The attacks came suddenly, on three clear spring days and nights in August 1942. They were brutal, and they were much closer to home than most Brazilians had ever anticipated.
Between August 15 and 17, five Brazilian ships—totaling some fourteen thousand tons—were torpedoed and sank while operating inside the country’s territorial waters. Approximately six hundred men, women, and children died; among them were 169 soldiers. These were by far the most devastating losses Brazil had experienced thus far in the war, and unlike previous German attacks—which had targeted merchant shipping—these had struck ships carrying passengers and troops.
A single U-boat, U-507, carried out all five separate attacks. At 7:12 p.m. on August 15, the U-boat torpedoed the Baependy passenger liner as it traveled from Salvador to Recife. All of its 215 passengers and 55 crewmembers were lost. Less than two hours later, at 9:03 p.m. on August 15, U-507 torpedoed another Brazilian ship, the Araraquara, also traveling toward northern Brazil from Salvador. Out of a total of 142 people on board, 131 died. Some seven hours after the second attack, U-507 struck again, torpedoing the Aníbal Benévolo. All 83 passengers traveling on the ship died, and out of a crew of 71, only four survived. Then, on August 17, close to the city of Vitória, the U-507 attacked and sank the Itagiba at 10:45 a.m., killing 36. Another Brazilian ship, the Arará, traveling from Salvador to Santos, stopped to help the crippled Itagiba, only to become the fifth Brazilian victim of the German submarine, with a death toll of 20. The total number of dead from the attacks reached 607.
Following the attacks, the Brazilian leadership went into a collective state of shock. The government ordered all Brazilian ships back to the nearest ports; postponed coastal sailings; canceled all leave for Brazilian soldiers, who were ordered to return to barracks; and cut short all shore leave for naval personnel, ordering sailors to rejoin their respective ships.1
When news of the losses reached the Brazilian population, the reaction was even more extreme. Riots erupted across the country as mobs attacked German and Italian businesses and personal property, smashing windows, ransacking offices, and even burning buildings. In Rio, the local police were initially reluctant to intervene and allowed the mobs to move with minimal interference. Brazilians called for reprisals against the Axis powers, in particular Germany and Italy, both of which were blamed for the attacks.2 “Death to Hitler” and “Death to Mussolini” were frequently heard chants, although the majority of the crowd chanted pro-Brazilian and pro-Vargas slogans. In Rio, a crowd of over five thousand people passionately sang the Brazilian national anthem and cheered as two German and two Italian flags were burned in front of the Municipal Theater.3 There were also attacks against official Spanish buildings in Rio after false rumors circulated that Spanish agents had provided Germany with details of the movements of the doomed vessels. The local press urged Brazilians to pledge funds to help the families of the victims. In the days that followed, the front pages of many of Brazil’s newspapers announced the total money raised in big, bold headlines.
The Americans described the losses as Brazil’s Pearl Harbor, and this comparison was spot-on.4 The attacks on Brazilian shipping represented a tremendous setback for those Brazilians who supported an isolationist approach to the war.5 President Vargas, who was still convalescing in the Guanabara Palace and had not been seen in public for over three months, was left to ponder Brazil’s response; Osvaldo Aranha, meanwhile, called for an immediate declaration of war on the Axis powers. This was the president’s moment of truth, and he could sense this fact despite his isolation since his car accident on May 1.
Vargas was also experienced enough to immediately comprehend that the attacks on the Brazilian ships changed the dynamics of his government. Whereas merchant ships were understood to be running a risk given their role in the Allied war effort, vessels carrying civilians and troops were widely considered innocent—and the attacks on them were an unmistakable display of German aggression toward Brazil itself, not the Allied powers generally. The country had been challenged, and it was clear what response the Brazilian people demanded from their leaders. The US intelligence service dramatically argued:
The apparently deliberate attack by Germany on Brazil has forced the hand of the Góes Monteiro-Dutra clique who have always proclaimed their readiness to defend their country in the event of attack. From now on, any failure on their part to cooperate with the defense effort can be called treachery and dealt with openly. Now it will also be possible to deal with the Fifth Column without open opposition from people who have hitherto advocated a neutral course with regard to the Axis powers.6
Yet while both Dutra and Góes Monteiro were furious with the Germans, their position was not as clear-cut as the United States suggested; they still wanted to stop short of dragging Brazil into the war, and quickly thwarted America’s hope that the attacks would lead to a political consensus among the senior figures in the regime.
