Conclusion

Gian Luca Gardini, Simon Koschut, and Andreas Falke

Interregionalism is a complex phenomenon. The existing literature has long acknowledged its definitional and practical intricacies (Hänggi, Rüland, and Roloff, 2006; Baert et al., 2014). First, interregionalism is a product of relations among regions and as such it is subject to all the complexities that affect regional studies and regionalism itself. Secondly, the variety of phenomena that fall under the umbrella of interregionalism is quite wide and multifaceted. Thirdly, the actors involved are multiple, in nature, in political culture, in economic resources and capacity of international projection, in level of development, but also in ambitions, expectations, and therefore in agendas. Finally, the Americas are in itself a segmented continent with intersected and overlapping regionalisms and interregionalisms. Taking stock of the existing literature and its difficulties in overcoming these caveats, the chapters of this volume have tried to make sense of these complexities, using a case-study approach, and dealing with three unifying questions.

The first question deals with the definition of interregionalism as a typology. That is to say, what conceptual typology—if any—among those discussed in the theoretical chapter by Gardini and Malamud, characterizes or prevails in the way in which the Americas engage with other regions. The case studies cover interregional relations between Latin and North American countries on the one hand, and a variety of extra-regional actors on the other. We covered cases of pure interregionalism, transregionalism, hybrid interregionalism, and overlapping interregionalism, while stealth interregionalism does not seem to be a typology particularly relevant to the Americas. We have studied the behavior of single states, groups of states, and regional organizations, both with a loose and a relatively strong institutionalization. Rather than one single answer to the first question on typology, the synthesis of our contributors can be summarized in a number of issues for further discussion.

A tension between pure interregionalism (or an aspiration to it) and hybrid cases of interregionalism as a growing praxis seems to be a prominent feature in most of the case studies. However, pure interregionalism only takes place when Latin America, as a whole region or through its subregions, is involved. As remarked by Ayuso and Torres (see chapters 2 and 3), this is the case of Latin America’s interregional relations with the European Union, which actively sponsors this form of relationship to promote its own models and agendas. This is also the case of Latin America-East Asia (chapter 10 by Paz) and Latin America-Southern Africa relations (chapter 8 by Mattheis). A special case is represented by interlocking interregionalism as defined by Koschut (chapter 6), where overlapping interregionalism defines relations between formal regional security organizations with overlapping membership and agendas, but with clearly distinct security cultures and approaches. The United States is definitely reluctant to the pure interregionalism form of engagement.

In many cases, and not necessarily only where the United States plays a central role, new varieties of interregionalism seem to take the shape of highly sophisticated forms of hybrid interregional relations between one strategic country and a regional grouping. Falke aptly captured this process discussing TTIP (see chapter 7). A similar argument characterizes chapter 4 by Müller on Brazil-EU relations where the author contends that even the EU, in spite of its normative aspirations, has to concede to the growing realities of key players emerging as potential “spoke-entities,” and/or would be leaders, of territorial and/or ideological regions. Stolte (see chapter 5) detects similar dynamics in Brazil-BRICS relations. Nowhere is this tension more clearly visible than in the case of Cuba (chapter 9 by Gratius), where relations between the United States, the EU, Latin America, and the Caribbean island perfectly epitomize this tension between aspirations and pragmatic practice. Mattheis and Paz (chapters 8 and 10 respectively) acknowledge these tensions too by speaking of “shifting dynamics” and “comprehensive typologies” respectively. The tension between aspirations toward pure forms of interregionalism and the pragmatism exercised in political and diplomatic practice gives rise to eclectic, multifaceted hybrid forms of interergionalism. This is confirmed also at the subjective level by the sentiment analysis conducted by Ruiz in chapter 11. A fully satisfactory and comprehensive definition, catching the essence and peculiarities of all these forms, remains quite elusive given the wide scope and varied ontology of the phenomenon in the field. Further study of new forms of interregionalism and a better understanding of their hybrid character is an interesting challenge, which may open new avenues for research.

