THE present volume, after dealing with the causes of the war, the war plans on each side, and the period of strained relations, traces the progress of hostilities till the first week in September 1904. That week marks logically the end of the first period of the war, for by that time the original Japanese scheme of operations had culminated in the indecisive naval actions of August 10 and 14, the unsuccessful assault on Port Arthur and the failure to destroy the Russian Army at Liau-yang.
In a war which from the nature of its object and the geographical conditions of its theatre was so essentially maritime the naval and the military operations during this period are for the most part inseparable. While, therefore, the history of the struggle is viewed from the naval point of view and naval operations alone are dealt with in detail, it has been found necessary to follow the military developments closely enough to bring out the mutual reactions of the two spheres.
For the land operations little or no independent research has been made. All through the British Official History of the War (cited in the notes as C.I.D.) has been followed except in a few cases, such as the Nanshan episode, where further detail seemed called for in order to elucidate its aspect as a combined operation.
In everything that concerns the fleet a fresh examination of all the available authorities has been made. Foremost among them is the minute and exhaustive history prepared by the Japanese Naval Staff, which, though strictly confidential, has been courteously placed at the disposal of the Admiralty by the Japanese Government for the use of naval officers only. A translation, made by Naval Instructor Oswald T. Tuck, R.N., by direction of the Intelligence Division, exists at the Admiralty, and it is this work which is cited as the Japanese Confidential History.
Consisting as it does of a bare but minute record of the proceedings, not only of every squadron, but of every division, flotilla and detachment almost from day to day, it is not what Europeans understand by a history. It is rather a chronicle, a bare record of facts with scarcely a comment, and only here and there a laconic indication of the reasoning on which the movements were founded. It is, indeed, little more than a collection of individual reports arranged by “movements” in chronological order, but each theatre is treated separately. Although, therefore, it makes no pretence of giving a broad comprehensive view of the war as a whole, or of correlating its various parts, it affords admirable material from which a history can be constructed.
For certain important episodes the original reports of commanding officers have also been communicated to us from which it has been possible to throw further light on several points of interest. These invaluable documents are cited in the notes as “Report of _____.”
With this amplitude of first hand evidence available, the official despatches written for publication become only secondary authority and little use has been made of them.
The record is not quite complete, but the only serious gaps in the very full information we have been granted are the book relating to the Causes of the War and that relating to Combined Operations. The latter, however, is filled to some extent by the Japanese Official Published Naval History, which has been translated by the Russian Naval Staff, with valuable notes by Russian officers who were present. But as the translation in some places leaves something to be desired, it has been carefully checked at all important points, from the original Japanese. A French version of this Russian translation and the appended notes has been issued by the French Naval Staff under the title Opérations Maritimes de la Guerre Russo-Japonaise, and it is this work that is cited in the notes as the Japanese Published History.
From the Russian side, at the time of going to press, no official naval history had been issued, and nothing was available except the chronological abstract of events prepared by the Naval Staff in the course of their preliminary studies. This want, however, is supplied to a considerable extent, so far as plans and orders are concerned, by the Military History prepared by the Russian General Staff, which in view of the dependence of the land operations upon what the navy could do and did, goes fully into the naval orders and councils of war and the correspondence between the Viceroy or Commander-in-Chief and the officer commanding at Port Arthur. To this extent, indeed, it serves well as a combined history. It is in course of translation by the French General Staff, and it is this version, so far as it has gone, that is cited as the Russian Military History.
With the actual operations at sea it naturally has no concern, but here again we have a good deal of material from various Russian sources, which has been collected, arranged, and translated by Major E. Y. Daniel, R.M.L.I. Of these the most valuable are two series of articles published in the Morskoi Sbornik and the Ruskaya Starina. The former may be regarded as at least semi-official, and in several places the author acknowledges his indebtedness to the Naval Historical Commission. At the time of going to press, however, the series was not quite complete for the period covered by this volume. The latter is specially valuable for its reports of Naval Councils of War at Port Arthur.
