From the Black Atlantic to the Racial Pacific
Rethinking Racial Hierarchy in Colonial and Postcolonial Contexts This essay was written as the final chapter in a book edited by Heike Raphael-Hernandez and Shannon Steen that was planned as an exploration of the contours of race in Asia. As that book progressed from idea to paper, it became a volume of essays, not precisely on race in Asia, but rather on the specific connections between people of Asian descent and people of African descent, here and there—in North America, Asia, and the Caribbean, in fiction, film, music, and martial arts.1 As the book took on a different shape, there seemed no point in including an analytical essay on race as an issue in Asia and the Pacific, and so the piece was withdrawn. It appears here for the first time.
Paul Gilroy, in The Black Atlantic, makes a wonderful interpretive move to extend the North American discussion of race across the Atlantic to northern Europe and also, somewhat differently, to Africa. He advocates attention to “a culture that is not specifically African, American, Caribbean, or British, but all of these at once, a black Atlantic culture whose themes and techniques transcend ethnicity and nationality.”2 That may be a salutary revision. But if it is, it probably does not go far enough. It is not just that there are racialized relationships involving African-descended peoples on both sides of the Atlantic (and that the sides are intertwined); there are other racialized relationships on both sides of the Atlantic, around the Mediterranean, among various peoples in Asia, and across the Pacific as well.3 By “racialized relationships,” I mean situations in which peoples confront each other with the result that some people dominate others; in that domination, a story of racial hierarchy—superiority and inferiority, dominance and submission—is written onto the bodies and into the genes of the peoples who are dominated.4
This essay explores the shapes of some of those other racialized relationships. It attempts to take quite a bit further the discussion that Gilroy began when he declared the African Atlantic: to examine the ways that systems of racialized relationships have been constructed halfway around the world, in Asia and in the Pacific.5 It examines the ways that Japanese and Chinese people have imagined and treated Africans and African Americans. Then it moves on to analyze the ways some East Asians have racialized other peoples within their own geographic domains. Finally, it attends to the making of racial systems at two places in the Pacific, Fiji and Hawai‘i.
RACE IN EUROPE
More and more, scholars and others are writing about race as a phenomenon in Europe, not just in the Americas.6 Too frequently, the only “race” that seems to exist consists of people of African descent, hence Gilroy’s limited and essentialist “Black” Atlantic. It seems to me that the racial reality of the Atlantic world is much more complex than that: Black there is, but there are several kinds of Black. Are Ethiopians and Eritreans Black in the same way (or is it ways?) that Igbo and Tutsis and Zulus are Black?7 Are Algerians Black at all, even if they are treated as racially Other when they venture into European countries?8 Just as there are many Blacks, there are several kinds of Whites, and others, too, in shades of yellow and brown. Racialized hierarchies and webs of social interrelationships are complex systems, not reducible to a simplistic binary.
It is true that, particularly in Britain, there is a group of scholars who have been writing for some time against the binary trend by doing racial analyses of, for example, the situations of Pakistanis or Chinese in the United Kingdom.9 But the majority of race talk among scholars in Europe is about Blacks. Insofar as the discussion addresses other groups, in Britain and especially on the Continent, it seems to focus on the question of nationalism rather than race per se or on ways to manage a multiracial population.10 Nonetheless, a small group of scholars has begun to talk about other groups on the Continent, such as Turks in Germany or Basques in Spain and France, in racial ways.11
As with European studies of race, so, too, in America, at least outside the West Coast. A major problem with the discussion of race in sociology and African American studies (as opposed to ethnic studies) has been that it has tended to see race as only a matter of Black and White. Or at least it has seen the Black-White encounter in the United States as the master racial project by which any others are to be understood. But race is a broader phenomenon, having to do with power relationships among peoples, which are then written onto the body and ascribed to the genes. Such relationships exist anywhere peoples encounter one another in confrontational and hierarchical ways.12
RACE IN ASIA
Asians and African-Descended People
Even before the Japanese began to have broad-scale interactions with the outside world in the 1850s, Japanese people had begun to adopt Europeans’ prejudices regarding African-descended peoples. The first African-descended people they met were sailors on Dutch ships trading in Nagasaki Harbor. In 1787 a Japanese scholar wrote about those sailors:
These black ones on the Dutch boats are the natives of countries in the South. As their countries are close to the sun, they are sun-scorched and become black. By nature they are stupid…. Africa is directly under the equator and the heat there is extreme. Therefore, the natives are black colored. They are uncivilized and vicious in nature.13
Ukiyo-e, Japanese woodblock prints, from the Meiji era depict Africans as grotesque and bestial, with kinky hair sprouting at odd angles, exaggerated noses and lips, and very black skin.
