS was to support the Allied invasion with focused resistance actions, and to maintain order in the period between the German capitulation and the return of the Dutch government and queen.
Initially, due to internal struggles and a shortage of weapons and explosives, the BS did not function smoothly. Once these issues were resolved, all kinds of sabotage acts took place, aimed at the destruction of the German transportation and communication infrastructure. Specialized resistance units were created, focused for example on the establishment of illegal telephone networks intended to facilitate contact with the liberated part of the Netherlands. Resistance fighters who broke through enemy lines operated as liaison officers. For instance, Jos Mulder-Gemmeke succeeded in October 1944 in crossing the bridge at Heusden under a barrage from German as well as Allied troops (among whom was a British soldier who would become her third husband in 1947). Stuffed into her shoulder pads were microfilms that she was transporting via Brussels to the Dutch secret service in London. She subsequently got herself parachuted back into occupied territory in March 1945, where she landed in a ditch. Having sustained serious back injuries, she was rescued by resistance fighters and spent the remainder of the occupation in bed.32
The increase in sabotage acts was accompanied by an increase in reprisals. One such reprisal was intended to avenge an act of resistance that killed one German officer and seriously wounded another. It took the form of a raid on the village of Putten on 1 October 1944. The Wehrmacht, which assumed an increasingly important role in the fight against the resistance alongside (and sometimes at odds with) the SiPo, burnt the village to the ground and deported 660 men and boys. Only 10 per cent of them survived the camps. A total of about 1,000 Dutch civilians were executed by the Germans during this period, including many resistance fighters. The occupiers had abandoned any semblance of justice after the Allied invasion, and resistance fighters were imprisoned or executed without any form of due process.33
In spite of the intensified repression, resistance groups in the occupied part of the Netherlands were quite active during this last phase of the occupation. Besides the aforementioned armed actions, the illegal press was there to maintain morale and satisfy the craving for news. Providing help to individuals in hiding continued, but this became more and more complicated because of the food shortages. Due to the elimination of normal means of transportation, the bicycle became increasingly important for the resistance, wooden tyres replacing rubber ones. Women occupied a more visible role in the resistance as the occupiers focused increasingly upon hunting down men for the Arbeitseinsatz. During a large raid in Rotterdam in November 1944, for example, 50,000 men were arrested and taken away. The role of female couriers became increasingly important: in prams and under corsets and bras they transported illegal leaflets, espionage material and weapons. Although the German authorities initially did not suspect these mostly young, innocent-looking women, they took more severe action against them during the final phase of occupation, indeed right up to the last day. For instance, in Amsterdam during the night of 4 and 5 May 1945, Annick van Hardeveld was shot dead from a car by the Grüne Polizei. She was on a bicycle, dressed in a Red Cross uniform, on her way to a resistance group to deliver a message. Because she had just heard the news about the approaching capitulation, she was wearing a Dutch flag over her uniform. It was a fatal mistake.34
The German capitulation on 5 May 1945 deprived the armed resistance of the opportunity to contribute to the liberation of the Netherlands. The resulting frustration worsened when it became evident that the College van Vertrouwensmannen (College of Trustees), appointed by the Dutch government in London, had been negotiating with the Germans about a relaxation of the repression and about the possibility of food drops by the Allies. Nor did the resistance play any role in the negotiations surrounding the German surrender.
