[Charts B and K 1.]
THAT at the Russian headquarters there was no immediate intention of abandoning Port Arthur as the main naval base in favour of Vladivostok is apparent from the orders which had just been given to the Northern Division. Their purport was that instead of expecting the main squadron to come north, the division was to go south to make a diversion in favour of the operations which Admiral Vitgeft was to carry out in the Yellow Sea to assist General Shtakelberg’s relieving movement. On June 12th General Kuropatkin had come down to Kaiping and given him at last permission to concentrate against General Oku. On the same day Admiral Bezobrazov left Vladivostok with his three armoured cruisers, with orders to raid the Japanese communications off Southern Korea. His instructions were to proceed through the East Tsushima channel and endeavour to cruise for two days on the transport route and then to double back by the western channel. If, however, this proved impracticable he was to carry on to Port Arthur and try to join the main squadron. So far, therefore, as there existed any idea of concentrating the two divisions of the Pacific Fleet, the concentration was to be in the Yellow Sea and not at Vladivostok.1
The general idea was, in fact, a concentration of all available forces, both by land and by sea, for the relief of Port Arthur, and to the Russians the moment seemed so favourable for the combination as to promise no little hope of success. Their dispositions for holding in check the two Japanese armies in Manchuria were complete, and as Rear-Admiral Togo had disappeared from the west coast of Liau-tung the danger of a landing at the head of the Gulf had passed away. Since his last demonstration at Tower Hill he had been trying to salve the Russian destroyer which had gone ashore off Murchison Island, but she had proved a total loss, and on the 10th he had started back for the base. It was the day after General Kuropatkin knew this that he gave permission for the advance.
But it so happened that this was also the day on which the disembarkation of General Oku’s train was complete. At last he was in a condition to move, and the General Staff gave orders for the counter-stroke at Telissu which had always been in their mind. All thought of a defensive attitude was now abandoned, and the Staff was absorbed in arrangements for the long planned advance to the northward. Besides the advanced supply base which had been surveyed near Tower Hill, the navy had been requested to find another on the opposite side of the Liau-tung peninsula. The work was given to the Kaimon and Banjo after they had completed the landing of the second group of transports for Ta-ku-shan. The region they surveyed was about the mouth of the Pi-li or Hitsuri River, some 12 miles beyond Pi-tsu-wo, a point from which, if it proved practicable, the right of General Oku’s army could be conveniently supplied.
In view of the advance the position of the Naval Brigade, which was still holding the Pi-tsu-wo end of General Oku’s line, was somewhat delicate. It. had still orders to confine itself to the defence of the landing place. On the 12th, however, General Oku requested the Commanding Officer to take ground a little higher up the river, as the IIIrd Division, to which the brigade was attached, was to move up its course. The request was granted, and leaving their camp to be guarded by one section and the cavalry, the brigade made the desired movement. Next day, as the General’s real advance began, came a further request that the brigade should move still further inland. They were only too pleased to oblige, it is said, as General Shtakelberg’s advance became known, and “the chance of an encounter grew nearer.” But such a movement, it is officially stated, was “beyond the scope of their function.” So soon as the Naval Commander-in-Chief heard of it he directed Admiral Hosoya to inform the officer commanding the brigade “that his duty was to guard the landing place and that as in a few days he would have an important service to perform he was on no account to proceed inland.”2 In accordance with this order, which Admiral Hosoya received on the 14th, the brigade was immediately recalled to its former position. Doubtless it was to their deep chagrin, for on that day and the next General Oku inflicted a severe defeat on the Russians at Telissu. By 2.0 p.m. on the 15th General Shtakelberg was in full retreat on Kai-ping. His attempt had completely failed. At the same time General Oku’s last division was disembarking, the landing place was out of danger, and a few days later the Naval Brigade was recalled to its transports.3
Judged by our own practice, the recall was perfectly correct. The highly trained men who formed the brigade had been drawn from the reserve to which the Admiral had to look for nourishing the crews of his fleet. So long as the enemy had a fleet in being it was unsound to spend them on purely military service. Moreover, as the Admiral had said, he had another use for them, which was strictly within our own traditional limits of combined operations. The “important service” at which he had hinted was quickly declared to them by an order to organise from the brigade a siege-gun corps to assist the Third Army against Port Arthur.
