CHAPTER XXIV.
THE CRUISER ACTION OFF ULSAN.
[Chart K, Diagram C.]
WHEN during the afternoon of August 11th, the news reached Vladivostok that the Port Arthur squadron was out, the northern cruisers were unready for action. It had been understood, as we have seen, that they were to have timely warning of a sortie. No such warning had been given. Indeed, at the Russian headquarters there was every reason to believe that Admiral Vitgeft was immovable. The last word from him that had come to hand was his telegram received on August 5th, in which he announced that “after prayer and full consideration “his final decision was to perish with the fortress. In reply, the Viceroy had sent him a categorical order to break through the blockade, but there was small hope it would have any more effect than those he had previously given him. Consequently, the Northern Squadron was leisurely coaling and making good defects which had developed during its late cruise off Tokyo Bay. Admiral Iessen’s main attention seems to have been devoted to sending away the transport Lena with troops and stores for Sakhalin. She sailed on August 11th, and when that evening a signal was made for the squadron to prepare for sea the general expectation was that it would proceed in support of the northern expedition.1 The Gromoboi was not quite ready for sea, and it was not till dawn on the 12th that the three cruisers got under way. Admiral Iessen himself took command with his flag in the Rossiya, but not till they had cleared Amur Bay about 11.0 a.m. was anyone allowed to know the destination. At that hour, as the torpedo-boats which had come out with them were sent back, the flagship signalled “Our squadron has left Port Arthur and is now fighting a battle.”
The object of the cruise was thus declared, but owing to the delay in sailing there was but little hope of being able to assist Admiral Vitgeft’s squadron at the critical passage of the Straits. It was calculated that if the action was successful, and the squadron was able to break through, it would be already coming up the Sea of Japan. Admiral Iessen, therefore, spread his ships in line abreast at intervals of three or four miles and hurried southward at 14 or 15 knots, in hourly expectation of sighting his colleague.
But already at Vladivostok the truth was known. No sooner were the cruisers well away than news came in of Admiral Vitgeft’s defeat. A torpedo-boat was immediately sent off to recall the squadron, but she failed to overtake it. The luck had turned. A few hours more delay in starting and the squadron might have remained a thorn in the side of the Japanese for a long time to come, to complicate incalculably the difficulties that were still ahead of them.
At night the squadron closed up into line ahead and all next day carried on to the southward at reduced speed. It was a serious disappointment that nothing had been seen of the expected fleet and the hope was still clung to that it might yet be met with in the Straits. Admiral Iessen informed his captains that at dawn they would be approaching Tsushima, and that it was his intention not to enter the Straits but to cruise all day on the parallel of Fusan. Before dark they had made the land, presumably near Cape Clonard, and held on about parallel with the coast.
At this time, as we know, Admiral Kamimura was to the eastward of them making for Position 410 (30 miles N.E. of Ulsan). The two squadrons must therefore have passed very close to one another in the dark on opposite courses but neither was aware of the other.2 Thus, by dawn, Admiral Iessen succeeded in reaching the parallel of Fusan unobserved and with the Straits wide open. Had it been his intention to pass them he could have run through the Western Channel without finding anything but torpedo-boats in his way. But his plan was not to pass them, and about 5.0 a.m., in accordance with his decision to await the coming of the Port Arthur squadron in the northern approaches of the Straits, he began to turn west towards the Korean coast.
Ever since 1.30 a.m., however, it will be remembered Admiral Kamimura had been steaming back from his northern rendezvous on a course which took him directly to where the Russians were, and the consequence was that no sooner had Admiral Iessen put his helm over than he was aware of the four Japanese armoured cruisers coming up on his line of retreat.
