After the disaster of Trasimene, all of Rome was now wholly apprehensive, its confidence shattered. The Roman defeat with the death or capture of at least thirty thousand soldiers—adding in the defeat and capture of Servilius Geminus’ four thousand cavalry en route from Ariminum—was a catastrophe that sent terror through Roman Italy. The paralyzed Romans were now unsure how to deal with Hannibal. First Ticino, then Trebia, and now Trasimene undermined their confidence in their vaunted military. Sharing leadership in the two-general system—a veteran officer and a political appointee—was now considered ill-advised.
After some worried dithering, Rome’s primary response was to appoint a military dictator to coalesce military leadership. This decision was unusual because the last time a dictator had been appointed was in 249 during the First Punic War. While the surviving consul Servilius Geminus should have been involved in the appointment, he was still held up in Ariminum partly by wariness of Hannibal.
The Senate appointed the veteran Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator to deal with Hannibal. This position consolidated power into one leader. His second in command, mainly over the Roman cavalry, was the younger Marcus Minucius Rufus, appointed magister equitum, or master of horse. Minucius had been a consul in 221,1 and because Fabius could not choose his own cavalry officer, he had to accept Minucius, who was elected. Given their somewhat forced relationship and the complete contrasts between the two—Fabius being older, from a distinguished family, resolute and patient to a fault; Minucius being a proudly rising star, hyperactive and inclined to hot oratory—there was immediate friction between Fabius and Minucius.
Hannibal had never encountered a Roman foe both so different from himself and other Roman generals and yet so cautious. Like the Scipios, Quintus Fabius Maximus (280–203 BCE) was a member of a prominent Roman military family, the Fabii. Fabius himself was a distinguished civil servant who had held the office of censor in 230 and was elected consul twice in 233 and 228 BCE, before his appointment as dictator. While everyone thought Fabius rigid, slow of mind, and inflexibly dull in his youth, Plutarch defended him as unwaveringly steadfast as an adult in military matters. Fabius was already much involved in this war because two years previously (219) he had been a member of the delegation that had gone to Carthage to complain about Saguntum, demand Hannibal’s surrender, and ascertain Carthage’s motives.
In the previous century, the family of Quintus Fabius had earned the right to style themselves Maximus as their final cognomen in the three-name system, identifying this branch of the Fabii as the “Greatest”.2 Fabius’ new title of dictator (a temporary office of exceptional power, not a modern-day autocrat) for this severe military crisis allowed him enormous power, or imperium.3 While he was old for this new office, around fifty-eight, Fabius was still the most respected survivor of the current Roman debacles, with considerable military experience.
Rome worried that Hannibal might be headed for the capital itself. Impromptu bulwarks of earthen berms were hastily reinforced, and farmers who feared Hannibal’s advance quickly harvested their crops and fled to Rome. The few survivors of the encounters with Hannibal, possibly mostly deserters, improvised even more dramatic tales of this diabolic adversary and made themselves out as honorable veterans to detract from their shame.
Many superstitious Romans even fell back on religious fervor to curry favor with any god who might better protect them, including extra sacrifices to Mars, god of war. A special and serious banquet to which all the major twelve gods were invited—a lectisternium—was conducted after almost a two-century hiatus.4 Added attention to omens was also important to make up for the apparent disregard of religion by Flaminius, who died at Trasimene, and Fabius made sure this neglect was corrected with massive public sacrifice and personal austerity.
After consolidating the city’s defenses, especially strengthening walls, forging new weapons, and conscripting soldiers to man these walls, Fabius and Minucius raised about forty thousand men in replenished legions, half of whom were inexperienced recruits from burnt farms in the ravaged North. The new dictator assembled his two new legions of conscripts, gathered the remnants of Servilius’ two legions, and then marched over the mountains east to Apulia to wait for Hannibal. Along the way, Fabius evacuated every town that he was glumly certain Hannibal would pillage. Fabius’ grim determination was countered by Minucius’ overambitious posturing—the master of horse convinced that Rome was superior.