The feeling of being ignored by the Dutch government-in-exile also led to considerable irritation and frustration in the liberated parts of the Netherlands. The government-in-exile (which did not return to the Netherlands until the entire country had been liberated) delegated authority in the south of the Netherlands to the Militair Gezag (MG, Military Authority). The MG had extensive jurisdiction, including the right to arrest people suspected of having collaborated with the Germans. This led to clashes between the MG, as the representative of the legitimate government in London, and the resistance groups who attempted to follow their own political agendas. However, resistance leaders were gradually incorporated into the government apparatus; thus demobilization of the resistance had already started before the eventual surrender of Germany.35
* * *
In assessing the general character and impact of the Dutch resistance we may conclude that the occupation of the Netherlands ended with a sense of disappointment for many resistance fighters. Many of them had expected that the war would lead to a radical political, social and cultural transformation of Dutch society. Even though resistance fighters did not agree among themselves as to what this transformation should actually look like, they had at least been expecting to play an active role in the process. However, during the latter phase of the occupation the foundation was laid for the restoration of former relations and, thereby, the preservation of the segmented structure of Dutch society. Following a brief period of hope for a ‘breakthrough’, the Netherlands returned after 1946 to the old, familiar pre-war patterns. It was not until the 1960s that a radical shift took place, one which, according to some historians, can be seen as a delayed effect of changes that had occurred during the German occupation.36
Even when using a broad definition of resistance, it is evident that the resistance movement in the Netherlands had a limited reach. Not until spring 1943, when the existence of people other than Jews was threatened (members of the Dutch army, students, men between the ages of 18 and 50), did the resistance movement expand. Large numbers of people went into hiding and had to be helped. Assisting people in hiding (along with everything associated with it, including armed activities) became one of the most important forms of resistance in the Netherlands. However, the deportation of Jews was already in full swing when such help began to be organized on a larger scale. Paramilitary resistance did not play an important role in the Netherlands; nor did espionage. The clandestine press, on the other hand, played a crucial part from the beginning in boosting the morale of the Dutch population. The press also served as the primary antidote for National Socialist propaganda.
None of this meant that the Dutch resistance was able to make a significant contribution to preventing the destruction of the Dutch Jews. Nevertheless, by their large-scale assistance to people who sought to avoid the Arbeitseinsatz, the resistance was able to do some harm to another important objective of the regime: the economic exploitation of the Netherlands for the benefit of the German war economy. At the same time, what is true for the Dutch resistance in general is valid here also: the effect was primarily moral, not material. This moral effect is most evident when considering the failure of Nazification. The resistance definitely contributed to this lack of success by promoting and channelling anti-German sentiments in numerous ways.
Every historian writing on the Dutch resistance needs first to consider the image of the resistance created in the early post-war years. The first historical work that was dedicated to the history of the German occupation, Onderdrukking en Verzet (Oppression and Resistance), laid the foundation for an image of Dutch resistance that endured until the mid-1960s.37 This study was distributed in the Netherlands in instalments which eventually grew to four volumes in size. Each segment of the ideologically varied resistance movement was presented in terms of the role it had played in the Dutch struggle for national survival. The nation, it was claimed, had been united in its rejection of National Socialism, and the resistance movement had been the most radical expression of this general attitude. However, such radicalism posed a problem for anyone who was not an author of Onderdrukking en Verzet: the choice of an illegal existence had often been accompanied by all kinds of unconventional behaviour, behaviour that in the eyes of many had undermined the unity of the nation. Some even spoke of ‘unpatriotic’ behaviour that should not be held up as an example for others. For this reason, post-war representations of the Dutch population stressed the collective suffering and struggles of the nation. Special attention to the distress of specific groups, such as the resistance or the Jews, did not fit well with this story. Even in Onderdrukking en Verzet, the persecution of the Jews was described as a tragedy that did not belong to the history of the Netherlands.
In addition, and partly in opposition to the conception of the Netherlands during the German occupation that predominated until the mid-1960s, resistance groups wrote their own histories. These came in the form of memoirs, commemorative books, interviews, (auto)biographies and monographs. Since this is a form of ‘partisan’ historiography, the depictions are often biased and hagiographical. Moreover, the image is fragmented because, with the occasional exception (Onderdrukking en Verzet), each zuil recorded its own resistance history. The fragmented nature of these resistance histories is further reinforced by their local and regional character.
