[Chart B 2 and Map E.]
IN the British Naval Service long experience has established the creed that it is scarcely possible for any strategical considerations to justify a failure to do all that is possible to take or destroy an enemy in sight. If any fresh testimony could strengthen that creed it is to be found abundantly in the two indecisive actions just related. Let it be granted that the precarious position of the Japanese Navy, its inferiority to that of the enemy and its lack of reserves, did much to justify the caution which both Admirals had displayed. Nevertheless that caution, whether justified or not, told its almost inevitable tale, and quickly revealed to the Japanese that their two victories were little more than minor strategical successes which left the crucial difficulties of their problem unsolved.
The unsatisfactory nature of the result began to display itself at once in the period of hurry and confusion which followed Admiral Kamimura’s failure. It is a period, moreover, well worth study as exhibiting the difficulty of reconciling the relations between a directing War Staff and an admiral in supreme command at sea, so soon as an action breaks the calculable development of a war plan.
It will be remembered that at the moment when the Vladivostok cruisers suddenly appeared the attention of both the Commander-in-Chief and the Naval Staff was directed to dealing with the ships which had escaped the main Japanese fleet and had taken refuge in neutral ports. To this end the Commander-in-Chief had detached from his own fleet the Third Division under Admiral Dewa to the southward for the purpose of dealing with the Tzesarcvich at Kyau-chau. On a further suggestion from Tokyo he had also ordered Admiral Kamimura to despatch Admiral Uriu with the Fourth Division to Shanghai to look after the Askold and anything else that might be there. But as this would deprive the Straits Station of all its light cruisers, he had told Admiral Dewa to send to Takeshiki the Chitose, which was coming down with his final orders, and the two auxiliary cruisers Nippon Maru and Hong-Kong Maru. He himself had his hands full at Port Arthur. The watch outside was committed to Admiral Kataoka with the Nisshin, Kasnga, and Yaeyama. The Fifth Division, under Admiral Yamada, was told off to assist the left wing of the army in the general assault for which General Nogi was about to begin the preliminary operations. The Battle Division was at the Elliot Islands, and on the 14th Admiral Togo was in conference with the General as to the terms of capitulation that were to be offered before the final assault was delivered.
There may have been some difference of opinion. The other three armies in Manchuria had by this time fought their way to within 16 miles of Liau-yang. The accumulation of the necessary supplies at the front was just being completed and everything was ready for the final concentric advance. In these circumstances it is natural that the Army Staff would be anxious to see Port Arthur capitulate on any reasonable terms in order to set General Nogi’s army free to reinforce the main operations in Manchuria. The conditions, then, that General Nogi was authorised to offer were that the garrison, with arms, baggage, and colours should be permitted to march out and join the army of General Kuropatkin. With regard to the fleet, however, no such terms could be for a moment entertained by the Admiralty, and when Admiral Togo was consulted by the General as to the gist of the summons he replied that there was only one condition on which he must insist. That was that every ship in the port must be surrendered at discretion.1
Whether any pressure was brought to bear on the Naval Staff to consent to a modification of this peremptory demand we do not know. Two whole days elapsed before the summons was sent, and in the interval news came in which could only stiffen the Commander-in-Chief. On the 13th Admiral Rozhestvenski had hoisted his flag in the Baltic Fleet and during the next afternoon Admiral Togo heard the unsatisfactory results of the Ulsan action. The naval condition of the summons remained unaltered, and the Admiral devoted himself to a resumption of the operations consequent on his own battle, which the appearance of the Vladivostok cruisers had interrupted.
Most important of these was the work entrusted to Admiral Dewa, whose position had been made so difficult by conflicting orders and uncertain intelligence. It will be remembered that on August 12 the Naval Staff, on a report that the Russian ships apparently had left Kyau-chau after completing their repairs, had requested Admiral Togo to send him with a division of destroyers “at full speed to Kyau-chau to watch the Russian Squadron.” He was at once detached with the Yakumo, Asama, Takasago, and the Nippon Maru, and other units were to join later. But it would seem that the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the information on which the Staff had acted, for Admiral Dewa was sent, not direct to Kyau-chau, but to a preliminary rendezvous off Ross Island, and was further told to keep up wireless connection with Hakko “in order to ascertain the intelligence concerning the enemy at Kyau-chau Bay.” Admiral Togo’s caution was not unjustified, for towards the evening on his way down Admiral Dewa received an order from the Staff that he was to proceed off Shantung Promontory and keep a look-out there, as the Novik and some destroyers had left that morning. If this were true Admiral Dewa conceived it was far too late to intercept them, since it would be dark before he could reach the assigned position. He had therefore taken upon himself to disobey and carry on with the Commander-in-Chief’s instructions. By 4.0. p.m. on the 13th he had his whole force assembled at his rendezvous off Ross Island, and though it was 24 hours since he started on his mission, no move had yet been made for Kyau-chau. The reason for this was that at 9.30 that morning the Takasago, which it will be remembered had been sent on to get touch with Peng-yong-do, passed him on a message from the Commander-in-Chief to say that the Tzesarevich was in Kyau-chau and the Askold and Novik outside. He also told him the Chitose was on her way to join him, and that after midnight he was to bring his flagship in touch with Hakko. This he did, and at 7.0 next morning, having failed to get any information whatever during the night, he decided to spread his squadron to the southward in hopes of catching anything that might be trying to run the Straits from Kyau-chau.