More recently, Japanese popular culture—advertisements, movies, television, music videos, and the like—has had a particular fascination with people of part Japanese ancestry. They have exoticized half Europeans as inferior to full Japanese but sexy; half Africans, on the other hand, have often been depicted as inferior but beastlike and threatening. It is difficult for anyone who is not seen as pure Japanese to be accepted in Japan, but it is far more difficult for people of full or part African descent than for those of European descent.14
Chinese denigrations of Africans also predated the intrusion of Western ideas that came with colonialism in the nineteenth century. From the Tang dynasty on, reports filtered into China about Africa and its peoples, and indeed some African slaves arrived via the Silk Road in the employ of Arab and Persian merchants. Chinese observers described them as “simpleminded but courageous,” “yeren, ‘wild man’, or guinu, ‘devil slave’”; “frightening,” “stupid.” Later, when China was in thrall to Western science and ideas at the dawn of the twentieth century, Liang Qichao, one of the nation’s foremost intellectuals and politicians, wrote, “All the black, red and brown races, by the microbes in their blood vessels and their cerebral angle, are inferior to the whites. Only the yellows are not very dissimilar to the whites…. [B]lacks and browns are lazy and stupid.” On visiting the United States, he wrote, “The blacks’ behaviour is despicable. They only die without regret if they have succeeded in touching a white woman’s skin. They often lurk in the darkness of woods to rape them. Thereafter these women are murdered so that they will not talk. Nine out of ten cases of lynching are due to this crime.” Kang Youwei, another prominent intellectual of the early twentieth century, wrote that darker races were unequal and should be eradicated by forcing them to intermarry, leave the nation, or be sterilized.15
Such attitudes have continued into the modern era. They permeated the treatment of African students at Chinese universities in the 1980s and 1990s. Several thousand students whose home countries lacked sufficient institutions of higher education accepted government scholarships and went to Chinese universities to study subjects like science and engineering. They were housed in segregated dormitories inhabited only by Africans. Officially, they were welcomed as foreign guests whose recourse to Chinese universities enhanced China’s international stature, but socially they were ostracized and viewed with suspicion. At two universities in Tianjin in 1985, Chinese students rioted against African students whom they accused of approaching Chinese women students romantically and of stealing food. When the African students took refuge in a dining hall, the Chinese students threw rocks through the windows and attempted to break down the doors. Relations on those campuses were still tense four years later, in 1988–89, when similar riots occurred at Nanjing and several other universities across the country. Many African students were terrified, and most of those who were able to return home did so.16
In 1989, I made a survey of 169 Chinese students at Nankai University in Tianjin. I used the Bogardus Social Distance Scale to measure the social distance that they felt between themselves and various foreign nationalities. Chinese did not feel very close to any foreign people, but they put Americans, British, and Germans near the middle of their scale, with Russians, Mexicans, and Japanese rather distant; Africans tied for last place with Vietnamese. When I asked Chinese students to list adjectives that they felt usually applied to people in a particular group, they agreed on these for Africans: primitive, uncivilized, threatening, warlike, poor, simple, uneducated, ignorant, stupid, ugly.17
Indigenous Asian Racial Hierarchies
So both Chinese and Japanese people have had negative views of Africans and African Americans for a long time. Yet Asians’ relationships with African-descended peoples are not the only racialized relationships in Asia, nor are they the most important ones. Most racialized relationships have been built in the context of colonialism; that is, they have been made by dominant peoples in the process of dominating other peoples. Examples include the British in India, the French and Germans in Africa, and the European-derived Whites in North America.18 The Chinese were colonizers and race makers, too. Many non-Chinese have at least heard of Chinese domination (some would say genocide) of Tibetans.19 Fewer Westerners are aware that the Han Chinese—those who regard themselves as the core Chinese people on the basis of descent from the peoples who lived within the empire during the Han dynasty (nearly 93 percent of the nation)—have created an elaborate system of racial hierarchy in which they rank internal minorities who inhabit the farther reaches of the Chinese empire, peoples like the Dai, Miao, Manchus, Liao, and Hui. My study of Han Chinese attitudes included questions about several such colonized domestic minorities. Han Chinese saw themselves, overseas Chinese, Uygurs, and ethnic Koreans living in China as smart, hardworking, brave, and kind. They perceived Manchus, Mongolians, Dai, and Yi as positive primitives: beautiful, friendly, adept at singing and dancing. Tibetans, the most brutally dominated of the peoples whom the Han have colonized, were characterized in much the same terms as Africans: primitive, threatening, warlike, stupid, dirty.20
The Japanese have long had the idea that they are an unusually pure race of people, separated by blood from all others and descended from the sun goddess Amaterasu Omikami. In fact, like all the world’s peoples, the Japanese are a mixed multitude, the product of the merging of many peoples. In ancient times, at least two big waves of immigrants from the Korean peninsula came to the islands to join the native Ainu inhabitants and form the Yamato people. Their number and ethnic diversity were increased by several smaller waves of immigrants from the islands of the western Pacific. Early in the modern era, Japan was barely a single political entity. Each region had its own autonomous government, its own version of the Japanese language, its own identity.21
Such divisions were self-consciously erased in the second half of the nineteenth century by the makers of Meiji Japan. They propagated the ideology of racial unity and blood purity as a powerful glue to unite the nation. They set up the emperor as national patriarch, with State Shinto as the unifying religion. In the Meiji era and after, Japan engaged in colonial enterprises in Asia and the Pacific that added to the variety of peoples in Japan, even as official policy denied that multiplicity. In 1905 the Japanese army invaded Korea, and in 1910 Japan incorporated the peninsula. From that time forward thousands of Korean workers were imported each year, and thousands of Korean women were impregnated by the colonizers. Several thousand ethnic Koreans were among those who died in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese colonial ventures in the Pacific—in the Bonin Islands, the Ryukyus, and Micronesia—brought Japanese people to those places and their mixed offspring back to Japan. In addition to such colonial peoples, for centuries there have existed within Japan two groups that have been marked off as racially separate from other Japanese: the indigenous Ainu and a hereditary outcaste group known variously, and pejoratively, as eta and hisabetsu burakumin. Except for the Ainu, who have sometimes been treated in ways resembling the American treatment of native peoples, none of this variety was officially recognized. The government required people of non-Japanese ethnic origins to take Japanese names if they wanted to become citizens, and Korean- and Pacific-descended people were discriminated against sharply. Koreans and burakumin especially were targets of the language of racial dominance: they were characterized by other Japanese as unclean, violent, primitive, and sexually predatory.22