Interregionalism emerges as a functional and practically relevant phenomenon too, and not just as a byproduct of regionalism. Interregionalism in its newest forms and features, such as the BRICS group itself (according to Stolte), have a clear function both at the internal (intragroup or intrastate) and the international (extra-group or extra-state) level. On the one hand, interregionalism is a tool to advance internal agendas. This is the case of Brazil and its relations with the EU and the BRICS, and the case of Cuba, the United States, and Latin America in their mutual interactions. On the other hand, interregionalism supplies an additional tool to overcome stalemate in regional dynamics, see for instance Brazil and the stagnation of regional agreements in South and Latin America, the security concerns of state actors in the case of the EU, NATO, and OCSE, the role of major regional powers in the case of Africa and East Asia and their relations with Latin America.

Perhaps surprisingly, this finding is in fact consistent with established theories of international organization, such as both functionalism and neo-functionalism (Mitrany, 1948; Haas, 1964). The former explains why organizations and regimes are created to solve problems that exceed state (or group) capacity. The latter explains why organizations and regimes expand their competencies in order to be able to tackle their original tasks effectively. This tells us something about both the creation and resilience of interregional mechanisms. Their competences and ability to produce results may have been substantially questioned in the last decade (Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2006; Maihold, 2010), yet their existence and even proliferation is not only the result of convenient political narratives and “rhetorical actions” (Schimmelfennig, 2003). Interregionalism is a functional tool to organize and coordinate an international system increasingly perceived as characterized by regional dynamics and cleavages (Buzan, 2011; Hettne et al., 2016). The fact that the concepts of region and regionalism is undergoing a significant process of revision and redefinition in the 21st century (Bacaria and Tarragona, 2016; Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012; Malamud and Gardini, 2012) does not detract from but actually adds to the needs of a better understanding of present and future interregional interactions.

The second unifying question of the volume deals with the role of summitry in interregionalism. Here the answer of our contributors is largely consistent with the theoretical chapter and acknowledges and unpacks the central role and different features of summits in interregional relations. Chapters 2 and 3, by Torres and Ayuso respectively, invariably show that summits are the main drive, and source of political direction, in the relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Latin America as a whole or its subregions on the other. This process has been strengthened over the years and the summit mechanism is now quite complex and articulated, reflecting the multilevel and multiplayer nature of the EU-Latin American interregionalism. The EU-Brazil summits, which often take place on the fringes of the EU-Latin America ones, replicate the same mechanism, reproducing the structure but also the complexities and limitations, of EU-Latin America summits.

Summitry is not an exclusive feature of interregional dialogues where the EU is involved. The BRICS group too, as a peculiar form of interregionalism, heavily relies on summitry. In chapter 5, Stolte argues that summitry is a crucial moment for the BRICS in both their internal and external dimension. As a sui generis organization, the BRICS countries coordinate their activities and set their common agenda essentially via summits, as their level of institutionalization is at best embryonic. But summits are by now the preferred instrument that the BRICS group uses to connect with other parts of the world too. Often regional organizations from the region of the country hosting the BRICS summit are invited to take part in the works. Chapter 9 by Gratius on Cuba also shows the importance of the summits, such as the Summit of the Americas and the newly created EU-Cuba mechanism. In the case of East Asia-Latin American relations, Paz argues that these relations overall rest on summitry, which was and still is fundamental to the launch, maintenance, and functioning of this interregional system. The case of Africa-South American relations is more complex but fundamentally consistent with the key argument proposed in the volume. While summitry may not be necessarily and under all circumstances the main modus operandi in Mercosur-SACU-SADC relations, it still provides mandates, sense of priority, and incentives to follow up in the entire process. Additionally, in the cases of ZOPACAS and ASA, other institutionalized forms of transregionalism involving African and Latin American countries, summitry fully returns to it prominent role.

