How can Social Democratic Parties in Government Deal with the Consequences of Globalization?
Manuel de la Rocha
Introduction: Social Democracy in Crisis
Social democracy emerged and became established in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s as a compromise between capitalism and the market. Workers accepted capitalism and the market system on the basis that the state should play an important role as a redistributive agent. This is how modern welfare states were born and strengthened in the years and decades following World War II, and social democracy enjoyed its golden age in this period. In the 1970s and 1980s, a conservative offensive began. Increasingly, many of neo-liberalism’s precepts became more acceptable to social democrats, who found themselves on the defensive particularly after 1989 following the fall of communist regimes. As the leftist intellectual Karl Polanyi (1944) has written, ‘Capitalism is governed by a double movement – a push for the liberalization of markets and a contrary pull in favour of regulating them in the interest of the social majority’. Since the 1980s, however, the pendulum has swung in favour of free markets which, fuelled by new technologies, launched rapid expansion and transformed the system into the global financial capitalism that currently prevails.
Around the same time, socialist and social democratic governments began to accommodate the ideas of the neo-liberal paradigm, partly due to the exhaustion of Keynesian-style policies that no longer met their desired objectives. The inherent goal of social democracy, which used to be the protection and advancement of the working class, was put aside, and priority was given to the regulation and control of capitalism for its own survival, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. All of this resulted in a progressive weakening of the ideological postulates of social democracy.
The only serious attempt to redefine and modernize social democratic principles was the so-called Third Way, which emerged in the mid-1990s when social democracy was facing a challenging moment, both historically and politically. The centre-left’s capacity to adapt to globalization and to offer a robust alternative to neo-liberal supremacy was being seriously questioned. The Third Way, led by Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, claimed not only to be an alternative to the dominant paradigm of neo-liberalism, but also to present something that was different to the old post-war socialism characterized by hierarchical state control of the key resources of the economy.
The Third Way willingly accepted the domination of markets and private property as the engines of innovation and wealth creation, although it did seek to temper its most harmful and unjust effects. Social democrats were criticized for being more concerned with maintaining the size and power of the state than with producing effective policies that addressed the stark problems for people arising from globalization. They argued in favour of the restructuring of public administration, giving enormous importance to the issue of efficiency, cost reduction and individual choice. Under these premises the privatization of public services, originally initiated by Conservative governments, was taken further by social democratic governments with the aim of reducing costs.
The greatest shortcoming of the theoretical writings and political programmes inspired by the Third Way relates to the implications for inequality and social justice. Although there was concern about rates of poverty and social exclusion, equality ceased to be a goal in itself, and few concrete solutions were found to address the problem of rising economic inequality. By placing so much emphasis on improvements in competitiveness and efficiency, the proponents of the Third Way ended up reducing the values of the left to mere principles of technocratic management, to the point where they became scarcely differentiated from neoliberal ideology. Thus, the Third Way failed in its attempt to transform and modernize social democracy, and to impose itself globally as the new way forward for the left. Even if we acknowledge certain positive elements in the theoretical content of Third Way thinking, in practical terms the policies that were executed by its main proponents were perceived by many as merely a moderate form of neo-liberalism, and did not appear to question or dispute some of the most harmful liberal tendencies, such as financial deregulation which led directly to the great economic crisis that unfolded in 2008 and which shook the foundations of the capitalist-globalized system in a way not seen since the crisis of 1929.
The Great Recession and its Impact on Social Democratic Ideas and Ideology
The bankruptcy of the American investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in September of 2008 set off one of the biggest economic crises since the Great Depression. The severity of the crisis has revealed the weaknesses of an immensely unstable process of economic and financial globalization. As Wolfgang Streeck contends, the bursting of the real estate bubble which caused the collapse of Lehman Brothers was nothing more than, ‘a manifestation of a basic underlying tension in the political-economic configuration of advanced-capitalist societies; a tension which makes disequilibrium and instability the rule rather than the exception’. The deregulation and liberalization of financial markets accelerated their integration and dominance over more productive forms of capitalism. This has reduced the stability of the international economic system and increased the frequency of financial crises.
