DISPOSITIONS TO COVER THE ADVANCE OF THE MILITARY BASE TO PING-YANG.
February 20—March 12th.
Activity of the Vladivostok squadron. Admiral Dewa at Thornton Haven. Reorganisation and redistribution of the Japanese fleet. Its new base at Haiju. Admiral Kamimura’s operations against Vladivostok. Admiral Togo’s demonstration at Port Arthur. Destroyer actions. The second bombardment.
[Charts B 2, F 1 and G.]
A FORTNIGHT had now elapsed since the opening of hostilities and the Japanese progress had more than fulfilled their most sanguine expectations. Not only had they dominated the Russian fleet, but ashore they had been equally successful. The cavalry of the XIIth division reached Ping-yang on February 23rd; the infantry marching from Seoul began to arrive two days later, and with the Ping-yang—Gensan line in their hands they had possession of the vital South Korean area on which the whole war turned. The pre-occupation of the Imperial Staff was to secure and improve the initial position they had seized and to press the rest of the First Army forward to the Yalu with the utmost speed.
For the fleet it meant no rest. The strain which the acceleration entailed was even greater than ever. It was not only that the operation on which they had relied to secure the control of the Army’s passage had failed, but in the Sea of Japan the activity of the Vladivostok cruisers began to call for drastic treatment.
For ten days after the first cruise Admiral Shtakelberg had made no further movement, but towards the end of February ships of war were being continually reported on the north coast of Korea, and there were also reports of troops moving down from the Russian frontier at Posiette Bay in the direction of Gensan. Finally on February 28th came news that four cruisers had appeared the previous day before Gensan, and there could no longer be any doubt that it was the Vladivostok squadron.
The fact was that on February 24th, while Admiral Togo was operating with his blockships at Port Arthur, a report of the Japanese occupation of Gensan reached Vladivostok. To prevent its use as a base was the most important part of Admiral Shtakelberg’s special functions and he at once put to sea. Arriving off the place on the 26th he found no trace of the hostile expedition which he had been led to expect. He, therefore, steamed northward along the coast, to search it, but at nightfall turned back and again appeared off Gensan on the morning of the 27th. Still no enemy was to be seen. Once more he retraced his steps, making a thorough examination of all the likely bays as he proceeded, and finally returned to Vladivostok on the 29th.1
It was not much to boast of, but enough, combined with the reports of a military advance, to convince the Japanese Imperial Staff that something must be done, so far as the situation in the Yellow Sea would permit, to keep the Russian northern force quiet.
Accordingly, on February 29th the Naval Staff sent to Admiral Togo the following orders:—“If possible you should detach a powerful portion of your command and send them to make a reconnaissance in force in the Vladivostok area.” The interpretation which the Commander-in-Chief placed upon this order, we are told, was that the movement should be “designed to cause a diversion of the enemy’s land forces by an appearance off America and Posiette Bays.” That is, its primary object was to prevent interference with the concentration of the First Japanese Army and its advance to the Yalu. This appears clearly from the instructions which, next day, he issued to Admiral Kamimura. With five armoured cruisers2 and two of the Third Division3 he was to proceed with all speed and by the shortest route to the Vladivostok area, attack or threaten the squadron there and endeavour by making a demonstration off America and Posiette bays, to hold down the land forces in those districts and possibly induce their reinforcement. He was not, however, to remain in the area more than three days, and was to be careful to maintain touch with the Commander-in-Chief through the Tsushima wireless stations and the telegraph offices at Gensan and Songchin.4 In making his way back he was, if possible, to send part of his force into Gensan to give heart to Japanese subjects residing there, and then after coaling at Sasebo he was to return to Hakko for further orders.5
On these instructions, after drawing up a detailed programme for the approval of his Chief, Admiral Kamimura sailed from Hakko on March 2nd.
Though the movement had been ordered from Tokyo, it had the Commander-in-Chief’s full concurrence. His recent experience had convinced him that the main Russian squadron was for the time removed from the board. It was known that the famous Admiral Makarov had been appointed to the command at Port Arthur and until he arrived it was felt that the policy of the Russians would be to decline action and let their enemy exhaust themselves as much as they would. To keep the whole fleet operating in the Yellow Sea would only be playing into their hands.
Correct as was this appreciation it meant to the main Japanese squadron no relaxation of activity. In the eyes of the Imperial Staff the reduction of the Port Arthur squadron to temporary quiescence was only a reason for pressing their army forward at still higher speed and still greater risk. For them the value of Ping-yang was not merely that with Gensan it secured a defensible line for South Korea, but also that being within easy reach of the port of Chinampho in the Ping-yang inlet it afforded a means of avoiding the 150 miles of execrable road that separated Ping-yang from Seoul. As it was, even in frosty weather that section of the advance meant a twelve days march, and when the thaw set in the line would be almost impassable. So soon therefore as the temporary domination of the Yellow Sea was assured the Staff had decided that it was at Chinampho and not at Chemulpho that the remaining two divisions of the First Army should be landed for the advance to the Yalu. The risk was of course serious. The Port Arthur destroyers were still potent and active, and Chinampho was less than a hundred miles from Thornton Haven, which was an ideal destroyer base. Still, serious as was the increased risk there was time to make arrangements to meet it. For until the Ping-yang inlet was free from ice the movement could not be made. The state of the ice was in fact the question which was most anxiously exercising the military authorities at Seoul.