Interestingly, only two cases show a limited relevance of the summitry exercise to interregionalism and the way in which the Americas engage with it. These are TTIP and interorganizational relations between the EU, NATO, and OCSE. In both cases, the very special nature and purpose of these cases of interregionalism may provide a credible reason for the exception. In the case of TTIP, negotiations started as early as 2013 and already received a political mandate and direction from the top. The process has now to do essentially with regulatory issues. Falke argues that at present the main feature of the mechanism rests on political elites (not necessarily the very top) and regulatory bureaucracies, in other words a mix of organizational and government models of decision-making (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). This is probably due to the function and purpose of the process, which is an ad hoc, and one-off, attempt to reach a comprehensive but quite specific trade and regulatory agreement and not to maintain and develop political relations overall between two regions. In the case of interlocking interregionalism, Koschut argues that summitry is less central to negotiations and that coordination mechanisms are more informal and flexible. This is due to the fact that relations are more focused on a function base rather than geography base. Interlocking institutions rest on staff consultations, information sharing, and joint monitoring. In both cases, the peculiar function, purposes, and nature of these specific forms of interregionalism explain why the marginal role of summitry is the exception rather than the rule in the landscape of interregionalism, in the Americas, and in fact beyond.

Finally, a consideration about the composition of, and the participation in interregional summits emerged. As the relevance and scope of the discussion of these summits increasingly affects, or at least generates an interest in civil society, this has sought a more proactive role in these processes. More and more, bodies of the state other than the executive, business representatives, culture and academic leaders, NGOs, trade unions have tried to make their voice heard at interregional summits. This tendency is epitomized by EU-Latin America, and even more so EU-CELAC summits. This certainly reflects the preference of the European Union for open and inclusive decision-making mechanisms. Yet, Latin American civil society has also enthusiastically and increasingly expanded its participation, presence, and attention to interregional summits. Something similar is happening in China’s engagement with other regions of the world, where business delegations attend summits and major international events. While this is not necessarily a signal of opening toward civil society but rather an attempt to generate more business opportunities, the fact remains that civil society engagement with international politics and its loci of power and decision is on the rise (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Sanchez Bajo, 2005; Pianta, 2001 and 2005). If regionalism is becoming more open to civil society and its concerns, and therefore it is evolving into a more participatory, multilevel, and multiplayer exercise, so is interregionalism as a result of regional interactions.

The third key question of the book is whether or not an Americas way to interregionalism exists. This is to say whether or not something specific, characteristic, even peculiar, but surely common to the Americas exists in the way in which the Western Hemisphere as a whole, as a region itself, deals with extra-hemispheric regions. The hard reality is that it was very difficult for our contributors to spot anything that could unite the Americas, from North to South. Rather than one America, our analyses suggest that many Americas exist. North America and Latin America is the obvious and most apparent divide. But within them many further cleavages exist: the United States and Canada differ, Central and South America differ, the Andean and the Plata Basin regions differ, and the Caribbean is a different thing altogether. This results in diverse historical trajectories (Fernandez-Armesto, 2006), sometimes divergent ideologies and interests, and very few common positions in international affairs. The fact is that not a single genuinely inter-American institution represents the entire Western Hemisphere in interregional relations or summits. The Organization of the American States (OAS) does not fulfill this task. There are no OAS-EU, OAS-ASEAN, or OAS-China summits or dialogues. Several American subregions and organizations have their own mechanisms. The Americas are perhaps too diverse, and so are the political interests and economic and productive vocations within it. Most of all, the United States is reluctant to this kind of engagement, preferring a direct presence—based on its status and power—without intermediary organizations.