Over the next few years, Fabius would ultimately earn, mostly posthumously, the famous—or infamous—epithet of Cunctator, “the Delayer,” because of his cautious policies toward Hannibal, avoiding conflict wherever possible. As conservative as this strategy appeared, it was ultimately sound, given Hannibal’s ability to destroy whatever Roman army he faced at this time. Fabius also rightly believed he could slowly restore Roman confidence with harassing tactics where he could pick off the enemy one by one in skirmishes against small raiding parties. He regarded such small successes as positive signs after battle debacles.5 Whatever reservations might be held about Fabius relative to the more colorful Hannibal, it must be admitted that Fabius Maximus was the first to counter Hannibal’s onslaught of favorable battle propaganda. He was the first Roman general who knew how to safely avoid Hannibal whenever possible.
After Trasimene, Hannibal had gone east through what is now Umbria over the Apennines to the region of Picenum and begun a slow march down the Adriatic coast. His troops were weary and their horses mangy. Hannibal’s policy allowed as many foraging parties as necessary until the army regained strength, with seizure after seizure of autumn harvests. Once he learned how the Romans had filled the dearth of leadership after Trasimene, he used several ploys to sow Roman mistrust against their new dictator. He wanted to either provoke Fabius Maximus into a battle he could manipulate—as he had Sempronius and Flaminius, who were more experienced politically than militarily—or portray him as a weak coward.
Moving down the coast from Picenum to Apulia, Hannibal camped near the city of Arpi, where Fabius Maximus was camped nearby. Trying to draw out the Romans, Hannibal deployed his army for battle—but Fabius did not budge. Even though Roman officers such as Minucius were disgusted by Fabius’ unwillingness to engage, Hannibal knew that caution was a virtue. Still, Hannibal now attempted to shame Fabius by open pillaging and amassing farm booty from territory that Rome had claimed from old Samnite holdings. Hannibal must have begun to appreciate that unlike prior Roman generals, Fabius was hard to provoke.
Wherever Hannibal went in a wake of destruction, a column of smoke marked his progress. Fabius followed at a reasonable distance, visible but sufficiently out of reach. Other than a few scouting skirmishes where he could take a few stray Carthaginian scouts, Fabius kept his mostly raw Roman soldiers out of harm’s way, instead skillfully maneuvering to limit Hannibal from revictualizing his army by foraging. Fabius commanded Roman farms to destroy their farms and crops and evacuate them. The Roman dictator harassed Hannibal’s flanks with small skirmishes whenever possible to execute without full engagement.6 Fabius also kept to higher ground because he recognized Hannibal’s military superiority, especially in cavalry,7 unlike some of his fellow military officers, such as Minucius. Polybius makes it clear that Fabius and the Romans had a distinct advantage over the invaders at this time: inexhaustible supplies of provisions and men.8 Historians have estimated the Roman free population at 300,000 adults from about 234 BCE, after the First Punic War, with Italian allies numbering about 600,000 and a slave population adding about another 2 million.9 The same scholars also comment on Rome’s extraordinary ability to levy resources for its military mobilization in the Second Punic War. Even if this total is divided in half to account for gender, there is no way Hannibal could compete for soldiery and personnel for agricultural production even after heavy Roman battle casualties. This may make his achievements with his veterans seem even more remarkable.
With the Romans following behind and above on higher hill ground, Hannibal marched west over the Apennines, through Benevento, and into Campania, the richest and most fertile of all Roman lands—the Ager Falernus, because it was a volcanic region with the best soil. Campania was a virtual cornucopia of Roman wealth. Hannibal had never seen such agricultural bounty, and he quickly acquired war booty, seemingly more than his army could consume. The irony of sacking Campania’s richest farmland would not have been lost on Hannibal, because it was the rich Campanian senators who had started the First Punic War when the Carthaginians had threatened to overwhelm Sicily, which was close to their Roman villas in Campania. One of Hannibal’s camps for several weeks was close to Capua, and the area was flooded with Hannibal’s spoils and thousands of stolen cattle.