Had the support of General Oku been regarded as a primary function of the fleet a more legitimate form of assistance would have been to send Rear-Admiral Togo back to Tower Hill to interrupt the railway traffic on the line of General Shtakelberg’s retreat. Why that was not done is not clear. At the time there was no serious apprehension of the Port Arthur squadron resuming activity. On June 4th Admiral Togo had issued a general order which opened with the words, “The enemy’s fleet at Port Arthur seems to be immovable.” It was not till after the battle of Telissu was over that news came to hand which forced him to mass his fleet to repel a sortie. The failure of the Japanese to take full advantage of the flexibility of their combined force must be put down to two causes. One was that from inexperience they did not see with the eyes of Wolfe, Abercromby, or Moore, and the other that they still could not shake off the cramping nervousness due to their lack of reserves. So far as we can judge a fine opportunity was certainly missed. Had Rear-Admiral Togo been ordered to repeat his previous bombardment it should have gone far to minimise the failure of the attempt which the army had made to envelop the enemy. It must at least have checked to some extent the orderly retirement which the Russians were able to make, and permitted a repetition of General Oku’s half-delivered blow. Still, regarded as a counter-stroke, the affair, though it fell short of a complete victory, had been a brilliant success. At a sacrifice of 1,150 men in killed and wounded the Japanese had inflicted on their enemy a loss of some 4,000 men besides capturing 16 Q.F. guns and a large quantity of war material. But this was far from being the whole of the account nor was the battle of Telissu the beginning and end of the Russian combination.
With the news of General Oku’s success Admiral Togo received the disturbing intelligence that the Vladivostok cruisers had appeared in the Tsushima Straits. Before General Shtakelberg had been dislodged they were in fact redressing the balance in the teeth of Admiral Kamimura’s greatly superior squadron. The Japanese Admiral, besides his own four armoured cruisers and despatch vessel, had Admiral Uriu’s division of three second-class cruisers and the third-class cruiser Tsushima. The Vladivostok detachment was thus drawing from the Yellow Sea a force of more than double its own strength. Besides the cruisers Admiral Kamimura had one division of first-class torpedo-boats and one of the second-class. There were also two divisions at Takeshiki, and with the above forces he had been made solely responsible for the safety of the Straits since May 3rd.
On taking over he had made the following distribution of his force. Admiral Uriu with his four cruisers and one division of torpedo-boats was stationed at Sylvia Basin to guard the Western Strait. Admiral Kamimura with the armoured cruisers would be at Osaki, at the mouth of the Takeshiki inlet, with another torpedo-boat division, each squadron apparently keeping a patrol ship at sea. He also arranged with Admiral Tsunoda, who commanded at Takeshiki, that the two divisions of torpedo-boats which belonged to the port should be moved to Miura-wan and based there to guard the channel between that place and Okinoshima.4 This distribution, we are told, remained materially unaltered till the middle of June; but seeing how fully alive was the Imperial Staff to the probability of some energetic action on the part of the enemy, the arrangement is difficult to understand, for apparently it left the Eastern Strait dangerously open. Nor does it seem to provide adequate security for the main transport route to and from the Straits of Shimonoseki. Yet transports were continuously passing both homeward and outward-bound, and unless there was a group of them no escort was provided. To what extent he had been called upon for such escort we do not know. It is to be assumed that, as has happened so often before, the long quiescence of the Northern Squadron had raised a presumption that they would never venture to approach so superior a force. Presumably, therefore, it was thought better to risk isolated captures than to exhaust the squadron by perpetual activity. Be this as it may, the disposition, as a method of safeguarding the area in question, was certainly faulty in principle. It was in the nature of an open blockade with no provision made for getting timely news of the hostile squadron’s putting to sea. Without such provision, Osaki, though good enough as against an attempt to break into the Yellow Sea, was not an interior position for the home terminal which lay off the Straits of Shimonoseki. It is true it was sufficient to prevent an enemy’s squadron operating there for more than a few hours, and may therefore be considered justified when no important vessels were on the line of passage, but this at the critical moment was not the case.
On June 15th two important transports had just sailed, each over 6,000 tons and each carrying over 1,000 men. The Hitachi Maru with a battalion of the First Reserve Regiment of the Guards was bound for Ta-ku-shan, where the base of the First Guards Brigade had been established since General Kuroki had thrown it out to his left to assist General Kawamura in threatening Kaiping. The Sado Maru was bound from Yentoa Bay with a railway battalion and electrical engineers for Dalny. Both vessels carried also a large amount of stores and plant. A third transport, the Izumi Maru of 3,200 tons, was also crossing the Straits homeward bound with sick from Yentoa Bay.