The two squadrons seem to have made each other out simultaneously. At 5.0 a.m. Admiral Kamimura made to the cruisers of Admiral Uriu’s division the wireless cypher for the enemy in sight. At the moment these cruisers were just breaking up the night observation line between Position 406 and Tsunoshima to proceed to their day Patrol Stations.3 Admiral Uriu in the Naniwa was nearest. Position 406, which was his western limit, was only some 10 or 12 miles to the S.E. of the point his chief had reached, and taking in the signal at once he set off to join. The Takachiho was next—her position being 425—but an hour previously she had left it and was steaming south-westward for Kozaki. By 5.15 therefore, when she took in the signal, she would be over 30 miles to the southward. There must have been something not quite clear in the signal for she steamed W.S.W. for half-an-hour before she finally turned north and made away for the scene of action at 14 knots.
Next her again in the line was the Chihaya at Position 443, but at midnight she had left it to take up the B Patrol Station, east of the north end of Tsushima. She missed the call altogether, but at 5.45 hearing firing in the north-west she steered for it. Ten minutes later she took in a signal from Admiral Uriu giving the position of the Vladivostok squadron, and increasing speed to 18 knots she made for the point indicated.
The Tsushima which was at the Tsunoshima end of the line took an entirely different course which is of considerable interest. At dawn she began to move away for the A Patrol Station, and at 5.0 she took in the wireless cypher “Enemy in sight.” Disregarding it, however, she held on as she was, in accordance with her previous instructions for maintaining guard. At 6.14 she got a clear message from both the Naniwa and Takachiho giving the enemy’s position, but as no call accompanied it her captain still considered it his duty to keep his allotted station. Bearing in mind that the orders were to bar the escape of the Port Arthur cruisers, as well as to watch for those from the northward, he argued that the Vladivostok squadron was probably trying to draw Admiral Kamimura ’into the Western Channel so as to clear the way for the passage of the Novik and Askold up the eastern side of the Straits.”4 He therefore decided with a fine grasp of the situation to maintain his appointed position in default of a definite order to leave it. In this he was undoubtedly correct, but the responsibility of the decision should not have been on his shoulders. It was a case of defective staff work which failed to anticipate a very natural contingency and to lay down definite instructions for meeting it.
As for the fifth ship, the Niitaka, all the previous day she had been watching the southern approach to the Straits at Position 222, 40 miles S.W. of Kozaki, but at 8.0 p.m. according to her orders, she had left for Okinoshima. At 5.0 a.m. on the 14th she passed Kozaki as directed, but received no intimation from the Tsutsu wireless station of what was going on; nor was it till 6.15 that she took in from the Naniwa the same signal that Tsushima received, and she having no allotted station made for the position indicated without hesitation.
By that time the action was at its height. By the accident of the two opposed squadrons passing in the night, Admiral Kamimura found himself between his enemy and their base, and with a far better chance than he had yet had of completing their business. His unarmoured cruisers were all on the other side of them in a position to deal with any ships of their own class that might appear from Port Arthur, and altogether his position was highly favourable for a crushing success. To Admiral Iessen the situation was equally clear, and the moment that the appearance of the Japanese cruisers revealed his danger he stopped his westward movement and turned to the eastward towards the open sea with the idea of getting back to the northward round his enemy. But Admiral Kamimura conformed as promptly with a similar turn, gradually edging to E.S.E. and forcing the Russians to the eastward off their course. In about a quarter of an hour both squadrons had settled to these slightly converging courses, and at 5.23 the action began at a range of about 8,500 metres (9,300 yards).
The Russians were slightly ahead, their rear-ship, the Rurik, being abreast of the Japanese flagship Idzumo. But at first the Japanese had the speed and as the range decreased all four ships concentrated on her with their 6-inch guns and distributed their 8-inch. In half-an-hour Admiral Kamimura had worked up to 17 knots, while under the heavy concentration the Rurik was already dropping astern. By 5.50 her range was down to 5,000 metres (5,500 yards)5; torpedoes were got ready and it looked as if the action were about to be settled quickly at decisive range. At this juncture, however, Admiral Iessen suddenly sheered away to starboard and headed south-east.
The intention of this move is nowhere explained. The immediate motive may have been to open out the range, for at this time hits were coming fast. The Japanese noted that all three Russian ships were on fire. An officer of the Rossiya says that about this time his ship received two severe hits besides others which set her on fire, killed the commander, and put three of her 6-inch guns out of action. To the Japanese it appeared that the enemy was abandoning the attempt to get round ahead of them, since, owing to the trouble with the Rurik, that was no longer possible.
