Not all Romans were like Livy in trying to undermine Hannibal’s achievements, especially those who saw Rome’s last days of fading glory, when its territories were shrinking. Possibly because of Rome’s wane, the late Roman author P. Flavius Vegetius (circa 400–450 CE) looked back on Roman military history with an apparent modicum of humility. He singled out military discipline as explaining Rome’s eventual greatness, an outcome not guaranteed in the initial contests with their neighbors:
Victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure it. We find that the Romans owed the conquest of the world to no other cause than continual military training, exact observance of discipline in their camps, and unwearied cultivation of the other arts of war. Without these, what chance would the inconsiderable numbers of the Roman armies have had against the multitudes of the Gauls? Or with what success would their small size have been opposed to the prodigious stature of the Germans? The Spaniards surpassed us not only in numbers, but also in physical strength. We were always inferior to the Africans in wealth and unequal to them in deception and stratagem.1
Careful not to mention him, Vegetius is clearly referencing Hannibal in his description of African deception and stratagem, both of which practices in war were so often shunned in writing (especially Livy) as unmanly or un-Roman. This denial continued even when brilliant generals such as Scipio and Caesar excelled at tricks and traps, both following Hannibal as the master tactical teacher of such devices that our militaries now embrace as necessary psy-ops.
Some of the greatest ironies surrounding Hannibal’s last years and his growing legacy were not lost on his contemporaries, especially how he was as feared by enemies in his own motherland who knew his leadership could challenge theirs and effect change that would not be in their interests. Even Scipio experienced exile after not being fully appreciated by Rome. After rumors of embezzlement and false charges of bribery in the East, he retired to his estate above Naples at Liternum near Cumae in Campania, long before he should have been forced out of Rome’s circles of power in the Senate. Scipio died in exile the same year as Hannibal, in 183, and Valerius Maximus much later gives this as his putative bitter epitaph: “Ungrateful fatherland, you will not even possess my bones.”2 The striking parallel to Hannibal in Rome’s cavalier treatment of its best general reminds how threatened lesser minds too often deal with originality and brilliance not so easily controlled or subverted.
Livy is the most virulent voice against Hannibal, especially accusing him of almost criminal cruelty, among other vices. But Livy was not alone in demonizing Hannibal. Seneca too makes Hannibal the paragon of cruelty and inhumanity (Latin crudelitas), delighting in bloodshed as he supposedly exclaimed, “What a beautiful spectacle” when seeing a vast ditch full of blood.3 Horace and Juvenal4 used “dire” (Latin dirus) as a stock adjective meaning “dreadful, terrifying, abominable” to describe Hannibal. Ovid also uses multiple examples of Perfidious Phoenicia in reference to Rome’s often repeated refrain of alluding Hannibal’s “untrustworthiness”5 in treaties as well as serving up judgment on how many tricks he used in tactics. As one scholar points out, the “whole question of fides (faithlessness) was a Roman obsession here imposed on the Carthaginians.”6
In his life of Flamininus, Plutarch too uses the epithet of “terrifying,” one who caused great fear ( phoberòn in Greek) to describe Hannibal and one not easily deceived in his life of Fabius and inversely full of ambushes and stratagems himself in his life of Marcellus.7 Diodorus Siculus paints the “savage cruelty” of Hannibal in his telling of how he pitted captive family members against one another in single combat fights to the death and how cavalierly he slaughtered twenty thousand men who did not want to accompany him back to Africa, along with three thousand horses and countless pack animals he did not want to fall into Roman hands and in an “excess of anger” also slaughtered four thousand Numidian cavalry who deserted.8 Dio Cassius details how Hannibal deliberately plowed Cannae to stir up dust for the wind to blow in the Roman army’s faces and threw slain Roman scouting parties into the Aufidus stream to spoil Roman drinking water.9 Even Polybius mentions the awful suggestion of H. Monomachos, a counselor in Hannibal’s circle, that he teach his troops to employ cannibalism of their dead comrades to avoid starvation, as mentioned here in the chapters on his Alpine passage, although Polybius asserts that Hannibal rejected such an atrocity as bad advice.10 Overall, how many of these accumulated stories are true or embellished from primary sources such as Polybius is difficult to gauge, but historian Brizzi suggests the many corroborating Roman accounts of Hannibal’s atrocities lead to a sufficient truth,11 that where there is smoke there is fire.