Hannibal’s Campanian sojourn was perfectly logical. First, as Polybius stated,10 this move would result in one of two Roman responses: either the Romans would be forced to engage him in battle, or, by not engaging him, they would concede he was the master of Italy. He in turn could then persuade many more Italians to defect.11 Second, because supplying and feeding an army are such vital parts of warfare, having sufficient food for soldiers and fodder for animals can make or break a campaign. Tactics must adapt accordingly based on food availability. Living off the land, as Hannibal’s invading army had to do—even more so than the Romans—meant that raiding farms and taking livestock were a necessity. In addition, what Hannibal seized deprived Rome of resources.12
Some historians have calculated the statistical needs of ancient armies and have compiled reasonable data to suggest that a consular army of several legions plus allies (around 20,000 men and 3,500 horses and pack animals) would consume around 35 tons of wheat and 25 tons of barley daily along with an optimum amount of 10,000 liters of wine and 2,000 liters of olive oil.13 Daily grazing of animals during the right seasons was an absolute given, but winter added a huge strain on food supply. Armies would plan for whatever needs lay ahead from harvest time onward. So Hannibal felt justified in occupying Campania to acquire food for his army; whatever the risks Hannibal knew that this was his window of opportunity to acquire supplies.
According to Livy,14 who rarely misses an opportunity to showcase Punic perfidy, Hannibal would soon devise a clever ploy to further undermine trust in Fabius. Like many Roman patricians, Fabius owned rich farmland in Campania, and Hannibal had learned the location from Roman deserters or locals. He then destroyed all the surrounding farms but left the land and vines of Fabius completely untouched. Livy says that Hannibal then spread rumors that Fabius was spared because he had made a secret deal with Hannibal. Fabius was mortified and delegated his son Quintus to sell the rich farm, using the proceeds to ransom Roman prisoners.15
Whether Livy’s tale is true or not, Minucius was close to mutiny at Fabius’ continuing reluctance to engage Hannibal. Even the Senate was beginning to doubt whether Fabius’ caution was the right strategy as the profitable harvests of Campania were seized by Hannibal. Fabius Cunctator, the Delayer, was assailed by nearly everyone around him for his caution. This combination of rumor and scorn would have made many Roman patricians angry, but not Fabius, who had great patience and a thick skin.
Fabius determined in autumn that Hannibal was about to return east to Apulia for the coming winter, planning passage out of the Ager Falernus through the lower Apennines with his enormous column of spoils, including the thousands of head of cattle, many laden with harvested food supplies. Hoping to trap Hannibal in Campania, Fabius sent Minucius to block the Appian Way, the road south from Rome toward Capua, in the narrow coastal valley of Sinuessa. Meanwhile, he and his army occupied the heights of the Volturnus Valley at the gorge of Casilinum,16 about three miles north of Capua—the only other way east out of Campania and where he expected Hannibal to cross. Fabius was right about Hannibal’s route, and he was convinced he had Hannibal and his army boxed in. When Hannibal’s scouts reported that the pass was blocked and guarded by Roman troops, Hannibal halted his army until nightfall in plain view of Fabius.
While Hannibal pondered the situation, Fabius sat tight, wondering what Hannibal would do. It certainly appeared that the Carthaginians were poised to break out the next day. Fabius knew that if Hannibal weighed the circumstances, he would see that only with great loss of life and a decimated army could he even reach the pass, since Fabius had four thousand Romans nearby to guard it and could easily defend the narrow route.17 Believing the next morning would be one of destiny, Fabius retired after dark to sleep for the night, certain he had Hannibal contained and possibly could end Hannibal’s campaign.18
But Hannibal hatched a clever scheme. At dusk he called a supply officer and told him to have his men collect and bundle as many dry sticks as possible from the surrounding valley floor and scrub. Since it was past harvest at the height of the year’s dryness before the rains, this was accomplished easily, and the pile of dry tinder wood grew huge as Hannibal’s men worked under the cover of dark and in silence.
By this time, the bulk of the Roman army had mostly gone to sleep, leaving only the Casilinum Pass itself guarded. Hannibal then had his men collect two thousand of the strongest cattle from the spoils and wait for his orders after their dinner meal. He pointed out a ridge above and not far from the Casilinum Pass but away from where he knew the bulk of Fabius’ army to be camped and told them to mark it well because they would be furiously driving the cattle to that spot in the middle of the night. Hannibal’s army rested for a few hours until around three o’clock in the morning when the Romans would be sleeping most deeply.