One may argue that the Western Hemisphere itself can be interpreted as a case of interregionalism. In fact segmented and overlapping regionalisms and interregionalism coexist (Malamud and Gardini, 2012). In the area of politics, the Americas have an established mechanism of political dialogue in the Summits of the Americas. This is largely perceived as a case of regionalism rather than interregionalism (Mace et al., 2015). The OAS itself might be read as a loose case of interregional membership. The difference is made by the way in which a region is constructed. In both cases the meaning of the exercise is precisely the attempt to construct the Americas as one region. In Latin America, coordination mechanisms between different regional groups exist, such the Mercosur-Andean Community or Mercosur-Pacific Alliance mechanisms. But are these really new forms of interregionalism? Do these organizations really represent regions perceived and constituted as such?

In the economic realm, NAFTA, the Free Trade Area between the United States, Central America, and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) might also be read as cases of interregionalism or interregional membership, but the lack of a specific political dimension as well as the identity and self-awareness of the members indicate that these phenomena are much closer to regionalism than interregionalism. The difference between cultural and historical regions on the one hand, and political and economic organizations within them on the other, may be subtle but is in fact crucial. This reverberates in our understanding of interregionalism. Ultimately, both regionalism and interregionalism rest on a subjective element, which is awareness, identity, and sense of belonging. Would anybody perceive themselves as “CAFTA-DRean” or “Mercosurean,” in the same vein as Europeans or Latin Americans perceive themselves and construct their region? This seems to us a potential element to help define regionalism and interregionalism and avoid including too many things under the same umbrella. In addition to new forms of hybrid interregionalism, also the study of emerging forms of overlapping interregionalism, often in the form of sui generis transregionalism, can be a promising area for further research and to tackle the current fuzziness and indeterminacy characterizing interregionalism.

Finally, it is actually possible to identify two elements that indeed unite the Americas and are distinctive and recurrent features in the Western Hemisphere. Yet neither plays in favor of interregionalism or a united front of the Americas, quite the contrary. The first element is that all countries are reluctant to relinquish sovereignty for the regional common good. Falke tackles this point very clearly when discussing US aversion to surrender even limited sovereignty for mutual gains, be that in North America, the Americas, or in relation to cooperation with extra-regional partners. On the Latin American side, reluctance to accept effective sharing of sovereignty or a real cession of national sovereignty and powers, has been considered a limiting factor of Latin American regionalism and efforts at political or economic integration (Malamud, 2013; Malamud and Schmitter, 2011).

The second unifying element is that both the United States and Latin America perceive each other as “the other.” Differences prevail over commonalities, and history played a significant role to shape these perceptions (Smith, 2008). Our authors have identified very different strategies of interregional relations in the United States and Latin America. The chapter by Gratius on EU, United States, and Latin American strategies toward Cuba is particularly revealing in this respect. Furthermore, in her chapter on sentiment analysis Ruiz finds that the Latin American discourse and narrative on the Americas and its regional institutions are essentially negative, characterized by a sense of otherness and opposition. The Americas is largely seen in Latin America as the space where the United States has a preeminent position and the Latin part of the continent trails (Saguier, 2016). Ultimately the few features that the Americas have in common are in fact detrimental to any sense of real unity in the Western Hemisphere, and political will—or the lack of it—is a consequence of these features. So, if an Americas way to interregionalism is not possible, the next section seeks to define at least a North American and a Latin American way to interregionalism in the hope to find some common ground for dialogue.