From the Meiji era through World War II, Japanese went abroad in large numbers to places as disparate as Brazil, Peru, Truk, Hawai‘i, China, Manchuria, Mexico, Canada, and the United States. They maintained webs of connectedness with their fellow Japanese in widely separated locations for four generations. Yet when—in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s—some of those ethnic Japanese who had been born abroad in Brazil, Argentina, and other places migrated to the land of their ancestors, native Japanese did not view them as long lost relatives. Rather they enunciated a story of difference about Latin American Japanese immigrants. In those decades Japan’s relatively robust economy and declining birthrate meant jobs were plentiful. Not only did ethnic Japanese come, but also Europeans and guest workers from places like the Philippines and Indonesia.23
Together, these groups of new immigrants and the descendants of burakumin, Koreans, Ainu, and others make Japan a much more self-consciously mixed place today than it was acknowledged to be in the past. The media are beginning to take notice of the mixed nature of the Japanese population. Models and TV stars show a greater variety of physiognomy. The government is relaxing its blood definition of citizenship—a naturalized Finn became a member of the Diet, the national legislature—although Japan’s citizenship law remains one of the most ethnically restrictive on the planet. Some unmixed Japanese people have begun in recent decades to deliberately blur their features by altering the color of their hair, the shape and color of their eyes, the shape of their noses, even body dimensions. All these things point to a more relaxed, less racially determined definition of Japaneseness than was the case during the first century and a quarter of modern Japanese nationhood.
Khmer attitudes and actions toward Vietnamese in Cambodia point to another sort of racial system in another part of Asia. Most outsiders probably do not give much thought to the issue of race in Cambodia or to Cambodia at all. But there are profoundly racialized relationships between ethnic Khmers (the Cambodian majority group) and the sizable minority of Vietnamese origin. That is, the peoples regard themselves as not just culturally but also physically distinct, and each believes that the other has innate, negative characterological qualities. Christine Su, an ethnic Khmer scholar working in the United States, writes:
In the midst of casual conversation, a close personal friend once told me that “it is necessary that we Cambodians hate the Vietnamese…. There is no why—it’s just a fact.” … Vietnamese are the “hereditary enemy,” the perpetual “threat to Khmerness.” They are thieves, gamblers, traitors, prostitutes. They are the antithesis of all that is Cambodian.24
I submit that throughout Asia such racialized relationships exist. The way Cambodians feel about their ethnic Vietnamese minority is not very different from the way Vietnamese talk about their ethnic Khmer minority, except that in the latter case the Vietnamese attribute the Khmer’s supposed negative character qualities to their darker skin color. Similar racialized attitudes exist in the minds of Thais toward their ethnic Chinese fellow citizens, among Burmans toward their Karen fellow citizens, and so on.25
In the Pacific, I will talk about Fiji and Hawai‘i, with reference to two axes of encounter: first, between European colonizers and indigenous peoples; and second, between indigenous peoples and Asian immigrants who were brought by colonialism but who have been established in the locale for several generations.
Fiji
Fiji has a long and troubled history of conflict between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians that has been shaped decisively by the legacy of British colonialism. It was a loose, frequently warring collection of island peoples when England took it over as a colony in 1874.26 The British government, in its possibly self-serving account of events, was initially reluctant to take on the colony, but did so at the request of some Europeans in the islands and also of a number of chiefs in eastern Viti Levu, the largest and most populous island. A year later Arthur Gordon arrived as colonial governor. He inherited a bankrupt administration and a native population ravaged by measles (forty thousand Fijians, more than a quarter of the population, died in the epidemic).
Gordon’s limited resources dictated that he must rule indirectly, through those existing chiefs who had supported the British takeover. He encouraged Fijians to maintain their languages and cultural practices. He brought together the collaborating chiefs in a Great Council of Chiefs, which is a power in Fijian politics to this day. Finding that much of the best agricultural land had already been swept up by Europeans and that land law varied enormously throughout the islands, Gordon used the Great Council of Chiefs to standardize land tenure and sharply limit the ability of Fijians to alienate land to foreigners, enshrining the new system as “traditional.”
In order to establish a tax base for his administration, Gordon completed negotiations with a large Australian firm, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR), to lease vast tracts of land for sugarcane production. At first the workers were Fijians and contract laborers imported from the Solomon Islands and elsewhere in the Pacific. But the colonial government promised CSR that it would bring in tens of thousands of farmworkers from India to plant and harvest sugarcane. Between 1879 and 1916, 60,969 Indian laborers came to Fiji on five-year indentures. They lived and worked in miserable, slavelike conditions. At the end of their contracts they were free to go home, but they had been paid very little and no passage money was provided. The overwhelming majority stayed on in Fiji.
A population that was 90 percent ethnic Fijian in 1881 was nearly 30 percent Indo-Fijian in 1911, over 40 percent Indo-Fijian by 1936, and over 50 percent Indo-Fijian on the eve of independence in 1966. These were second-, third-, and fourth-generation residents of the islands, with no personal ties to any homeland other than Fiji. Yet British colonial policies and the CSR kept Indians and Fijians apart. Fijians held a monopoly on landownership but were a population by and large mired in poverty; Indo-Fijians owned and ran many businesses and were prominent in the professions. Most Fijians were fervent Christians; Indians were Muslims or Hindus. The two communities were strictly segregated. For example, the western end of the large island of Viti Levu—sugar country—is almost all Indian, the northern and eastern regions are almost all Fijian, and Suva, the capital, has de facto segregated neighborhoods.