Whatever his reason Admiral Iessen held on south-east till 6.0 in spite of the advantage it gave his enemy. For the movement brought the Japanese squadron on his port quarter and as they continued their course they secured an enfilading position. Nor was this all. The sun had now risen behind the Japanese, making it impossible for the Russians to lay accurately, and by holding on as he was Admiral Kamimura kept this advantage. “With the sun behind us,” he says, “we enfiladed the enemy, concentrating on the Rurik.” She was now so far astern as to be practically isolated, and seeing that something must be done to improve the situation, Admiral Iessen decided to make a 16-point turn in succession to starboad. It would at least enable the Rurik to recover station, and at the same time might give the squadron a chance of getting away to the north-westward along the Korean coast.
By Admiral Kamimura the meaning of the movement was not at first understood. As the Russians began to turn to starboard he believed they intended to run off to the southward, and he promptly signalled for a turn together into line abreast in order to chase. But before the evolution could be carried out the Russians were seen to be turning their full 16 points, and realising that they were trying to escape to the north-westward he annulled his order for line abreast and turning in succession nearly 16 points to port he stood away N.W. by W. to cut them off. Thereupon the Russians inclined to the westward, opening out the range till at 6.17 it was over 9,000 metres (9,800 yards) and the Japanese ceased fire. It would seem that at these extreme ranges the Russians had the advantage. At this moment a shell pierced the forward 8-inch turret of the Idzumo, but still Admiral Kamimura held his course without trying to close. The Russians, however, inclined to starboard to continue their effort to escape to the north-westward and the range began to decrease again.
The closing, however, was very gradual, for just when Admiral Kamimura wanted his utmost speed to recover his position on the enemy’s line of retreat the Adzumo, his next astern, began to lose station and he had to slow down from fear of being deprived of her support, and finally it was not till 6.24 he was in action again. At that time the range from the Japanese flagship was down to 8,600 metres (9,400 yards). Admiral Kamimura now led N.W. by W. 
W., and the Russians going about N.W. were a little before his beam. As the Rurik was again dropping astern the concentration on her became heavy and in five minutes it could be seen that she was in trouble with her steering gear. Instead of following the flagship she was turning northward towards the Japanese squadron. The fact was she had been suffering severely. She had been badly hit three times on the port side; there were two holes in the after provision room below the water; and a shell had burst in the room itself, bulging the bulkhead next the tiller flat. The flat was quickly flooded and the water made its way by a ventilating shaft into the steering engine flat, while a third hole below the water line flooded the paint store. All efforts to cope with the water proved unavailing and she signalled “Helm not acting.” Admiral Iessen replied “Steer with the engines.” Thereupon her captain gave orders to set the helm amidships and close the steering engine flat. It was high time, for as she settled aft the water began to pour in by another large hole above the water-line and threatened to flood the ammunition lobby and after magazines. The trouble now became manageable, and steering with the engines she was able to carry on after her consorts, though she continued to drop further and further astern of station.
Being now practically isolated the Rurik continued to receive the fire of all four Japanese ships as they held on in chase of her consorts. The range fell rapidly from 8,000 metres to 6,500 (8,700 to 7,100 yards) and they were soon able to use their 12-pounders. The punishment the Rurik received was now very severe, both to guns and crew. Two boilers were put out of action altogether, but this was not the worst. Suddenly she swerved again to starboard out of the line and nothing the engines could do would keep her from turning towards the enemy. Something fresh had happened in the closed tiller flat. It was supposed that another shot had entered it and in some way jammed the tiller hard-a-port. This was about 6.40. Admiral Iessen promptly abandoned his idea of getting away to the northward and swung round to port in succession to come back to her assistance, in spite of the raking fire to which the turn exposed him at a range of less than 7,000 metres (7,600 yards).