From the first of course it had been realised that the fleet would have to support a constant shifting of the army’s base to the northward, though the call had not been looked for so soon. Still they had already anticipated it. As early as February 22nd Admiral Uriu had sent a private query to Chemulpho about the state of the ice at Chinampho and as to whether any troops were to be landed there. In reply he was told what was to happen, and the information was accompanied by a request from the Army that he would send to examine the ice. The blocking movement was then just beginning and he could only answer that all his ships were occupied in the defence of Chemulpho, as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, and that he could not make any movement simply at the request of the Army. It was not till March 2nd that he received an order from Admiral Togo to carry out the desired investigation.
The Commander-in-Chief was then at Hakko, where he had arrived from Rooper Harbour on February 27th, and was devoting all his energy to the necessary naval arrangements to cover the accelerated military advance. Since the greatest danger he had to fear was from the Port Arthur cruisers and flotilla, his first care was to make sure that no advanced base was being established at Thornton Haven or the Elliot Islands. Before the war began there had been constant reports that the Russians intended to use them for a torpedo base. They were known to have been busy at Thornton Haven and it was believed that they had not only established there a coal store and signal station but had also connected it by cable with Port Arthur. Accordingly the first thing the Admiral did, when on February 26th, after the attempt to block, he had reassembled his fleet at Rooper Harbour, was to detach Admiral Dewa with two of his own cruisers, two battleships and the 5th destroyer division to examine the island and destroy any signalling apparatus he found.
Reaching Thornton Haven on the 27th Admiral Dewa’s landing parties quickly found that except for a jetty and an empty coal store there was no trace of Russian occupation. The fact was that on the day of the first attack on Port Arthur the Viceroy had sent a vessel to remove the coal which had been taken there and the small guard which had been left to watch it; and by a lucky chance she had stolen into Port Arthur after the first action undetected. Admiral Dewa therefore contented himself with partially burning the store; and leaving the jetty for future use, he made away for Hakko to rejoin the Commander-in-Chief.
The rest of Admiral Togo’s work was peculiarly onerous. When the Imperial Staff had directed that Admiral Kamimura should be detached to deal with the northern disturbance it had been considered essential to reorganise the fleet by abolishing the Tsushima area as a separate command and placing the Third or Straits Squadron directly under Admiral Togo’s flag. He therefore found himself in command of the whole fleet. So at least he appears to have regarded the position. Admiral Kataoka was formally placed under his orders and Admiral Kamimura was never formally withdrawn from them. Yet, as will be seen hereafter, the Imperial Staff did at a critical moment and with unsatisfactory consequences assume the control of Admiral Kamimura’s movements and he considered their order as overriding that of his immediate Chief.6
To add to the labour of the reorganisation which the new arrangement entailed, the Admiral decided that the development of the military situation demanded a change of his advanced base. Considerable progress had been made with preparing the anchorage and its boom defences in Asan Bay, but from the moment that the Japanese began to assert their local superiority at sea, it had proved a much less convenient position for all purposes than Rooper Harbour. Some five and twenty miles to the eastward of that place and deep in a wilderness of uncharted banks and islands, known only to the Japanese and the natives, lay the large inlet known as Haiju Bay—which, as we have seen, had already been used to push a party on to Ping-yang overland. It was a veritable “Puerto Escondido” such as the corsairs of the Spanish Main used to affect, and while far better placed than Asan both for Port Arthur and for operations up the Korean Coast in support of the Army’s advance, it was practically impenetrable to the enemy’s torpedo craft. This place then was the Admiral’s choice. Immediate arrangements were made for connecting it up by cable, and on February 28th he telegraphed to Admiral Uriu that Haiju was for the future to be the advanced base of the Combined Fleet. It would also take the place of Baker Island as the second rendezvous and he was to cease work at Asan.
It was on this day that the Commander-in-Chief was officially informed that Admiral Kataoka’s squadron was to be under his command and he was able to proceed with the details of his arrangement. Hakko was not to be abandoned. It was far too valuable as marking the focus of the Japanese interior position and for watching the approaches to the Yellow Sea. Accordingly a permanent guard was established there consisting of a division of torpedo-boats and two gunboats of Admiral Hosoya’s Seventh Division which at this time was established at Cargodo Gulf outside Sylvia Basin to guard the home section of the transport route. It was also made the base for two merchant cruisers which were to patrol in turn the neighbourhood of Mu-i-tau to intercept the enemy’s trade and neutrals carrying contraband along the Chinese coast.
For the support, escort and cover of the military movement the disposition was as follows:—
The duties of support, which would be of special importance as the army moved northwards, was committed to Admiral Hosoya whose coast-defence division was peculiarly adapted for inshore work. He was called up from Cargodo Gulf, where he was to leave one coast-defence ship and one gunboat, and after dropping two more gunboats at Hakko for the permanent guard he was to proceed with the rest to Haiju. There his command was to be reinforced by Admiral Uriu’s two gunboats as well as four merchant cruisers and two torpedo-boat divisions. With this force he would carry out the landing at Chinampho and co-operate with the army as it moved to the Yalu.
