ADMIRAL TOGO’S PLAN OF OPERATION FOR COVERING THE FINAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE JAPANESE ARMY.
[Chart B 2.]
THE call of the Army in Korea, which the Navy had met so loyally, involved a further increase to the Commander-in-Chief’s responsibilities. The establishment and protection of the various supply depôts entailed serious exposure for Admiral Hosoya’s squadron. Instead of being able to keep it massed for the guard of the original base he had to split it up into fragments, each incapable of defending itself against attacks such as were still within the power of Admiral Makarov to deliver. In all his arrangements, therefore, Admiral Togo had to take into account the need of covering these supporting operations, and it inevitably happened that the fresh complication was intruded at a time when his hands were more than full elsewhere, and the whole atmosphere was in a state of increased tension as the result of the second failure to block Port Arthur.
Its general effect had been undoubtedly to impress both sides still more deeply with the desperate nature of the struggle before them. In Admiral Makarov’s opinion the attempt had been so nearly successful that it would certainly be renewed. Had one more stone-laden vessel been sunk between the two most successfully placed he knew the port would have been sealed for an indefinite period. All his energy was, therefore, devoted to preventing the enemy from completing their work. The late attempt had shown that a blockship, even when entirely disabled by gun-fire, might carry on with her own way straight into the Gut and there sink. To guard against this two more vessels were sunk directly opposite the entrance, so that the port could only be entered on a tortuous course that would demand an uninjured helm and nice steering. To seaward again of this obstacle a new boom obstruction a thousand yards long was fixed in line with the original boom on the west side of the roadstead and with the ships which he had previously sunk there. But materials were so inadequate that on being tested the new boom proved of little resisting power. As a further precaution, therefore, a triple row of E.C. mines was placed to seaward of it and extended eastward as far as Lutin Rock. On the Tiger Peninsula side about 1,000 yards to seaward of the old boom was established a similar mine field, which extended about 1,000 yards from the shore. In this way it was rendered practically impossible for anything to make directly for the harbour without encountering an obstacle. To perfect the arrangement a cruiser was always kept moored in the Gut, so placed as to sweep the narrow channel that was still open between the Japanese blockships.1
To deal with a renewal of the indirect bombardment a minefield, as early as March 12th, had been laid in the area from which the Japanese had first operated and the new battery on Liau-ti-shan which covered it was now pushed forward with all speed. A further anxiety was the Elliot Islands. The recent Japanese reconnaissance had been reported at Port Arthur and there was an impression that the enemy must be forming there an advanced base. We are also told that the continued absence of the Japanese fleet, combined with reports that were reaching the Staff, led to a suspicion that the long expected expedition might already be assembling there. In any case the Admiral determined that the situation must be cleared up, but here was a serious difficulty. He had only four cruisers, barely sufficient for the needs of the fleet when the time should come for it to act and he dared not risk them in subordinate operations.2 His only course, therefore, was to fall back on his untrustworthy torpedo-craft, and a flotilla of destroyers was accordingly ordered to examine the islands. A spell of thick and rough weather, however, prevented their sailing for a week.
Most galling, however, of all the Admiral’s troubles was the continued inefficiency of his officers. Men fit to take charge even of a destroyer were hard to find, and the commands were being constantly changed. In the squadron it was almost as bad. Each time he had taken it to sea accidents had occurred; there had been one or two serious collisions; and when on April 11th after the weather had mended he took his whole force out again to Talien-hwan little improvement was shown. For the first time the ships had managed to keep clear of one another, but the inability of the captains to handle their commands in a seamanlike manner goaded the harassed Admiral to a severe expression of his opinion.
From trouble of this nature the Japanese Commander-in-Chief was free, but his anxieties were no less heavy than those of his adversary. True he had successfully performed his primary function in covering the First Army’s landing in Korea and placing it in position well forward for an advance on the Yalu, but that only marked the point at which he must begin the far heavier task that lay before him.