Dutra and Góes Monteiro tried to counter Aranha’s call for a declaration of war by strongly condemning the sinkings, while also arguing that Aranha himself had effectively caused them with his initiative to break diplomatic relations with the Axis powers at the start of the year. Dutra also blamed the sinkings on the United States and Great Britain, which he argued had neglected “the defense of Brazil as regards the supply of war material and the protection of shipping.”7 In a spectacular bit of political gamesmanship, Dutra and Góes Monteiro essentially succeeded in shifting the blame from Germany to their internal enemies and their foreign patrons. Or so, at least, they must have thought.
On the morning of August 18, 1942, President Vargas was working in his small study in the Guanabara Palace. He was still very much recuperating from his accident. Earlier that morning, he had practiced walking around the palace and its secluded grounds with a cane. His hip was still in the process of healing and he walked with a slight, but pronounced, limp. Although the president’s jaw had healed sufficiently for him to be able to speak without difficulty, he was still apprehensive about speaking in public for any extended period of time. Today, however, circumstances would compel him to put aside that fear.
During the morning, angry Cariocas started to gather outside the gates of the palace, chanting anti-Axis slogans and singing in praise of Vargas and Roosevelt. The crowd wanted war and revenge. As it grew from hundreds into thousands, Vargas ordered that the gates of the palace be opened to allow the people into the grounds of the palace. He hurriedly dressed and appeared on the balcony to address the cheering throngs below. With tears in his eyes, the president told the crowd, “Brazil will act with maximum vigor to punish the Axis criminals for the torpedoing and sinking of five Brazilian ships.”8 He went on to promise that seized assets of Axis nationals would be used for the good of the country, and “those that had informed about the movements of the ships that were sunk, or who worked against Brazil, will be sent with picks and shovels to open roads in the interior.” The president did not promise war, but he told the crowd to go back to their homes with their heads held high. He concluded with the emotional statement, “The flag of Brazil will not be humiliated, for Brazil is immortal.”9
It was by no means Vargas’s best speech, but as an act of political theater it was pure genius. And theater it may well have been; following Vargas’s appearance on the balcony of the Guanabara Palace, the United States still speculated that he did not want to be drawn into declaring war on Germany if that could still be avoided.10 But more than anything else, the balcony speech was a reaffirmation of Vargas’s commitment to the country, and it gave the Brazilian people an opportunity to show their love for their leader. Jefferson Caffery had been proven right when he assured Brazilians following Vargas’s accident, “You must not worry. President Vargas will very soon be on his feet again.”11 He added later in the month, “Today President Vargas is on his feet and Brazil is on her feet.”12 As if to prove his point, later the same day, a large crowd gathered outside the US embassy on Avenida President Wilson, where it cheered President Roosevelt and sang the Brazilian national anthem with gusto.
As the attacks at sea continued—a sixth ship was sunk on August 19—President Vargas ordered the detention of all German nationals, save diplomats, who were scheduled to sail from Brazil to Europe on two passenger ships, the SS Bagé and the SS Cuyaba.13 The police also banned public demonstrations, out of fear that the attacks on Axis houses, businesses, and individuals were getting out of hand; the authorities were still struggling to restore order to the country.
Inside the Guanabara Palace, away from the public, Vargas listened to the arguments for and against Brazil formally declaring war on the Axis powers. But it seemed he had already made up his mind. On August 21, Vargas told a group of soldiers who were protesting outside the Guanabara Palace that Brazil would defend its territorial waters.14 Meanwhile, he prepared to formally announce his decision at a cabinet meeting the following day.
