The EU in Crises: Brexit, Populism and the Future of the Union
Dimitris Tsarouhas
Introduction
The UK referendum to exit the European Union (EU) is a watershed moment in EU history. The formal reason is that this constitutes the first exit from the EU club and is evidence membership need not be a one-way street. Importantly, and this goes beyond the formal, institutional processes of rearranging votes and seats in the EU institutions, the member state departing constitutes a major political, economic and cultural force within the EU and beyond. A permanent member of the United Nations’ Security Council, a nuclear power, the EU’s second largest economy and a major pole of attraction for the world’s talent in finance, culture and the arts, the UK constitutes more than your average EU member (Matthjis 2017).
This chapter will focus on the repercussions of Brexit for the EU’s cohesion and sustainability in the context of its crises and ongoing challenges. To analyse the issue, I will pay special attention to populism and its rise in the EU, inquiring on the extent to which the populist forces that propelled Brexit to the top of Britain’s public policy agenda may be able to exert similarly successful pressures to other EU members. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that attributing Brexit solely to populist forces would be inaccurate; whether one endorses the thesis of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ or not (George 1990), it remains true that Britain’s EU trajectory had been different from that of Continental states from day one. Its historical ties to the Commonwealth and to a distinct aversion to political integration had often led Britain to strike a different tone in EU policy-making, despite the fact it has been at the heart of major EU initiatives, not least the Single Market and eastward enlargement.
The chapter’s main argument is that the EU faces multiple crises at the same time, with Brexit occupying a large part of the EU agenda but by no means the core of its contemporary challenges. I focus on the economic crisis, and the migration and refugee crisis, as issues that place Europe’s role in the world into question and the successful overcoming of which will alleviate populist pressures on the EU. In other words, the Union’s sustainability will not be put into doubt following Brexit (at least directly) but may well be undermined if other parallel challenges are not handled in ways that enable the EU to move forward. Brexit is a symptom, not a cause, of the Union’s current malaise. Victories by pro-European forces in some recent European elections, most notably in France with the election of Emmanuel Macron as president in 2017, do not and cannot suggest that populism as a political force has been defeated.
In what follows, I begin with a brief discussion of the Union’s response to Brexit thus far, and argue that unity at this stage has been facilitated by Britain’s largely incoherent stance on its departure. This is likely to change depending on the content of a possible agreement and the extent to which Britain will act in accordance with member states’ core interests. The next two sections discuss the economic and migration crises respectively, pointing to the need for more and better policy on the EU’s part to address current shortcomings and to safeguard cohesion in the wake of the ongoing populist challenge. The latter may be in retreat in the aftermath of Brexit yet its appeal has become deeper over time and is directly correlated to the EU’s own behaviour. The concluding section will summarize the chapter and will outline a few practical policy suggestions that could aid the EU in facing up to the complex issues confronting the Union.
The EU Response to Brexit: Unity with a Purpose
As UK Finance Minister, Gordon Brown would often talk of the need for ‘prudence with a purpose’. The EU has so far sought to display unity in the face of the shock UK referendum result with an explicit, and easy to understand, purpose: deterrence. This is the first time that a member state is seeking to withdraw membership and is about to create a dangerous precedent. To obtain the best possible result from the Brexit negotiations, the EU has been unwilling to display, at least in public, flexibility towards the UK’s negotiating position. In fact, the incoherence of the UK position, and the confusing discourse on the part of the UK government has to date greatly facilitated the EU’s stance (Schrieberg 2017), and has allowed EU member states to close ranks and keep the British government guessing as to Brussels’ ‘real intentions’. This is especially true regarding the prospects for a future trade arrangement, a crucial issue for Britain, given the proportion of exports that it sends to members of the Single Market.
Attempts by Theresa May’s government to suggest that future trade deals with non-EU trade blocs could be concluded prior to any final settlement with the EU have been repeatedly, and emphatically, rebuffed. Similar incoherence has characterized Britain’s stance as to membership of a Customs Union and the Single Market, and regarding the jurisdiction of the European Court. All this plays into the hands of the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator Michel and his team. Meanwhile, the improving economic outlook for eurozone countries and a pick-up in employment rates across the EU has led to an increasing sense of confidence on the part of Brussels that, ultimately, the UK will regret its decision to leave. This, however, is contingent on Britain feeling the ‘pain’ of Brexit. So far at least, the Remain camp arguments that warn of economic calamity have proven futile, with the UK economy performing well and riding on a wave of global economic recovery following the crisis. And then there is the heterogeneity of EU member states’ positions vis-á-vis the UK, with different states wishing to focus on the different aspects of a possible deal that is of key concern to them. The Republic of Ireland is most concerned about the border with Northern Ireland. Poland wants guarantees on the considerable number of its citizens living in the UK, Spain is likely to try and make an issue out of the Gibraltar issue at a time of rising secessionist tendencies in Catalonia while France may prove hard to please given Emmanuel Macron’s antipathy to the act of ‘political vandalism’ that the UK committed by opting to leave (Hammond 2017).