With the First Army placed as it was the General Staff at Tokyo could calculate with some certainty the moment when the occupation of Korea would be complete with the passage of the Yalu. It would take place at the end of the month, and that would be the signal for the final stages of the full military deployment to begin. That deployment, with which the second phase of the war would open, involved, as we have seen, two highly delicate operations. The Second Army must suddenly be thrown into the Liau-tung Peninsula to isolate Port Arthur and seize the railway; and simultaneously they must land the connecting force in the depth of the Bay of Korea for the concentric advance on the Russian concentration area.3 For the Navy it meant a task without parallel in modern history except in the Crimean war. It meant landing a large force within torpedo radius of a port they had failed to seal, and which contained an undefeated and apparently active fleet. Though the General Staff, elated by the unexpected impunity of their first move, seem scarcely to have realised the tremendous responsibility they were throwing on the fleet, Admiral Togo was under no illusions. To him there still seemed no sure way of covering the proposed landing except by denying the enemy all possibility of putting to sea. At almost any cost Port Arthur must be closed, and no sooner had he realised that his second attempt had failed than he staggered Headquarters with a request for no less than twelve more blockships.
Seeing how great was the strain on the available transport for the movement of the Second Army and the supply of the fleet such a demand fairly took their breath away. “Although the enemy,” we are told, “had made a great show of force with five battleships, four cruisers, and ten destroyers, the Grand Council of War on March 26th had come to the conclusion that they had no intention of coming out boldly to effect a junction with the Vladivostok Squadron, but were so completely depressed by their policy of inaction, that they intended to wait quietly for us to land our army in the Liau-tung Peninsula.” Three days after this conclusion had been reached the Admiral’s startling demand arrived. The Naval Staff at once saw the necessity of a “decisive conference” with the Commander-in-Chief to settle the scheme of the coming operations, and the same day two officers of the Staff were sent away to Haiju.
The Imperial Staff had indeed to face the fact that there had arisen one of those conflicts between the naval and the military point of view from which combined warfare can never be entirely free. They themselves, imbued with a high spirit of initiative, had their eyes fixed on the rich return which the projected movement promised, and for the sake of the high gain they were ready to take high risk. But it did not follow that the man on whom rested the task of making that risk good was equally ready, or that he judged the risk by the same standard. By the Admiral the peril was seen at closer range, he measured more soberly and with greater knowledge the possibilities of his weapon, and balanced the hazard with a heavier weight of personal responsibility. Emboldened by the success of their last venture the Imperial Staff were obviously counting on the next movement being made with equal impunity. At a distance from the scene of action the conditions may well have seemed identical. But for Admiral Togo—viewing the problem from the deck of his flagship off the enemy’s port—the two cases were essentially different. For him a new factor had arisen—a personal factor that was vital—and it was that Admiral Makarov’s flag was flying in Port Arthur.
It was natural perhaps that at Tokyo they should miss the full significance of the change, but when the question is whether or not the enemy will take the offensive, the personal factor is the key to the answer, and Admiral Togo could not but know that the change in the Russian command made all the difference between a defeated fleet impotent in harbour, and one that had been awakened into being.
It was impossible then for the naval Commander-in-Chief not to insist on that fleet being rendered powerless to move at any cost, if troops were to pass the sea before it was defeated. Without knowing what was actually in Admiral Makarov’s mind Admiral Togo gauged his man too well to take the complacent Staff view. On the scene of action for weeks the two men had pitted brain against brain, and the Russian had so far beaten the Japanese. He had beaten him with bad material, but it was material which Admiral Togo had watched growing in spirit and efficiency week by week. He knew well enough that no depression of inactivity could paralyse his adversary’s initiative permanently. For such a man inaction could only mean preparation for some striking activity. A desperate attempt to join the northern squadron was what he expected, and at the moment when he was informed that the Second Army was coming he was deeply engaged in distributing the fleet to prevent the anticipated Russian movement.
At Tsushima Admiral Kataoka was warned to be ready at any moment, and the Imperial Staff was requested to strengthen the coast defences of the Straits. He himself was spreading his cruisers between Shantung and Haiju that he might have immediate warning of an attempt of the Russian Squadron to come south. Everything that was not wanted for the support of General Kuroki—and that call, as we have seen, was very heavy—was gathered under his flag. Even the Hakko and Chemnlpho guardships were withdrawn. Opportunely he received a most valuable addition to his force in the shape of the two Argentine armoured cruisers, Nisshin and Kasuga, which had now been completed for sea; and to begin with he used them for strengthening Admiral Kataoka’s squadron in the Straits which had just been further weakened by the necessity of reinforcing Admiral Hosoya.