A Tale of Two Stories: North and Latin American Perspectives on Interregionalism

A North American perspective on interregionalism in the Americas is essentially, though not entirely, a US perspective. This is due for mainly three reasons. The first reason is geographic proximity. The United States shares a common border with Mexico and its Southern coastline in Florida lies only a few miles off the coast of the Bahamas and Cuba. Here, the United States tightly guarded Southern border is the antithesis to its Northern border with Canada, which constitutes one of the longest and oldest demilitarized borders in the world. While the United States and Canada have established a security community, the United States and Mexico are still a long way from achieving such a zone of peace (Adler/Barnett, 1998). Moreover, the United States keeps or has kept territories in Latin America, such as the Panama Canal zone (until 1979), Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, or Puerto Rico. Second, the United States is by far the most powerful regional actor (in military and economic terms), not just in North America but the entire Americas. More importantly, the United States has not hesitated to project its power vis-à-vis Latin America. The United States conducted military interventions in virtually all Latin American states and often combined this with economic expansionism to open up new trade routes (as in Nicaragua and Panama) as well as new commodities (e.g., coffee and sugar). As former US Senator John Miller infamously exclaimed in the 1880s: “New markets are necessary to be found in order to keep our factories running. Here lies to the south of us our India.” Finally, both geographical proximity and power projection are underpinned by ideology, a sense of mission that occasionally borders overt racism toward Latin American people. Consider former US Secretary of State James G. Blaines who advocated US engagement in the Americas as a necessary “moral influence upon the Spanish-American people . . . (which) would have raised the standard of their civilization.” The Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary are all representations of a greater regional “manifest destiny” that grants the United States a self-defined “civilizational” right to intervene in the political affairs of the Americas. This well-known historical pattern has been used to describe a hegemonic type of interregionalism that marks a key characteristic element of the North American (and by extension also the Latin American) regional experience.

On a global scale, the United States has pursued a similar type of hegemonic interregionalism, albeit with different degrees of success. Initially, Washington attempted to establish its hegemonic role after World War II through a global web of regional organizations gravitating around the United States. This “hub and spokes-model” of US interregionalism originally included the Baghdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the OAS in Latin America. CENTO and SEATO have long been dissolved and the OAS is being increasingly marginalized by Latin American states. ANZUS has de facto become a bilateral defense treaty since the United States revoked its defense guarantees vis-à-vis New Zealand in 1986. This leaves NATO as, by and large, the only intact interregional multilateral framework (Foot et al., 2003). In addition, the United States has built strategic partnerships with other regional organizations, such as the European Union, the African Union, or the Arab League. However, these cases of hybrid interregionalism seem to be of lesser significance (at least from a US point of view). As Katzenstein (2005) has rightly noted, contemporary US interregionalism is predominantly built on vertical relationships that link regional core states to the United States. The US interregional experience has thus more or less moved toward bilateral interregionalism (Baert et al., 2014). Canada’s interregional perspective differs from the United States mainly through its special interregional ties to the Commonwealth of Nations.

But there is another historical pattern of US interregionalism, one that bears hope of a very different engagement, especially with Latin America. As former US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933) outlined in his first inaugural address:

In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well.

More recently, former US President Barack Obama attempted to construct a similar type of American interregionalism that is situated outside of the hegemonic paradigm. This type of post-hegemonic interregionalism is one opposed to armed intervention and open to post-neoliberal economic integration models (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012). But can the United States truly be a “good neighbor” in its relations with Latin America? The current Trump administration raises serious doubts about this. Instead of building bridges between North American and Latin American regional experiences, the Trump administration is drawing its bridges up. And little suggests that much will change soon. Even so, the North American interregional experience reveals an ambivalent picture. On the one hand, there is a strong pattern marked by domination and division. On the other hand, there is an alternative perspective on North American interregionalism that holds the promise of bringing the two American regional experiences closer together.

A Latin American perspective on interregionalism cannot escape the fact that the region is extremely diverse and hardly cohesive. Preference for cooperation over confrontation and concertation over unilateralism has traditionally characterized Latin American global insertion. This applies to the region overall, to its organized groups of states at the subregional level, and broadly speaking to the foreign policy of individual states. This is probably the result of a continent that was born as fragmented, weak politically and in economic terms, and largely exposed to the fluctuations of international politics and markets. At the same time, and probably for the same reasons, Latin American countries have developed a strong sense of sovereignty, nationalism, and independence. This type of nationalism has often been translated in equally strong forms of regional pride, sense of unity and dignity, almost in opposition to those perceived as alien, mostly the United States. Latin American approach to regionalism and as a consequence to interregionalism is characterized by a double tension (Gardini, 2012). The first is between unity and diversity. The second is between the discourse and the aspirations on the one hand, and the realities of political and diplomatic praxis and practical implementation on the other.