As Brexit talks continue, the price to pay for such a confusing stance is becoming increasingly clear. In December 2017, the two sides came to an agreement, in principle (though not yet in concrete detail) covering the three fundamental issues of the talks’ first phase, namely a financial settlement, the rights of citizens and the Irish border issue (Joint Report 2017). The Council thus approved moving on to the second, and tougher, phase of Brexit talks. This is likely to be the start of a long series of clarifications that ardent Brexiteers are likely to interpret as a mistake at best, and treason at worst. The UK government stands on thin ice, not least due to domestic political realities that call into question the legitimacy and authority of Theresa May’s government, and a unified EU bloc is unlikely to budge for the likes of David Davis or Boris Johnson. The controversy surrounding the post-Brexit settlement with Ireland in December 2015, and the possibility of the erection of a ‘hard border’, is indicative of the challenge that the UK administration, present and future, will face. The Labour Party, for its part, is now advocating staying in the Customs Union, contrary to the government’s position, and is likely to ask for more if the government’s double-speak on Brexit continues.
Though it may appear futile at present, not least given the urgent need of a settlement, it is worth remembering what brought Brexit to the forefront of Britain’s, and the EU’s, agenda. David Cameron’s decision to put the membership issue to a public vote, above and beyond the inconsistencies that characterized the Leave campaign, was from day one a high-risk strategy. Cameron’s governments had done little to portray the EU as a natural environment for Britain to operate in, given the current state of global interconnectedness and the need for Europe to speak with one voice on matters of transnational public policy. In fact, even ardent supporters of membership from years past, such as Tony Blair, had failed to directly challenge Britain’s tabloid press in their unrelenting depiction of the EU as a monstrous bureaucracy determined to subvert national sovereignty and to undermine national governments through the back door. The Remain campaign was the cherry on the cake, continuing with helpless economic arguments regarding the benefits of membership in the face of a large populist challenge that led to several colourful alliances against ‘Brussels’ (Cassidy 2016). Finally, it is worth recalling that Cameron’s negotiations with the EU had led to a deal that, had the referendum’s outcome been different, would have undermined the four freedoms that are enshrined in the Treaties, by curbing the rights of EU citizens in the UK.
The populist challenge is, of course, nothing unique to Britain. The Continent is as affected by it as the United States under Trump, to name but one glaring example. A large, but by no means exclusive, set of reasons that account for the rise of populism relates to the EU’s twin crises – sovereign debt and migration. Writing in 2018, both appear now to be increasingly under control, with economic growth picking up across the EU, and with the number of migrants and refugees arriving halved in 2017, compared to 2016. Yet the EU is not out of the woods just yet, and it is worth considering why.
The European Union’s Key Challenges
The Economic and Social Crises
In recent months, positive economic data has been pouring in regarding the eurozone economy as well as that of EU member states. GDP levels are now back to pre-crisis levels in the Eurozone, productivity is on the increase and unemployment rates have now returned to pre-crisis levels (Khan 2017). What is more, the economic boost is now widely shared, with countries in the Southern periphery of the eurozone appearing to be leaving the worst aspects of the crisis behind them. A return to business as usual is on the cards.
And yet that would be a fatal mistake. The economic and financial crisis had led to increasing Euroscepticism and many EU citizens, even in states that were not directly affected by austerity, thought that the EU was moving in the wrong direction. More importantly, economic and social dislocation has been experienced by most EU citizens and has hit citizens in the periphery of the eurozone especially hard (Owen and Tsarouhas 2018). The adoption of strict fiscal austerity has not only led to a rapid increase in unemployment and the proliferation of non-typical forms of employment; it has also resulted in the retreat of the sort of labour market policies favoured by labour representatives and trade unions in several countries (Heyes 2013). Further, the combination of austerity with weak social protection mechanisms and sharp economic shocks has resulted in the deterioration in health conditions as well (Karanikolos et al. 2013). The role of the EU in reforming welfare states by encouraging cuts to public expenditure, which undermines some prior achievements of European governments, has been very important in this regard. Moreover, what former US President Obama described as the defining issue of our time, namely inequality, is on the rise pretty much across the EU, which threatens the European Social Model.
The Pillar of Social Rights
To its credit, the Commission has launched a timely initiative, the European Pillar of Social Rights. This consists of various documents and policy ideas, all of which boil down to three main headings forming the Pillar’s basis. These are: a) equal opportunities and access to the labour market by means of stressing the employability of individuals; b) fair working conditions allowing for decent jobs whilst maximising flexibility for firms to respond to market needs; and c) adequate social protection to ensure citizens’ full and unhindered participation in society (European Commission 2016: 7–8). The Commission now aims to integrate the Pillar into the European Semester cycle of economic and structural reforms, while the next Multiannual Financial Framework should make funding readily available for member states to reform along the lines of the Pillar’s stated objectives (Kirk and Zalan 2017). Yet if the crisis has taught us anything it is that growing socio-economic divergence and non-respect for social rights undermines social and economic arrangements as well as the European Social Model. Enshrining parts of the Pillar in the Treaties as an Annex and EU Directives pertaining to, for instance, the need to classify so-called self-employed people as employees (and thus not allowing unscrupulous employers to hide behind current legislation to exploit vulnerable workers further, through bogus self-employment and other ruses) would mean that EU citizens enjoy concrete benefits from the Pillar. The Union’s discourse on bridging the gap with EU citizens will then be more than well-meaning rhetoric.