Such was the position when on April 3rd the two Staff Officers reached Haiju. A Council of all Flag and Commanding Officers (including those commanding flotilla divisions) was immediately called on board the Mikasa and a long discussion ensued. On the question of the blockships the Admiral was inflexible, in spite of the serious objection which the Imperial Staff had urged. Two days after his demand had reached them he received the following telegram from the Naval Staff:—“At the present moment all the Japanese merchant ships we can get are apparently already employed on naval and military transport service and therefore the ships to be used for blocking must be taken from this number. Moreover, should you use up the twelve merchant ships you require for this blocking operation without completely or practically achieving success you will probably want several more later on. As we must therefore consider carefully the question of naval and military transport we cannot immediately decide to carry out your wishes, and we send Commander Takarabe of the Staff, who is now on his way to you with despatches from the Imperial Staff. On his arrival with these you will think over the good of your country, and after you have carefully considered the question in all its bearings we beg you will transmit your wishes to us.”
From this letter the tenour of the despatches must be inferred. If after hearing the Staff’s remonstrance he still considered the twelve ships necessary he must have them at any cost, no matter how seriously the mobility of the fleet or the army would be hampered. In the last resort the mobility of the army depended on him; and his power of giving it mobility depended on his power to prevent the interference of the enemy’s fleet. That was the overruling consideration and what he deemed essential for the work, he must have. Nothing could be more closely in accordance with the theory of combined warfare which we ourselves had developed by the end of the Great War, when the amphibious art had reached its highest development.
Accordingly, the day after the conference the Admiral telegraphed to the Director of the Naval Staff that in his opinion the sealing of Port Arthur was more necessary than ever, and that if twelve ships could not be got ready they ought to send him as many as possible. Two days later came the reply that twelve transports had been selected; but the Army Staff had only consented to sacrifice four of their own transports. The other eight had been taken from those supplying the fleet.
That the Admiral felt unable to give way on the point is no wonder when we consider the other matters which the Council decided. Most vital of them all was the determination of the landing place for the Second Army. In accordance with the Japanese system this was a matter left entirely to the Admiral afloat who was responsible for carrying the movement through. His only limit was a certain strategical area which had been indicated by the Imperial Staff as essential to the general war plan. So far as the fleet was concerned that area was defined by the stretch of coast about 100 miles long that lay between Tunguz Bay and Talien-hwan. Any point within those limits would do, but the nearer to the primary objective the better. The principle on which we ourselves had always acted was to choose the point nearest to the objective at which an unopposed and uninterrupted landing could be expected. Such a point within effective striking distance was not always to be had. It was then necessary to weigh the probabilities of opposition by land or interference by sea against the drawbacks of a longer line of communication between the sea base and the objective and particularly the drawback of losing the advantage of surprise. In our practice it was usual to fix the mean of advantage in joint conference between the naval and the military commander. If the greatest danger was to be looked for from the sea, the last word was with the Admiral; if from the land, it lay with the General. In the present case by far the greatest danger was from the sea, and possibly for this reason the decision was left entirely to the Admiral and the Naval Staff. Not a single military officer appears to have been present.
Nevertheless, the point chosen was that most advantageous for the army. The primary objective, according to the war plan which had been adopted, was Dalny. The primary object was to establish at the gate which the Russians had provided a base which would serve at once for the siege of Port Arthur and for the supply of the left wing of the whole army as it advanced up the railway for the concentric movement against Liau-yang. It was known to the Japanese that Kerr and Deep Bays, the two nearest inlets to Dalny, had been mined, but beyond Terminal Head—the point from which the Elliot Islands spread to seaward—it was believed that no precautions had been taken. Here was a stretch of coast well known to the Japanese, for it was the place where they had landed in the war with China. No reconnaissance therefore was necessary, and the vital element of surprise would be preserved as far as possible. The actual point for disembarkation was fixed at Yentoa Bay, of which Terminal Head forms the southern arm. It had many disadvantages. Like all the coast the water was shoal very far out, and nominally at least it was within night torpedo range of Port Arthur. Still the latter objection would be overcome to some extent by using and improving the natural obstacle which the Elliot Islands afforded, while its proximity to the objective overrode all the others. Still for the fleet, unless Port Arthur could be sealed, it promised a task of extraordinary difficulty and anxiety. A heroic sacrifice of shipping to secure the sealing was therefore not too much to ask. It might fail, but that was to make no difference. If the army was prepared to take the risk the fleet was equally ready, and finally it was decided that the two operations should proceed together and that the landing should be carried on whether the blocking succeeded or not.