When the range had begun to approach that figure Admiral Kamimura had twice inclined away to starboard as though to keep it open. He appears to have got an occasional hit on the leading Russian ship and he himself had suffered nothing worse than another shell on the fore turret which seems to have done little harm. He had, moreover, headed off his enemy and so soon as the Russian turn was complete we are told he thought it “time to turn as well and press them.” At 6.47, therefore, he turned in succession to starboard 16 points and held back S.E. on a course inclining to that of the enemy. Why, if his idea was to press the Rossiya and Gromoboi, he did not turn together is not clear. His second-in-command was in his rear ship as if for this very purpose, but not once in the whole action was a simultaneous turn used by either side. Whatever his reason the increased range saved him from punishment on the turn and the Rurik herself by her uncontrolled movements prevented her consorts taking full advantage of the situation.
Admiral Iessen’s idea must have been to run down on her engaged side and cover her. By this time having completed half a circle on her involuntary turn, she was heading south and away from the enemy and was nearly stopped. There was thus plenty of room for Admiral Iessen’s manœuvre. As he approached, however, she forged ahead again and swung round to starboard so that he found it would be impossible to pass on her engaged side if he held on. He, therefore, immediately put his helm hard over to port in order to get back ahead of her and draw the enemy’s fire in that way. But as he did so the Rurik, still unable to stop circling, passed between him and the Japanese. The result was as bad as could be. “The enemy,” says the Confidential Japanese History, came up on the disengaged side of the Rurik and turned to starboard, thereby getting their three ships in a line on our starboard side. We poured upon them a very effective fire from which the Rurik, whose range was less than 5,000 metres (5,500 yards), suffered more severely than the others.”
As before Admiral Kamimura, to take full advantage of the position, held his course till the Russian turn was complete. The two squadrons were indeed for a short time on opposite courses and during this time the Russians got in their first serious hit. The Japanese rear ship Iwate received an 8-inch shell which burst in her foremost upper-deck casemate simultaneously with the shell in the gun. The ready ammunition detonated, wrecked the compartment, flung some of the armour overboard and put out of action the next 6-inch casemate and the one on the deck below as well as a 12-pounder. The resulting casualties amongst the crew were extraordinarily severe, for by this one shot she lost 1 officer and 31 men killed besides 43 of all ranks wounded, of whom 1 officer and 8 men subsequently died.6
Immediately after this Admiral Kamimura made his 16-point turn in conformity with that of the Russians, but again it was to port in succession where a simultaneous turn inwards might have been expected. His torpedoes were ready but it would look as though his fear of those of the enemy overcame the desire to use his own, notwithstanding the fact that his gun ammunition was being consumed at a prodigious rate for the effect it was producing at the ranges he kept.
Still he was in time to preserve his dominating position to the northward of the enemy and he did actually come to much closer quarters. For a quarter of an hour the two squadrons fought again on parallel courses about N.W. at over 6,000 metres (6,600 yards). Then (at 7.12) Admiral Iessen began another wide circle to starboard as though to try a second time to get between the Rurik and the enemy. But again her erratic circling prevented him and in eight minutes he was turning back again stern to the enemy. His only desire he says was to draw the fire from the Rurik and he was certainly exposing himself in an heroic manner, for as Admiral Kamimura did not turn till 7.18, four minutes after the Russians began to come back, the range at the critical period of the Russian turn was down to less than 4,600 metres (5,000 yards).
When the Russians, foiled by the Rurik’s manœuvres, turned again to the northward, Admiral Kamimura did not respond at once but keeping steady on the opposite course poured in a concentrated fire on the Rossiya and Gromoboi at ranges of from 6,300 to 5,500 metres (6,800 to 6,000 yards) with marked effect. Indeed, the Japanese claim that at this time the Rossiya was again on fire and that all her forward guns were silenced, and one of her officers says that on her engaged side only three of the five guns could be fired. Still Admiral Kamimura did not turn to follow her; bent on giving the Rurik her coup de grâce he refused to be drawn away from her and held on south-east.