Awaking his army camp in whispered quiet, Hannibal ordered his men to tie the thick bundles of branches between the horns of the two thousand cattle and light them all together with fire as quickly as possible. The dry branches caught fire, and the cattle were prodded forward. It looked to anyone watching that a whole army was suddenly moving up the ridge through the low brush. The assembled bulk of Hannibal’s full army with the rest of the spoils waited, hushed in great discipline below the Casilinum Pass under the noses of the unsuspecting Romans. The brilliant stratagem caught the Romans completely by surprise.
The frightened cattle with burning firebrands thundered up the ridge away from the pass, their fire-lit bundles looking just like thousands of torches carried by men; Livy says that the brands also scorched the hillside vegetation, causing even more fires that seemed to enlarge the enemy troops before the Roman eyes.19 A group of Hannibal’s chosen cattle drivers with pikemen herded the massed cattle from behind and on both sides, keeping them together, while others goaded them with weapons from the rear. The sleepy Roman guard units on watch noticed the moving fires and immediately jumped up, yelling and running toward the illuminated mass, thinking that Hannibal had sent his entire army that way because he was aware that the pass was guarded.
If the body of Fabius’ main waking army also thought the same thing, and many of them tried to sleepily assemble and head off Hannibal’s “army” of cattle ascending the ridge, the darkness covered the whole enterprise well. Meanwhile, Hannibal’s army passed quietly en masse toward the now-unguarded Casilinum Pass and quickly and safely made it through. The Romans made so much noise in their haste that they were blind to anything but their mistaken quarry as they tried to cut off this escaping army of cattle. Hannibal had anticipated this by choosing to run the cattle up the ridge in a direction away from both the Casilinum Pass and the main Roman army camp so that no Romans would cross his path as he took the pass.
When Fabius was wakened and told about the moving lights and noise, he refused to call out the rest of his army, thinking this was a trap.20 Although there were a few fights between the pursuing bewildered Romans on the ridge and Hannibal’s cattle-prodding skirmishers, even the Cartha-ginian pikemen and drivers quickly disappeared in the confusion. Some of the cattle escaped with them over the ridge and through the woods on the other side to catch up to the main Carthaginian force, the fires between their horns extinguished. Hannibal sent some of his armed Spaniards to fight any following Romans and accompany the last pikemen. About a thousand overzealous Roman soldiers were slaughtered as they tried to return to the Casilinum Pass.
The confused Roman army reassembled at dawn, and to Fabius’ and the Romans’ great disappointment and shamed befuddlement, morning light in the Volturnus Valley revealed that Hannibal’s entire army had escaped Fabius’ trap minus only a thousand or so cattle. This was the phantom army that had tricked the Romans in one of Hannibal’s most famous maneuvers.21 While Fabius had initially guessed right about Hannibal’s route, his Carthaginian counterpart had more correctly gauged that the conservative Fabius would hold back his full army during the night, thinking rightly that there was a trick under way, as Polybius wrote.22 Fabius waited out the night before fully assessing the situation.23
Hannibal’s forces now moved quickly eastward, virtually unopposed, back to Apulia for their wintering. This was not only a return with rich rewards in booty from the very heart of Roman agricultural wealth in Campania—further demoralizing Rome—but also another psychological victory for Rome’s enemies, rightly bolstering their confidence in Hannibal.
When word got to Rome, the humbled Fabius Maximus was criticized greatly for letting Hannibal escape—not least by his rival Minucius, who raged more at being absent during the maneuver than for hurt Roman pride. If overcautious Fabius Cunctator was personally prescient to delay meeting Hannibal in battle, many Romans shuddered to think what might happen if their two armies actually met under the same leadership. Minucius lobbied everyone he could in Rome to replace Fabius as dictator. Fabius, unshakable although much maligned, was no fool and knew that the cleverest and most elusive commanders could reverse the tide by pretending to be the quarry when they were really the hunters.24 Given the chance, he would still bide his time in the waiting game. For all the short-term perceptions of weakness in his “Fabian strategy,” Fabius Cunctator’s decision to “not meet Hannibal in the open field unless Rome had the advantage” would turn out to be wise.25