Scarcely had the movement begun when, at 7.30 a.m., he got touch with the Chitose, and at last had something definite to go on. Her message was that the Tzesnrevich in a much damaged condition was in Kyau-chau Bay with some destroyers, that the Askold and one destroyer had gone into Wusung, and that the Novik was no one knew where, but probably off Shanghai. He was, therefore, at once to proceed to Kyau-chau to demand that the Tzesnrevich should leave and to capture or destroy her. One ship should be sent into the port to take advantage of the German 24-hour rule. The Chitose and the two auxiliary cruisers were to be sent to Takeshiki, and in their place he would have the Kasagi.
On these instructions he at once sent away the Chitose detachment, stopped his spreading movement, ordered the Takasago to Ui-do to pick up his destroyer division that was coaling there, and shortly after 9.0 started with his two armoured cruisers Yakumo and Asama for Kyau-chau. But scarcely was he two hours on his way when a signal was taken in from the Takasago to say that Admiral Kamimura was in action with the Vladivostok squadron and that he was to remain in touch with Hakko till further orders. Thereupon he turned back, recalled the Chitose and her consorts, and proceeded to re-assemble his squadron at Ui-do.
It was many hours before any further news or orders reached him. Admiral Kamimura had not telegraphed to Headquarters the result of his action till 1.30 p.m., as he passed O-Ura on his way to Takeshiki. It had been his intention to make good his damages there, but on further consideration he decided it would be better to take his armoured cruisers in to Sasebo. He therefore ordered Admiral Uriu to take over the guard of the Straits with the Fourth Division, and was about to start when orders came in from the Admiralty which upset the arrangement.
Early in the morning of the 14th it had become known that the Novik had left Kyau-chau at dawn on the 12th, and during the afternoon the Foreign Office received intelligence that at 10.15 a.m. on the 13th a neutral merchantman had sighted a cruiser resembling her midway between Nagasaki and Shanghai, standing apparently for the Van Dieman Strait. At 5.25 p.m. this information was sent on to Admiral Kamimura. “I hope,” the Staff message concluded, “you will send if possible two fast ships with all despatch to the Tsugaru Strait.” The Tsushima and Niitaka, which had had no part in the action, were at once selected.
Scarcely was this done when a message was received from Admiral Togo which in its turn upset the new arrangement. It is somewhat difficult to understand. It will be remembered that early on the 14th he had directed Admiral Kamimura to send the Fourth Division to Shanghai to deal with the Askold and the destroyer that was with her. This instruction Admiral Kamimura did not receive, and in the course of the morning the Commander-in-Chief was informed that for diplomatic reasons it must be modified. He must defer any warlike operations at Shanghai, for the Government had decided to make diplomatic representations to China in the first instance. They were demanding that as the Russian ships had been there for 24 hours they should either be compelled to put to sea or disarmed. They also informed the Chinese Government that if these conditions were not complied with they would be forced to take such action as they considered suitable, and that the responsibility for the consequences would rest on the neutral Government.
What further communications, if any, passed between the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief we do not know. During the afternoon it would seem that Admiral Togo received intelligence that there was another Russian ship at the Saddle Islands outside Shanghai. At all events, without any further instructions from Tokyo, so far as we are aware, he sent that night to Admiral Kamimura another order in place of the previous one which he had never received. “You must immediately,” it ran, “send the Fourth Division and the Iwate to destroy the enemy’s ship which is near the Saddle Islands, and to take action about the Askold. You will receive direct orders about the treatment of the Askold from the Imperial Staff. With the remainder of your squadron you will rigidly bar the Korean Strait, looking out for Russian ships which may come from the south.”
This order, which was clearly incompatible with those which Admiral Kamimura had just received from Tokyo, must have reached him as he was about to start for Sasebo.2 In the conflict of instructions he appears to have been at a loss what to do, and he decided to do nothing. The orders to the Tsushima and Niitaka for chasing the Novik were cancelled, and leaving them with the Chihaya and the flotilla to guard the Straits, at 3.0 a.m. on the 15th he started for Sasebo with the armoured division, directing Admiral Uriu to follow with his two remaining cruisers.
Here then was an excellent chance for the Novik to get through to Vladivostok. Some 24 hours previously, that is, at half-past five on the morning of the 14th, avoiding the Van Diemen Strait, she had passed round south of Yakushima, and was well on her way north. Though she had been sighted by a Japanese merchant ship, the information had not yet come to hand, and it was many hours before the confusion could be cleared for the chase to be reorganised. The necessary order reached Admiral Kamimura at 6.45 a.m., as he, was making his way to Sasebo. It was from the Commander-in-Chief, instructing him to send the Chitose and Tsushima in chase. Unfortunately the Chitose’s captain, as senior officer, would command the detachment, and owing to his recall by Admiral Dewa on the previous day he was not yet within touch. Admiral Kamimura therefore carried on to Sasebo, where he arrived a little before noon, and not till then did he issue his orders for the chase. The instructions were to proceed with all despatch to the Tsugaru Strait and co-operate with the station guard in endeavouring to destroy the enemy in the Strait.
The Tsushima being then on her way to Sasebo, received the order without delay, but where the Chitose was she did not know. Her captain, therefore, fearing he would lose a chance, decided to set off for Tsugaru alone and join the Chitose there. He did his best, so he says, to communicate his intention, but he could make nobody hear. Meanwhile, however, the news that the Novik had passed Yakushima had come to hand, and he took in an order from the Chief of the Staff to act as he had already resolved to do. As for the Chitose, she heard nothing till, at sundown that evening, she reached Osaki, and it was not till half-past-three next morning she was able to get away on the Tsushima’s heels.
