After his father’s death in Spain, the young Publius Cornelius Scipio (later Africanus,1 whom I will call Scipio from now on), had been only about twenty years old as a likely survivor at Cannae and was now about twenty-six in 210. Normally that was too young to command, and although a patrician from one of the best Roman families serving in the military, the Cornelii Scipiones, he had not climbed enough ranks of the cursus honorum with the necessary time in grade in the offices. Polybius asserts that Scipio helped save his wounded father’s life at the Battle of Ticinus in 218,2 when he would have been about seventeen or eighteen, and Livy likewise relates a now-famous romantic story about young Scipio surviving Cannae as a young officer and, at Canusium, taking a vow with bared sword in front of other survivors to never desert Rome.3 Others have suggested the romantic story of the vow is a late embellishment, probably by Livy, since Polybius makes no mention of it, but that Scipio likely was at Cannae—possibly even a very young military tribune under Aemilius Paullus.4
Now since Spain required new leadership to fill the gap created by the deaths of his father and uncle, the consuls Cnaeus Fulvius Centimalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba called the Senate’s electoral comitia centuriata—an assembly that elected annual consuls, praetors, and censors—to convene and choose in a special election a leader who would measure up to the challenges of Spain. Scipio had been a military tribune5 and had only been a curule aedile (a magistrate supervising markets) a few years before in 213, but he certainly had not yet been a praetor or consul with authority to lead an army.
Derived mostly from Livy’s hagiography but also from Polybius, who compares Scipio to the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus,6 many historians7 have commented on how young Scipio sat in temples—ostensibly meditating and communicating with the gods of Rome—and related “dreams” where the gods intervened on his behalf. If Scipio was prepossessed with his possible future role, he was certainly also planning it well, making every effort to influence public opinion on his behalf by allowing people to draw favorable conclusions about him—neither denying nor confirming supposed marvels at his birth that recalled Alexander8—and his hinting at every opportunity of his divine mission. One military historian makes it clear that Polybius is to be read that one “acting on dreams and omens alone would not have won such an empire,” rather to not underestimate Scipio’s exceptional mind.9 Scipio was no doubt subtler and more psychologically complicated than even the normally religiously skeptical but admiring Polybius understood, along with modern commentators who may see his publicly “religious” side as persuasively manipulative rather than brilliant and insightful. Even Livy says he “prepared men’s minds”—planting ideas that he most likely carefully constructed for a considerable time—and Polybius accepts that Scipio calculatingly “instilled into men the belief his projects were divinely inspired” without criticizing him for it.10 Scipio is one of the best examples in history of a leader who planned carefully, not only for his battles but also how to bend people to his will. Scipio knew that many people are persuaded more by religion than by reason, and that power of devotion often trumps power of deduction; no doubt a Machiavelli could later paraphrase this.
Whether or not Scipio was the sole candidate for leading Rome’s forces in Spain, he was the primary adult heir of the Scipio clan—seemingly paterfamilias—but a privatus, or private citizen, rather than a ranking officer. Spain, after all, was not an easy place for a Roman general with inadequate supplies battling vast Punic assets. He did have military experience from the Battles of Ticinus and Cannae, but his appointment was about as extraordinary as he was. In some sense, it shows some desperation brought on Rome by the dire loss of his father and uncle, but other factors were also invested in his choice, such as the patrician families ruling the Senate. The comitia centuriata could not actually elect him, but its formal vote possibly legitimized an already-made decision as one historian notes, adding that part of the mystery of the choice of Scipio may have been name recognition in Spain. His father and uncle had already courted Celtiberian tribes, and continuity could be an asset.11 Named commander of Spain—actually proconsul—Scipio was given ten thousand infantry to add to the eighteen thousand in Tarraco and north of the Ebro, and he left the Roman port of Ostia with thirty ships and landed at Emporion (Empúries, Catalonia) in late 210.