The British government, on granting independence, insisted that all Fijian citizens—ethnic Fijian, Indo-Fijian, Chinese, Rotuman, European, other Polynesian, and so on—be allowed to vote and hold office. This was part of the Commonwealth’s vision to create little British-inspired democracies around the globe, all tied together with the United Kingdom at the center. Up to that time, there had been a legislative council composed of representatives from three racial communities, with each community’s representatives chosen by different rules: European men elected their representatives, Fijian members were chosen by the Great Council of Chiefs, and Indo-Fijian members were chosen by wealthy Indians.
Two budding political parties, the New Federation Party (NFP) and the Alliance Party, hammered out a constitution over several years. These parties were led, respectively, by an Indo-Fijian, A. D. Patel, and an ethnic Fijian chief, Ratu Kamisese Mara. Both parties were officially multiracial, but in fact nearly all Indo-Fijians voted for the NFP and nearly all ethnic Fijians voted for the Alliance. Ratu Mara’s party won the first election in 1972, as well as the subsequent three elections. But in 1987 a coalition of the NFP and the new Labour Party won a narrow victory. An ethnic Fijian, Timoci Bavadra, headed the ticket, and the majority of his cabinet was Fijian, yet the new government was labeled “Indian dominated.”
On May 14, 1987, a young ethnic Fijian lieutenant-colonel, Sitiveni Rabuka, and ten soldiers overthrew the multiracial government and put a Fijian at its head. Theirs was the first military coup against a democratically elected government in South Pacific history. In time Rabuka consolidated his hold on the country and promulgated a racial constitution that allowed only ethnic Fijians to vote and hold office. Indo-Fijians, who constituted a slim plurality of the nation’s population, began leaving the islands by the thousands. Indo-Fijian department heads at the University of the South Pacific were replaced by ethnic Fijians.27
Over the course of nearly a decade and a half, Fijian politics opened up again. Commissions met and reported.28 A new constitution was written. Indo-Fijians were allowed to vote and stand for office. Some began to agitate for the right to own land. In 2001, under the new constitution, the Chaudry government was elected and took power, briefly, and then it too was deposed. A failed businessman, George Speight, led a ragtag bunch of ethnic Fijians in taking over the parliament building and holding Chaudry and thirty people hostage for several weeks.29
The pattern was repeated. Indo-Fijians left in droves. Commissions met and recommended democratic reforms. A more ethnically open government began to assert itself. And in 2006 there was a third ethnic Fijian coup and restoration of dictatorial rule.30
The conflict continues. There is near-total segregation between ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Both sides, and especially the fundamentalists among the ethnic Fijians (a substantial group), lay the differences at the door of religion. But off the record they speak in racial terms about the body and essential racial character: a lot of Indians talk about Fijians as sexual, violent, irresponsible, and foul-smelling; many ethnic Fijians talk about Indo-Fijians as effeminate, money-grubbing, and heartless.
Polynesian seafarers had inhabited the Hawaiian Islands for more than a millennium when James Cook, a British sea captain, made the first modern outside contact in 1776. Shortly thereafter, Kamehameha, hereditary leader of one district on the Big Island, united the archipelago by force. He proclaimed himself king, and the kingdom he and his heirs ruled took on many of the features of European-style monarchy. American and European Protestant missionaries and businesspeople came, trading in sandal-wood and souls. They also brought American and European diseases: a population that had numbered between 800,000 and 1.3 million at first European contact plummeted to 40,000 by the 1820s. People left their communal farms and fishponds in the countryside and went to newly established towns, where they worked for wages, interacted with the growing number of foreigners, and caught the foreigners’ diseases. Hawai‘i became a center for whaling and trade throughout the Pacific, and islanders traveled abroad, many never to return.31
By the 1840s, Haoles, or White foreigners, had married into the Hawaiian ruling class and taken over the government in all but name. Missionary influence outlawed the ancient sacred dance, the hula, and had a hand in the abolishment of the traditional system of kapu, the rules that had governed Hawaiian society for centuries. In place of the kapu came Western-style law codes and courts. In 1848, under intense pressure from Haole advisers, the king conducted the mahele, or land division. All lands had formerly belonged to the king but had been in the hands of the people organized in ahupua’a, or communal groups. Now 1.5 million acres were carved up and assigned as personal property to the noble class, one million acres became the personal property of the king, and 1.5 million acres were designated as crown lands to support the government. Some commoners were allowed to claim not ownership but kuleana, or stewardship, of small parcels of land if they had lived on them for more than a decade. Government land was not supposed to be alienated to non-Hawaiians, but by 1865 two-thirds of the government lands and much of the rest were in Haole hands.32
This gave rise to a financial oligarchy of foreign land barons. Haoles, mainly of American derivation, owned vast tracts of land in sugar and later pineapple cultivation. They brought in thousands of foreign workers, first from China, then from Japan, and later from the Philippines, Korea, and elsewhere. Soon the newcomers outnumbered Native Hawaiians. The various new peoples formed a mixed ethnic plantation working class that created a common mixed culture, including a language, Pidgin, and mixed local food customs. Power, however, remained in the hands of the Haole oligarchy. In the 1880s and 1890s, King David Kalākaua and his successor, Queen Lili‘uokalani, attempted to pull power back into Hawaiian hands but failed. Haole businessmen forced what has come to be called the Bayonet Constitution on Kalakaua in 1887, reducing his power still further. Then in 1893 they overthrew Lili‘uokalani, imprisoned her, and proclaimed a Hawaiian Republic with one of their own, the White missionary descendant Sanford Dole, as president. They applied for annexation by the United States, which was achieved in 1898; two years later Hawai‘i formally became a US territory.33