From this time onward the chase was directed from Tokyo by Admiral Ito. The Tsushima reached Hakodate about sunset on the 17th, where the Chitose joined her at one the next afternoon. In spite of urgent orders to all signal stations to be specially vigilant, there was no more news of the chase. The orders that night from Tokyo were for both ships to cruise off the west of the strait, and if by 8.0 a.m. on the morning of 19th nothing had been seen of the chase they were to separate, the Tsushima remaining in the Tsugaru Strait and the Chitose going north to search La Pérouse Strait.
Next morning as the Novik had not appeared these instructions were carried out. But the Chitose had been on her way north no more than an hour when a message reached the Admiralty from a signal station at Atoiya, in the north of Yezo, that the Novik had passed the Kuril Islands by the channel between Yetorup and Urup. It was obvious, therefore, that she was trying to reach Vladivostok by La Pérouse Strait, and the Tsushima was ordered to follow the Chitose thither with all speed. They would be well in time, for it was certain that the chase would have to coal at Korsakovsk.
Before 10.0 next morning the two ships were together in La Pérouse Strait. The Chitose had been searching it for the last two hours and as the Novik had not been seen the Tsushima was sent away to look into Korsakovsk. By 4.0 p.m. she was in sight of the place and could see smoke rising from the anchorage. As the Japanese had expected, the Novik was there. In spite of using economical speed, her wide detour in the Pacific had forced her to put in for coal and water, and at sunrise she had begun to take in the necessary supplies. As the work proceeded she had felt the Japanese wireless. Later on traces of the Tsushima’s smoke were seen, and in the early afternoon her captain, who had intended to run the strait in the night, decided to put to sea at once for fear of being trapped.
Accordingly, as the Tsushima drew on she quickly made out the chase steaming south for La Pérouse Strait. Signalling the warning to the Chitose, she put on full speed and headed to cut the enemy off. At 4.30 she opened fire; the Novik replied with spirit, and a sharp and well-sustained action ensued. The match was, however, unequal. The Tsushima was somewhat larger and better protected, and against the Novik’s six 4·7 guns she carried an armament of six 6-inch and ten 12-pounders. She was, moreover, fresh and uninjured, and the advantage told quickly. In a little over half an hour the Novik was seen to turn back and make for Korsakovsk. The practice of the Tsushima must have been good, for by this time the Russian had half her boilers out of action, she had been hit five times on the water line, and her steering compartment was flooded. So soon as the Novik turned, the Tsushima gave chase, but only for half an hour. The Novik was not yet quite beaten. She returned the fire, and at 5.40 got in a hit on the water line which filled two of the Tsushima’s compartments and gave her so heavy a list that she was forced to abandon the chase and stop for emergency repairs.
While she was thus engaged the Chitose joined, and together they watched the port all night. At dawn next day the Chitose drew in to complete the business, but only to find the Novik beached on a sandbank with boats and launches busy removing her gear and crew. The fact was that during the night her captain had come to the conclusion it was impossible to save her. Her steering gear was smashed beyond repair and the searchlights outside told him that another cruiser had joined his adversary. Escape being thus impossible, he had decided to sink his ship in shallow water. Realising what had happened, the Chitose stood in, and at 8,500 metres (9,300 yards) she opened fire. There being no reply, she gradually moved in to 4,000 (4,400 yards). At that range she put a score of hits into the wreck, and then getting to within 2,500 metres (2,700 yards) she was able to satisfy herself that no more was required and drew off. So the affair ended, and the two cruisers returned south with a smart piece of work to their credit.
At Kyau-chau things had gone equally well. It was not till 7.35 p.m. on the 14th that Admiral Dewa received a final order from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed. Starting at once, he arrived off the port with his four cruisers and his flotilla early on the 16th, and sent in two of his Staff to inquire of the German authorities what they intended to do with the Tzesarevich and the three destroyers that were with her. The Governor informed them that all four ships had hauled down their flags the previous day and had handed over their breechblocks and the main parts of their engines, and that they were now landing torpedoes and ammunition. As to the crews, no orders had been received from home for their disposal, but the ships themselves would have to discharge their whole armament and remain where they were till the end of the war. Thereupon Admiral Dewa withdrew his squadron, and next day rejoined the flag just in time for the crisis which had developed at Port Arthur.
At Shanghai there was more trouble. The replies of the Askold’s captain to the Chinese authorities were so unsatisfactory that at the Japanese Government decided that they must back their diplomatic procedure with a show of force. Accordingly on the 19th Admiral Uriu received orders from the Staff to start with the Tokiwa, Naniwa, Niitaka, and two torpedo-boats, and on the 20th he established a naval blockade of the port outside territorial waters, but refrained from sending in a ship as the Russian destroyer was reported still capable of action. It was over a week before he could get any satisfactory assurance that the Chinese authorities had done their duty. But as his own Government—in deference to the susceptibilities of the Powers—had given him strict orders not to violate neutral waters he could do no more. On the 25th he was told that both the Askold and the destroyer had hauled down their flags, but as their repairs were still going forward he was obliged to maintain his position. Finally, it was not till the 31st that he was informed the enemy were disarming, and felt he could submit to headquarters that he should be recalled. “At this pressing time,” he urged, “it seems a bad plan to keep uselessly in this district an appreciable part of our force.” Still it was a week before he received the desired permission. To the difficulty of trusting to the firmness of the Chinese was added the fact that for the past week the Diana had appeared at Saigon, and in spite of active negotiations with the French Government, no agreement had yet been reached as to her disposal. It was not till September 6th that the Staff was able to inform Admiral Uriu that it was definitely settled that she was to disarm, and that he was at liberty to withdraw as convenient. He was told, however, he must do everything he could to keep the withdrawal secret. On these instructions he sailed after sunset the same day, and on the 8th was back at Tsushima.