Yet a sure sign of the future was the bold and brilliant taking of Cartagena (Punic Qart Hadasht) in 209 by young Scipio, almost in the mold of Hannibal. The great personal loss of his father and uncle in 212 seemed to have increased his motivation to give Rome greater success, and he certainly needed to balance the miasma of his family tragedy, one that had the superstitious apparition in Rome of misfortune, which could taint a family if the gods were perceived as averse. Scipio certainly knew that during the winter of 210 in Spain, the three Carthaginian armies were widely separated over a considerable distance of hundreds of miles, with at least one in the south near Gades under Hasdrubal Gisgo; another to the west of Cartagena near Castulo under Mago; and another under Hasdrubal Barca, most likely also in the west among the Carpetani tribe at the headwaters of the Tagus River near Toledo in central Spain, southwest of the Ebro but northwest of Cartagena.12
Because the road to Cartagena was thus open, unprotected by Cartha-ginian forces and only a ten days’ march away at a distance of 280 miles, this fact encouraged Scipio to plan a move as daring as any. It was a great risk but also a great undertaking if planned carefully, something Polybius says was his hallmark.13 Cartagena—Carthago Nova (New Carthage) is the Latin translation of Qart Hadasht14—had the best harbor in Spain and was enormously wealthy. Perhaps Cartagena stored more bullion than Carthage kept at home, since the Spanish silver mines a few miles away around La Unión to the east and other mines north of that between Murcia and the red-hued Los Victorias hills—many less than a day’s journey away on foot—were so rich. Polybius points out how much Carthage itself depended on Cartagena, offering such great service to the Punic enemy that funded damage to Rome.15 This prize, seemingly so far away but casually defended, was an irresistible lure that would help realize Scipio’s vast political ambitions if only he could take it, thereby also cutting off any hope Hannibal had of resupply from Spain either of silver or Iberian allies.16 Without waiting for any permission from Rome, Scipio shared his plan with only Gaius Laelius, a Roman admiral and friend, to prevent word getting to the far-off Carthaginian armies who thought Cartagena was both a safe distance from any Romans and also nearly invincible in its maritime setting. At the outset, Scipio would be outnumbered by about three to one, given that his total force was, as Goldsworthy says, only “barely equal” to one of the three Punic armies in the field.17
After setting up 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry under Marcus Junius Silanus to guard the Ebro, Scipio assembled the fleet under Laelius at the mouth of the Ebro then near Dertosa and took off quickly with 25,000 troops and 2,500 cavalry on the march, with the fleet likely shadowing their journey offshore. While Polybius and Livy say the journey took a week, the length of the march is better understood as a week plus a few days,18 and although his army marched very fast and mostly by stealth—his advance scouts probably killed any hostile observers who could have sent messengers to Cartagena and possibly even to the Carthaginian armies in the field to the west and the south—Scipio arrived and quickly set up his army camp east of the walled city of Cartagena. At that time, Cartagena was on a peninsula flaring east from a narrower isthmus where the deep Gulf of Cartagena gave sea access from the south and a lagoon protected the city from the north. From the extant Roman theater, one can easily still see the remnant five hills of the ancient city, once covered with sacred areas and the Carthaginian citadel. The walls of the city only enclosed a circumference of twenty stades, or about 4,500 yards, according to Polybius.19 Mostly surprising the Carthaginians, the Roman fleet first rounded Cape de Palos from the north, sailed west, and entered the gulf harbor from the south under oar to ready the assault by sea facing the south-facing walls: Scipio’s army would attack by land on the isthmus mostly from the east.
Famous stories about Scipio telling his army of his dream of Neptune coming to his aid are great fodder for Scipio’s propaganda mill and enhanced his own carefully constructed legend by playing on Roman superstition, love of dreams, and attention to omens. But even if the stories are exaggerated, there are feasible interpretations of what local fishermen may have related about the extremely shallow water of the lagoon and daily wind-aided lowering of the lagoon surface and its ebbing.20
This battle underscores one of the worst issues in Carthaginian policy in Spain, a fault due either to Cartagena’s distance from Carthage or the lack of clear leadership in Spain in terms of chain of command—three disputing generals—or some other lacuna: Why were so few defenders in the city? Did they really think the city was invulnerable, or did they assume Roman power concentrated at Tarraco and the Ebro was too remote a threat? Polybius says the Carthaginians didn’t dream of anyone assaulting the city, when they controlled almost the whole of Spain.21 The city first tried to fend off seaward assault of Laelius that encircled the walls accessible on the gulf, putting the more trained Carthaginian forces there—up to a thousand men at hand—and leaving up to two thousand townsmen along the landward isthmus walls.