The territorial period (1900–1959) saw the rise of a racialized system in Hawai‘i that the historian Lori Pierce calls the Discourse of Aloha. This was accompanied by the rise of a tourist industry, civic boosterism, the 1930s and 1940s vogue of ersatz Hawaiian music and aloha shirts, the sexualization of island women, and the figurative emasculation of island men. The Discourse of Aloha cast the islands as a place of happy natives eager to sing and dance for visitors and make them welcome. At the same time, it pictured Native Hawaiians as a dying race, to be supplanted by “the golden men,” in the novelist James Michener’s phrase—a polyglot mixture of Whites and Asians (with perhaps a tiny element of Hawaiian ancestry) who were making the islands a peaceful “meeting place of East and West.” A corollary to the Discourse of Aloha was the narrative of Native decline. Things Hawaiian were suppressed. Even at the Kāmehameha Schools—institutions for Native Hawaiian children, named after Hawai‘i’s first king—students were forbidden to speak Hawaiian or dance hula. The Hawaiian language nearly died out, and predictions were made that the people would disappear as well.34
Meanwhile the Haole oligarchy continued to dominate the islands. Five companies headed by missionary descendants—the so-called Big Five—ran not only the economy but also the Republican-controlled state legislature through the 1950s. Their hold was loosened a bit by the Democrat- and Japanese American–led campaign for statehood that culminated in 1959. Statehood brought demographic and economic booms to the islands. The colonial relationship to the United States was cemented. Native Hawaiians were honored culturally and ceremonially, even as they were impoverished and criminalized in fact.35
The years since statehood have seen a sharpening of race-based class divisions, with Haoles, Chinese, and Japanese (in that order) at the top of the social structure and Hawaiians, Samoans, and Filipinos (in that order) at the bottom. The first three groups are pictured in public discourse as productive, positively oriented toward family and education, civic-minded, and wholesome members of society. The darker three groups are often pictured as lazy, violent, sexual, and criminal.
The 1980s through 2000s saw a renaissance of Native Hawaiian cultural prestige and political activism. The Hawaiian language made a comeback. As a new century began, some Hawaiians began to contest the position of people they called “Asian settler colonialists,” whom they portrayed as junior partners in Haole domination. Some Asian-descended Hawaiian residents supported this characterization of Asians as essentially illegitimate members of Hawaiian society; others resisted.36
CONCLUSION
There are profound racial dynamics in Asia and the Pacific. They include the experiences and images of African Americans in those places. Yet that is only a minor theme in Asian and Pacific racial relationships. In each part of Asia and the Pacific, there are profoundly important racial dynamics that are critical to the situation and future of the peoples in those places. They have little or nothing to do with African-descended people.
Frequently there is a colonial tie to this race making and maintaining in Asia and the Pacific. Sometimes the tie is to European or American colonialism: for example, race in Fiji was framed by British colonialism, and Chinese and Japanese ideas about Africans (but not other racialized peoples in their spheres) were more or less inherited from Americans and Europeans. Sometimes the colonialism is more regional, whether it be Chinese colonialism in Tibet and other territories ruled by China or Japanese colonialism in the western Pacific. The key issue in such racialized hierarchies is power: those who would rule write a narrative of inferiority onto the bodies and into the genes of those whom they would control.
Finally, I would ask, does the end of colonialism lead us in the direction of an end to racialized encounters and oppression? Sadly, my preliminary judgment is that it does not. If one looks at Fiji, one sees a former British colony that has been legally independent for decades, yet is still mired in racial hierarchy left over from the colonial period. In Hawai‘i, some would say that the colonial era ended when the islands were incorporated into the United States as the fiftieth state; others would say that colonialism continues. Yet in either case it is clear that the racial regime that came with American colonialism persists.
NOTES
1. Heike Raphael-Hernandez and Shannon Steen, eds., AfroAsian Encounters: Culture, History, Politics (New York: New York University Press, 2006). See also Vijay Prashad, Everybody Was Kung Fu Fighting: Afro-Asian Connections and the Myth of Cultural Purity (Boston: Beacon, 2002), for another interesting take on the issues that Raphael-Hernandez and Steen ended up engaging.
2. Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic (London: Verso, 1993), back cover.
3. Paul Spickard, ed., Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World (New York: Routledge, 2005), 21–22 and passim.
4. Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs, “We Are a People,” in We Are a People: Narrative and Multiplicity in Constructing Ethnic Identity, ed. Paul Spickard and W. Jeffrey Burroughs (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 1–19; Lori Pierce, “The Continuing Significance of Race,” in Spickard and Burroughs, We Are a People, 221–28; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994), 53–76; Paul Spickard and G. Reginald Daniel, “Independence Possible,” in Racial Thinking in the United States: Uncompleted Independence, ed. Paul Spickard and G. Reginald Daniel (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), 1–17; G. Reginald Daniel, “Either Black or White: Race, Modernity, and the Law of the Excluded Middle,” in Spickard and Daniel, Racial Thinking in the United States, 21–59; Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., Race and the Enlightenment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Patrick B. Miller, “The Anatomy of Scientific Racism: Racialist Responses to Black Athletic Achievement,” in Spickard and Burroughs, We Are a People, 124–41; Stephen Cornell, “That’s the Story of Our Life,” in Spickard and Burroughs, We Are a People, 41–53.