The image of the resistance in the Netherlands since 1945 has not only been determined by amateur and professional historians. There have been memorials, monuments and autobiographies—such as that of Eric Hazelhoff Roelfzema, the legendary Soldier of Orange.38 Fiction, film and television documentaries demonstrate that the resistance remains a popular and important theme up to this day. It is striking that, although complexity was for a long time absent in the historiography, it was present very early on in fiction writing and in the films based on that writing. As early as the 1940s and 1950s, authors such as Simon Vestdijk and Willem Frederik Hermans published novels expressing doubts about the aura of sainthood that surrounded the resistance.39 These novels undermined the black-and-white image of oppression and resistance that was prevalent during these decades. Perhaps new, more complex histories of the resistance will draw their inspiration from this early fiction.
Notes
1. For Wilhelmina’s role during the war see Cees Fasseur, Wilhelmina. Krijgshaftig in een vormeloze jas (Amsterdam, 2001).
2. Radio speech of Queen Wilhelmina on the occasion of the German attack on the Soviet Union, broadcast by Radio Orange (24 June 1941); available at: http://hmi.ewi.utwente.nl/choral/radiooranje.html. In popular memory these words of the queen are remembered as: ‘will hit the Kraut on his head’ (in Dutch: ‘slaat den Mof op den kop’).
3. For a description of the structure of the Aufsichtsverwaltung see Peter Romijn, Burgemeesters in oorlogstijd. Besturen onder Duitse bezetting (Amsterdam, 2006), pp. 130–59. The estimate of the number of officials in the German civil administration, which is not in his book, was kindly provided by the author.
4. No precise figures on the number of German military and police men are available. After June 1940 two divisions of the German army were stationed on Dutch territory. A third division was added in 1941 and a fourth one in 1942. In that year the forces of the German army numbered probably 50,000 to 60,000 in total, mainly deployed at the coast manning the defences against an Allied invasion. In addition, there were small units of the German navy and the Luftwaffe stationed in the Netherlands. De Jong estimates the number of security forces (Ordnungspolizei and Waffen-SS together) at 20,000 to 23,000. L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 14 vols (The Hague, 1969–88), Vol. 4-1 (1972), pp. 115–17.
5. Louis de Jong, The Netherlands and Nazi Germany (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 33.
6. Bob Moore, Victims and survivors. The Nazi persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands 1940–1945 (London, 1997).
7. Louis de Jong, preface to Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation (Stanford, Cal./London, 1963), pp. v–x.
8. De Jong, The Netherlands and Nazi Germany, pp. 47–8.
9. For different calculations see Dick van Galen Last, ‘The Netherlands’, in Bob Moore (ed.), Resistance in Western Europe (Oxford, 2000), p. 214. All calculations of the numbers of resisters are quite general. On the basis of the available literature it is not possible to break down the various branches of the resistance movement in a reliable way.
10. In this contribution I limit myself to the resistance in the Dutch territory in Europe. For examples of resistance to the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies see Madelon de Keizer and Marije Plomp (eds), Een open zenuw. Hoe wij ons de Tweede Wereldoorlog herinneren (Amsterdam, 2010).
11. Van Galen Last, ‘The Netherlands’, p. 190.
12. Henri Michel, Les mouvements clandestins en Europe (Paris, 1965), p. 63.
13. Bart van der Boom, ‘We leven nog.’ De stemming in bezet Nederland (Amsterdam, 2003).
14. For these poems see Hinke Piersma, Zou de goede Sint wel komen. Sinterklaasgedichten uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam, 2009).
15. De Telegraaf (19 August 1940).
16. For the underground press see Lydia Winkel and Hans de Vries (eds), De ondergrondse pers 1940–1945 (Utrecht, 1989).
17. For the Geuzen, see Harry Paape, De Geuzen (Amsterdam, 1965).
18. For the OD see J.W.M. Schulten, Geschiedenis van de Ordedienst. Mythe en werkelijkheid van een verzetsorganisatie (The Hague, 1998).