The work of escort was left to Admiral Kataoka with his two cruiser divisions, and until his services were required he was to continue to guard the Korean Straits from Takeshiki, an arrangement which eventually would leave nothing except the flotilla and the Sylvia Basin guard to protect that vital area.
All the rest of the Yellow Sea fleet, under Admiral Togo’s immediate command, would be used as the covering force. After the detachment against Vladivostok it was of course considerably weakened. It was on March 2nd that Admiral Kamimura had parted company with five of his six armoured-cruisers and two of Admiral Dewa’s division, so that the Russian detachment was attracting successfully a force nearly double its own strength. The sixth armoured cruiser was given to Admiral Dewa to replace the units with which he had to part, and Admiral Uriu with his division of four cruisers continued with the main fleet which was to undertake the duty of cover in the Yellow Sea. Its chief operation would be to try to complete the blocking of Port Arthur and Admiral Togo’s first act after the last attack had been to telegraph a request for four more blockships to sink between those which lay on each side of the entrance.7
Their preparation would take time nor could the troops start as yet. The Ping-yang inlet had been found still choked with floating ice, but was expected to be free in about a week. To fill up the pause and keep the enemy in alarm the Admiral decided to carry out another destroyer attack and an indirect bombardment from the dead area behind Liau-ti-shan.8 The movement was designed to synchronise with the appearance of Admiral Kamimura’s squadron before Vladivostok. But for two days the Commander-in-Chief was weather-bound and he was still at Hakko on March 6th when his colleague was off his objective.
Owing to fogs and a snowstorm the previous day it was not till 7.0 a.m. on the 6th that Admiral Kamimura sighted Askold Island off the further or eastern arm of the extensive Peter the Great Bay, within which Vladivostok lies. Here was a signal station which immediately reported his presence. It was Sunday. The Russian crews were all ashore, but they were at once recalled and fires lighted, while the Japanese proceeded towards the Eastern entrance. Vladivostok is situated at the extremity of a peninsula, which projects about south-west into Peter the Great Bay, and divides its inner part into two minor bays, Amur Bay to the west and Ussuri Bay to the east. The extremity of this peninsula is penetrated by curved inlet which forms the harbour and is known as the Golden Horn. Protecting it to seaward is Kozakavitcha Island, and beyond that again a range of smaller islands project still further outward into the great bay and emphasise its two divisions. Between the most seaward of these islands and the mainland is the entrance to Amur Bay, which is connected with Ussuri Bay by a channel called the Eastern Bosporus, between the end of the Vladivostok peninsula and Kozakavitcha Island. Through this strait access is gained to the Golden Horn, and at its eastern or Ussuri mouth are the principal fortifications. While the port is therefore extremely difficult to attack by sea, its double exit makes it equally difficult to blockade.
As Admiral Kamimura advanced about N.N.W. into Ussuri Bay, several columns of smoke were seen rising over the low snow-clad hills which hid the Russian squadron in the Golden Horn. They would make an excellent mark, but they soon disappeared and no sign of a ship was to be seen. By noon, moreover, the Japanese reached the verge of the ice which still covered the bay. They began crashing through it, but progress was slow, for they had constantly to alter course to find weaker places. It was bitterly cold—the ships were covered with ice, but by 12.42 they had made sufficient progress for the Admiral to detach his two unarmoured cruisers to observe the entrance out of range of the batteries. He himself held on deeper into the bay for another three quarters of an hour, till he had opened the Bosporus at about eight miles distance. He then turned directly for it, and shortly before 1.0, being within range, he altered to starboard parallel with the coast, and opened an indirect fire with his 8-inch guns. As the forts did not reply he turned and stood in closer, till at 2.10 he was about 4,000 metres (4,400 yards) from the beach. Then once more he turned parallel with the coast to the northeastward and began again. While his 6-inch bombarded the forts at ranges from 5,000 (5,500 yards) to 8,500 metres (9,300 yards), his 8-inch kept up their indirect fire on the dockyard in the Golden Horn at from 10,000 (11,000 yards) to 13,500 metres (14,800 yards). This was where the smoke had been seen, but still there was no reply, and in ten minutes Admiral Kamimura turned away S.S.E., ceasing fire altogether at 2.27.
Little or no harm had been done. For owing to the trouble with the ice the Russians had had just time to get under way and move down unseen to where the Golden Horn opened into the Bosporus. There a narrow escape of a serious collision caused them to stop, and the result was that the Japanese had been raining shells into an empty harbour.
About half-past two they withdrew towards Askold Island and half an hour later the Russians, having restored order, began to move again. Their smoke was seen, and though the short day was already closing in, Admiral Kamimura turned back to see what it meant. They advanced, however, no further than the mouth of the Bosporus. By that time it was dark—they could not be seen under the land, and the Admiral finally took his squadron off to sea for the night. He appears to have been still in doubt as to whether the Russian cruisers were in the port or not. On his way north he had received from the advanced cruisers of the Straits Squadron a report that they had been out again, and during the fog he had taken in wireless signals in Russian. At daybreak next morning, therefore, he dispersed his squadron to reconnoitre America and Strelok bays immediately east of Askold Island. Nothing being found he resolved to make another demonstration, and by noon was once more before the entrance.