5. Many writers on international economics, politics, and business refer to “the Asia-Pacific.” See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003); Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011); Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee, and J. Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-Pacific Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai, Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012). The term Asia-Pacific makes no sense, and in fact it leads the reader astray. We can argue about whether or not “Asia” is a meaningful abstraction, but “Asia-Pacific” certainly is not. There is no Asia-Pacific region, culture zone, or field of intertwined economic activity. Tokyo, Beijing, Singapore, and Manila—even Mumbai—have a great deal in common with one another thematically, and they connect with each other economically, but none has much at all to do with Suva or Rarotonga; the former are Asian places, the latter Pacific places. Those who use the term Asia-Pacific in fact mean Asia (with the possible inclusion of Australia) and its trans-Pacific connections, and by this hegemonic usage they obscure the very distinct issues—even the existence—of Pacific peoples. See Epeli Hau‘ofa, “Our Sea of Islands,” in A New Oceania: Rediscovering Our Sea of Islands, ed. Epeli Hau‘ofa, Eric Waddell, and Vijay Naidu (Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific, 1993), 2–16; Joanne L. Rondilla, “The Filipino Question in Asia and the Pacific: Rethinking Regional Origins in Diaspora,” in Pacific Diaspora, ed. Paul Spickard, Joanne L. Rondilla, and Debbie Hippolite Wright (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002), 56–68; Arif Dirlik, What Is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Rim Idea, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).
6. E.g., Stephen Small, Racialised Barriers (London: Routledge, 1994); Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack (London: Hutchinson, 1987); Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, Racialised Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle (London: Routledge, 1992); Robert Miles, Racism after “Race Relations” (London: Routledge, 1993); John Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1993); Ika Hügel-Marshall, Invisible Woman: Growing Up Black in Germany, trans. Elizabeth Gaffney (New York: Continuum, 2001); Hans J. Massaquoi, Destined to Witness: Growing Up Black in Nazi Germany (New York: Morrow, 1999); Yelena Khanga, with Susan Jacoby, Soul to Soul: The Story of a Black Russian American Family, 1865–1992 (New York: Norton, 1992); Paul Mecheril and Thomas Teo, Andere Deutsche: Zur Lebenssituation von Menschen Multiethnischer und Multikultureller Herkunft (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1994); Darlene Clark Hine, Trica Danielle Keaton, and Stephen Small, eds., Black Europe and the African Diaspora (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009); Trica Danielle Heaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics, and Social Exclusion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Jill Olumide, Raiding the Gene Pool: The Social Construction of Mixed Race (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Alessandro Portelli, “The Problem of the Color-Blind: Notes on the Discourse of Race in Italy,” in Spickard, Race and Nation, 355–63.
7. Tekle Woldemikael, “Ethiopians and Eritreans,” in Case Studies in Diversity: Refugees in America in the 1990s, ed. David W. Haines (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 265–87; Tekle Woldemikael, “Eritrea’s Identity as a Cultural Crossroads,” in Spickard, Race and Nation, 337–52.
8. Craig S. Smith, “French-Born Arabs, Perpetually Foreign, Grow Bitter,” New York Times, December 26, 2003; Craig S. Smith, “Third Bomb Attack Directed at France’s First Muslim Prefect,” New York Times, January 30, 2004; Taoufik Djebali, “Ethnicity and Power in North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco),” in Spickard, Race and Nation, 135–54; Paul Spickard, ed., Multiple Identities: Migrants, Ethnicity, and Membership (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013); Alec G. Hargreaves, Multi-Ethnic France: Immigration, Politics, Culture, and Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007); Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955–2005 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Michèle Lamont, Ann Morning, and Margarita Mooney, “Particular Universalisms: North African Immigrants Respond to French Racism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 25.3 (2002): 390–414; Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities (London: Open Society Institute, 2010).
9. E.g., David Parker, Through Different Eyes: The Cultural Identities of Young Chinese People in Britain (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995); Tariq Modood, “Political Blackness and British Asians,” Sociology 28.4 (1994): 3–13; Tariq Modood et al., Ethnic Minorities in Britain (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997); Paul Spickard, “Mapping Race: Multiracial People and Racial Category Construction in the United States and Britain,” Immigrants and Minorities 15 (July 1996): 107–19; Miri Song, Helping Out: Children’s Labor in Ethnic Businesses (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999); Miri Song, Choosing Ethnic Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003); Susan Benson, “Asians Have Culture, West Indians Have Problems,” in Culture, Identity, and Politics, ed. T. O. Ranger, Y. Samad, and O. Stuart (Alder-shot: Avebury, 1996).
10. E.g., Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998); E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., Becoming National (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
11. See the references in note 8, plus Elisabeth Schäfer-Wünsche, “On Becoming German: The Politics of Membership in Germany,” in Spickard Race and Nation, 195–211; David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky, eds., Turkish Culture in German Society Today (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996); Gérard Noiriel, The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity, trans. Geoffroy de Laforcade (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
12. See chapter 4.
13. Morishima Churyo, Komo Satsuwa (Chitchats with the Dutch), ed. R. Ono (Tokyo, 1943), 54–55, 92; quoted in Hiroshi Wagatsuma, “The Social Perception of Skin Color in Japan,” in Color and Race, ed. John Hope Franklin (Boston: Beacon, 1968), 135.