The “pressing time” to which he had referred in urging his recall, was the outcome of the severe disappointment which the Japanese had received at Port Arthur. The grand assault, which in the confidence of their continued success ashore they had no doubt would finally dispose of the squadron it contained, had been fixed originally for August 21st. The fact, however, that the Russian Squadron had effected its retreat to the port in little decreased strength, so far as the Japanese knew, rendered it highly desirable that the attack should take place at the earliest possible moment, before the shock of the defeat at sea could be recovered. Certain preliminary operations were necessary, which General Nogi did not feel he could forego, but he consented to advance the main operation by three days and fixed it for the 18th, the same day the final advance on Liau-yang was to begin. The Eastern defences had been settled as the front of attack, but with a view of distracting attention from it and of tightening the investment the Japanese right wing, which since the end of July had rested on Louisa Bay, was to be swung round till it reached Pigeon Bay. The preliminary movements were to begin on the 14th, but owing to mist and heavy rain they had to be postponed till the 15th. Even then so unfavourable did the weather continue that progress was very slow. Still the advance was made good to a point half-way between the two bays, and on the 16th it was decided, as we have seen, to summon the garrison.
In the midst of these proceedings an alarm came from General Nogi’s Staff that the squadron was putting to sea. Admiral Togo immediately left the base with the Battle Division to take up his intercepting station, but Admiral Hosoya was soon able to inform him that the alarm was false. Still in the opinion of Admiral Togo it might well have been true. He, above all men, was convinced that the squadron would put to sea again; and as, like everyone else, he looked upon the speedy fall of the fortress as practically assured, he believed the sauve qui pent could not be long delayed.
So far, then, from releasing his vigilance, he felt he must increase the stringency of the blockade. Abandoning altogether the open form, he established practically his whole squadron at stations before the port. He himself with the Battle Division cruised about Round Island during the day, retiring at night to Position H, about 22 miles N.E. of Shantung Promontory, with the Kasuga thrown out to Position 1183, which was some 40 miles S. by E. of Port Arthur and 25 miles N.E. of Chifu. He thus kept connection with the Third Division, which as soon as it returned from Kyau-chau was stationed south of Liau-ti-shan. The Fifth Division was off Cap Island during the day and at night patrolled about Round Island. The Sixth Division, whose day station was close off the port, maintained a night patrol near Position P, just south of Encounter Rock. The Seventh Division, which Admiral Hosoya was directing from Dalny, was engaged in the direct support of the army. The bulk of it was stationed between Ping-tu-tau and Lung-wang-tang, with orders to push the swept area as far as possible towards the Russian right, while the divisional flagship Fuso remained permanently at Dalny with the special duty of “keeping up certain and rapid communication between the army and the fleet.” The rest of the division, known as the “Saiyen detachment,” was at Louisa Bay, where, covered by the Third Division, it was to stop blockade-runners and support the extreme right of the army.3 The flotilla patrol stations were also re-arranged to prevent more effectually the entrance of the enemy’s supply ships and to give more immediate warning of a sortie, and as a precaution against a repetition of the recent ineffective night attacks they were strictly ordered to use B-class torpedoes only, and at ranges of less than 800 metres.
This form of close blockade was now maintained permanently. There was no further return to the base even for coal and water. The First and Third Divisions coaled at sea near Round Island, the Fifth and Sixth at Odin Cove, and the flotillas at Ping-tu-tau. The arrangement dated from the day General Nogi gave the Admiral notice that the general assault was about to begin. On the 17th word reached the flagship that the Russians had curtly refused to treat, and that the attack would open on the morrow. It was on this day that Admiral Togo issued the last of his series of orders, and the gravity with which he viewed the crisis is strongly reflected in the clause with which they concluded. “The existence of the Empire,” it ran, “depends solely on the ability of the Combined Fleet to destroy the remainder of the Russian Squadron. Every man, with no thought of danger or hardship, must do his utmost, determined to allow not even the smallest of the enemy to escape.”
If the Commander-in-Chief was seriously anxious it was little wonder, and it is not difficult to imagine his feelings when, in the midst of straining his force to the utmost to make his last dispositions, he heard that the Admiralty had given Admiral Kamimura permission to begin docking his ships at Sasebo. He immediately protested, submitting that until the Port Arthur Squadron was satisfactorily disposed of the guard of the Tsushima Strait must be strictly maintained. The Admiralty at once gave way; the docking of the Second Squadron was postponed, and Admiral Kamimura was ordered back to his station.
As it happened, the Commander-in-Chief had one day’s grace to perfect his arrangements. Continued bad weather made all operations impossible on the 18th, and it was not till the 19th that the attack began in earnest. While it was directed chiefly against the works of the east face, the guns of the Naval Brigade gave their main attention to the dockyard. During the two days it continued the right wing pressed resolutely forward, and by the 20th, after one costly failure, succeeded in capturing 174-Metre Hill, the key of their new position. At the same time the cavalry, with the assistance of the Saiyen detachment, had succeeded in establishing themselves on the northern side of Pigeon Bay.4 To what extent the gunboats were able to assist we do not know, but their help was not sufficient to enable the troops to dislodge the Russians entirely. They were still able to keep their hold of a position in the middle of the bay, which left its larger portion open for blockade runners, and it was consequently found necessary to retain the Saiyen detachment on the spot for blockade duty.5 Nor did the capture of 174-Metre Hill give any decisive result so far as the fleet in the harbour was concerned. In front still lay the heights, known as Division Hill and 203-Metre Hill, which masked the port and made it impossible for the Japanese to mark the fall of their shot. Still, enough had been done in the General’s opinion to justify a regular assault on the front of attack, and on the 20th he sent word to Admiral Togo that it would be delivered next morning.