Scipio’s landward assault of the city walls on the east was not fully successful. He was beaten back at first. Normal assaults would, as Polybius suggests, wait a day or so to renew strength. One of Scipio’s multiple intentions in attacking both from the isthmus and by sea may have also been to divert attention away from the lagoon. But when Scipio saw the water indeed begin ebbing out of the northern lagoon channel in the afternoon, as described by fishermen in Tarraco, he gave the order for enough unnoticed Romans—five hundred men carrying ladders—to scale the walls after wading the shallow water. This new small force found the walls there unguarded, climbed over, and quickly entered the city. Here is a curious event, almost a paradox or at least ironic for a culture that once was so careful about its relationship to marine contexts. The general consensus must be that Cartagena’s lagoon provided only an illusion of water depth, since it is very difficult to gauge water depth from a distance.
More than a few have wrestled with this text of “Neptune’s aid” as related somewhat differently by both Polybius and Livy.22 While recent commentators have discussed the phenomenon, the best analysis to date suggests variables of tides and shallow salt flats mixed with offshore wind.23 The deep water of the Cartagena Gulf harbor toward the sea was possibly a better defense, although Roman ships could also approach here without hulling, so, in summary, Cartagena’s perceived impregnability was most likely an illusion.
Scipio’s canny invocation of Neptune from his dream enhanced his standing among Rome’s Spanish forces, perceived as a leader with divine blessing when his soldiers crossed the lagoon. In any event, one historian makes a good case for interpreting Polybius as “attributing Scipio’s success to his own forethought rather than the fortuitous aid of Neptune” in listening to the account of the fishermen of Tarraco who knew the phenomenon of the lagoon’s variable depth.24 This is also firm evidence for Scipio’s capable use of military intelligence long before an established imperial Roman spy-craft service, documenting that Scipio was disposed to and had learned from Hannibal’s example of how to gather intelligence and was also fully able on his own to carefully consider source information and plan accordingly.25
Scaling the undefended walls along the lagoon, the Romans moved rapidly east and killed anyone resisting, also helping to open the isthmus gates that Scipio had placed under renewed assault—his men hacking at the gates with axes but covered by testudo shields (large curved shields that covered at 1 to 2 soldiers when held overhead)—so that the landward forces met about the same time as the seaward forces also scaled the underdefended walls on the south. The Roman forces swept through the city to the citadel, where the remaining Carthaginians had retreated, and soon its surrender was accelerated by the obvious sight of marauding Roman soldiers filling the city, a custom of killing all who stood in their way, as Polybius noted, without looting, to inspire terror in a mayhem that did not even spare animals.26
Not even counting the Carthaginian treasury of silver, the collected booty from Cartagena was indeed huge, brought into the city square and guarded before some of it was distributed among Scipio’s forces. Gold, silver, and military equipment such as catapults are just a few of the materials taken as part of the Roman prize. Some of the silver and bullion from Car-tagena may have been claimed as personal fortune by the Barcids themselves and held in reserve there, but now all of this was gone too. Scipio took the Carthaginian commander named Mago and several high-ranking members of Carthage’s Gerousia Council and its Senate as prisoners to be guarded by Gaius Laelius.27 Spanish hostages numbering about three hundred were freed and released back to their tribal homes with gifts on condition of promising to guarantee their tribes would ally with Rome. Many of the city’s slaves were promised freedom after the war if they served Rome; then Scipio allocated them for rowing the eighteen captured Carthaginian ships or to reinforce the Roman rowers of Laelius. This use of slaves as rowers, whether in crisis or not—and to be freed after war service to Rome—may not be at all unique.28
In astute magnanimity he could usually fan into legend, Scipio not only was said to have kept the hostage women from being raped but also turned down one offer the hostages made of a beautiful Spanish maiden, releasing her back to her father and her fiancée, who had hoped to ransom her.29 Livy likely embellishes the story that Scipio gave back the gold for her ransom as a wedding present to the young Spanish chieftain in order to better recruit from his tribe. That Scipio took Cartagena in one day confirms not only that it was inadequately defended—only a thousand Carthaginians and townspeople were pressed into defense—but also that Carthage made a grave error in thinking it was invulnerable with its walls and surrounding water, since the shallow lagoon provided only an illusion of safety.30 Scipio’s strategy was fast coming into parity with that of Hannibal, from whom he had learned well (if unintentionally on Hannibal’s part).