In the context of globalization and neoliberal domination, the 2008 financial crash led to a severe economic crisis which had huge repercussions for the productive sectors, for workers and companies, and for labour markets. Perhaps most dangerous is the profound delegitimization of democratic politics which has occurred since then, due to the incapacity and the unwillingness of institutions to adopt measures which respond to the general interest of the public in the face of pressure from speculators and unfettered markets. Increasingly, markets are not only exempt from the regulation and control of public authorities, but in their attempt to maximize benefits without incurring risks, advocates of free markets try to dictate and impose – through false interests and subtle forms of power – measures of liberalization and continuous adjustment that obstruct the recovery of the productive economy, and make it impossible to maintain the welfare and social protection policies which are such a characteristic feature of social democracy.
However, the Great Recession has shattered many of the fallacies of neoliberal thought, such as the supposed efficiency of financial markets based on self-regulation, or the belief that economic cycles are a thing of the past. Markets can generate economic growth and wealth but without adequate control and regulation they become unstable and produce bubbles, in the financial sector, in real estate, with raw materials, and so on, that can burst causing crises, the consequences of which are enormously damaging.
Along with the growth of the financial sector, the other side of the evolution of capitalism manifests itself in the model of economic and social growth that has been driven forward by the neoliberal paradigm in Western economies, particularly in the United States. Since the beginning of the 1970s, practically the entire Western world has seen a discrepancy between improvements in productivity and wage increases, which suggests that income and wealth are increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, while workers have witnessed their salary levels stagnate for decades. Some economists, most notably Thomas Piketty, have depicted this situation of an unprecedented rise in inequality as inherent to the capitalist system.
In addition, it has been shown that GDP growth is not enough to guarantee equitable and lasting progress. The predatory energy and resource-intensive growth model, that arises in the light of the deregulatory forces of the market is neither efficient, nor sustainable in the medium-term. It produces harmful side effects, such as climate change, which need to be urgently addressed.
Yet despite the apparent failure of neo-liberalism and the detrimental effects of the crisis on large sections of the population, socialist and social democratic parties have been unable to stem their electoral decline. What is more, in many countries it was mostly social democratic parties that were punished for the ostensible failures of the prevailing model, at least in an electoral sense, often losing votes to populist political offerings of the left and right.
In retrospect, it seems clear that in the early 1990s, social democracy put too much emphasis on the benefits of the form of globalization that was emerging at that time, which was believed to increase growth, wealth and overall prosperity in the world. Social democrats didn’t spot, or at least underestimated, the negative impacts of globalization on a wide segment of society. They could not even imagine, let alone warn of, the instability and risks that it entailed, and that eventually led to the 2008 crisis.
The reality of globalization, unfortunately, turned out to be much more problematic. Global financial capitalism has become significantly more aggressive in the last three decades, and the ‘losers’ of globalization are far greater in number than originally envisaged. Among those losers are the long-term unemployed in developed countries (those who will not find a job again because their skills have become obsolete), young people – including graduates – who cannot find skilled work, those who have lagged behind in the digital revolution, and the workers whose employment sectors have disappeared.
The efforts to update the worn-out Keynes-Beveridge model to protect and promote social protection were too accommodating to the neoliberal system, and did not offer any real alternative. In the absence of a differentiated political project, social democracy offered merely palliatives that did not challenge the foundations of the prevailing economic orthodoxy.
Consequences of the Social Democratic Decline
The ideological decline of European social democracy has inevitably affected the strength of its electoral support. The main leftist parties have gone from being the representatives of the electoral majority across Western Europe during the second half of the twentieth century, to a political force in evident decline during the first decades of the twenty-first century, especially since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008. The electoral data reflects this evolution:
• From 1950 to the present-day, social democrats across Europe have lost an average of 12 per cent of the vote in national elections.