By this time the Russians were equally aware of what was coming. On the 18th the S.S. Georges had run the blockade into Port Arthur with despatches to General Stessel from the Viceroy and his Staff. They informed him that the Japanese had three divisions operating against the fortress, and that they were about to deliver an assault, and further that there was no hope of General Kuropatkin advancing to his relief until three more army corps had arrived which would not be concentrated till the end of September. Upon receipt of this alarming information General Stessel decided to call upon the Navy for direct assistance and he informed the Admiral that for the further defence of the place he must rely on the resources of the fleet, and particularly for the supply of 10-inch and 6-inch guns and ammunition. Prince Ukhtomski at once called a council of war for the next day, the 19th, and submitted to it two questions. The first was whether the squadron in its reduced strength could break out and proceed to Vladivostok when its repairs were completed. The answer was unanimous that it could not, and the majority held that escape was even impossible for single ships. The second question was whether during the process of repair they should act as a squadron in support of the fortress or assist the garrison by every means in their power, since their only object was to preserve the place as a refuge. The answer was that they should assist the defence directly with all the guns and men they could spare, leaving in the ships only enough to fight an action at anchor. This decision, which condemned the squadron to complete inactivity, was immediately acted upon. More guns appear to have been landed, and a naval brigade of two battalions was organised and added to those already ashore.
Of all this Admiral Togo was unaware, and so soon as he got the General’s intimation he issued orders that the vigilance of the blockade must be redoubled. Though there was no sign of movement in the harbour, a number of sweepers could be seen at work from the entrance, along the Tiger Peninsula, almost as far as East Liau-ti-shan. Destroyers were sent in to interrupt the operations, and the fleet, as close in shore as it dared go, waited in breathless suspense for the result of the assault and the expected sortie.
It was little it could do to assist the army in its desperate undertaking. The main assault was on the right of the front of attack, too far away for the ships’ guns to reach even if the Russian minefields had permitted them to approach the shore. Still, something they could do to prevent the enemy supporting their right from the sea. On the 21st, as the assault developed, some Russian gunboats made an attempt to do this. They came out as far as Ta-ho Bay, but although, as before, the Fifth Squadron, which was operating from Cap Island, could not reach them, they were quickly repulsed by the Naval Battery “Y” of the Japanese Heavy Gun Brigade, which had been established for the purpose above the mouth of the Ta-ho.
Otherwise the fleet lay in forced inactivity, except for a brief period when it was believed the crisis was at hand. At 3.40 in the afternoon a code signal came through that the enemy was coming out. All divisions immediately started for Encounter Rock, but again it was quickly discovered to be a false alarm, and blockade stations were resumed.
To add to the disappointment, a signal from the Fuso followed to say that a fierce battle had been raging since dawn, but that owing to the unexpected obstinacy of the defence little progress had been made. Next day, the 22nd, the assault was renewed, but in the evening there was only the same story to tell. It was on this day the Japanese had counted on the fall of the fortress, and the fact that no serious impression had been made, in spite of the heroic persistence of the infantry, began to open a prospect which Admiral Togo could only regard with the gravest anxiety, and which fired him to seek some way of assisting the attack. He had been informed that it would be renewed on the morrow, and that the coast batteries—especially the group in which the eastern face terminated to seaward—had caused the army great annoyance by firing inland. Accordingly, he gave orders to Admiral Kataoka that at dawn he was to go in with the Nisshin and Kasuga and endeavour to make a diversion from a point out of range of the batteries. It was scarcely to be hoped that such a measure could seriously affect the issue. It was now obvious to the Admiral, we are told, that the capture of the place would probably take much longer than had been expected, and realising how little he could help from the sea, he sent an urgent request to Tokyo that the 4.7 guns which had been mounted for the defence of Sylvia Basin should be sent at once in order to enable him to strengthen the heavy gun brigade with which he was assisting the army.
By half-past nine next morning, the 23rd, Admiral Kataoka was at his appointed station with his two armoured cruisers and a sweeping flotilla, and finding the batteries of Golden Hill, Manjayama, and lower Roritsu were firing inland, he opened on the latter at 14,000 metres (15,300 yards). All three forts ceased fire and then re-opened on the ships. Admiral Kataoka, content with this effort, stopped his bombardment, and as shells from Golden Hill began to reach him at a range of 17,000 metres (18,600 yards), he moved away towards Ping-tu-tau.
As he lay there watching, it was reported to him that the Sevastopol was coming out. Being the least injured of the Russian battleships, she had, in fact, been ordered out to try to deal with the “Y” battery of the Japanese Naval Brigade, which was preventing operations from the sea to harass General Nogi’s left. About noon she began to fire, and Admiral Kataoka moved up again to attack her. He found, however, it was impossible to reach her without coming under the fire of Electric Cliff, and could do nothing. Yet according to the Russians his demonstration was enough to make her retire, as she knew the armoured cruisers outranged her, and in her eagerness to get back, she fouled a mine. The explosion struck her almost exactly where she had been damaged before, and the bunker affected, being empty this time, offered no protection. It was flooded, as well as a 6-inch magazine and 12-inch shell room, and with some difficulty she was towed back into harbour. Seeing this, Admiral Kataoka proceeded, as instructed, to rejoin the flag at Round Island—content that with very little expenditure of ammunition he had diverted the fire of the forts from the army and had frustrated the attempt on the naval battery.6
As the attack was to be renewed next day, Admiral Togo ordered the diversion to be repeated in its support. In the meantime, however, it would seem that the Naval Staff at Tokyo had heard of the proceedings, and come to the conclusion that they must not be permitted. We know, in any case, that some time during the 23rd the Commander-in-Chief received from the Chief of the Staff the following message: “For the present, when the heavy guns of the fleet have already fired half the rounds which their lives will endure, and several of them are so badly damaged as to be unserviceable, everything must be done to husband them for action with the Port Arthur and Vladivostok Squadrons and with the Baltic Fleet, which will sooner or later arrive. The thought of wearing them out in minor engagements with parts of the fortress cannot be tolerated. I therefore request that no ships of higher value than the Seventh Division be employed for the present in bombarding the fortress.”