President Vargas brought the meeting to order at 3:00 p.m. on August 22. The tone of the gathering was extremely sober, and—in a sign of the momentousness of the decision at hand—all the ministers were given an opportunity to speak at length. But it was clear from the beginning of the meeting that war was a forgone conclusion.
Vargas brought with him a draft of the proposed declaration of war, and the main topic of discussion at the cabinet meeting concerned the declaration’s ninth paragraph. Aranha and his supporters were still in favor of a declaration of war, while Dutra and the armed forces still opposed it, and the disputed paragraph only intensified their disagreement. The first draft of the paragraph read as follows:
There is no use in confusing the situation, nor can we fail to recognize the state of war which, in an inhuman and brutal manner, has been forced upon us by the German Reich.15
The second draft was wordier:
There is no use in confusing the truth nor can we fail to recognize that the German Reich forces Brazil, through belligerent, inhuman, and brutal acts, into a situation that demands prompt and immediate reaction in equal degree, not only against the aggression, but also against the methods and procedures used by it against us, in a manner unprecedented in the history of civilization.16
Aranha was strongly in favor of adopting the first draft, which, as he told the United States, “would place Brazil in the position of saying the truth instead of merely acting without saying it.” Needless to say, Dutra and the military favored the second draft, which was pointedly vague about what Brazil’s “prompt and immediate reaction” to Germany’s aggression would be.17
As was usual in such disputes, Vargas initially sat on the fence, telling the parties on both sides to consider the implications of each version of the paragraph. But, predictably, he soon came out in support of Aranha. Eventually, the cabinet agreed that—for the sake of clarity—they would adopt the first draft of paragraph nine.18 Soon, Brazil would be at war with Germany.
The cabinet concluded that, as Japan had yet to participate in any hostile attack on Brazil, the declaration of war would be addressed to only the governments of Germany and Italy. But even this more limited war carried extreme risks for Brazil. During the meeting, the military continued to warn Vargas of the perils of declaring war when Brazil’s armed forces were so poorly equipped. The possibility that Argentina might attack Brazil’s south while the majority of Brazilian forces were concentrated in the north was also discussed. In the end, and after frantic diplomatic correspondence with the United States, Vargas was fully convinced that Brazil had little choice but to go to war.
At the end of the meeting, the government announced that Brazil was at war with Germany and Italy.19 The formal announcement was broadcast across the country on the radio and repeated in hourly news bulletins. The full statement of the cabinet was printed in the daily newspapers, along with articles outlining why and how the historic decision had been taken.
After the declaration, the angry, retributive mood that had gripped Brazil gave way to a more sober outlook, as Brazilians wondered about the uncertainties and challenges that lay ahead for the nation. The Brazilian national sentiment was perhaps best summed up in an editorial in Diário de Notícias:
This is an exceedingly grave moment in our history; maybe the most serious. Brazil, forced by Italy and Germany, again enters into a world war and hopes that none of her children will hesitate in fulfilling the duty circumstances have imposed upon them. We are a great nation and we are decided to resist and survive. The cause for which we fight is worthy of the ambitions and sacrifices of free people who do not provoke, but do not fear, who do not defy, but do not step back.20
Despite—or perhaps because of—the significance of its announcement, Brazil did not rush to get word of its decision to the Axis. When it did, however, it was clear about where the blame for its decision lay. On August 24, two days after the cabinet meeting, Aranha handed a note to the representatives of the governments of Germany and Italy in Rio. The note concluded: “There is no doubt that Germany and Italy practiced acts of war against Brazil, creating a situation of belligerency which we have been forced to recognize in defense of our dignity, our sovereignty, and our safety, as well as the safety of America, and to fight with all our strength.”21
By the time Aranha delivered the note to the Axis representatives in Rio, Berlin had already learned of Brazil’s declaration of war, and had begun to react. Up until the start of 1942, the Germans had hoped that the promise of armaments for the Brazilian army would be enough to tempt the Brazilians into sitting out the war; now it was clearer than ever that this strategy had failed. A radio broadcast from Berlin, which was transmitted from Argentina in Portuguese on August 22, the same day as the cabinet meeting, refuted the accusation that Germany had forced Brazil into its current position and also sent out a clear warning to the Brazilians:
The declaration of war by Brazil did not surprise the Reich nor cause any impression whatsoever. From the military viewpoint it has no significance, principally because Brazil has already demonstrated that she has no will of her own, to put herself at the disposition of the Americans. . . . By violence and brute force the Brazilian people lose their neutrality to take part in a struggle in which they have nothing to gain and everything to lose. Between the Axis powers and Brazil there was no opposition of interests; on the contrary, only the interest of conserving the peace and, after the war, increasing their profitable commercial relations. In addition, insofar as the future interests of the war are concerned Brazil is threatened in the highest degree as to her sovereignty. And all of this—independence, integrity, sovereignty, and the welfare of Brazil—is now sacrificed by her government, partly suborned by the North Americans. The responsibility for this decision is solely that of the government concerned.22
The gist of the message was clear: Brazil had backed the wrong side in the war and would suffer the consequences.
Yet in reality, the German radio broadcasts on Brazil gave the appearance of indifference. The US broadcast monitors noted that the message appeared very similar to the one issued to Mexico earlier that year after that Latin American country, too, had declared war on Germany. The monitors suggested:
The broadcast gives the impression of having come out of the file-drawer where they stored the discussion of Mexico’s belligerency three months ago. The arguments are so similar to those used with Mexico as to be almost indistinguishable:
1 The declaration makes no difference.
2. The move was engineered by Washington.
3. The sinkings were a mere pretext.
4. The people of Brazil aren’t really hostile to Germany.23
Yet even while they appeared to brush off Brazil’s involvement in the war, the Germans were racing to estimate the effects of Brazil’s declaration of war. And they were not the only ones.
On September 22, 1942, precisely a month after the Brazilian announcement, US planners circulated a secret memorandum within the war department.24 In detail, the document predicted the demands that Brazil would make on the United States over the months and years ahead. The Americans anticipated that Brazil would move to shore up its defenses in northeastern Brazil and would also take steps to further strengthen the power of the president. Closer military and economic cooperation between Brazil and the United States would follow, yet there would also be an intensification of Axis intelligence and propaganda activities in Brazil, as well as Axis efforts to enlist the country’s large German and Italian communities in anti-Allied activities. The report summed up its predictions:
Brazil’s economic and military dependence upon the United States, already great, will be considerably increased. The United States must face the future possibility of diverting large stores of equipment and large contingents of troops to ensure the defense of the western hemisphere. The problem of supplying sufficient ships to transport Brazil’s requirements of fuel, machinery, and manufactured goods also becomes increasingly vital.25
While the United States had long urged Brazil to join the war, the United States thought the decision might have the effect of pushing Rio and Washington into even greater codependence. This prediction would prove extremely accurate in the months ahead.
The report also illustrated that the United States understood the wartime goals of Vargas and Aranha much more clearly than the Brazilians realized. The Americans apprehended that Brazil’s split from Argentina at the conference of foreign ministers in January 1942 would allow Rio to use the war as a springboard to regional supremacy—with the full assistance of the United States, which was still more concerned about potential German attacks on the Americas than about any possible flare-up in intra-American tensions. The report stated:
Brazil, a long rival with Argentina for leadership in South America, will look forward to strengthening its military power as an ally of the United Nations. Strategically located as it is, the country should move forward greatly with United States aid. Increase in air power should be a prime objective to safeguard Axis attack from Africa. As to design on Argentine territory, it is believed that Brazil will be content to leave existing borders alone. Unless an incident develops, no action is to be expected between the two rivals.26
This assessment, too, would prove prescient. Yet while a war between Brazil and Argentina did not strike Washington as a likely consequence of Rio’s declaration of war, there were other risks that could be every bit as serious—and which indeed were much more likely—than a transatlantic German attack.