• The ‘golden age’ of social democracy is now seen to have been in the 1950–70 period, and since then, there has been a gradual and continuous erosion of centre-left support that coincides with a period of increasing globalization.
• Although social democracy has been losing votes since the 1950s, the decline has accelerated over the last decade.
• If the focus is on the post-crisis years, PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español/Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) is the European socialist party that has suffered the biggest fall in support after the Greek PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα/Panhellenic Socialist Alliance). PASOK received 43.9 per cent of the votes in 2009 and only 7 per cent in 2015, while PSOE won the Spanish election in 2008 with 43.9 per cent and in 2018 is touching 20 per cent support in the opinion polls. Similarly, the German SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands/Social Democratic Party of Germany) secured 20.5 per cent in the 2017 federal election – the worst result in the party’s history during (see Estefanía 2016).
The decline of social democracy has led to important changes in the political landscape of almost all European countries. During the post-war period, European politics was dominated by competition between the centre-left and centre-right parties, generally through a large social democratic and a large conservative-Christian democratic party which offered real political alternatives, but that nonetheless agreed on the basic framework in which liberal capitalist democracy should operate. These parties were large enough to form majority governments, to set agendas, and to carry out their policies. The decline of social democracy overturned this state of affairs. In many European countries, most notably in Germany, this breakdown has made it more difficult to form stable governments, which leaves voters increasingly frustrated with traditional parties and institutions.
These developments have paved the way for the advent of populist parties on both sides of the political spectrum. On the far right, we have seen the emergence of parties with xenophobic and anti-democratic attitudes. But new populist parties of the extreme left have emerged as well, and in some cases are outperforming traditional social democratic forces, notably Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and La France Insoumise of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France. Populist parties of both the left and right have succeeded in attracting citizens who have historically supported moderate social democratic parties – such as industrial or low-skilled workers – by directly confronting the economic fears generated by globalization, and the associated cultural and technological change. Despite their differences, all of these parties tend to share a nationalist vision that rejects globalization and the political and economic elites that defend the status quo of global capitalism.
This situation is apparent in France with Marine Le Pen, and in Germany, where the right-wing populist party, AfD (Alternative for Germany/Alternative für Deutschland), promoted itself as the authentic ‘alternative’ to the economic and political elite. It seems clear that if social democrats fail to provide voters with relevant solutions to the challenges their societies are facing, the decline of the left will persist and populism will continue to grow. In the longer term, the entire liberal democratic system will be put at risk. The emergence of populism has also altered the electoral axis and the key dividing-lines of European politics, which can no longer be defined on the traditional divide between left and right. Now, there are at least two other dimensions of electoral politics that have to be taken into account:
The ‘up-down’ axis: This relates to the elites who allegedly represent the establishment as opposed to the citizens. The social democratic parties who dominated the political arena for decades are perceived to have become increasingly out-of-touch, having little empathy with the circumstances of the most disadvantaged groups whose situation has progressively worsened. In these circumstances, it is easier to understand why the traditional leftist parties are seen as part of the elite.
The ‘openness-nationalism’ axis: here, those in favour of an open society, who endorse the integration of Europe in a more globalized world, are counter-posed against nationalists and protectionists from left to right who reject immigration, international trade, the EU, multinationals and everything associated with globalization.
Social democrats need to understand and better respond to the new political dividing-lines that are reshaping European democracies. This should be done by maintaining the best tradition of the left, by articulating progressive social values and by defending the role of the welfare state, while at the same time by embracing a reformist spirit; by paying attention to what happens in the local communities and coming closer to the most disadvantaged groups; and by distancing itself from elites, while defending a united Europe but a democratic Europe, that favours globalization and international trade, but only when it is done fairly. Upholding and advancing all of these values and principles together with sound policies is no easy task, and represents the great challenge that social democracy now faces if it wants to recover its relevance in the decades ahead.