Serious as was the interference with the discretion of the man on the spot, it was interference at one of the points where the revolution in naval material had most profoundly modified the older strategy. At the home base the men responsible for the upkeep of the fleet were able to realise quite clearly how closely the possibilities of the campaign were restricted to the life of the gun. Their vision was unclouded by the impulse which prompted the Admiral on the spot to overtax his material in the desire to assist his hard-pressed colleague, and perhaps they were right to remind him peremptorily of the limitations of his strength. On the other hand it may be argued that Admiral Togo was the better judge of how to make the most of the power he had left, and that if he believed that a generous support of the army was the quickest way of settling the enemy’s fleet he should have been permitted a free hand. In any case it will probably be agreed that it was a case in which the line between just Staff control and local liberty of judgment was of necessity very finely drawn.
In Admiral Togo’s view, it is clear, the request of the Staff was not a binding prohibition. He did not cancel Admiral Kataoka’s orders, but contented himself with adding a caution to withhold his fire unless it was imperatively needed. On the 24th, therefore, the two cruisers went in again. This time the forts were not firing, and Admiral Kataoka endeavoured to find a point where he could assist the infantry attack; but being unable to determine how far the troops had advanced, he retired as before to Ping-tu-tau to watch the forts. In the afternoon some field guns which came into action near Roritsu seemed to give him a chance, but after firing a shot from each of his barbette guns he found the range was too great, and proceeded to rejoin the flag.
The inshore flotilla, however, had better success. Under the indefatigable Admiral Loshchinski, the Russian mining was as active as ever. Destroyers had been constantly coming out to escort the mining vessels, and Admiral Togo had set a trap for them. Mines were ordered to be laid close to the surface, and is well was the work done that the same day two destroyers were caught.
Still no news came from the General to relieve the enforced impotence of the fleet. All day the sound of a renewed attack could be heard, but there was nothing to show that any further progress was being made. It was, in fact, the last effort. Almost superhuman as had been the endurance of the Japanese troops, it was at last exhausted. The resistance of the Russians had been no less heroic, and towards evening General Nogi realised that in face of the quite unexpected resource and obstinacy of the defence there was no hope of taking the place by assault. Since his first day’s success at the northern angle he had gained no ground of value, his losses were known to be over 10,000 men, and the ammunition of his guns was nearly spent. He therefore stopped the attack and telegraphed to the Admiral that he would have to reduce the place step by step by regular siege operations.
Unaware that the last hope of carrying the place by assault was over, Admiral Togo had ordered the two cruisers to carry on next day, but again with the caution that they were not to fire unless absolutely necessary. Then, some time after they had parted company, General Nogi’s disheartening telegram was taken in. The effect of the announcement on Admiral Togo, with his exhausted force and the knowledge that the Baltic Fleet might sail at any time, is easily to be read between the lines of the laconic official statement of what he did. “Admiral Togo,” we are told, “in view of the condition of the ships in the blockading squadron, considered it was imperative to take Port Arthur at the earliest opportunity,” and on the 25th he submitted that view to the Japanese Headquarters. At the same time he urged that the army should be strengthened by good and fresh reinforcements, and that his naval heavy gun brigade should be given four more 4·7 guns and an increase of ammunition “as an emergency measure at this pressing crisis.” To General Nogi he replied with a sincere expression of sympathy from the fleet for the losses which their comrades of the army had suffered, and to give it practical expression he sent ashore doctors and a strong sick-bay party to assist in the military hospital at Dalny. The good feeling between the two commanding officers seems to have been unabated, and the General sent back a cordial message of thanks for the condolence and for the assistance which the fleet had rendered on both flanks and with the Naval Brigade. He must have felt all that his failure meant for the Admiral, for in his expression of gratitude he added an assurance that he intended to leave no stone unturned to capture the place without a single day’s delay.
But it was quickly realised that with the best will in the world the attack could not be carried through for another month. There was no material on the spot adequate for so formidable a siege, and it would take long to collect it and to gather the reinforcements that the terrible carnage had rendered necessary. For the fleet the strain of the blockade must continue, and all the Admiral could do was to issue a general order saying that the fall of the place was only a question of time and that the fleet must have further patience until the object of the campaign could be achieved.
At the Imperial Headquarters, when the situation was grasped there was a hope that the delay might be used to improve the condition of the fleet; and in reply to the Admiral’s message, urging the importance of pressing the attack by land, the Staff suggested that he should begin sending his ships one or two at the time into dock. But Admiral Togo took a different view, and refused. “The case is such,” he replied, “that all the ships and vessels on the station must as far as possible be retained here till Port Arthur falls.” His reason was, that he regarded his late action as wholly indecisive. His view of the situation is on record. A day or two later Marshal Oyama, who was about to develop his concentric attack on Liau-yang, requested to be informed what was the strength of the fleet in Port Arthur, presumably that he might judge how far he could subordinate the operations against it to the operations against the main Russian Army. The Admiral’s reply settled the question. It ran, “The main force of the Russian Fleet at present remaining in Port Arthur consists of five battleships . . . two second-class cruisers Bayan and Pallada, three gunboats, and ten destroyers. The Sevastopol will not be able to fight for a fortnight at least, but the four other battleships have made temporary repairs and have recovered most of their fighting power, so that they are considered already able to steam. The Pallada and Bayan are expected to finish their temporary repairs in the course of the present month.”7 Thus by the accepted view of the naval situation it was obvious nothing could be moved from the blockade if the urgent reinforcements and supplies for the besieging army were to be sure of safe passage.