No special provision was made for their protection, but Admiral Kamimura’s original disposition had undergone considerable modification, owing apparently to the condition of the squadron. He himself was still at Osaki with all his armoured cruisers, and was keeping steam for 10 knots, but Admiral Uriu had also moved there from Sylvia Basin as two of his ships Takachiho and Niitaka had to go into Takeshiki for repairs. His smallest cruiser Tsushima was out patrolling in the direction of Okinoshima, while the despatch-vessel Chihaya was starting to patrol to the northward. As for the flotilla six boats were anchored at Takeshiki and the other two were with the squadron at Osaki.
At the moment, therefore, there was nothing on guard but the Tsushima. About daybreak she had reached the south-east of Okinoshima and having turned back towards the south of Tsushima Island was at 7.15 about the middle of the channel. Here through the mist that prevailed she saw a steamer coming from the opposite direction and altered her course to examine it. Scarcely had she done so when she sighted smoke away to the north-east, that is, towards Okinoshima. In a few minutes a large four-funnelled cruiser came into view, then another, and then a third with two funnels, and then she knew she was in the presence of the Vladivostok Squadron. She immediately began to call up the Admiral, but getting no response she made away as hard as she could towards the Tsutsu wireless station at the south of Tsushima.
As she went she kept making the warning cypher for an enemy’s fleet, but getting no answer she began repeating “Three three-masted ships of the Vladivostok Squadron are coming south near Okinoshima.” The enemy did not follow her but held their course and she was able to warn four merchant steamers that were in sight to run for shelter, but the transports were not among them. Still she could get no reply—there seemed to be interference—and she was forced to hold on till she lost sight of the enemy in the mist. Nor was it till 8.15 that she took in a signal made by the Takachiho at Takeshiki to the two flagships at Osaki which told that her warning had been received. Twenty minutes later, being satisfied she was within range, she signalled that the enemy were near Okinoshima and that she was steaming in that direction to try to keep touch with them.
The flagship had in fact taken in the warning through Tsutsu at 7.40, but as part of it was unintelligible it was some time before Admiral Kamimura could make out that it really meant “The enemy’s main force is in sight,” and apparently nothing was done. Presently, however, the Iwate took in a clear message from this Tsushima, “ Three three masted ships of the Vladivostok Squadron are coming south near Okinoshima,” and there could no longer be any doubt. The Admiral at once ordered steam in all boilers for 15 knots, summoned everything at Takeshiki to come out, re-called the Chihaya and warmed Shimonoseki to stop all sailings. At 8.35 he got the Tsushima’s last message and as the flotilla had just come down from Takeshiki he sent it away to Kozaki at the south end of the island with orders to direct all eastward bound ships into Takeshiki and to await his arrival. By this time the Tsushima had recovered touch, and at 9.0 a message came in from her to say the Russians were firing on a merchant ship south of Okinoshima. Admiral Uriu in the Naniwa was immediately sent ahead and the Niitaka, who had completed her repairs sufficiently, followed a little latter, but it was not till 9.45 that the armoured cruisers were clear to sea.
Meanwhile the Russians had a free hand. The Tsushima’s report was true. About 9.0 a.m. they had picked up the homeward bound Izumi Maru. The Gromoboi chased and opened fire and it was not till the transport had lost over 30 men, killed and wounded, that she stopped and surrendered. About 100 men sick and whole were taken out of her, and then she was sunk with those who refused to leave her.
The firing was heard by the Tsushima and reported, and also by the other two transports, but by this time it had begun to rain and so short was the range of vision that they could see nothing. About 10.0, however, they suddenly found themselves close to the enemy. Both refused the summons to stop and made off. The Sado was quickly overhauled by the Rurik and as she carried non-combatants it was decided to haul down the flag. Forty minutes grace was given her to abandon ship. Before the work was done however the Rurik received a re-call from the Admiral. Whereupon she fired a torpedo into her prize and finding she did not sink gave her another on the other side, and then left her. Both took effect but still she kept afloat and was ultimately towed into port.
For the Hitachi with the Guards on board there could be no thought of surrender. As the Gromoboi came up to chase her she ran back for the land under a hail of shell. The Naval Officer in charge was quickly killed, but the British master, John Campbell, carried on with no less determination till he too was wounded. A shell in her engine-room then killed the British chief-engineer. By this time her decks were a shambles and she was on fire, and seeing escape was impossible Colonel Suchi who was in command of the troops solemnly destroyed the colours and then “with a smile on his face “committed suicide. The surviving men by his last instructions stripped and took to the sea and of her whole company, both troops and crew, barely 150 were rescued by fishing boats.