Searching for Solutions: The Difficulty of Defining a Social Democratic Electoral Offer
The crisis of social democracy is a crisis of Western European democracy itself, and of the idea that democratic systems can channel the goals and aspirations of a wide part of the population. There is a systemic problem in the present political and socio-economic model, which needs to be addressed. The consequences of the Great Recession have sown doubt in the system among the majority of voters. Citizens are increasingly aware that the instruments of democratic politics remain essentially national, and cannot confront challenges that are, by their nature, supranational or global in scope (from social dumping to tax evasion, as well as climate change, migration and terrorism).
In this context, centre-left parties must re-think their political strategies. If in the past social democracy was willing to accept the current capitalist system as part of a wider social contract, it is now clear that the contract is broken, which automatically calls the system into question. The capitalist model of the 1950s and 1960s is very different from the current system of financial capitalism which is increasingly globalized, predatory and destabilising, for which mild remedies and temporary fixes are not sufficient.
One of the great challenges for social democracy is how to identify its target voters given these changing circumstances. In the past, centre-left parties established themselves as the dominant force in industrialized societies that were much more homogeneous than they are today. Social democrats were the defenders of workers’ interests against capital. At the time, there was a strong culture of class-based politics, as working people shared common interests and aspirations. However, the situation has now changed dramatically. The divide between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization in societies that are more heterogeneous has created an electoral dilemma for leftist parties.
A first obvious electoral divide is between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. If social democratic electoral programmes target public sector workers, civil servants, retired citizens and the middle classes (the insiders), then temporary workers, immigrants, students, and the unemployed (the outsiders) risk ending up in the hands of populists from the left and right. On the other hand, if social democrats neglect the demands of the insiders, and those with decent jobs, who have been a natural source of support for social democratic parties, they will be tempted to vote for more centrist Macron-style parties that prioritize the stability of the existing social order (that social democrats helped to create, if should be said).
Furthermore, the dilemma of social democracy has been largely determined by the budgetary restrictions that have affected almost all EU countries for a decade. Improvements to major public services, such as to education, health and social services, are expected to benefit mainly the lower-income middle classes. However, in general, investments of this type require tax increases to cover the cost without dramatically increasing public deficits. And this is where the core of the problem lies for social democrats. The middle-class insiders who provide the bulk of the public finances are opposed to paying more taxes and punish those governments who impose higher taxes electorally. This leaves social democrats with few options to carry out transformative political programmes.
In addition, in most European countries there is a generational divide that leads to a dilemma for traditional left parties. In societies with ageing populations, public spending on pensions and healthcare tends to grow, which puts more pressure on those of working age who are typically the ones that have to pay the most.
Most surveys demonstrate that the biggest decline in votes for social democratic parties has occurred among young people who have suffered a marked decline in their material living standards. Those born in the 1980s (so-called ‘millennials’) are the first generation since the war to reach the age of 30 with lower real incomes than those born during the previous decade. The rise of generational inequality has accelerated since 2008, while social democracy has been unable to offer effective responses to the problems faced by young people.
Laying out a New Social Democratic Agenda
By too often conforming to the neo-liberal agenda while failing to propose an alternative conceptual framework, social democrats have given the leftist populist parties a window of opportunity. They have managed to build an appealing narrative, rooted in certain concepts derived from the work of authors such as the Italian revolutionary and political philosopher Antonio Gramsci, the Argentine intellectual Ernesto Laclau, and other Latin American influences. The political discourse of the ‘elites’ versus ‘the people’ is intuitively attractive since it threatens to disrupt the status quo, while it also connects to the lived reality of millions of citizens – those at the bottom of society, the ‘losers’ of globalization, those who feel alienated, insecure and who no longer see social democratic parties as defenders of their interests.