The Russian squadron could now be seen in the harbour, but there was no smoke. They had apparently no intention of coming out to fight him, nor did the batteries fire. Having now no hope of an action he decided to carry on with the rest of his programme and moved down to Posiette Bay. During the afternoon it was carefully examined, and next morning he proceeded down the coast of Korea. In the evening he was exchanging intelligence with the Japanese consul at Songchin, and on the 9th he anchored at Gensan. Finding all quiet there he held on after a few hours for Sasebo, where he was to coal before rejoining the main fleet.
As a direct disturbance of the Russian military arrangements the operation had little or no effect. Its moral impression, however, was considerable, for from this time the civil population of Vladivostok began to return to Russia in large numbers, and in the following month, if not before, General Linevich began to make serious complaint as to the inadequacy of the force at his command in the event of a Japanese landing.9
The whole movement was completed before the Commander-in-chief was able to begin the intended simultaneous attack on Port Arthur. It was not till March 9th, when Admiral Kamimura was back at Gensan, that the main fleet reached its final rendezvous off Round Island. The Admiral’s general idea was to send forward his destroyer flotilla in the night with the two despatch-vessels Tatsuta and Chitose as supporting ships. The 1st destroyer division was to deal with the enemy’s destroyers that kept night guard at Liau-ti-shan and the 3rd to proceed off Port Arthur, attack anything they could see, and if there was nothing outside to drop dummy mines with Holmes lights to deter the Russians from coming out in the morning and to tempt them to waste ammunition. On the morrow he would conduct the bombardment, but he warned the fleet that it was probable the enemy would put to sea and that all divisions must be prepared to meet them.
The reason of this expectation is not explained. It was doubtless due in the main to the coming of Admiral Makarov, who in fact had reached Port Arthur the day before. Called to the command at the same time as General Kuropatkin, he had hurried to the stricken fleet with all the speed that was consistent with making the necessary arrangements. On February 14th he placed his requirements before a council of the senior officers of the Navy Department which at his request had been summoned by the Minister of Marine. They related chiefly to supply and intelligence, and particularly to the organisation of a secret service to obtain information of the enemy’s movements and intentions and to preparing postal communication through Chifu in case Port Arthur should be isolated. On the 17th he left for the Far East, expecting to reach his command in 18 days and trusting to the time spent on the journey to work out instructions and organisation with his newly formed staff.
The first result was a report which he sent to the Ministry of Marine on the 19th requesting a large increase of the flotilla. What he asked was that eight destroyers just completed should be taken to pieces and forwarded to Port Arthur by rail, and, further, that 40 small torpedo-boats should be constructed and sent put the same way at once. “These small boats,” he wrote, “will serve the port at night. Leaving two hours before dark and steaming at 16 knots, they will be 100 miles from the port at 11.0 o’clock. This will be their radius of action. During the night they will be masters of the sea in the waters allotted to them.” In the third place he urged, as the most pressing step that could be taken at once, that Admiral Virenius should be ordered to continue his voyage to Port Arthur.10 This he had already advised at St. Petersburg on hearing it was intended to recall the squadron from the Red Sea and had intimated that he was ready to take the responsibility of solving the strategical difficulties of the junction. He now pressed the measure again with increased insistence. “If,” he wrote, “this squadron of three ships and seven destroyers is unable to appear in the theatre of the war, it will be equally impossible for me to send out a similar detachment for any operations whatever. I consider it absolutely necessary that the squadron should proceed to the Far East, otherwise the moral effect will be most serious.” In spite of his insistence everyone of his proposals were negatived with the sole exception of the small torpedo-boats, which were actually commenced.
Still, at Headquarters they expected him to do the impossible, and on his arrival he was greeted with the following advice sent off when news of Admiral Kamimura’s appearance at Vladivostok was received:—“We consider that the enemy’s squadron appeared before Vladivostok mainly to impede the departure of our cruiser squadron, or to cut it off from its base. We find that this is a favourable opportunity for our squadron to make a sortie from Port Arthur in order to drive the enemy off the shores of Liau-tung, where their operations are becoming more and more bold.”
To this extent Admiral Togo’s expectation of a sortie was justified. His last information was that five of the Russian battleships and four cruisers were still fit for sea, and the rumour which prevailed that the new Commander-in-Chief would take them out as soon as he arrived was not unreasonable. But for the present nothing was further from Admiral Makarov’s mind. It was only the day he arrived that the Retvizan was towed off and taken into the harbour. The whole fleet was in a state of complete demoralisation, and his first act was to order the battle flags which had been flying for a month to be hauled down.11
With his coming, however, the whole tone of the fleet was changed. He brought with him a number of skilled dockyard hands to expedite the repairs of the ships and news that a squadron from the Baltic was to come to their relief. His personality counted for still more, and high spirits took the place of the former apathy and depression. To an assembly of the Senior Officers he announced that his policy would be to husband the fleet and its resources till the reinforcement could arrive, but never to cease efforts to strike the enemy so far as was in his power, and to wear down their strength. “Everyone,” says an officer who was there, “felt the colossal energy of the man; all knew he would make them work, being an untiring worker himself.”