During all this time there was no sign of Admiral Kamimura. The weather had grown so thick that he had had to feel for Kozaki before he dared turn out of the western channel and it was not till past noon that he had doubled the cape. Somewhere ahead of him was Admiral Uriu with the Naniwa and Niitaki, and he could only find one division of his torpedo-boats. But now he got a signal from the Tsushima, who was still keeping touch with the enemy, reporting them as four ships (for she mistook a Japanese transport for one of them) going apparently north, 15 miles south of Okinoshima. Thither then the Admiral proceeded at full speed. But the rain was now so heavy that he could barely see 3,000 yards. The two divisions of the squadron had quite lost touch with one another and neither could find a trace of the enemy beyond the wreckage they had left in their path. The Tsushima too had lost them, but hearing the firing on the Hituchi she was able at 1.30 to pick them up again, about five miles south of Okinoshima, steaming north-westerly and then she lost them for good and all.
The usual thing had in fact happened. The Japanese wireless had told Admiral Bezobrasov there must be a squadron near him and having dealt his blow he felt he must get away without carrying out the full programme which had been assigned to him. So without attempting the Western Channel he was making away back under cover of the mist and rain.
Meanwhile Admiral Kamimura was steaming at full speed for the north of Okinoshima believing from the Tsushima’s reports that he would cut across their course near the island. As he proceeded the rain squalls grew more violent and the fog thicker; the range of vision fell very low, and to complete his difficulties his wireless was carried away. On receiving the Tsushima’s last message, saying she had lost the enemy temporarily only 4,000 metres (4,400 yards) away from her, die thought the best way to get in contact would be to close on the cruiser, and accordingly at 2.30 he turned S.E. by E. for the south of the island. At the same time, feeling sure if the enemy were going north they would pass to the west of it, he made ready for coming upon them at close range and gave orders to stand by torpedoes. In an hour’s time he sighted Okinoshima only two miles distant, but without finding any trace of the enemy or the Tsushima. She had in fact gone to the westward to look for him and passing in the fog unseen had fallen in with Admiral Uriu. A message from the Nauiwa to this effect reached Admiral Kamimura and he altered to N.N.W. to close. By 3.50 the three cruisers of the Fourth Division were sighted, but the fog quickly hid them again and for nearly an hour the Admiral tried in vain to get the last word from the Tsushima as to the enemy’s probable course. “Owing,” we are told, “to the frequent passage of messages at that time he was unable to get an answer.” The suggestion is that there was some unhealthy excitement in the squadron which found vent in a reckless use of wireless. Not till 4.45 did the answer come “I think northward.”
Much time had been lost. The fog was thickening and the range of vision had became shorter than ever. It was simply a game of blind man’s buff; what then should the Admiral do? Three courses were open to him. He might stay and hold the protective position assigned to him; he might abandon it in order to try to deal a decisive blow at his enemy; or he might compromise between the two. It was Lord Barnaul’s opinion that the best way to deal with a raiding squadron of this kind, which could not be blockaded, was to make sure that if it put to sea it should never get home again. On this principle he should have steamed straight to Vladivostok. But this would have been to abandon his station and leave the Straits open too long. His decision was to compromise; that is, he resolved to endeavour to get between the enemy and their base without losing touch with the Straits. Judging the Russians in retiring would take the most direct course he therefore made at full speed for Matsushima, the island which lies some 200 miles to the northward of Tsushima, in the direct line to Vladivostok.
Admiral Bezobrasov, however, was quite equal to the occasion. He fully expected the Japanese would chase direct for Vladivostok and instead of taking the most natural course he took the most improbable one, that is up the coast of Japan continuing his depredations as he went.
Two schooners were sunk next day (the 16th). It was beautifully clear and fine, and at 11.0 the raiding cruisers were observed from Dozen, the south island of the Oki Group. At 3.0 they were seen from the northern island with a large prize in company with which they disappeared to the north-westward. The captured vessel was the British ship Allanton (4,000 tons) with coal from Mororan (Endermo) to Singapore. She had been met with off the Oki Islands and on the plea that her papers showed she had been carrying contraband on her last voyage she was detained and taken on with a prize crew.5 All next day no definite news reached Tokyo, only vague reports from Takeshiki and Tsunoshima that firing had been heard during the morning.6
Admiral Kamimura had in fact been completely thrown out. As he proceeded northward to Matsushima on the night of the 15th the squalls increased to such violence that the torpedo-boats had to turn back for shelter, and not till about dawn as the weather mended did Admiral Uriu’s cruisers join him. It was nearly 8.0 a.m. before he made the island. In an hour’s time the horizon was perfectly clear and there was not a sign of the enemy. Concluding they must be making their retreat north by way of Gensan and that there was still a chance of cutting them off he altered course for Cape Bruat. At 5.0 next morning he made it, and having felt no indications of the enemy’s being at sea he altered for Gensan to try to get in touch with headquarters. For this purpose the Chihaya was sent ahead, but it was not till 6.30 p.m. she rejoined the squadron off the port, and then for the first time the Admiral knew that the day before the enemy had been seen off the Oki Islands, and that there were reports of firing that morning in the eastern Tsushima Strait.