This is why traditional left parties have to make their political language more robust. They must be more radical in their criticism of the capitalist system, and the privileges of corporate elites, while being clearly reformist in their deeds and overall line of action. Social democrats’ strong defense of the policies and accomplishments of the past often makes them appear conservative, or too close to the privileged classes. For instance, a strong defense of the public sector must be coupled with an equally strong demand for quality and efficiency in the delivery of public services. Further, in modernising their political discourse, social democrats must recognize that the labour-capital dichotomy has lost much of its historical resonance in societies where a large number of citizens are self-employed, entrepreneurs, or small business owners. Likewise, the struggle for equality should not lead to a distortion of meritocracy that undermines the importance of effort and talent.
If social democrats are to restore their appeal to the majority of working people, they need to reconstruct their political discourse far beyond the mere denunciation of the negative effects of globalization. Rather, it has to be articulated within a conceptual framework that gives social democrats a clear direction and sense of priorities. The basis upon which social democracy ought to build its new project is the idea of a new social contract between capital and labour, between different generations, and between the public and private sectors. It is a contract based on social justice and shared prosperity, which allows us to overcome the enormous inequalities created by the capitalist system, exacerbated by globalization. The generation of wealth in any society is always a collective effort, so the question is how to allocate income fairly. More specifically, we must consider what are the best mechanisms for redistribution? It is these mechanisms (i.e. salaries, taxation, public spending, collective bargaining) that shape the effectiveness of welfare states, and it is the failure of these mechanisms that is the main cause of citizen unrest, especially among young people who feel that they do not have any future.
Ultimately, this means coming up with a very different approach to human progress and prosperity. For conservatives, it comes down to economic growth, with some degree of redistribution. For social democracy, prosperity and progress should be measured according to the advance of three key elements, namely: social justice; environmental sustainability; and the strengthening of democracy. There cannot be widespread prosperity and social cohesion if these elements are not present together, as they reinforce one another. These ideas encompass, but clearly surpass the traditional social democratic approach to class struggle. The notion of solidarity continues to be central but in a broader sense – solidarity between existing generations; solidarity with future generations to which we must leave a more habitable planet; solidarity with citizens of other countries and with immigrants; solidarity between countries; above all, solidarity with developing countries.
Translating this proposition into public policy would mean six categories of action:
Firstly, on predistribution policies, redistribution in welfare states has reached its limit. The Beveridge-Keynesian model of redistribution is no longer effective in reducing inequality, which makes it necessary to focus on the primary causes of inequality. The Nobel laureate in Economics, James Meade, a colleague of J.M. Keynes, defined predistribution as being based on the need to, ‘radically reform markets and power relations in order to empower the working class, [by] transitioning from a democracy of private owners to a democracy in which the citizens own the system’. Predistribution seeks to promote market reforms that encourage a more equitable distribution of economic power before public redistribution takes place through taxes and public spending alongside mechanisms such as collective bargaining, education and training, market competition, public procurement, and public-private partnerships.
Secondly, on continuing the fight against inequality. This is not exclusive to income and wealth inequality but relates to all other kinds of inequality including based on gender, sexual orientation, race, disability, and immigration status.
Thirdly, regarding sustainability and climate change policies, there has to be a determined transition towards a new model of energy supply, transport mobility and the creation of smart cities.
Fourthly, progressives must work to deepen democracy. Representative democratic systems have shown worrying signs of instability and fracture. Democracy cannot mean simply voting every four or five years to elect a parliament. Deepening democracy requires the increased participation of civil society, the involvement of citizens in the internal operation of the system, and introducing new forms of political engagement.
Fifthly, policies around development co-operation and multilateralism must form part of a global development agenda. Progressives should argue for an increase in development aid to fulfill the commitments made in the past. They must also advocate for the strengthening of multilateral agencies, especially the United Nations, while at the same time demanding efficiency gains and results.