Of private works the most informing is Captain Bubrov’s Reminiscences of the First Pacific Squadron and Operations of the Naval Brigade, but for operations at sea his knowledge is for the most part at second hand, he himself being most of the time ashore in command of the Naval Barracks. The better known works of Naval Officers such as Commander Semenov’s Rasplata and Lieutenant Steer’s Novik, though interesting for the feeling in the Russian fleet and the morale of the men, are too inaccurate and ill-informed to be regarded as real historical material. Of far higher authority are the excellent works, Nanshan and Port Arthur, by Colonel Tretyakov (translated by Lieutenant A. C. Alford, R.A.), and La Défense de Port Arthur by Colonels von Schwarz and G. Romanovski (translated by J. Lepoivre, Chef d’escadron in the French artillery). As Colonel Tretyakov commanded at Nanshan and 103-Metre Hill and the other two officers were on the spot both works are first hand authorities, but, of course, they only touch naval operations which took place in direct support of the Army.
Amongst British sources the most important for Naval and Combined Operations are the volumes of Reports from our Attachés, &c. But besides these other reports not issued in volume form have been consulted as well as the confidential Foreign Office and Admiralty correspondence which is specially instructive for the period preceding the outbreak of war. These sources have been in places supplemented by information from officers concerned.
The spelling of place-names has presented the usual difficulties owing to the fact that no logical system of transliteration has yet been officially adopted. The nearest approach to such a system is that used by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. But in spite of its many advantages it was decided that as a matter of practical convenience for Naval Officers, it would be better to follow the Sailing Directions and Admiralty Charts, and this has been done so far as was consistent with any degree of uniformity.
The inadequacy of our terminology for expressing the internal organisation of fleets presents similar difficulties, and with a view to avoiding confusion as far as possible, certain typographical distinctions have been used. Divisions of the Squadrons (battleships and cruisers) are written thus:—“First Division,” “Third Division.” Divisions of destroyers or torpedo-boat flotillas are expressed in ordinary numerals and without capitals, thus:—“2nd division,” “10th division.” Army divisions are distinguished by roman numerals and capitals, thus:—“IIIrd Division,” “VIIth Division.”
As to the method and plan of the work it will be found that an attempt has been made to deal with the events in chronological succession and to embrace the events in all theatres of operation, whether naval or military, in one progressive narrative. Though this is a departure from the course usually taken in staff histories it is felt that, in spite of the difficulties it entails, it is the only way in which a clear impression can be given and retained of the inter-relation of the various parts of the struggle and the only way in which justice can be done to commanding and directing officers, in that by no other means can we justly appreciate the subsidiary and external deflections by which their decisions and conduct were necessarily influenced.
For similar reasons the usual method of reserving comments till the conclusion of the narrative has been discarded, and the aim has been to weave criticism into the narrative as it proceeds, so that the significance of each step in the development of the war may, as far as possible, be apprehended as it takes place and that each decision or operation may be judged more correctly in the light in which the officers responsible saw the situation at the moment. The method has the further advantage of enabling officers to consider for themselves the criticism offered while the facts are fresh in their minds. Comments, moreover, made in this way will always be more direct and concrete and, therefore, easier to weigh, while those reserved till the end must always tend to be vitiated by a tendency to facile generalisation and to what is even more fertile of error, a tendency to ex post facto judgments.
The only exception to this rule of procedure is the case of the staff arrangements and their working. With these questions, specially important as they are in amphibious war, it has been found impossible to deal fully as they arise, for lack of information. We have nothing authoritative or definite from either belligerent and for the Japanese side at least this is specially to be regretted. The relations of the Imperial Staff and the Naval and Military Staffs, both with each other and with commanding officers, raise questions of the highest importance to ourselves. In this case, therefore, it has been thought better to reserve full consideration until a complete study of the whole of the relevant facts may possibly enable an approximately just appreciation to be made.