From this we are told he concluded—though it is difficult to see why—that the enemy were making for Vladivostok by way of Gensan or Matsushima, and he held away again for the island. Finding no trace of them there he swept southward all next day, the 18th, in line of search, till about 4.0 p.m. the Naniwa began to feel the wireless station at O-Ura, in the north of Tsushima, 120 miles away. It was too far to communicate intelligibly, so he altered towards it, and by 6.40 the messages became clear. At the same time 11th torpedo-boat division rejoined from Takeshiki, and confirmed in detail the messages which were coming through. The staggering news was that three transports had been sunk and that that morning the Russians had been seen cruising off the Tsugaru Strait. To attempt to prevent their return was now hopeless. The Squadron’s coal was nearly exhausted, and in deep chagrin Admiral Kamimura made back for Osaki.
In our ignorance of whether he had any definite orders from the Naval Staff which determined his arrangements, no sure judgment can be passed on him personally, but by whomsoever arranged the watch was faulty, and its failure complete. To a great measure it was certainly due to his not making the most of his force. He had sufficient strength to have detached some at least of his light cruisers to keep touch with the Japanese Signal Stations, but not having done this he was drawn into the common error of acting on mere impressions which he could not verify. A central course between Okinoshima and Matsushima, with a cruiser off each island, should have given him contact, or if it did not he would have failed by bad luck rather than bad judgment.7
Since the catastrophes of April 15th it was the most serious reverse the Japanese had met with, and the shock quite eclipsed the success of the army at Telissu. At Tokyo an angry deputation waited on the Minister of Marine to demand an explanation. The Minister could only reply that the existing disposition had been directed mainly to preventing the Vladivostok detachment breaking into the Yellow Sea. To that end the protection of transports must be subservient. When any considerable number of them were passing special convoy arrangements were always made, but the force available was too small to protect all the isolated ships that were continually in transit, and they had to take their chance. Nevertheless, he promised that, in view of the last deplorable tragedy, special arrangements would be made to prevent its recurrence.
So the end of the great combination on either side was that Port Arthur was doomed to stand a siege, and the Japanese, awakened from their pardonable contempt for their enemy at sea, knew that the communications upon which that siege and the operations for its cover on shore depended were far from safe. It was a revelation that was to have many evil consequences. It shook the confidence of the Japanese people in their fleet, and ere long led to that kind of interference from civil apprehension which a Navy has most to dread in war.
Nevertheless, no blame was attached to the Admiral by his superiors. On the 19th, so soon as it was known that he was back at Osaki, the Chief of the Naval Staff sent him the following telegram: “Your arrangements and appreciations with regard to the recent sortie of the Vladivostok Squadron are considered most appropriate by us in the Admiralty and by those outside who have any knowledge of naval affairs. But there are some who, knowing nothing of such matters, have blamed you, being influenced by misconceptions or by their connections with the men lost in the transports, and they have published criticisms in the newspapers and magazines. As we will here devise some method of letting these people know the real truth you should not look back at this affair but do your utmost to secure the original object. I hope you will achieve a splendid result.”7
1 Diary of an Officer of the Rossiya. Under June 13 he says, “We have now heard what our object is. We are to pass through the East Korean Strait towards the Island of Quelpart and then cruise for two days between Quelpart and Ross Island in order to intercept the Japanese communications with South Korea. We shall return by the West Korean Strait, and if we fail to break through we are to proceed to Port Arthur. Orders have been given to lower the topmasts, as we think, the Japanese, like ourselves, determine the range by the height of them.” He says they had no Barr and Stroud range finders, though they had asked for them before the war.
2 Japanese Confidential History, p. 340.
3 The order to the transports to proceed to Yentoa Bay for the re-embarkation was received on the 19th and the brigade was afloat again on the 22nd. Ibid., Section 11.
4 Miura-wan is a bay on the east coast of the island, opposite Takeshiki, and was connected with it by a canal practicable for destroyers. Okinoshima is the same as the Kotsusima of our Sailing Directions.
5 She was condemned by the Vladivostok Prize Court but released on November 9th on appeal to the Admiralty Council at St. Petersburg.
6 Tsunoshima is a coastal island about 25 miles north of the Straits of Shimonoseki.
7 Japanese Confidential History, Vol. IV., Ch. v., Sec. i., Sub-sec. 2.