Sixthly, there should be more Europe, but also a different Europe. Many of the initiatives already mentioned can only be implemented effectively at the European level. Unfortunately, in the last decade the policies imposed by the EU have put financial and monetary stability ahead of social stability. This situation raises a key question about the future of social democracy, and whether it is possible to advance progressive, social democratic policies within the framework of a twenty-first-century European Union. The way that the EU is designed, in particular the eurozone, leaves little margin for individual policy at the national level. It is necessary for social democratic parties to take European politics, including elections for the European Parliament, much more seriously. Only if the current Conservative centre-right majority that dominates the main European institutions (the Commission, Council and European Parliament) is changed will it be possible to envisage a shift towards full employment and the reduction of inequality as the central objectives of EU and eurozone policies.
Obviously, the narrative and the story are important but must be accompanied by concrete measures and policies, especially in economic matters. The good news is that a genuine ‘economic corpus’ is developing full of solid policy proposals, with great intellectual strength that should serve as the basis for any modern social democratic economic programme.
Modernization of the Welfare State
One aspect traditionally central to the political discourse of left parties has been the defence of the welfare state. Social democrats played a decisive role in the creation of welfare states more than 50 years ago, and must remain the strongest defenders of welfare provision. Yet, the world has evolved dramatically in recent decades. Economic and social change, driven in part by new technologies, trade, demographics and migration, now have a dramatic influence on the outcomes of public policies. The modernization of the welfare state must go beyond simply increasing spending and criticising austerity, and must focus much more on the quality and impact of public spending. In this sense, the reforms adopted by the Nordic countries can serve as a guide.
In the early 1990s, the Nordic states, in particular Sweden and Finland, faced serious economic crises, with low economic growth, unprecedented levels of unemployment and high deficits that had in part been caused by the increased level of public spending that was necessary to maintain their long-standing welfare state practices. National governments were compelled to introduce economic reforms whose primary goal was to revive economic growth, while ensuring the future viability of welfare states. Not all of these reforms were carried out by social democratic administrations, but they were not reversed when the centre-left regained power.
Firstly, the Nordic countries managed to reform their institutions and make their labour and product markets more competitive, not only by means of simple deregulation, but also via reforms that were aimed at increasing training, geographical mobility and work incentives. Much more emphasis was placed on active employment policies, on continuous training, on the employability of workers, and on gender equality. The case of Denmark stands out in this regard with its well-known ‘flexicurity’ model that combines a liberalized labour market with a powerful system of continuous training for workers financed in large part by the state.
Secondly, the reform process was accompanied by major adjustments in public spending. Since the 1990s enormous emphasis has been placed on the quality of spending, and on the prioritization of investment and expenditure in sectors that promote economic growth. In addition, rigorous budget evaluation and policy review systems were put in place, and absolute transparency in their use was promoted.
Many social programmes evolved from a system of universal benefits to a means-tested system that is dependent on the level of income. In the areas of education and health, reforms were carried out with the ultimate objective of improving the quality and efficiency of services and their outcomes. Supplying both sectors has remained the responsibility of the state, although not necessarily managed from the public sector. Co-payments in healthcare were introduced to reduce unnecessary spending. In Sweden, a major reform of the pension system was also carried out to maintain the basis of a pay-as-you-go model, encouraging greater labour-force participation and delaying retirement to ensure economic sustainability over time. Likewise, welfare provision has been decentralized, with greater responsibility given to individual municipalities and regions.
Thirdly, the state was re-orientated toward new technologies and innovation, by greatly increasing their investment in R&D, education and ICT innovation, which they have maintained even in periods of crisis.
The reforms carried out have been successful from an economic and fiscal perspective, especially in Sweden and Norway. Thus Nordic countries regained economic dynamism, and over the last two decades have enjoyed growth and productivity rates clearly above the European average. This was achieved while maintaining the lowest levels of unemployment and inequality, and the highest rates of active population in the EU.
A key aspect of this relatively successful Nordic social model lies in its capacity to continuously reform and adapt institutions and policies in the face of economic and demographic challenges, and especially its ability to maintain dynamism and innovation in the field of public policies.