They were not deceived. It so happened that the first indication of the energetic action they expected occurred on the night Admiral Togo had arranged for his new series of operations to begin. In the evening the Russian wireless began to indicate the approach of the Japanese fleet, and Admiral Makarov at once ordered out all available destroyers, instead of the usual slender guard. Only two divisions proved fit for sea, and of these two boats broke down, leaving only six to do the work. The weaker division, consisting of the Ryeshitelni, and the Steregushchi, was ordered to make a reconnaissance as far as Thornton Haven, and the other, consisting of four units, was to patrol Port Arthur waters.12 The result was that when the 1st division of the Japanese flotilla reached Liau-ti-shan they found themselves surprised by an undetermined number of destroyers. The enemy were under the dark shore—the Japanese had the moon behind them and had been careless enough to make flashing signals during their approach. They could be seen but could see nothing, and believed they had at least six enemies to deal with. Just as they were engaged in turning and the line was disordered the Russians dashed at them. So close and suddenly did they come that several collisions were with difficulty avoided. A confused action ensued, sometimes at a range so close that grenades could be used. No one quite knew what was happening. The Japanese, being all out of station, were constantly masking each other’s fire, but for some minutes the action was very hot and close. Nearly all were hit and holed again and again, but fortunately for the Japanese none of the Russian shells burst, and as the two flotillas were on opposite courses they soon drew out of range without any boat being actually disabled. Yet so far from executing their orders to destroy the enemy’s guard the 1st division, with a loss of 24 killed and wounded, had to close on their battle squadron for assistance. The Russian destroyers had also been too severely damaged to seek to renew the action. In two of them the engines were disabled and one was torpedoed by one of her consorts, though she remained afloat. The casualties included two officers severely wounded and it was not till daylight that they were all back at Port Arthur.
The other Japanese division, also consisting of four boats with the despatch-vessel Chitose as support, had better fortune. When they approached the entrance nothing was to be seen; even the Retvizan had gone, and in pursuance of their instructions, they dropped dummy mines and Holmes lights. The latter were fired on for a short time, but the firing soon ceased nor could the destroyers by any means draw the forts again. Though they were constantly in the beams of the searchlights the guns remained silent. The fact was the forts were now under better discipline, and withheld their fire for fear of injuring their own destroyers. Till daylight the Japanese kept up their efforts, and then made for Liau-ti-shan to rejoin the fleet.
At this moment they had sight of the two Russian destroyers which had been sent to Thornton Haven. In returning they had been headed off by a Japanese cruiser and again by some destroyers. To avoid them they had been forced to stand out to sea, and were now coming in from the S.S.E. to make the harbour. The Japanese at once altered course to cut them off and drive them west to Liau-ti-shan into the arms of the fleet. The Russians, however, altered to starboard, and made for the shelter of the Dalny mine-field. Chase was given, and the superior speed of the Japanese quickly enabled them to close to 300 metres. A sharp action began. Both the Russians fought fiercely, but though they got home a good many hits they were soon seen to be in trouble, and the second boat, the Steregushchi, was dropping speed fast. By this time the day was breaking, and the chase had come within range of the forts and they began to fire. The leading Russian boat, though she had one boiler damaged by a shell and her captain disabled, was keeping her speed fairly well, and with her engineer in command was now making for Port Arthur. It was seen to be impossible to prevent her escaping, and all four of the Japanese destroyers closed round the Steregushchi and concentrated upon her an overwhelming fire.
It was now broad daylight. The various divisions of the Japanese fleet were proceeding to their several stations for the bombardment, and Admiral Dewa, whose duty was to spot the fall of the shot off the harbour, appeared in the offing. Seeing what was going on, and that the shore fire on the destroyers was too hot for a despatch-vessel like the Chitose to approach in support, he sent in his armoured cruiser Tokiwa. It was high time. Away towards Port Arthur the Novik could be seen coming out to the rescue, and on board of her was the new Admiral in person. The moment he knew of the action he had hoisted his flag, and ordering the Bayan to follow as she could, he put to sea. Meanwhile, the Russian destroyer had been reduced to a motionless and silent wreck and had hauled down her flag. One of the enemy approached to take possession, while the rest gathered for emergency repairs and to send their wounded to the armoured cruiser. But the Russian had no thought of surrender. When the Japanese got alongside they found the decks a mass of dead and dying; not a single officer was to be seen, and scarcely an unwounded man. One or two were seized and sent off. A few had swum to the boat as she approached. The destroyer’s Kingston valves had been opened, nor was it possible to reach them. Two devoted men, to make sure she would never fall into the enemy’s hands, had locked themselves into the engine room, and by no means could they be induced to open their living tomb. Preparations were therefore made to take her in tow.