The United States remained sensitive to the possibility that Brazil’s entry into the war might well suit Axis plans.27 Brazil’s increased demands on the United States for assistance in troops and material would effectively divert forces from other theaters of the conflict, and would therefore help the Axis powers—a gain they would enjoy at little risk to themselves.28
As the United States looked to the medium- and long-term strategic implications of Brazil’s entry into the war, President Vargas concentrated on preparing the country for the trial that lay ahead. As he did so, meeting extensively with the Brazilian military and with Jefferson Caffery, another American arrived in Rio as part of a whirlwind tour of Latin America. Nelson Rockefeller was already a bona fide star in Brazil, but his appearance in person, and so soon after the declaration of war, always created an electric atmosphere in Rio. The only person who appeared slightly miffed by Rockefeller’s arrival was Jefferson Caffery, who maintained that Rockefeller’s visit had no official purpose. In reality, Caffery’s vanity made it difficult for him to accept his eclipse by Rockefeller or the show of love and respect that Cariocas gave the visiting coordinator of inter-American affairs.
Osvaldo Aranha laid out the Brazilian version of the red carpet treatment for Rockefeller. Large crowds greeted the American’s arrival at the Rio airport, and he was paraded at public events such as at the horse racing at the Jockey Club. In private, both Aranha and Vargas hosted lunch or dinner parties in honor of their American guest. Alzira, meanwhile, took an instant shine to the handsome, energetic, and articulate American. Both she and Aranha moved Rockefeller around the room, making sure he was introduced to the right people. Despite the onset of war and the uncertainties that lay ahead for Brazil, an upbeat and positive atmosphere seemed to follow Rockefeller wherever he went. To many Brazilians, he represented everything that was good about the United States, and—much to the annoyance of Caffery—they bestowed prizes and honors on Rockefeller, making him an honorary member of some of the city’s major clubs, such as the Jockey Club.
But Rockefeller had not come to Brazil just to shake hands, smile, and reassure Brazilians about the struggles that lay ahead. He had come to tie up a whole series of economic and cultural deals with the Brazilian government—huge agreements dealing with everything from rubber to banking, agreements that would soon transform Brazil’s wartime economy beyond recognition.
By his very nature, Rockefeller was a doer. While in the country, he was constantly firing off quick notes to his staff on the ground in Rio and back in the United States, trying to understand how to make things work better, and not taking “no” for an answer. “What’s the biggest problem here?” he asked Vargas. “Infrastructure,” the president replied. So Rockefeller promised to help develop new transport systems in the huge interior of the country.
Rockefeller also saw great potential for using his Brazilian adventure as a means for solidifying his powerbase back in Washington, which was still under threat from General Donavan and his “spook agency.” For all his good work and ambitions, however, Rockefeller’s trip almost ended in disaster when the plane carrying him and his team crash-landed in a ditch at the end of the runway at Porto Alegre in southern Brazil.29 Luckily, all were able to walk away from the crash with only cuts and bruises. Rockefeller, no doubt, made a note to build better and longer runways in Brazil.
While in Brazil, furthermore, Rockefeller was gathering information about the newest addition to the Allies. Shortly after his return to the United States, Rockefeller’s office produced a confidential report on Brazil and its potential impact on World War II. The report represented a detailed effort on the part of his office to assess Brazil’s needs and determine the immediate tasks confronting the Vargas regime. It outlined these tasks in terms of the threats facing Vargas both from within his regime and from the Axis powers. Vargas, the office of the coordinator of inter-American affairs declared, needed the following:
The consolidation of a unitary front within the government itself; the completion of steps safeguarding against the threat of Axis invasion in the northeast; and measures to ensure internal security against the potential danger from Axis minority groups and the organized fifth column. Should it be necessary to rid the government of powerful figures hitherto in sympathy with the Axis, the president is in an excellent position to do so by seeking support from the middle and left.30
Vargas, no doubt, would have agreed with the Americans’ assessment of the three-pronged threat he faced, although it’s much less clear whether he would have been so sanguine about the possibility of removing from his government the “powerful figures” to whom the report referred—no doubt meaning Dutra and Góes Monteiro.
