The Development of Fireforce
Fireforce went through three phases of development: Phase One: 1974–1976, Phase Two: 1977–1979 and Phase Three: 1979–1980.
Phase One: 1974–1976
At first there would be a preliminary briefing before take-off if the Fireforce were not needed immediately. If called out to a sighting, the K-Car would be talked onto the target by personnel manning an OP. The problem of parallax, the difficulty of judging the relation between the position of an aircraft in the sky to that of a target on the ground, often caused delays which afforded the enemy time to escape. To solve the difficulty, the K-Car gunner would drop a smoke grenade over the approximate area of the target to allow the OP unit to use the smoke as a reference point to redirect the K-Car to the target. The K-Car would then pull up to its optimum orbiting height of 800 feet and put down 20mm cannon fire to annihilate the enemy or at least to drive him to ground to be dealt with by the ground troops. The G-Cars would fly in a wider prearranged orbit, waiting for orders from the Fireforce commander to land their four-man stop groups to seal the escape routes. This was a somewhat rigid, slow and cumbersome procedure and was at times fruitless because the enemy had fled. It was soon realized that the aircrew had to look outside the circle constantly as the insurgents covered the ground at an astonishing, adrenaline-fuelled rate of 500 metres a minute.
Phase Two: 1976–1979
In this period, changes drastically improved the success ratio. The Fireforces were given Dakota-loads of paratroops to reinforce the helicopter-borne stop groups. The briefing would normally be held at the refuelling stop en route to the target. This was done to save time and because by then the men of the OP might have crucial information on further enemy movement or the lack thereof. By 1977 it was realized that the K-Car needed to fly in from behind and over the OP to be able see what the observer was seeing and therefore waste no time in finding and marking the target with a white-smoke generator. The K-Car would pull up and fire on the enemy. To avoid any delay when waiting for orders from the Fireforce commander, the G-Cars were given some autonomy. As the G-Cars arrived, they would fly directly to prescribed stop positions on the escape routes and orbit them. If the G-Car crew spotted the enemy, they could land their stop groups without reference to the Fireforce commander. If the enemy were not spotted, there would be no landing which meant the troops remained airborne for quick deployment elsewhere. There would also be an alternative plan—Plan Alpha. The Fireforce commander would simply state “Plan Alpha” and the G-Cars would deposit their stop groups on the predetermined stop positions which meant minimum delay in bottling up the enemy. Once the escape routes were sealed, the Fireforce commander would order the dropping of his paratroopers to sweep the area, driving the quarry into the open where the 20mm cannon could deal with them or into the ambushes of the stop groups. The achievement of Phase Two was that the quick positioning of stops often trapped the enemy.
Phase Three: 1979–1980
In 1979, not only did the Fireforces expand to as many as six but also ‘Jumbo’ Fireforce came into being due to the constant availability of G-Cars. They were available because the forces deployed on external operations at last could exploit the longer-range and greater troop-carrying capacity of the AB205A ‘Cheetah’ helicopters (Hueys). The Jumbo Fireforce comprised two Fireforces, giving it two K-Cars, eight G-Cars, a Dakota and a Lynx, often with the support of No. 1 Squadron’s Hunters. When the Fireforce was seven minutes out from the target, the two K-Cars would accelerate towards the target. Once directed onto the target, the K-Cars (being used like tanks on the battlefield) would immediately attack without pulling up, seeking to kill or at least traumatize the enemy. The Fireforce commander might bring in the supporting jet aircraft immediately to use their devastating firepower to lower the enemy’s morale further. The effect would be to ‘stabilize’ the situation. Those insurgents who survived would go to ground. The stops would be in position quickly and the paratroops would follow to sweep the area. Actions that used to take an entire morning or a day thenceforth were often over in an hour. The commander of Support Commando, 1RLI, Major Nigel Henson, recalls tackling and killing 22 insurgents at 06.00. By 07.00 his Fireforce was in action against ten more and, having dealt with them, was in a third contact by mid-morning.
In this last phase, the exclusive role of the RLI was Fireforce, scoring formidable tallies of kills. Their manpower limitations, naturally, meant that other units continued in the role. Fireforce Delta, based in Wankie, for example, continued to be manned by the national servicemen of 1 (Independent) Company, RAR bolstered by the paratroops of 2RAR. In late 1979, in the south of Matabeleland, South African Parabats, under Rhodesian command, served clandestinely in the role, using South African aircraft.
In the period after the election of Muzorewa’s government in April 1979 until the ceasefire in December 1979, the Fireforces killed 1,680 insurgents of which, 1 Commando, RLI, killed 450, 2 Commando 350, 3 Commando 410, and Support Commando 470.
Major André Dennison’s fine A Company, 2RAR, by contrast, killed 403 insurgents in the period September 1977 to July 1979. Perhaps there is no comparison but, in nine years of campaigning in Malaya, the British SAS killed 108 of their enemy.
Major Henson, who commanded Support Commando for two and a half years (1977–1979), was called out 111 times. Of these call-outs, 77 were in 1979 and 68 of them resulted in contacts. In 1979, only one in six call-outs were unproductive ‘lemons’ and this he attributes to the full deployment of the Selous Scouts on the OPs and their professionalism as well as to the experienced dedication to their task of the aircrews and his men. There had always been a high rate of unsuccessful call-outs but many of them were the product of the Fireforce not spending time combing the area. In many cases, if nothing appeared, despite the sighting by the OP unit, the Fireforce would depart. Of course, it was often ordered away by the JOC to a new target.