With the Straits Squadron, however, it was different. A telegram identical with that sent by the Staff to the Commander-in-Chief was received by Admiral Kamimura. He at once referred the decision to his chief, and on the 26th Admiral Togo replied that two ships at a time should be sent into dock at Sasebo.
The order was a reluctant admission that the active naval campaign had come to an end with its ultimate object unachieved. One hope, however, still remained, that in spite of the abortive issue at sea the quick decision at which the Japanese war plan had aimed might yet be reached on land. The blow at Liau-yang had not yet been struck. The three Japanese armies were all in position to deliver the enveloping attack, and could it be carried through so as to bring about another Sedan, it was conceivable that the Baltic Fleet would never sail, and that Russia would abandon the struggle on the comparatively easy terms which Japan was then prepared to accept.
The situation was not too promising. Owing to the delay in the Japanese deployment, due to the imperfect control of the Yellow Sea, and their lack of agility in Kwantung, General Kuropatkin had had too much time to push on his concentration, and the bad weather, which had postponed the assault at Port Arthur, had caused further delay in Manchuria. The condition of the country was still very unfavourable for offensive operations. Nevertheless, the failure of General Nogi was the signal for the great effort to begin, and by the time Admiral Kamimura received the order to dock, Marshal Oyama’s right wing was already engaged. Next day the great battle of Liau-yang had fairly begun. For over a week it raged with unprecedented endurance, and in the end, although General Kuropatkin was driven from all his positions, he succeeded in withdrawing his army unpursued beyond the Tai-tzu-ho; and by September 9th he was concentrating again about Mukden, only some 20 miles to the north. Like the two Russian admirals, he had been defeated, but the result of the land battle, so far as the speedy termination of the war was concerned, was as indecisive as those of the two actions at sea.
Here, then, the first stage of the war came to an end. Everywhere the culmination of the Japanese war plan had been reached—the culmination beyond which no war plan can see—and everywhere they had failed to secure the results at which it had aimed. Both sections of the Russian Fleet had been brought to action; Port Arthur had been assaulted; the blow at Liau-yang had been delivered. To these points they had been working elaborately for six painful months and at no one of them had a firm decision been obtained.
For all the ground the Japanese had gained, the end of the war was nowhere in sight. Still, insecure as their position was, it marked a great advance. Though at Liau-yang they had failed to destroy the Russian Army, they had obtained the necessary defensive position for covering the two territorial objects at which they aimed. With that position they had secured the initiative. Sooner or later the Russians would be forced to break it down by offensive operations, in which, owing to the vast length of their communications, they would be deprived of the main advantages of offence, while the Japanese, based on an adjacent coast, would enjoy to the full all that defence can give. But their position was far from well established. It still depended upon their ability to nourish their Manchurian armies freely by precarious oversea lines. How long could they enjoy the advantage they had won depended, therefore, entirely upon the time they could retain their local control of the sea; nor could their position be regarded as established until they could make that control permanent.
The main flaw in their position was that they had failed to get possession of their secondary territorial object. At Port Arthur lay the solution of both the naval and the military problem. The fact that they had not seen their way to seizing the place at the outset, as they had seized Korea, was forcing on them an offensive in Kwangtung which greatly weakened their main defensive attitude. Equally it prolonged their exhausting defensive at sea, and week by week the wear and tear of maintaining their position tended to diminish the power of the blow which sooner or later they would have to strike for the permanent command. In their plan of operations they had violated the logical order of precedence demanded by the nature of the war in which they were engaged, and their precarious position was only what a theoretical appreciation would indicate as inevitable.
The error was probably due to inability rather than neglect. Political reasons had prevented their mobilising before declaration of war in sufficient force to seize both objects by an opening coup de main. There was further the strategical objection that such an effort would have entailed two lines of operation too widely separated for common prudence to sanction. Still, great as would have been the risk, success would have brought a gain far greater—so great, indeed, that possibly the risk would have been taken had they not misjudged it by over-estimating the offensive power of the Russian Fleet and under-estimating the power of the fortress to resist attack. In both cases their faulty appreciation was not without excuse. In their former war the fortress had fallen an easy prey, while, as for the fleet, the balance of strength had been if anything in favour of the Russians at the outset, and during Admiral Makarov’s command it had displayed an ever growing activity and offensive spirit. They could scarcely realise in full how much it had lost in the hands of his unfortunate successor by demoralising inactivity, and incompetent administration.