The tension between unity and diversity is palpable at the level of Latin American regionalism and also in the way in which the region approaches interregionalism. The idea of one cohesive region including all Latin American (and possibly, if not ideally, the Caribbean states) occupied the thinking of early leaders and intellectuals, such as Bolívar, Alberdi, Rodó, and Monteagudo, since the beginning of the 1800. However, the first formal regional organization to bring together all Latin American and Caribbean states is one of the latest created in the region: the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) was established in 2011. Until then, a plethora of political and economic integration schemes were founded: the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Central American Common Market (CACM then SICA), and the Andean Community (CAN) in the 1960s; the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in the 1970s; the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and a radical rebranding and reorientation of the Andean Community in the 1990s; the Bolivarian Alliance for our America (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Pacific Alliance (PA), and indeed CELAC in the new millennium.

These organizations are characterized by overlapping membership and competences but also by quite diverse and often incompatible political and economic stances. This results in fragmentation and divergence. A major problem therefore arises for interregionalism. Which of these many organizations should represent Latin America or parts of it vis-à-vis international partners? Do these have the resources and appetite to engage with all of these entities? And the same applies to the Latin American wide contingent, does it have the resources and appetite to propel so many attempts at unity and their projection toward several regions of the world? Most of these Latin American organizations actually entertain relations with other regions and their formal organizations, but one may ask questions of legitimacy, credibility, efficiency, and not least effectiveness. Like for regionalism, Latin American interregionalism too can be defined as quite fragmented, overlapping, and intersecting. This makes the picture extremely articulated but little coordinated or consistent.

The second tension is between rhetoric and practice. In spite of the strong discourse in favor of unity and integration, the fragmented landscape of Latin American regionalism reveals the diversity of interests, agendas, and foreign strategies. In this context Latin American regionalism is often a light one, characterized either by limited institutionalization, or by limited actual powers and competences, or by modest political weight and commitment. This has brought a number of consequences for interregionalism too. First, coordination mechanisms inside Latin America, between its subregional organizations and within its only truly regional organization, CELAC, are weak. Second, regionalism, and therefore interregionalism and its agendas are more a question of government policy than of state policy. Consistency, reliability, and ability to deliver are limited. Third, Latin America finds itself often in a reactive rather than proactive position in interregional assemblies.

Overall, what Latin America seeks in interregionalism is recognition more than any practical outcome. Coordination of agendas and positions is important but not primary. Initially Latin American approach to interregionalism was essentially emulative of and responsive to the EU structures and global pretensions. Upon EU initiative, Latin American countries joined the first interregional summits launched by the EU, participating in a loose form of transregionalism sponsored by Brussels. Now, the situation is fast changing. Since the new millennium, Latin American political stability, economic growth, and self-awareness, in conjunction with the rise of the Global South and its increasing activism worldwide have expanded Latin American interregional presence and increased its dynamism. Regarding interregional relations in the Americas, the Latin part displays the two tensions discussed. The general rhetoric in favor of more hemispheric cooperation clashes with the reluctance, mostly ideological but also on real economic ground, of a number of states, as much as with the consistent desire of Washington to dictate its terms and conditions. The discrepancy between discourse and practice and between unity and diversity affect Latin American effectiveness and ability to negotiate and commit as a bloc also within the Western Hemisphere.