All this time Admiral Dewa was standing in, but the shore fire had grown so hot and accurate that the Chitose, and even the Tokiwa, after taking in the wounded, had to retire out of range. Thereupon, Admiral Makarov also turned back, and the sinking vessel was taken in tow by the Japanese destroyer that was standing by. The hawser, however, quickly parted, and the Novik was seen coming out again to the rescue accompanied by the Bayan. An action seemed imminent, but at this moment Admiral Uriu’s division appeared on the horizon, proceeding to its station. His duty was to pass in front of Port Arthur and destroy a signal house and other buildings, believed to be a mining station, which the Russians had on the island of San-shan-tau off Talien-hwan. The moment he realised the situation he hoisted his battle flag and stood in for the Russian cruisers. Whereupon Admiral Makarov stopped. Admiral Dewa had just signalled for the prize to be abandoned, and the Japanese destroyers were retiring into safety, while Admiral Uriu, seeing that the Russian cruisers refused to leave the shelter of the forts, passed on to execute his orders. As soon as he was gone Admiral Makarov put out for the third time to the scene of the wreck, but not a trace of the destroyer was found. She had sunk with all hands. By this time some Japanese battleships had hove in sight; it was low water; not a Russian battleship could move out; and Admiral Makarov had no course but to return to port.
The battleships which had appeared were Admiral Togo’s own sub-division succouring the 1st division of destroyers which had been cut up off Liau-ti-shan. When he found what a plight they were in, he decided to commit the bombardment to his Rear-Admiral with the Fuji and Yashima, and himself to stand by the destroyers and take off their wounded. As for the destroyers themselves it was found necessary to send them away at once under escort of their supporting despatch-vessel to the new base at Haiju, where by this time two repair ships had arrived.
As soon as the Admiral had taken the wounded on board, he proceeded to a point in front of the harbour whence he could watch the fall of the shot. The bombardment was taking place along the south shore of Liau-ti-shan from the lighthouse on the promontory as far as Rotetsu Tau. This area was entirely masked from the Russian batteries, but as soon as Rotetsu-zan was passed the Golden Hill Fort could open with effect, and to avoid the shot the ships had to turn back. When the Rear-Admiral had fired his allotted number of rounds Admiral Togo took his place. The range was from 13,000 to 15,000 yards, and the spotting very difficult owing to the heavy fire of the forts and a haze along the shore. Still, the work was done very deliberately, and as a prominent mark for laying had been given on the summit of the promontory it seems to have been fairly accurate. Most of the shells fell into the Gullet and part of the inner harbour and burst well, but by a miracle, though nearly 150 rounds were fired, the Askold was the only ship touched, and that not seriously. As for Admiral Uriu, he duly carried out a vigorous bombardment of San-shan-tau, to the surprise of the Russians, for although there had been a lookout post there earlier in the war, it had been withdrawn and there was nothing now but a quarantine station. After a considerable expenditure of ammunition the Japanese retired without completing the destruction, as a rising swell made a landing impossible.
Still, besides another destroyer to their score, the Japanese claimed that they had effected their real moral purpose of what used to be called “insulting the enemy in his port,” but in fact, according to Russian accounts, the moral effect had been the reverse of what the Japanese hoped. They believed that the activity which Admiral Makarov displayed had prevented the bombardment being carried out thoroughly, and when the Fuji and Yashima retired the men cheered, being convinced their fire had driven them off. Moreover, just as Admiral Togo began to draw off his whole force according to programme, the Russian battleships were moving out into the roadstead, and the Japanese withdrawal had the appearance of a prudent retreat. The general result in fact was to produce an increased feeling of exhilaration and confidence in the Russian fleet. “The moral effect of the day,” we are told, “was very great. The men of the Russian squadron were sensible that with Makarov at their head, the squadron was a real fighting force with which the Japanese could not easily contend.”13
Amongst the fighting spirits of the Japanese fleet the results were certainly found disappointing; nor could the cooler heads fail to be impressed with the improved discipline and accuracy of the Russian fire, and to see in it an additional reason for husbanding the fleet and not pressing attacks upon the batteries. It was this caution which the fleet as a whole found it hard to stomach, and by March 12th, when all the divisions were again concentrated at the new base at Haiju, there was a ward-room rumour that the Port Arthur squadron was not for them. It was whispered that the Admiral had orders that the place and the ships it contained were to be dealt with by the Army, and that he was to risk nothing till the sister service had forced the ships to sea.