In the Aeneid, Virgil tells of Dido’s curse against Aeneas and his Roman descendants. Here Dido prophetically demands her Tyrian brood to “persecute the stock and hate the future race,” echoing Hamilcar’s vow exacted from his son. In the Aeneid, Dido calls from her “ashes” an “unknown avenger.” The idea of rising from ashes or bones suggests a wordplay on the mythical Phoenix, a Phoenician in the wordplay. All have recognized Hannibal as this unnamed avenger, a descendant “to harass [Rome] with fire and sword” exactly as the Second Punic War accomplished.12
Valerius Maximus praises Hannibal’s acts of honorable mercy, although he called him Rome’s “bitterest enemy.” In the anecdotes of Valerius Maximus, Hannibal searched for the body of Aemilius Paullus and did not let it go unburied on Cannae’s battlefield. Likewise, he gave back to Rome the body and bones of the elder Tiberius Gracchus, slain by Lucanians, and sumptuously buried Marcus Marcellus in Bruttia with a pyre, a Punic cloak, and a golden wreath.13
When ruses and tricks were no longer despised as un-Roman, Sextus Julius Frontinus recorded Hannibal’s deeds many times in his Strategemata, a book on historic military stratagems, as good war maneuvers.14 Valerius Maximus said Hannibal “entangled the Roman people with many nooses of cunning.”15 Valerius Maximus also relates the story of King Prusias of Bithynia, who would rather follow the omens of entrails than Hannibal’s advice, and Hannibal’s exclamation, “ ‘Would you rather trust a lump of calf flesh than a veteran general?’ . . . He did not brook calmly that his glory attested in long trial should yield to the liver of a single victim.” Valerius Maximus added to this anecdote:
“And in truth, if it came to exploring war’s stratagems and estimating military leadership, Hannibal’s brain would have outweighed all the braziers and all the altars of Bithynia, let Mars himself be judge.”16
Hannibal’s immediate legacy on Rome—examined countless times from Rome’s own historians—can be measured in part by how much changed in Roman war policy and operations between 218 and 202 and afterward. It is perhaps easy to agree that Hannibal has been called “one of Rome’s best military instructors.”17 His general strategy of surprise has been discussed for centuries, but perhaps can never be overestimated. As one historian said, “In war, it is the unexpected which triumphs. And in preparing for war the unexpected is never given its proper weight.”18
The power of plebeian consuls elected by popular vote to lead armies was diminished after Sempronius at Trebia, Flaminius at Trasimene, and Varro at Cannae were each provoked by a Hannibal who understood their fundamental weaknesses. Second and related to the first, even though the underlying aim of checks and balances between military and political leadership may have been essentially a good idea, Hannibal proved that alternating the battle authority from one strong general on one day to another weak general on the next day was disastrous at these three iconic battles.
After Hannibal showed them to be useful battle ploys, contemporary Romans such as Claudius Nero and Scipio successfully adopted deceit and stratagems in Italy, Spain, and North Africa. As Frontinus noted, Claudius Nero deceived possibly both Hannibal and Hasdrubal: the first by lighting enough night fires in his camp in South Italy so that Hannibal would not know he had departed with thousands of men; the second by arriving quietly at night to the Roman camp of Livius Salinator near Metaurus without first alerting Hasdrubal.19 Scipio also appreciated the great potential of psy-ops, especially when the enemy expected something else, and yet Livy’s disdain for trickery does not in any way poison his praise for Scipio. In a somewhat similar vein to disinformation, Hannibal undermined his enemy by trying to make the Roman Senate suspect the integrity of Fabius Maximus over real estate in Campania that Hannibal captured but left immune from ransacking.20
Professional Roman armies—similar in a way to Hannibal’s trained and battle-hardened mercenaries—would ultimately fill the legions previously levied by Roman citizen militias whose military discipline and training was often suspect, although their loyalty to homeland was guaranteed. Of all the transformations of Roman war policy, one of the most dramatic and important Hannibal-inspired changes was this gradual transition to a more professional army rather than mere conscription or levies from citizen-farmer militias and levies of Latin allies. By forcing Rome to dig deep to find soldiers—even enlisting boys and debtors and exonerating criminals to fill new legions21—Hannibal paved the way for the later change under the Roman general Gaius Marius that even abandoned the property requirement for service “and the idea that possessions guaranteed a man’s loyalty to the state.”22
Polybius had noted after Cannae the battle advantages Numidian cavalry gave Hannibal: “it demonstrated to posterity that in times of war, it is better to give battle with half as many infantry as the enemy and an overwhelming cavalry than to be in all respects his equal.”23 In 218 Hannibal started out from Cartagena in Spain with an enormous advantage cavalry relative to Roman standards, and by the time of crossing the Rhône, he still had nine thousand horsemen, mostly Numidian, an unheard-of quantity of other cavalry.24
Learning from Hannibal, Scipio implemented an enhanced role for mobile cavalry, especially Numidian, the most feared of Hannibal’s cavalry. Scipio derived battle advantages from using them wisely at Zama, where he outnumbered Hannibal in cavalry for the first time: As Hyland notes, “Scipio Africanus was quick to take advantage of Numidian cavalry when he turned the tables on Hannibal at Zama.”25 Successive Roman armies adopted Scipio’s cavalry model that was based on Hannibal’s.26