Rockefeller’s office excelled at organizing trade links between the United States and Brazil, but the report revealed the agency’s limited understanding of internal Brazilian politics, particularly as they concerned the military. The future of two key men in the armed forces, Dutra and Góes Monteiro, continued to give the United States a great deal of concern; the Americans viewed both men as relics of a past era, and felt they should be replaced as soon as possible. The United States also understood that while both men were making public and private noises to the effect that Brazil must wage an effective war against the Axis, they continued to concentrate their efforts on protecting Brazil’s southern borders from what they envisaged to be the major threat of an Argentine invasion—thereby detracting from the strength of Brazil’s defenses against a possible German attack.
The United States was doing what it could to counterbalance the military’s fixation on Brazil’s southern border. In November 1942, after protracted and complicated negotiations, Brazil and the United States concluded the administrative arrangements for a joint force to defend the northeast of the country. The deal essentially left the defense of Brazilian territory and military bases to the Brazilian armed forces, with coastal defenses being run by a joint US-Brazilian force. Admiral Jonas Ingram was formally put in charge of all aspects of security, including the protection of shipping, and for his troubles received the title chief of allied forces in the South Atlantic.31 He was based in Recife, along the northeastern coast of Brazil, in the region where a German attack was most anticipated.
Another US senior officer, General Robert L. Walsh, commanded the US army forces in the South Atlantic and was also based in Recife. The roughly two thousand men under his command were not based in Brazil, however, but rather on the British Ascension Island, halfway across the Atlantic.32 General Walsh himself was in Brazil to establish the air base at Natal, which would become an important staging point for planes flying to Africa and from there to the European theater. Indeed, the base would prove vital to US operations in Africa—which were part of a broader US-British invasion code-named Operation Torch—as well as in the pivotal antisubmarine war in the South Atlantic. With U-boats continuing to attack shipping convoys en route to Great Britain from the Americas, the Allies’ victory would hinge on what would come to be called the Battle of the Atlantic. Short of critical military materials as well as basic necessities like food and fuel, Great Britain would not be able to continue fighting if this lifeline were cut off. For a short period during the war, Natal air base was one of the busiest in the world, with an American plane landing there every two to three minutes for eighteen hours a day, seven days a week.33
These security arrangements boded well for the future of US-Brazilian cooperation, yet they were also a source of ongoing tension in Rio. While Dutra remained far from happy about his relative loss of control over the Brazilian armed forces, he grudgingly understood that Brazil was in no position to defend itself on its own. As the year drew to a close, however, Góes Monteiro was becoming increasingly critical of the Brazilian military, arguing that it was doing little and was far too passive.
In choosing not to replace his two top military officials following the declaration of war, Vargas had taken somewhat of a gamble. Later, Jefferson Caffery would admit that the president had been right to hold on to both men, but during the war itself it was a significant risk to allow two outspoken critics of the war effort to remain in power. Yet while Dutra and Góes Monteiro stayed at their respective posts, at least for the time being, Vargas did clip their wings. The president made it clear to both men that he alone would guide Brazilian policy toward the war. Vargas was riding on a wave of personal popularity following the decision to go to war with the Axis, and with his authority—and Aranha’s—at its peak, he obviously felt comfortable reining in his recalcitrant commanders. Dutra, however, was far from admitting defeat, and while he had put his rivalry with Aranha on hold, it was far from resolved. Dutra was biding his time, ready to put a dagger in Aranha’s back the moment the minister of foreign affairs made a mistake.