The movement may be regarded as questionable, for now for the first time it left the way open for Admiral Iessen to escape to the northward. But probably by this time it was clear to the Japanese Admiral that he did not intend to desert his injured consort, and sure enough in five minutes the attack on the Rurik brought him back again.
For the third time it would seem his idea was to get in on her engaged side, but as soon as his turn was done Admiral Kamimura, at 7.30, altered to S.S.W., whereby he closed on the Rurik and headed athwart Admiral Iessen’s course. To avoid being crossed the Russians had also to turn south, and thus the two squadrons were brought on nearly parallel courses. The range between the two flagships, which was then about 7,500 metres (8,200 yards), continued for some time constant, but that of Rurik fell to 5,500 metres (6,000 yards), and was kept so by a gradual inclination to port, which brought the Japanese to a S.E. course diverging from that of the Rossiya and Gromoboi. Still, the effect was to bring the Rurik between the Japanese and her consorts, and the position was so excellent for punishing her that Admiral Kamimura kept it till 7.40. By that time, however, seeing that the Rossiya and Gromoboi, by keeping the southerly course, had begun to draw clear, he altered again to S.W. S to close upon them, and keeping his 12-pounders on the Rurik, opened on the Rossiya with his main armament at 8,400 metres (9,200 yards). In five minutes, in spite of the danger, Admiral Iessen turned back to the northward again towards the Rurik. Admiral Kamimura held on, pouring in a heavy fire as the distance between the two squadrons rapidly diminished. By 7.50 the range was down to 5,500 metres (6,000 yards), but by that time they had passed on approximately opposite courses, and it began to increase. Still Admiral Kamimura did not turn, but starboarding a little held on S.W. by W.
His motive is not clear. The course he chose to keep obviously permitted the Russians to get to the northward of him and to deprive him of the dominating position he had hitherto maintained on their line of retreat. He may have been influenced by the fact that Admiral Iessen now turned to the eastward and was passing again on the far side of the Rurik, so that once more he could keep her between him and her consorts. This, in fact, is what he did. As Admiral Iessen passed within hail of the Rurik he called to her, “Full speed to Vladivostok,” and then turned northward. Admiral Kamimura responded by altering to the north-westward across his wake.
The situation was no doubt tempting, and the Japanese Admiral seems to have over-estimated the damage he had done to the Rurik. She had a list to port, her bows were visibly tilted, and her fire had almost died away. No doubt he thought he could quickly finish her and still have time to overhaul the other two ships. From the account of the officer of the Rossiya it would seem that the Russian flagship at this time received very severe punishment. The actual cause of her leading north, he says, was an alarming fire which compelled her to draw off. Two 8-inch shells hit her simultaneously under the forecastle and set fire to some 8-inch cartridges. The upper deck and forecastle were in flames, and the fire rapidly spread down the hoists to two 8-inch magazines below. Of the crew of the five guns which formed the forward group all but seven men were killed or disabled by splinters or burns. She was, in fact, put out of action, and it was not for 20 minutes that with all hands at work the fire was eventually mastered.
There was then at least some reason for Admiral Kamimura’s supposing that he had the situation sufficiently well in hand to devote a few more minutes to the Rurik. Nevertheless, the whole of his movements at this time did involve an error of judgment similar to that which had deprived Admiral Togo of a decisive result four days previously. It was in effect a weak attack on the rear which left the Russians free to fight or fly as they pleased, and surrendered to them the initiative. It is probable that Admiral Kamimura himself was conscious of the mistake, for his narrative at this period of the action is so obscure and vague that it is only from the track-chart we can learn what he did.