Hannibal’s peerless tactics of using topography, fighting in winter, night fighting, depriving enemies of water sources, and other environmental factors as a secret weapon eventually became part of the Roman arsenal, beginning with some in the Second Punic War, such as Scipio. Hannibal had made the Romans cross the icy Trebia River in high winter, which froze the legionaries and also deprived them of strength, especially since they had not had any morning meal. He used fog at Trasimene as a weapon.27 Hannibal employed the swampy ground as well as the night cover of darkness at Volturnus and used cattle with lit burning brands to confuse the Romans, as well as making them face the sun and dust at Cannae.28 He likely prevented Romans from watering at the Aufidus River, possibly even tainting the Roman water supply.29 Scipio employed similar tactics when he knew that the shallow “tidal” water at Cartagena could be crossed but attributed the crossing to divine assistance.30 Imitating Hannibal, Scipio exploited the cover of darkness and chaos in his night attack in burning the camps of Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisco near Utica. He commandeered the water sources around Zama before battle there. Demonstrating a new Roman willingness to mirror Hannibal’s tactics, Cornelius Nero in South Italy left camp quietly under cover of darkness,31 taking a page out of Hannibal’s night maneuver book.32
Hannibal made copious use of military intelligence, gathering hard intelligence on the ground by employing Celts from Italy as scouts and informants, and continuing with spies who dressed like Romans and spoke Latin in Roman territory and behind the Roman lines.33 Few understood the need for reliable information better than Hannibal when he had the monetary resources in Spanish silver to acquire it.34 Hannibal’s precedents in gathering military intelligence seemed not to be followed by Romans prior to Scipio.
Not all the changes in Roman policy in the third century BCE and beyond were due to Hannibal, and some of Rome’s changes affected him greatly in ways he could not understand until after Zama. A huge difference in the rules of engagement that Rome followed in the First and Second Punic Wars signaled an evolving outcome: Rome would not quit because she suffered losses. Hannibal had to be one of the first enemies to realize that Rome would never consider itself defeated. Hannibal would also be one of the first commanders to witness Rome’s plans to conquer lands beyond Italian soil: Spain, North Africa, Celtic lands, Greece, and Asia were all part of Rome’s vision of increasing territorial expansion. Rome used Carthage after its conquest as a source of food (and slaves) and a fortress boundary in North Africa on the perimeter of the known world.35
One of the unintended consequences of Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, where he found on arrival a “collection of fiercely independent and competitive polities bound under Roman hegemony” under bilateral alliance he hoped to disrupt, was that by the end of the Second Punic War, these same communities suffered Roman reconquest under terms that ultimately made them Roman and no longer independent.36 Hannibal’s South Italian allies paid a price when Rome brutally punished and then absorbed them.
Ultimately, Hannibal taught a reluctant Rome how to conduct war. Satirist Juvenal’s ambiguous poetic nod to Hannibal is telling: “Put Hannibal in the scales; how many pounds will that peerless general mark up today? . . . No sword, or stone, or javelin makes an end of a life that once troubled humanity.”37 But he was not without his flaws. D. B. Hoyos is right that Hannibal made “geostrategic, diplomatic, and military miscalculations that are too often underestimated,” even though he is generally regarded as one of ancient history’s three greatest generals alongside Alexander and Julius Caesar.38 Because modern scholarship with full access to sources often considers Hannibal with deeper scrutiny than in the past, one cannot easily judge him in terms of overall greatness as a strategist, however much his tactical genius and historical influence are acknowledged.
Perhaps the leading modern authority on Hannibal, Dexter B. Hoyos, points out how risky Hannibal’s invasion of Italy was, how he mistakenly thought the Romans would give up after his decisive victories, and that no real evidence remains that a hostile Carthage sabotaged Hannibal’s enterprise. Hoyos observes that after both Capua and Siracusa fell, Hannibal was holding a wolf by the ear. He could not let go, nor could he achieve much more. Overall, Hoyos concludes Hannibal had genius and was great, but not quite great enough. Hoyos maintains that Hannibal’s most important decision was not marching on Rome after his victory at Trasimene, a judgment that other scholars share.
Could Hannibal have taken Rome? Could he have won at Zama or victoriously concluded the Second Punic War39? That his was a gifted military mind is not usually one of the lingering questions. If too much ambition destroyed Caesar, perhaps not enough stopped Hannibal.
While it is often popular to attempt to negate his genius, citing the downfall of Carthage at Zama and eventually its fiery end in 146, which he neither precipitated nor hastened, Hannibal’s legacy remains intact: he still inspires immense curiosity after two millennia, demanding scrutiny with his intrepid behavior, and he always will. Hannibal knew that one man alone could not beat Rome, yet perhaps history has unfairly held him accountable for not having the confidence to do so even when it looked unreasonable to him or for lacking the will to try after Trasimene and Cannae. His humanity is not always obvious, and much about him remains a riddle. At times he carefully cultivated the appearance of being terrifying and pitiless to his enemies while staying unflinchingly commanding to his men. This is the Hannibal history preserves.