14. Discrimination against mixed-race Black Japanese seems to be lessening in the new century as Japan becomes a more cosmopolitan country. Nathan Oba Strong, “Patterns of Social Interaction and Psychological Adjustment among Japan’s Konketsuji Population” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1978); Miyuki Yonezawa, “Memories of Japanese Identity and Racial Hierarchy,” in Spickard, Race and Nation, 115–32; Lily Anne Yumi Welty, “Advantage through Crisis: Multiracial American Japanese on Post–World War II Japan, Okinawa, and America, 1945–1972” (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012). See also Frank Dikötter, ed., The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997).
15. Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 15–17, 38–39, 82, 89.
16. Field notes, Tianjin, 1988–89.
17. Rowena Fong and Paul R. Spickard, “Ethnic Relations in the People’s Republic of China: Images and Social Distance between Han Chinese and Minority and Foreign Nationalities,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13.1 (1994): 26–48.
18. Spickard, Race and Nation, 14–16, 135–211; Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Nicholas B. Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Anthony W. Marx, Making Race and Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 29–46; Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern, eds., Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850 (London: University College London Press, 1999); Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1991; orig. 1965); Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
19. Melvin C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet since 1947 (New York: Penguin, 2000); John F. Avedon, In Exile from the Land of Snows: The Definitive Account of the Dalai Lama and Tibet since the Chinese Conquest (New York: HarperCollins, 1998); Warren W. Smith Jr., China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009); Blake Kerr, Sky Burial: An Eyewitness Account of China’s Brutal Crackdown in Tibet (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1997).
20. Fong and Spickard, “Ethnic Relations in the People’s Republic of China.” See also Emily Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850–1980 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Stevan Harrell, Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Stevan Harrell, ed., Cultural Encounters on China–s Ethnic Frontiers (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995); Dru C. Gladney, Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1998); Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People–s Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1991); Dru C. Gladney, ed., Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the United States (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 95–131; Dikötter, Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan, 12–95; Dikötter, Discourse of Race in Modern China; Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Edward J. M. Rhoads, Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).
21. Yonezawa, “Memories of Japanese Identity and Racial Hierarchy”; Cullen Tadao Hayashida, “Identity, Race, and the Blood Ideology of Japan” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1974); Kirsten L. Ziomek, “Subaltern Speak: Imperial Multiplicities in Japan’s Empire and Post-War Colonialisms” (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2011). See in Dikötter, Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Michael Weiner, “The Invention of Identity: Race and Nation in Pre-War Japan,” 96–117; Kazuki Sato, “‘Same Language, Same Race’: The Dilemma of Kambun in Japan,” 118–35; Richard Siddle, “The Ainu and the Discourse of ‘Race,’” 136–57; Louise Young, “Rethinking Race for Manchukuo: Self and Other in the Colonial Context,” 158–76; Kosaku Yoshino, “The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan,” 199–211. In Gladney, Making Majorities: Kosaku Yoshino, “Culturalism, Racialism, and Internationalism in the Discourse on Japanese Identity,” 13–30; Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, “A Conceptual Model for the Historical Relationship between the Self and the Internal and External Others: The Agrarian Japanese, the Ainu, and the Special-Status People,” 31–51.
22. George DeVos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma, Japan’s Invisible Race: Caste in Culture and Personality, rev. ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Richard Hanks Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
23. Lane Ryo Hirabashi, Akemi Kikumura-Yano, and James A. Hirabayashi, eds., New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and People of Japanese Descent in the Americas and from Latin America in Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Lesser, Negotiating National Identity: Immigrants, Minorities, and the Struggle for Ethnicity in Brazil (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Joshua Hotaka Roth, Brokered Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Migrants in Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); David T. Suzuki and Keibo Oiwa, The Other Japan: Voices beyond the Mainstream (Golden, CO: Fulcrum, 1999); Daniel Touro Linger, No One Home: Brazilian Selves Remade in Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); James Brooke, “Sons and Daughters of Japan, Back from Brazil,” New York Times, November 27, 2001.
24. Christine Su, “Becoming Cambodian: Ethnicity and the Vietnamese in Kampuchea,” in Spickard, Race and Nation, 273–96.
25. Joanne L. Rondilla and Paul Spickard, Is Lighter Better? Skin-Tone Discrimination among Asian Americans (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 45–78; Khong Dien, Population and Ethno-Demography in Vietnam (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2002); Nicole Constable, ed., Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996); Craig J. Reynolds, ed., National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today, rev. ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2002); Shamsul A. B., “Bureaucratic Management of Identity in a Modern State: ‘Malayness’ in Postwar Malaysia,” in Gladney, Making Majorities, 135–50; Anthony Milner, “Ideological Work in Constructing the Malay Majority,” in Gladney, Making Majorities, 151–69; Judith A. Nagata, “What Is a Malay? Situational Selectivity of Identity in a Plural Society,” American Ethnologist 1 (1974): 331–50.