There can be little doubt that he left the Rossiya and Gromoboi to escape if they liked, and, content with having driven them off, devoted the attention of his whole squadron to finishing the almost helpless Rurik. By 8.0 he had passed across Admiral Iessen’s course, who by that time was beyond effective range. Then he turned, but instead of chasing to the northward he altered in succession to port and then heading to the eastward kept his whole squadron on the Rurik at a mean range of 4,500 metres (5,000 yards). For a time it is true these tactics appeared to be justified, for though the overwhelming attack failed to finish the Rurik, it did for the fourth time bring Admiral Iessen back to her rescue. At 8.8, by which time the fire on board the flagship had been got under, he turned 16 points in succession and ran back south, for a last effort to save the Rurik. Here, again, the official Japanese narrative fails us. “The two Russian ships,” it says, “which had fled northward altered course at 8.8 . . . . and steamed towards us, whereupon we altered course to north. . . . The action recommenced furiously.” The individual narratives of the ships slur over this part of the action altogether. What the track chart shows (and the captain of the Idzumo confirms it) is that Admiral Kamimura did not at once turn north, but held his course eastward across the bows of the Rossiya and Gromoboi until 8.14, and not till that time did he alter to the northward. Nor even then did he keep a northerly course; for as soon as the Rossiya was within 7,000 metres (7,700 yards) he inclined away to starboard, presumably for the purpose of bringing the guns of his whole line to bear in oblique concentration on the Russians as they came south.7
Meanwhile, as Admiral Iessen came down he had signalled to the Rurik, “Proceed to Vladivostok.” She had answered and turned to the north, and seeing, as he says, from her bow wave that she seemed to be steaming full speed he turned back again. Now if ever it might have been expected that the Japanese in their excellent position might have finished the business. As Admiral Jessen turned his two ships all four of the Japanese were concentrating on him at a minimum range of 6,000 metres (6,600 yards).8 What the effect was we do not know exactly. At this time, the officer of Rossiya reports, “the remaining guns were put out of action one after the other; casings and funnels were shot through; we had holes on the water line and a list; all five torpedo tubes were disabled; a torpedo had burst in one of them; two masts were riddled; shells flew continuously; small fires broke out which we could not get under; two boilers were damaged.” . . . Yet to the mortification of the Japanese the turn was accomplished apparently without any vital damage and the two ships went off about N. by E., with the way to Vladivostok open. The Japanese were now in fact on their starboard quarter from 7,000 to 8,000 metres away (7,700 to 8,700 yards), and both Russian cruisers had an excellent chance of escape. Much in the same way as Admiral Togo, Admiral Kamimura had thrown away the game. From a false appreciation of the controlling conditions he had suffered himself to be too much preoccupied with a crippled ship in the enemy’s rear, and so by failing to keep a determined hold on their van had forfeited his dominant position. What was he to do? The Rurik was at this time struggling to the northward after her Admiral, but so far from going full speed she was falling rapidly astern. He must now finally choose between her and her two consorts.
The decision was quickly made. The list of the injured ship had increased, she was heavily down by the stern, and it was clear she could have little power of resistance left, while Admiral Kamimura’s strength had increased. As early as 6 o’clock the Naniwa had come up, and about an hour later, the Takachiho had joined her. Since then Admiral Uriu had been doing his best to keep on the Admiral’s disengaged quarter just out of range, and he was now with his two ships about five miles to the south-eastward of the Rurik. Only two or three of her guns seemed to be in action, and at last Admiral Kamimura made up his mind to leave her to his second. So soon therefore as the Russians had started on their northerly course he turned parallel and gave chase, taking with him the Chihaya, which had also joined, and for more than an hour had been hovering on his disengaged side. But the range was now too great for really effective firing, ammunition was getting low, and the chase was likely to be a long one. In view of the disheartening failure of their last effort orders were issued that fire must be very deliberate and under the strictest control, for there was no sign that the speed of the Rossiya and Gromoboi was dropping or that their injuries were serious.
At 8.30 Admiral Iessen in order to draw his enemy away from the Rurik sheered to starboard and headed to the eastward. Whether or not Admiral Kamimura saw in this movement an attempt to cross his bows he did not use the chance for closing the range which was then over three miles, but immediately conformed by altering to N.E. by E.9 Satisfied apparently by the success of his movement Admiral Iessen then altered to N.E. On these slightly diverging courses the action continued for a quarter of an hour, the Japanese keeping up a slow and deliberate fire from their 8-inch, but without sufficient effect to check the Russian speed. Then at 8.44 Admiral Iessen turned sharply to N.N.W., that is on his true course for Vladivostok, and brought his pursuers four miles on his starboard quarter. His position was thus considerably bettered. All Admiral Kamimura could do was to conform with a similar turn and settle down to a stern chase four miles to the bad.