The views which Admiral Makarov himself formed about the situation, as the result of these first experiences, we have on record from his own pen, in his reply to the sanguine instructions which he had received from Admiral Stark’s hands on taking over the command. Those instructions he considered could only mean “the assumption of the offensive in the Korean and Pechili Gulfs,” and as a test of the squadron’s fitness for offensive operations he had taken it for a short cruise when the Japanese disappeared. Though he had succeeded in getting the whole of it to sea in one tide—a feat it had never hitherto attempted—the simplest manœuvres he had tried revealed how wholly unfit it was without further training for active operations of any kind. His reply then to the extravagant expectations of Headquarters was to lay before them a frank and full appreciation of the situation as he found it. It took the form of a report to the Viceroy and ran as follows:—
“I quite calculated on 24 destroyers being available at Port Arthur, and to-day gave orders for all effective destroyers to put to sea to work with the squadron, but only eight destroyers and two torpedo-vessels were found to be serviceable. Of the eight destroyers one on leaving the harbour reported a boiler leaking, and another that one of her engines was out of repair, and both had therefore to return. The cruise lasted from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., but nevertheless when we returned to the outer roadstead and I wished to leave these destroyers behind so that they should be with the squadron when it passed from one roadstead to the other, the commander of the flotilla reported that they had no more fresh water, and three of the destroyers had at once to proceed into the harbour. If the destroyers can only take sufficient water for twelve hours, it will be impossible to take them on any distant expedition. I shall thoroughly inquire into this matter.
“I must report to Your Excellency that the vessels of the squadron were only commissioned a short time before the outbreak of war, and with their present captains have not steamed in company. This was brought strongly before me when steaming out to-day to carry out evolutions.
“The rapid departure of the squadron out of port and its return into port have not been practised, and to-day for the first time nine large vessels went out during one tide and returned on the next, but the port is by no means suited for this; at the same time I find it risky to leave any of the vessels at anchor for the night in the outer roadstead, while the sea is entirely in the hands of the enemy.
“It would be extremely desirable to deepen the entrance so that the vessels might go in at any minute, not only with their normal draught, but when they have been holed and are filling with water. As soon as I have time I shall go into this matter.
“In many directions we are inferior to the enemy; thus, to-day, while we were steaming 12 knots all the vessels steered well, but when I signalled 14 knots the line spread out excessively. The ‘wireless’ on board the Novik does not work at all when she is under way, and I could not send despatches to the Diana, which was 5 miles distant. I shall also go into this.
“I am especially anxious with regard to the frequent damage to the machinery of the destroyers. Every small expedition made by them at night is accompanied by certain breakdowns.
“The repairs to the Palladia are proceeding very satisfactorily. The Retvizan has been taken into the inner roadstead, but they have not succeeded so far in pumping out the compartments torpedoed. At the request of the commandant of the port and the captain of the ship, and with my concurrence, they have placed her on a shoal, but owing to the action of the tides she is working the mud under her and settling down. I am afraid, moreover, that her holes will fill with liquid mud, and that her displacement will increase. The Retvizan is causing me much anxiety.
“I have already reported to Your Excellency that I wish to make a mud dock in the same manner as is done at Ying-kou for small vessels; the commandant of the port and Lieut.-Colonel Prestin consider this quite feasible, but during the last four days nothing has been done except boring in order to select a place, although the work necessary for such a dock would be quite insignificant for the dredgers available here.
“I will not write to Your Excellency about many other matters which require looking into, as for example, the daily expenditure of coal, which in some ships amounts to 23 tons, even while at anchor in the harbour. In addition to much else I am anxious that the captains shall become familiar with the general lines on which an action should be conducted, and I have already had one conversation with the admirals and captains on this matter. To-morrow we shall consider the notes made by me during to-day’s evolutions. As Your Excellency will observe, in addition to the present affairs, there is a mass of other work absolutely necessary in order that the fleet may be equal to those tasks which have been imposed on it, but in spite of all imperfections and the insufficiency in the service of the destroyers, I find that we might now risk an attempt to obtain command of the sea, although prudence dictates that the present time is too early to lay all at stake, and half measures are impossible. The enemy being in possession of long distance ‘wireless’ may quite easily concentrate his forces. A weak detachment will refuse to fight and make use of its speed. The enemy usually steams at 14 knots, whereas we do only 10.
“As regards reconnaissances, I consider it my duty to report that the risk attending independent reconnaissances on a sea occupied by a strong enemy outweighs the value which such reconnaissances might have. On arriving here I intended that the destroyers should take the risk of running to the Korean Islands to attack the transports, but now their condition prevents this being done until some method of keeping them in repair is devised.”
Upon this despatch the Russian Official Naval Journal has the following comments:—
“The above document explains the difficult strategic position in which Makarov found himself. From other documents containing the correspondence between Admiral Makarov and Headquarters it is seen that he resolved in any case, should the Japanese attempt to land at Ying-kou, or on the Liau-tung littoral, to fight a decisive battle. Thus the plan of campaign which Admiral Marakov placed before himself was to train the squadron, to complete the repairs to the damaged ships, and then to assume the offensive and seek a decisive action with the main body of the Japanese fleet for the command of the sea. Should the Japanese risk a disembarkation of their armies on the Liau-tung or the shores of the gulf of Pechili, Marakov intended to enter into a decisive struggle with them and prevent the disembarkation, without waiting for the damaged ships to be repaired.
“We may therefore state that as regards the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, he appreciated the situation correctly, and placed before himself a correct strategical object.
“Having received the report of Makarov, the Viceroy agreed with it generally, and only added two additional directions. In the first place, he required that Makarov should only have recourse to a general action with the Japanese fleet in the case of urgent necessity, e.g., the landing of large numbers of Japanese in Liau-tung. Should this not happen, the Viceroy wished this general action to take place when the Russian troops passed over the Korean frontier, by which time it was calculated reinforcements from the Baltic would have arrived. In the second place, he advised Makarov, before entering into a general action, to attempt to increase his force by the addition of the cruiser squadron from Vladivostok.