The continuing importance of Cartagena to the Romans—as Carthago Nova—would be evidenced in its strategic venue as a depot for metal production since its Punic establishment, as well as the fact that it became one of three Roman military command centers in eastern Spain, along with their previous base at Tarraco and the other established at Emporion.31
After Cartagena, Scipio had one decisive battle where he defeated Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula (Baelen) in 208, his first victory in Spain. Now controlling vast reaches of Spain south of the Ebro and Cartagena, this last battle was also in the upper Baetis (Guadalquivir River) region, not far from the disasters that had wiped out his father and uncle. Scipio had an army of about thirty-five thousand soldiers compared with Hasdrubal’s twenty-five-thousand-plus Iberians. This time the Carthaginians and Iberians were trapped in a steep valley when Scipio closed both the road to Baecula and the valley entrance. Hasdrubal moved his army to the heights, but after a few days, he was surprised when attacked on three sides by so many Romans climbing up the ridge. Scipio had pretended it was only a feint or a skirmish of a few troops, and yet Hasdrubal, abandoning his camp, managed to retreat with most of his men. Hasdrubal lost the battle along with many of his Iberian mercenaries and light troops, as well as his baggage and supplies when his camp was overrun by the Romans.
Hasdrubal’s losses were possibly about six thousand dead and up to ten thousand captured, while Scipio lost fewer than two thousand at the Battle of Baecula. Scipio did not pursue the retreating Hasdrubal Barca, who moved west with his remaining army, although Hasdrubal still had a large reserve of precious metal, including gold and silver, to pay his mercenaries. The news of this last defeat reached Carthage, which now knew Spain was lost. Carthage then ordered Hasdrubal to go to Italy and assist Hannibal. Hasdrubal avoided Roman territory and moved as far west and north as possible in late 208, to Galicia near the Atlantic, passing over the western Pyrenees to Gaul. He was also ordered to take his remaining money with him to hire as many Celt mercenaries as he could. Scipio now controlled the Cartagena silver mines and their prolific production, and without Cartagena and the mines, there would be no more revenue from most of Spain, severely diminishing Punic revenue.32
Hannibal still reigned in direct combat on the open battlefield and was capable of similar ambushes that took out senior Roman leadership such as Marcellus and Crispinus or Roman troops daring to confront him. The death of the Scipio brothers in Spain was another Roman tragedy impacting Spain in the short run, but it may have motivated young Scipio, quickly leading to the conquest of Cartagena and Carthaginian control in Spain.
The loss of Cartagena—Carthage’s precious metal depot—and subsequently the loss of all Spain soon after Gades surrendered in 20633 was almost incalculable, with both its wealth in gold and silver as well as its supply of allied Iberian soldiery gone forever. Hannibal would be forced to survive on his own. His presence in Italy would now be a burden on a region severely strained by war. No new numismatic Barcid or Punic presence in coin finds in South Italy after 207 is evidence to some extent of this loss of Spain.34 How much Spanish silver came to Hannibal before 211 is hard to quantify, but some estimates suggest as much as 135 kilograms a day came to him from Spanish mines like the mine at Baebulo alone.35 Spain’s rich precious metal was now forever lost to Carthage.36 What little silver would trickle indirectly from Carthage itself would be inconsequential in comparison.37
After Punic loss of Spain, Hannibal knew his options against Rome were shrinking like his power base at the foot of Italy. He had no ports, no new silver, and was becoming more and more dependent on less-committed Bruttians and Lucanians instead of his veterans, who were old, tired, and dangerously diminished. Yet while his brother Hasdrubal had a fresh army to bring to Italy from Spain, there was still hope.
Had Hamilcar Barca lived to see two of his three “lion cub” sons on Italian soil, one in the South and one in the North, it surely would have made him proud. It might have even given him some vindication over the bitter outcome of the First Punic War, when he knew as a warrior that his merchant-dominated Carthage had capitulated too quickly.