Meanwhile the Naniwa and Takachiho, passing across the wake of the armoured cruisers, had closed the Rurik, and at 8.42 had opened fire on her at 6,500 metres (7,100 yards). As the Japanese approached she had altered to N.W. to avoid them and was now steering fairly well. But they had the speed of her and as the range diminished hits came fast. Shortly before 9.0 she circled again and then struggled northward. This enabled Admiral Uriu to pass athwart her stern and when he had done so he turned and stood back to cross her again. By the time he had settled on his new course she had lost all control and began moving helplessly in small circles. For three quarters of an hour this went on while the two Japanese cruisers circled round her firing continually at ranges which varied from over four miles to a mile and a half. The reply grew feebler and feebler. Both Japanese cruisers had been hit once and between them they had lost 2 men killed and 2 officers and 15 men wounded. But by 10.5 it was all over and Admiral Uriu signalled to cease fire, having expended over 650 rounds of 6-inch.
The last shot had burst in the Rurik’s conning tower and had killed the captain, who had been lying there wounded since the beginning of the action, and wounded Lieutenant Ivanov, who was in command. Though he was flung clear out on the deck he was able to pick himself up and visit the battery. He saw at once that further resistance was hopeless. He had tried to ram but the ship was too much out of control; a torpedo had been fired from the stern tube, but without effect; the other tube had been smashed and its torpedo exploded; and fearing the Japanese would board he ordered the Kingstons to be opened. He also directed the only unwounded officer to prepare to blow up the torpedo magazine, but the Bickford fuse that was ready had been destroyed in the conning tower and the remainder was in the flooded tiller flat. The wounded were brought on deck and furnished with life belts and pieces of wood, for there was not a boat that would float; and so she began to settle slowly.
For Admiral Uriu there was no hurry. The Niitaka had just signalled she was coming up with two torpedo-boats. It was two hours and a half since he had called up the Tsushima and she too was coming near at full speed with three other torpedo-boats. Till half past seven she had resolutely maintained her position watching single-handed for the Port Arthur cruisers. At 7.0 she was joined by two boats of the Kure flotilla which had come away to learn what the firing meant and they were sent back with a warning to keep a sharp look-out both to the north and south-west. Half-an-hour later she received the call which Admiral Uriu had sent her just as the Takachiho was joining him. She started at once at full speed and having picked up three boats of the 9th torpedo division from Takeshiki was now close at hand. The Chihaya, following the armoured division, received the information that the Rurik was sinking at 9.45 and was trying to convey it to the Admiral. But unfortunately she was not able to communicate and so could do nothing to allay the increasing anxiety he felt with every mile the chase carried him away from the position he had been charged to hold.10
His situation was certainly not without difficulty. The last orders he had received were to bar the Straits against the ships that had escaped Admiral Togo. Among them were two, if not three, cruisers as powerful as those he had left behind him, and besides there was the Tsesarevich, which for all he knew might have completed her repairs at Kyau-chau. Further there were his strict instructions not to chase wide unless he was sure of effective contact, and of this he could not be sure. At 9.30 the Adzumo, his next astern, broke down again in her engine room and the Tokiwa by a great effort took her place. He was still securing hits, fires were continually breaking out in both Russian ships, but their speed appeared to be well maintained. According to Admiral Iessen it had fallen to 15 knots, and why the Japanese did not overhaul him more quickly is not explained. By 9.45, according to the official track-chart—that is, after nearly an hour and a half’s chase—Admiral Kamimura had only brought the range down to 5,000 metres (5,500 yards). Then it seems, for some unknown reason, instead of making a last effort to close he edged away to starboard and the range began to increase again, till by 10.0 o’clock it was nearly 6,500 metres (7,100 yards). By that time he was some 25 miles north of the scene of the main action which made him some 60 miles north of Tsushima. To all appearance he would have to chase twice the distance to secure a decisive result and that would mean leaving the Straits wide open and his light cruisers unsupported. Ought he to go on?