The decisions of the conference did not end here. There was still nearly a month before the blocking or the landing could take place and the interval was to be used with fresh devices to deal a blow at the Port Arthur Squadron. The main idea involved a radical change of tactics. The recent experiences had proved that, against the attitude which the Russians were stubbornly preserving, both the gun and the torpedo were incapable of dealing a blow of sufficient weight to relieve the situation. With no efficient means of spotting, the indirect bombardments were wholly precarious. It was equally obvious that nothing would induce the enemy to leave the shelter of their batteries at the risk of an action. There remained the mine. Since the Russians were not entirely inactive and did venture to sea when the Japanese were not off the port, there was the chance of laying a minefield secretly in the waters they were accustomed to traverse, and if the main fleet were kept out of sight and a weak squadron exposed as a decoy they might be enticed into the mined area. The idea of bombardment, however, was not entirely given up. True the mine field, which the Russians had placed off Liau-ti-shan, forbade any of the Japanese battleships to approach sufficiently near, but this was not so with the two new cruisers. The improved mountings of their turret guns permitted an elevation which would enable them to reach the inner harbour from beyond the mines and to this end they were now called up from the Straits. Nor was the possibility of a general action ignored. The decoy squadron might give the chance. It was arranged, therefore, to keep the armoured ships in such a position that if the enemy were enticed more than 10 miles out, they could be attacked by the whole force—not excepting the destroyers which now for the first time had orders “to rush in in broad daylight.”
The orders for the new movement were issued on April 7th. The mine field was to be laid at night by two divisions of destroyers and one of torpedo-boats, accompanied by the minelayer Koryo Maru, with another division of destroyers to clear away guard boats and to act as a reserve. The escort would be the First Division and Admiral Dewa’s division reinforced with two of Admiral Kamimura’s armoured cruisers. The latter division was to act as decoy on the following day. Admiral Kamimura with the Nisshin and Kasuga added to his command was to follow later, but in time to join the Commander-in-Chief at Encounter Rock in the morning. He had orders to show the two new ships to the enemy in order to display the increase of force, but the rest of his division was to keep out of sight unless the enemy came to action. The Fourth Division with all unemployed units, as in the last operation, was to remain in reserve at Haiju till further orders.
The general lines of movement for the various divisions were the same as before,4 but a new feature was introduced. This time the shelter point for the flotilla and final rendezvous for the fleet was to be Thornton Haven. The reason appears to be that it afforded a handy refuge for the flotilla if the weather should prove unsuitable for mining, while at the same time as a final rendezvous it was an excellent covering position for Admiral Hosoya’s operations along the adjacent Korean coast. And not only this. The various groups of islands that lay between Thornton Haven and the Liau-tung coast were the key to the solution of the delicate problems which the coming deployment involved. It was of course unknown to the Japanese that Admiral Makarov had just decided to make a reconnaissance of them, but on general principles it was in any case vital to prevent the enemy from rectifying the mistake he had made in neglecting them, and for this purpose they must be watched and guarded as closely and strongly as was consistent with concealing the attention that was being paid to them.
Seeing how complex was the situation with which Admiral Togo and his Staff had to deal, and how difficult it is to forecast an enemy’s action in naval warfare, the arrangement provides a model well worth study. While making provision for dealing a blow at the enemy’s fleet in every way that was conceivably possible, it did not for a moment hazard the preventive duties with which its authors were charged, and, indeed, provided means of meeting every possible form of counter-movement which was within the enemy’s power.
1 See Plate XII., p. 210.
2 It was this difficulty which in some Russian quarters is regarded as condemning the division of the fleet. It is argued that if Admiral Makarov had had the Vladivostok cruisers at Port Arthur he could not only have kept proper observation on the enemy’s movements and prevented their surprise attacks, but he could constantly have harassed their operations generally. Against this it must be noted that had the Russians concentrated in the Yellow Sea the Japanese could have done the same and their relative superiority in cruisers would not have been diminished. See Morskoi Sbornik, September, 1912.
3 See ante, p. 68.
4 See Plate 16, Appendix F., p. 510.