“The latter recommendation was fully in keeping with Makarov’s own views, and directions were speedily given to this squadron; on being personally informed by the Commander-in-Chief that the latter had assumed the offensive with the Port Arthur fleet, the Commander of the independent squadron of cruisers was to leave Vladivostok and proceed to the point of landing of the Japanese troops, where the main body of the Russian fleet would have moved from Port Arthur, in order to combine in engaging the Japanese fleet.
“Thus the central idea of the plan of campaign of Admiral Makarov was a simultaneous advance of both sections of our fleet to oppose the Japanese for a decisive action. At the same time, should the Japanese begin to disembark troops in large numbers on the Liau-tung, this advance was to be carried out without delay, notwithstanding the difficult situation; while if the Japanese did not commence landing operations for some time, the delay was to be used to prepare the Port Arthur squadron in every sense, by conducting an active defence of the waters round Kuangtung. The Vladivostok squadron, in the latter case, was to make short cruises and to prepare for its main task, the support of the main body when it assumed the offensive.
“This was undoubtedly the correct decision to that strategical question which came before the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet.”
For his tactical ideas we have a complete set of “Instructions for Steaming and Fighting.”15 Like those of Admiral Togo and his colleagues they reflect the prevailing conceptions of the time, and are mainly interesting on account of their author’s personality. The most notable points are certain provisions contained in Articles 14 and 15 for obtaining a concentration of fire by shortening the line; but it is obvious that the evolutions required would be difficult and even dangerous for a squadron that was not highly trained. The latitude which he permitted to his Rear-Admiral in leading after a 16-point turn together is also interesting, and the same tendency to leave initiative to his subordinates is noticeable in the article which authorised his cruiser admiral to break the line and act independently when he saw a chance of enveloping. But it must be said that this idea of using his cruisers on the enemy’s disengaged side, as well as that of crossing the T and enveloping the rear, both of which he shared with Admiral Togo, seem scarcely to take sufficient account of the great range at which an action was likely to be fought. Under modern conditions against an enemy with equal if not higher speed, and certainly higher fleet training, concentration by crossing or enveloping was not to be counted on, and the part assigned to the cruisers would expose them to great risk of being cut off and annihilated by an enemy whose cruiser strength was superior to his own. It is possible that he underrated the tactical skill and mobility of his opponents, and it is in any case certain that he hoped to confuse them by a bold use of his destroyers in the action. It is, of course, impossible to say how far in the hands of so capable and spirited a leader such tactics might have availed to upset the combinations which the Japanese had arranged, but the comparison of the two sets of instructions suggests that the outcome must have been either a confused mêlée of independent divisions or two separate actions of battleships and cruisers respectively line to line.
1 Japanese Confidential Histovy, II., p. 9.
2 Idzumo, Adzuma. Asama, Yakumo, and Iwate. The Tokiwa and Chihaya (despatch-vessel) remained with Admiral Togo.
3 Kasagi, Yoshino.
4 America and Posiette Bays are on either side of Peter the Great Bay, where Vladivostok stands, and the demonstration would threaten a landing to take the place in reverse. Songchin is a Treaty port in lat. 40° 40', long. 129° 15’, that is about 125 miles N.E. of Gensan and 25 miles W.S.W. of Cape Bruat or Boltin.
5 For the text of these instructions see Japanese Confidential History, Vol. II., p. 3.
6 See post, p. 333 and 343.
7 Distribution of the fleet for the landing of the Guards division:—
Covering Squadrons.
Yellow Sea.—Togo, with First Division (six battleships), Third Division (Dewa, one armoured cruiser and two 2nd-class cruisers), Fourth Division (Uriu, three 2nd-class and one 3rd-class cruiser) and two destroyer divisions.
Sea of Japan.—Kamimura, with Second Division (five armoured cruisers) and part of Third Division (two 2nd-class cruisers).
Escort Squadron.
Kataoka, with Fifth Division (the Chinyen and three 2nd-class cruisers) and Sixth Division (Rear-Admiral Togo, four 3rd-class cruisers).
Support Squadron.
Hosoya (Seventh Division) two coast-defence ships, six gunboats and four merchant cruisers.
Hakko Defence Area.—Two gunboats and one torpedo-boat division.
Sylvia Basin.—One coast-defence ship and one gunboat.
8 For the orders, see App. E., p. 506, and Plate 4, p. 150.
9 Japanese Published History, Vol. II., page 168, note. Russian Military History, vol. IX., Part IV., pp. 181, 184–6. Russian Edition.
10 Oslyaba battleship, Aurora and Dmitri Donskoi, cruisers, and seven destroyers.
11 Morskoi Sbornik, quoting the Historical Commission of the Naval Staff.
12 Morskoi Sbornik.
13 Morskoi Sbornik, September 1912.
14 Morskoi Sbornik, July 1912.
15 See Appendix C., page 491.