Finally, it is worth highlighting a series of interesting proposals, inspired in part by the Nordic model, that make up the so-called ‘social investment’ approach throughout the life-course. This is about generating virtuous cycles which guarantee equal opportunities and increased investment in people throughout the course of their life, starting from early childhood. The social-investment framework focuses on improving their employability and productivity, which leads to greater potential growth and, therefore to higher tax revenues. Thus, the main priority of the social investment approach becomes advancing family policies understood in a broad sense, including the likes of: universal extension of early-age school, the extension of assistance for dependent citizens, the implementation of gender equality and anti-discrimination legislation that encourages the full integration of women and disabled citizens into the labour market.
Reforming the Organization and Functioning of Social Democratic Parties
The final essential criteria for the recovery of social democratic parties is to do with internal reform and the selection of party leaders. For much of the twentieth century, leftists formed mass parties – not only in the sense of their garnering wide electoral support, but also because of the large number of members who lined their ranks and who actively participated in the organic life of the party. Over time this has changed and party membership has been reduced to a tiny percentage of voters, and is often characterized by a very high average age. For large parts of the population, traditional parties, including social democratic parties, have transformed themselves into closed organizations, increasingly more distant from society, and dominated by clientelism and opportunism, instead of talent and merit. Leaders can often be regarded as having little regard for grassroots activists, who feel marginalized in the political decision-making process, and who ultimately end up leaving the party.
The populist parties are taking advantage of this situation. By embracing new technologies and social media, they have opened up and allowed millions of people to participate in the party’s decision-making processes. Social democrats should draw lessons from the populist left parties and their mass mobilization strategies in order to attract new activists, including from among the liberal professionals, academics, students, small-scale entrepreneurs, and young people. It is necessary to consolidate the selection system through open primary elections in which members and sympathizers can participate so as to mobilize left-wing voters, sparking a conversation on the issues that really matter to people.
Finally, the personality of the candidates matters as well. The electoral result obtained by Jeremy Corbyn in the 2017 British elections teaches us about the importance of coherence. In a world dominated by uncertainty about the future, some values such as trust, honesty and authenticity are valued above others, like charisma, oratory or super leadership. Along with Corbyn, names such as the mayor of New York, Bill Di Blasio, the mayor of London, Sadiq Kahn, the new Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez or the Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Lofven, embody this type of profile of an authentic and close politician who can revive the social democracy.
Conclusion
Social democracy was the ideology that played the most decisive role in shaping the European economic and social model created after World War II. At the time, Europe enjoyed almost three decades of continuous economic growth which benefited a large majority of the population, especially among the working class. Since the 1970s, the rise of neo-liberalism accelerated by the fall of communism led to a slow but deep decline in the fortunes of left parties. Although the financial crisis of 2008 exposed the deficiencies of the neo-liberal approach, social democracy failed to reap the rewards of a loss of confidence in markets. Social democratic parties have a lower share of the vote than for decades. Worse still, populist parties of left and right sought to capture traditional social democratic voters. This loss occurred because of ideological compromises made over the years in the face of neo-liberal ideas, sometimes executed by supposedly left-wing governments.
Updating the political discourse of social democracy means restoring the domination of democratic politics over market forces, while subordinating the latter to the collective interest. It is about recovering the spirit of reform by articulating an alternative economic model that goes beyond the technocratic management of capitalism and transcends national borders to create more democratic and just societies that temper the most negative aspects of globalization. Given the extent of financial globalization, progress and prosperity must go hand in hand with three fundamental concepts: social justice, environmental sustainability, and strong participatory democracy.
The renewal of the social democratic agenda also involves modernising the welfare state, improving efficiency and flexibility, decisively pursuing investment in growth and innovation, and equipping citizens, especially the most vulnerable, with capacities to face new challenges. Ultimately, it is about laying out an optimistic narrative for the future which embraces the spirit of progress, humanism and solidarity in the face of conservative individualism. It is a vision that should appeal to all classes and sections of society. In short, a political project framed by an idealistic spirit: the belief in a better, more decent and more just society for all.
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