More difficult to justify is their failure to repair the mistake when it had become patent. So obvious was it that for them the destruction of the enemy’s fleet was far more important than the destruction of his army, that nothing but an excessive devotion to the German ideal of enveloping operations or an overweening confidence in their troops will readily explain their neglect to devote sufficient force to Port Arthur. In this connection they have been severely censured for not deploying the whole of their available troops at once. Two complete divisions, the VIIth and VIIIth, were held back in Japan, and kept there, as it is said, in idleness. But were they idle? Consider where they were located. One was in the Island of Yezo, the other in the northern district of Nipon, adjoining the Tsugaru Strait; that is, they were occupying that portion of Japanese territory which the fleet was unable to protect against raids from Vladivostok. Apart from the moral importance of preventing successful counter-attacks on any part of the home territory, the Tsugaru Strait was too vital a position to be left without defence. Was, then, the real reason for holding back these two divisions a naval reason? Was their neutralisation one of the effects of the division of the Russian Fleet? It will be remembered that at the outset Admiral Togo had advised that no naval force should be deflected for barring what the Vladivostok cruisers might be able to attempt in the north. For if the Japanese Navy had to protect the northern part of the home territory there could be no concentration in the Straits of Tsushima sufficiently strong to ensure adequate cover of the main line of military transit. His advice was adopted, and it is conceivable that this paramount naval consideration was regarded as entailing the otherwise vicious retention of the two divisions for a purely defensive purpose. The distribution of the Russian Fleet in fact raised combined problems so intricate that severe censure of the solution which the Japanese adopted, even if it did not prove to be the right one, is surely out of place after the event.
The real explanation of the failure of the Japanese is to be found deeper down in the fundamental conditions of maritime war. By general admission, the main cause of that failure was the slowness with which their war plan was developed, that is the slowness of their advance in Kwantung and the slowness of their concentric advance in Manchuria. In each theatre of operations the delay was due to a sense that their lines of passage and supply were not secure. But for this we might have seen a bolder handling of the situation in Kwantung, and certainly the blow at the Russian concentration zone would have been rapid. In the elation of their first success at sea, they had acted to the extreme limit of prudence. But from the time Admiral Makarov arrived upon the scene and the squadron in Port Arthur began to awake into life, their conduct of the campaign was marked by an apparent shrinking from risks—from sea risks, which if taken would have repaid them a hundredfold. The moral atmosphere changed; why was it so?
The most general comment on the war, as a whole, is that it exhibits the great advantage possessed in a maritime theatre by the belligerent that has the command of the sea. But there is a lesson less trite and of deeper significance. In a sense, as we know now, the Japanese had the command; they had at least as large a degree of command as is to be expected between two nearly equal belligerents. From the outset the Russian fleet, if boldly faced, would have had little power to interfere with the free movement of the Japanese troops. But this they did not know with sufficient certainty. Clearly what is needed in such cases is not mere physical preponderance—it is the sense of security, and so long as even a beaten fleet can show that it is not dead, it will set up a moral condition in the other belligerent that is fatal to the spirit which amphibious operations demand. The test question then becomes, not Have we a fair chance of success? but, Is there not danger of disaster? If then, we would calculate whether or not an enemy will take a certain sea risk with his troops, and if we would turn him from undertaking it, it is upon this moral factor we must calculate rather than upon what it is physically possible for him to do. Make him feel insecure upon the sea by any means available, and his hand will be cramped. A fleet defeated even severely need never cease to count.
The failure of the Japanese to take Port Arthur and the ships it contained, meant that the dead weight of the sense of insecurity must continue to clog the play of their forces; and in the Baltic the reinforcing squadron—far as it still was from active interference—was adding fresh irritation to the moral disturbance. It was obvious therefore that unless the Japanese could clear the situation quickly, the sense of insecurity must continually increase, and while the Russian army was growing week by week, the confidence and freedom with which the Japanese could handle theirs were diminishing. A play of forces, both moral and physical, had in fact been set up which made them a formidable ally of the Russians. It was against them the Japanese had now to fight, and it was frankly recognised that a re-consideration of their war plan and of the means it required was necessary, and that a new departure must be taken.
1 Japanese Published Naval History, Vol. I., page 224. The attitude taken by the Japanese Naval Authorities was in strict accordance with the rule laid down by the British Admiralty in 1808, after the convention of Cintra had admitted to terms the Russian squadron blockaded at Lisbon. After receiving the news the Admiralty heard that Saumarez was blockading another Russian squadron in Port Baltic. The Russians proposed terms, but Saumarez insisted on unconditional surrender. Before his resolute attitude was known, the Admiralty sent him a strict order to the same effect. The capitulation of a fleet on terms, they said, was quite new to maritime warfare and the case of Lisbon must not be allowed to become a precedent. Out Letters 1366 (Secret Orders), October 5th, 1808.
2 It was sent off by the Commander-in-Chief at 10.30 p.m.
3 Saiyen and Akagi, with two auxiliary gunboats and two armed steamboats from the Nisshin and Kasuga. By the original orders of the detachment, dated August 18, it was to operate for 3 days only, retiring each night to Kinchau Bay.
4 The detachment did not leave Dalny till early on the 19th.
5 On the 25th the Commander-in-Chief ordered Admiral Hosoya to recall the detachment, but on his representing that the position of the army greatly depended upon the presence of the ships they were allowed to remain, and were subsequently reinforced.
6 Russkaiya Starina, April 1908.
6 The number of rounds fired was only two 10-inch and seven 8-inch.
7 The source of this precise information is not stated, but it may be noted that some days before General Nogi had conveyed to the German attachés in Port Arthur the Kaiser’s orders to come away. Both left in junks when the assault began, and the naval attaché was taken off by a Japanese destroyer on the 19th and conducted to the Flagship at Round Island. The military attaché was killed by a Chinese boatman and never seen again. The S.S. Georges was also captured on the 19th at she endeavoured to break out with despatches from General Stessel; but from neither of these sources could Admiral Togo have heard of the condition of the Sevastopol, whose mishap did not occur till the 23rd. Next day, the 24th, General Stessel received a telegram from the Tzar, presumably by a junk. He sent a reply on the 25th and the vessel carrying it may have been captured, and given the complete information.