19. E. Hazelhoff Roelfzema, Soldaat van Oranje, ’40–’45 (The Hague, 1971), English trans., Soldier of Orange (London, 1972); Op jacht naar het leven. De autobiografie van de Soldaat van Oranje (Utrecht, 2000), English trans., In pursuit of life (Stroud, 2003). Filmed as Soldaat Van Oranje, directed by Paul Verhoeven (released 22 September 1977), American version Soldier of Orange (released 16 August 1979).
20. Erik Schumacher and Josje Damsma, Hier woont een NSB’er. Nationaalsocialisten in bezet Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 2010).
21. For an assessment of the impact of this strike and the ways in which it has been remembered see Annet Mooij, De strijd om de februaristaking (Amsterdam, 2006).
22. Liesbeth van der Horst, April–Mei ’43. De stakingen als keerpunt (Amsterdam, 1998).
23. Ad van Liempt, Verzetshelden en moffenvrienden (Amsterdam, 2011), p. 15.
24. Ibid., p. 20.
25. For Boellaard see Jolande Withuis, Weest manlijk, zijt sterk. Pim Boellaard (1903–2001). Het leven van een verzetsheld (Amsterdam, 2008).
26. For Gerrit Jan van der Veen see Anita van Ommeren and Ageeth Scherphuis, ‘Die man had moeten blijven leven.’ Gerrit Jan van der Veen en het verzet (Amsterdam, 1984).
27. Withuis, Weest manlijk, zijt sterk, p. 110.
28. Van Galen Last, ‘The Netherlands’, p. 201.
29. Ton Kors, Hannie Schaft. Het levensverhaal van een vrouw in verzet tegen de nazi’s (Amsterdam, 1976).
30. M.R.D. Foot, L. Marks and L. Pot, ‘The Englandspiel’, in M.R.D. Foot (ed.), Holland at war against Hitler: Anglo-Dutch relations 1940–1945 (London, 1990), pp. 120–56.
31. De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, Vol. 10a-1 (1980), pp. 8, 284–5.
32. Jaus Müller, ‘Op de fiets door de frontlinie. Jos Mulder-Gemmeke (1922–2010), verzetsvrouw en drager Willems-Orde’, NRC-Handelsblad (23 December 2010), available at http://archief.nrc.nl/.
33. Madelon de Keizer, Putten. De razzia en de herinnering (Amsterdam, 1998).
34. ‘Annick van Hardeveld’, available at: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annick_van_Hardeveld.
35. Peter Romijn, ‘The Synthesis of the Political Order and the Resistance Movement in the Netherlands in 1945’, in Gill Bennett (ed.), The End of War in Europe 1945 (London, 1996), pp. 139–47.
36. One of these historians is Hans Blom. See J.C.H. Blom, ‘The Second World War and Dutch Society: continuity and change’, in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (eds), Britain and The Netherlands, Vol. V, War and Society (The Hague, 1977), pp. 228–48; J.C.H. Blom, Crisis, Bezetting en Herstel. Tien Studies over Nederland, 1930–1950 (Gravenhage, 1989).
37. J.J. van Bolhuis, C.D.J. Brandt, H.M. van Randwijk, B.C. Slotemaker (eds), Onderdrukking en Verzet, 4 vols (Arnhem, 1949–55).
38. See n. 19 for bibliographical and filmographical details.
39. S. Vestdijk, Pastorale 1943. Roman uit de tijd van de Duitsche overheersching (Rotterdam, 1948), no English trans. available. Filmed as Pastorale 43, directed by Wim Verstappen (released 20 April 1978); Willem Frederik Hermans, De donkere kamer van Damocles (Amsterdam, 1958), English trans. The Dark Room of Damocles (London, 1962). Filmed as Als Twee Duppels Water, directed by Fons Rademakers (released 21 February 1963).
Guide to Further Reading
De Jong, Louis, ‘The Dutch Resistance Movements and the Allies, 1940–1945’, in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on the History of Resistance Movements—Milan, 26–29 March 1961 (Oxford, 1964).
Van Galen Last, Dick, ‘The Netherlands’, in Bob Moore (ed.), Resistance in Western Europe (Oxford, 2000), pp. 189–222.