26. Sources for this section include Michael C. Howard, Fiji: Race and Politics in an Island State (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1991); Brij V. Lal, Broken Waves: A History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992); Stewart Firth and Daryl Tarte, eds., 20th Century Fiji (Suva: USP Solutions, 2001); Deryck Scarr, Fiji: A Short History (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984); Padmini Gaunder, Education and Race Relations in Fiji, 1835–1998 (Lautoka, Fiji: Universal Printing, 1999); Timothy J. Macnaught, The Fijian Colonial Experience: A Study of the Neotraditional Order under British Colonial Rule Prior to World War II, Pacific Research Monograph No. 7 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1982); K. L. Gillion, Fiji’s Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1962); Alexander Mamak, Colour, Culture, and Conflict: A Study of Pluralism in Fiji (Rushcutters Bay, NSW: Pergamon Press, 1978); John D. Kelly, “Aspiring to Minority and Other Tactics against Violence,” in Gladney, Making Majorities, 173–97; Martha Kaplan, “When 8,870 – 850 = 1: Discourses against Democracy in Fiji, Past and Present,” in Gladney, Making Majorities, 174–214.
27. The 1987 coup is the subject of several books, including Victor Lal, Fiji: Coups in Paradise: Race, Politics and Military Intervention (London: Zed, 1990); Brij V. Lal, Power and Prejudice: The Making of the Fiji Crisis (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Victoria University, 1988); Deryck Scarr, Fiji: Politics of Illusion: The Military Coups in Fiji (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1988); Jeremaia Waqanisau, “The Only Option: Fijian Coup d’État: A Product of Political Development” (MA thesis, Cartmel College, University of Lancaster, 1989); Robert T. Robertson and Akosita Tamanisau, Fiji: Shattered Coups (Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press, 1988).
28. Sir Paul Reeves, Tomasi Rayalu Vakatora, and Brij Vilash Lal, The Fiji Islands towards a United Future: Report of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission, 1996, Parliamentary Paper No. 34 (Suva: Parliament of Fiji, 1996); Brij V. Lal and Tomasi Rayalu Vakatora, eds., Fiji Constitution Review Commission Research Papers, 2 vols. (Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific, 1997).
29. One can follow the course of politics in the 1990s in the pages of such sources as Ralph R. Premdas, Ethnic Conflict and Development: The Case of Fiji (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995); Reeves, Vakatora, and Lal, Fiji Islands towards a United Future; Brij V. Lal and Peter Larmour, eds., Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review, Pacific Policy Paper No. 21 (Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1997); Robert T. Robertson, Multiculturalism and Reconciliation in an Indulgent Republic: Fiji after the Coups, 1987–1998 (Suva: Fiji Institute of Applied Studies, 1998); Lal and Vakatora, Fiji Constitution Review Commission Research Papers; Stephanie Lawson, Tradition versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37–76; Kelly, “Aspiring to Minority and Other Tactics against Violence.”
30. Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal, eds., The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups? (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2009); Jonathan Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, eds., From Election to Coup in Fiji: The 2006 Campaign and Its Aftermath (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2007).
31. Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1968); Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 3 vols. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1938–67); Michael Kioni Dudley and Keoni Kealoha Agard, A Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty (Honolulu: Nā Kāne O Ka Malo Press, 1990); O. A. Bushnell, The Gifts of Civilization: Germs and Genocide in Hawai‘i (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1993); David Stannard, Before the Horror: The Population of Hawai‘i on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu: Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawai‘i, 1989); J. Matthew Kester, Remembering Iosepa: History, Place, and Religion in the American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); David A. Chang, “Borderlands in a World at Sea: Concow Indians, Native Hawaiians, and South Chinese in Indigenous, Global, and National Spaces,” Journal of American History 98.2 (2011): 384–403.
32. Lilikala Kame‘ele‘ihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992); George Cooper and Gavan Daws, Land and Power in Hawai‘i (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1985); Linda S. Parker, Native American Estate: The Struggle over Indian and Hawaiian Lands (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1989); Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai‘i: The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
33. Jonathan Osorio, Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002); Dudley and Agard, Call for Hawaiian Sovereignty; Lili‘uokalani, Hawai‘i’s Story by Hawai‘i’s Queen (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle, 1964); Michael Dougherty, To Steal a Kingdom: Probing Hawaiian History (Waimanalo, Hawai‘i: Island Style Press, 1992); Noenoe Silva, Ku‘e! The 1897 Petitions Protesting Annexation (Honolulu: ‘Ai Pohaku Press, 1998); Helena G. Allen, The Betrayal of Lili‘uokalani (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1982); Noenoe Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism (Durham, NC: Duke Universty Press, 2004); Tom Coffman, Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawai‘i, rev. ed. (Kihei, Hawai‘i: Koa Books, 2009).
34. Lori Pierce, “‘The Whites Have Created Modern Honolulu’: Ethnicity, Racial Stratification, and the Discourse of Aloha,” in Spickard and Daniel, Racial Thinking in the United States, 124–54; Pierce, “Creating a Racial Paradise: Citizenship and Sociology in Hawai‘i,” in Spickard, Race and Nation, 69–86. The conquering and remaking of the Philippines by the United States in the same era was a similarly racialized encounter, though without the syrupy veneer. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989); Angel Velasco Shaw and Luis H. Francia, eds., Vestiges of War: The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream (New York: New York University Press, 2002); Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
35. Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993).
36. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, eds., Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai‘i (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008); Jeffrey A. S. Moniz and Paul Spickard, “Carving Out a Middle Ground: Making Race in Hawai‘i,” in Negotiating the Color Line: Multiracial Identities in the “Color-Blind Era,” ed. David L. Brunsma (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 63–81.