From a Continental Vision to Trilateral Interregionalism

The Americas can be seen as one single continent or as the encounter of two continents, North and Latin America. Both positions have their reasons and visions. What is certain is that the two souls of the Americas have to share the same land mass and coexist. A cooperative, if not cordial, mutually beneficial relation would be desirable on both sides. Stronger coordination and cooperation mechanisms would smooth differences and highlight commonalities, in terms of economic and political interests and most importantly in terms of key values and norms for the management of hemispheric as well as global affairs. A common ground for dialogue and cooperation however already exists, this is the inter-American system, comprising of the OAS, the Summits of the Americas, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and—partly—by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Yet there seem to be a palpable dissatisfaction and disenchantment with this system, on both sides. As a normative conclusion to this volume we offer two proposals for discussion, intersecting the issues of regionalism, interregionalism, and global governance.

First, the relaunch of the inter-American system as an effective forum for dialogue and cooperation in the Americas. From the “Latin American option” (Pastor, 1992) to the “vision of a continental future” (Pastor, 2011), the late Robert Pastor advocated strong links within the Americas and invited the US elites to look with interest and respect at Latin America. This call is even more topical and meaningful today considering the rise of Latin America and its increased international activism. Pastor identified interdependence as the key word, the starting point of the reasoning. Although Pastor applied the argument essentially to North America, the idea can be transferred to the Americas. The management of interdependence requires dialogue and common institutions. The relaunch of the inter-American system is a way to manage the interdependence between the North and the South of the Western Hemisphere, but also a tool to face common challenges posed by the rise of China, the shift of economic power toward Asia, environmental and climate issues, and the resurgence of authoritarianism. A level of institutionalization would be required for this effort. Perhaps this is not the ideal moment for such proposal considering the positions of the Trump administration. However as former US President Barack Obama reportedly said on 2016 election night “the sun will rise again in the morning” (Los Angeles Times, 2016).

The second proposal is the launch of a trilateral interregional mechanism between North America, Latin America, and Europe. This would make sense because of common challenges, established interdependences, and shared values. Most of the challenges faced by North and Latin America are perceived as such by Europe too. Furthermore, interdependence across the Atlantic shores is evident in the density of political, economic, societal, and cultural relations (Atlantic Future, 2016). If one accepts the argument of interdependence as a basis for the creation of institutionalized regional or interregional mechanisms to manage it, the Atlantic space offers a perfect case in point. Whether this interregional venture would be considered a “North-South trilateralism or the triangle of common values” (Spence, 1989) has only relative importance. In addition to interdependence and common challenges, there are common values too. The three regions (or the two if the Americas are considered as a unity) are the bulk of the Western world, its principles and norms. Latin America too, in spite of its mounting “developmentalist” rhetoric and actually different levels of development, is part of the West (Rouquié, 1998).

The West as a concept and as a political and economic space is perceived to be in decline, largely because it is not able to stand up for its own values and traditions (Koch and Smith, 2006). To join forces to stop this perceived decline must be an imperative. An interregional summit of the West would increase the visibility and strengthen the affirmation of Western norms and values. At the same time it would offer a platform to discuss global challenges. This does not necessarily mean a defense of the neoliberal order, largely perceived around the world as a Western creation, when not an imposition. This would be much more about values such as democracy, the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and the political and economic initiatives to support these principles. Furthermore, differences in security cultures and development models do not impede dialogue and cooperation on regulatory frameworks, interoperability, disaster prevention, exchange of good practices in noncontroversial fields, exchanges in the field of education, or joint efforts to fight organized crime and illicit traffics.

What institutional shape this initiative ought to take exceeds the scope of this book and the ambition of its editors. It could take an OAS-EU format, a US+Canada+CELAC+EU format, or a loose transregional Atlantic initiative modeled on the Tran-Pacific Partnership. What counts is that this interregional mechanism would represent over 1.7 billion people and an aggregate GDP of over 40,000,000 million USD, well over a half of the world total and four times more than China (World Bank, 2018). Furthermore, this mechanism would include developed and developing countries, and would easily connect with the Atlantic and the Pacific Basin. In other words it would be at the center of global flows and dynamics giving its members a credible chance to retake the lead in international affairs and global norms setting.

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