Historically, then, single arms can at times prevail, and that response—or attack—in kind is not always the right thing to do.
Assuming that in a particular theater the best or only way to defeat the enemy is through destruction (or disarming through maneuver) of his forces, the question arises as to which forces must be destroyed and in what order. If equipment, doctrine, or will suggest that the enemy will never use, or effectively use, his air forces, then it would be pointless to expend great effort to destroy them merely because of one own doctrine. In this case, the air arm could immediately find use in some form of interdiction or close air support.
Conversely, if the enemy believed that either his air force was key to success or that his ability to provide a specified degree of protection against air attack was a prerequisite to continuing the war, then the prime objective might well be the attainment of air superiority. As we will see, Japan surrendered after she lost her ability to defend herself against American air power, and the North Vietnamese accepted a truce under similar circumstances.
In the next several chapters, we will examine air superiority in great detail. We will see the benefits that flow from attaining it—and the penalties exacted for losing it. These chapters, in turn, will lay the base for planning and executing a successful air campaign.