It was also becoming clear that the alliance between Dutra and Góes Monteiro was starting to fray at the edges. Góes Monteiro was becoming increasingly angry about Dutra’s ability to effectively transform himself politically to reflect the new realities of wartime Brazil. Yet Góes Monteiro seemed to have resigned himself to those same realities. The US military and political figures who had dealings with Góes Monteiro at this time noted that he appeared to have fully embraced the closer ties with the United States and did not have any major problems with the fact that the US military was playing a far greater role in Brazil. The dissonance between his public expressions and his private sentiment may have taken a toll. Caffery, who had known Góes Monteiro since 1937, noted that the chief of staff’s health was worsening.
Within military and political circles in Brazil, the major issue remained the supply of arms from the United States. President Vargas worked away in his small office in the Guanabara Palace, trying to make sure that the United States made good on its promises to supply weapons to Brazil. The US arsenal was already overstretched, and when the Allies launched Operation Torch in North Africa on November 8, 1942, it further limited the quantity of weapons the United States was able to send to Brazil. Yet the offensive also had a positive effect in Brazil. It quickly became clear that Operation Torch would be an enormous success, and this news was widely welcomed in Brazil, where it helped to undercut the military’s deeply held admiration for Germany’s fighting prowess. On hearing of the landings in Africa, Osvaldo Aranha said, “With God’s help and with the tenacity and fighting spirit of the defenders of freedom, we will soon emerge into a better world.”34 The Brazilian press, meanwhile, marked the landings with headlines that highlighted the Allies’ military successes and the failings of the Germans. Jornal do Brasil commented: “The sensational event marks the beginning of the decline of the Nazi military machine. The Axis will be destroyed, Fascism will be swept away from the face of the earth, and peace will be dictated in Berlin by the representatives of England, the United States, China, Russia, Brazil, etc.”35
The Allied victories in North Africa also convinced many Brazilians that the days of the Axis were numbered—and left them wondering how the world would look once it collapsed. Brazil’s middle and upper classes understood that the African campaign would lead inexorably to the liberation of Europe, along with all of the art, culture, and civilization that Brazilians identified with that continent. There was, however, some anxiety as to what would happen at the end of the war. The two most likely outcomes of the conflict were a negotiated German defeat or a total Allied victory, yet there was no way of knowing what would replace the existing structures in Europe. Quietly, many educated, propertied, and conservative Brazilians started to wonder whether, if democracy spread in the aftermath of World War II, the Estado Novo would be compatible with the postwar order.36
While comfortable Brazilians experienced pangs of anxiety about the changes that lay ahead, working-class Brazilians were generally positive about the prospect of a US victory in the war. On the other hand, many Brazilians were becoming increasingly suspicious and afraid of the power of the United States.37 Many Brazilians were concerned that the same US strength that was assisting them during the war might be used to oppress them in a US-dominated postwar world.
By the end of 1942, the likelihood of an Axis attack on northeastern Brazil had decreased due to both Admiral Ingram’s organization of the joint US-Brazilian defenses in that region and also the Allies’ successes in North Africa. The air base in Natal remained a vital bridge for the United States as its commitments in the European theater increased. Naturally, Vargas welcomed developments in North Africa and was happy about the enhancement of Brazil’s national security, but he needed to make the shipment of weapons to Brazil something of a priority for the United States. He also understood that the economic and political gains that Brazil stood to make in the war would require the country to make a clear military investment in the conflict.
Brazil, Vargas knew, was in danger of becoming a bit player in the war unless it could find new ways to help the war effort. Both Vargas and Aranha were aware that the postwar era would be governed by a simple equation of “what you put in = what you get out” of the war. Both men wanted to use the war to help transform Brazil, yet they now found themselves in the position of having arrived late to the party. If Vargas and Aranha were to realize their dreams for Brazil, they would need to raise the stakes and make a more dramatic contribution to the Allies than they had thus far. With Vargas and Aranha’s authority at its peak, the time was ripe for just such a change.