At this juncture his gunnery officer made a report that the Idzumo had expended all but a quarter of her ammunition supply.11 This seems to have been a mistake. The flagship fired in all 255 rounds of 8-inch, 1,085 of 6-inch, and 910 of 12-pounder, which was only about half her supply. But the report seems to have decided the Admiral. For a minute or two he developed his full intensity of fire, and then at 10.5, seeing no visible effect, turned back 16 points and abandoned the chase.
His real reasons we cannot tell. He admits the enemy’s fire was dying, while his own was scarcely affected. The Idzumo had been hit over 20 times, but the Iwate was the only ship that had suffered at all seriously. In the other ships the casualties were negligible, and the Adzumo moreover had repaired her damage. If we turn to the Confidential History for an explanation we find nothing adequate or convincing. “The action,” it says, “had been a long one (nearly five hours). During the chase all the guns’ crews were warned to fire slowly and to make certain of their aim. But at 10.0 o’clock it was reported to Admiral Kamimura that the Idzumo’s ammunition was running short. Seeing that the enemy’s speed had not slackened in the slightest in spite of the waning of their gun fire he considered it better to use his remaining ammunition in sinking the Rurik, and making certain that she at least did not escape.”12
If this and not his order to bar the Straits was his reason surely it was a bad one for loosing his grip on the “enemy in sight.” Could he not have trusted to his flotilla to finish the Rurik, and would he have gone on if the Chihaya had been able to communicate her news in time? And what if he had gone on?
In the Rossiya were eleven holes, and in the Gromoboi six, on or below the water line. The casualties were over 50 per cent. of the officers, and 25 per cent. of the men. Three of the Rossiya’s funnels were badly damaged and three of her boilers disabled, and it is said that in expectation of a close attack, after the last burst of fire from the Japanese, preparations had actually been made to sink her. When, therefore, the Russians saw their enemy suddenly turn they were filled with astonishment, and could only conjecture that a failure of ammunition had saved them from what had seemed inevitable destruction.
And all this time the Chihaya was doing her best to let Admiral Kamimura know he need have no anxiety for the Rurik. Her feeble fire had wholly ceased exactly at the time he had turned back, and the Chihaya had seen she was on the point of sinking. She signalled this to the Idzumo, but getting no reply tried to communicate with the Iwate. But it was 10.45 before she got through. Five minutes later she took in a message from the Niitaka that the Rurik had just sunk. She had come up just in time to see the end and had hurried north to carry the news, and it was at once passed on by the Chihaya. There was still time to renew the chase had Admiral Kamimura known it, for directly he had turned back the Russians had been compelled to stop to repair damages. As it was the message had no effect and he held on his course for the spot where the Rurik had gone down.
There he found his cruisers and torpedo-boats busy rescuing the remains of the Russian crew. The ship had settled so quietly that there had been no suction and nearly all the survivors of the action were saved, to the number of 625 officers and men out of a complement of 805. By 1.0 p.m. the work was done and Admiral Kamimura led his squadron back for his base, telegraphing through O-Ura as he went a report of the action to Tokyo and to the Commander-in-Chief.
In reply he received from the Japanese headquarters a message congratulating him on his victory. Yet the real honours lay with his opponent. In his effort to hold out a hand to the Port Arthur squadron, Admiral Iessen had been caught in a trap by a force which may fairly be regarded as almost double his own, and yet in face of these overwhelming odds and desperate situation he had managed to bring off two-thirds of his squadron. As for the lost ship, her resistance had been such as to reflect the highest honour on the Russian service and to secure the escape of her two consorts. That Admiral Kamimura did not obtain a more decisive result was undoubtedly due partly to the long ranges he persistently maintained, and partly to his not having with equal resolution kept his position on the enemy’s line of retreat. For this he alone was responsible, but in refusing to close he was only acting in accordance with the policy which the Japanese had adopted all through as an exigency of the naval situation.