Economic Governance: Greece, Italy, the Eurozone as a Whole
The social crisis of the Union is compounded by the challenges surrounding the future economic prospects of some of its Member States, and the eurozone’s architecture itself. Greece and Italy are representative samples of cases that are far from being resolved. Greece remains the only country to remain in a financial bailout programme, and the participation or not of the IMF in the next phase of the country’s supervision remains uncertain. This, in turn, relates to both the key issue of debt sustainability, as well as to the future architecture of the eurozone and its ability to emancipate itself from the Fund. Italy’s better economic prospects allow for some optimism, but this is only half the story: youth unemployment remains comparable to the worst performers in the EU, and the forces of populism are blowing hard. The triumph of Beppe Grillo’s 5-star populist movement in the March 2018 elections, the defeat of the governing centre-left Partito Democratico (PD), as well as the return of Silvio Berlusconi as junior partner to the national scene as part of the centre-right bloc raise serious concerns. Not only do they point to the fact that Euroscepticism is gaining a foothold in a traditionally Europhile state, but the result is likely to prolong political instability and thus remove Italy from the list of countries willing to press ahead with reforms of the sort being promoted by French President Macron.
And then there is the eurozone. It is uncertain to what extent the mistakes in handling the sovereign debt crisis have been learned and if the EU is now better prepared to handle a similar phenomenon in the future. Institutional innovations during the crisis have helped, but the project remains incomplete. The debate on the issue is ongoing, but a new institutional architecture is a sine qua non to guarantee stability. Enderlein et al. have rightly pointed out that such a design will require three key components: a) a reinforced European Stability Mechanism (ESM); b) the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) that will be directly subject to political control and will entail a degree of supranational governance; and c) a combination of structural reforms that will dare to go beyond austerity and will be combined with meaningful, productive investment to boost growth and quality employment. It is a tall task and needs to be combined with ‘Social Europe’ – but it can be done so long as a sense of urgency governs the policies of Brussels and member states in the years ahead.
The Migration Crisis
In 2015, Europe was hit by a major migration and refugee crisis, after countries in the Middle East were hit earlier as a consequence of the Syrian civil war. In the year 2015 alone, according to official data, 1.3 million people claimed asylum in Europe, which was more than double the equivalent figure of one year before (Angenendt et al. 2017). The EU has sought to deal with the problem in an ad hoc fashion, and has not hesitated to securitize the issue, both at member state level (Szalai 2016) and more widely. At the same time, the EU has sought to call member states to task to facilitate the process, but has had little success in terms of relocating refuges to even some of the member states least affected by the problem and convincing them of the need to display solidarity to their Southern neighbours (primarily, Italy, Greece, Malta). More importantly, the early outcome of the EU’s handling of the crisis has been confusing and asymmetrical, with multiple refugee policies operating at member state level, thus diminishing the Union’s coherence. This is significant, because the migration and refugee crisis has hit at a time when the EU seeks to make long-needed progress in forming a cohesive foreign and defence policy.
The most important measure undertaken by the EU to stem the flow of migrants and refugees was the agreement with Turkey in March 2016, the so-called EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. The very fact that 28 member states with very different positions and interests on the subject managed to sign such an agreement is noteworthy. The core of the agreement between the two sides was a transactional deal based on (short-term) mutual interests. Turkey committed to accept from Greece all ‘irregular new migrants’ and to work closely with EU authorities to implement that crucial part of the agreement. In return, the EU promised to accelerate the visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens, to open new negotiation chapters with Turkey and to offer substantial financial aid to Turkey to deal with the refugee and migration challenge, worth up to €6 billion (Collett 2016). This would come on top of cooperation with NATO through the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and training from the European Asylum Support Office. When numbers entering the EU would drop substantially, a ‘voluntary’ relocation scheme designed to bring refugees from Turkey to EU member states would be enacted. Turkey, along with Jordan and Lebanon, has been at the high end of receiving Syrian refugees and it is estimated to date that more than 4 million Syrians currently reside in Turkey. Coping with this challenge on its own would have been difficult at the best of times, and the EU dependence on Turkey’s goodwill gave Ankara a strong hand in negotiations.
As discussed previously, the deal has proved successful in achieving the EU’s core objective of ‘welcoming’ fewer people to its member states. More than 10,000 people a day were crossing the Aegean in 2015, trying to move west. By the end of 2016 the equivalent number had been reduced to 80 or so. Despite occasional fluctuations, the number remains relatively low since then (European Commission 2017). Alternative routes to Italy have not proven successful for people smugglers and by end 2017, the peak of the crisis appears to have passed, to the great relief of Brussels as well as Italy and Greece. And yet the crisis has had several repercussions across the EU and its foreign relations, including enlargement. The crisis has helped consolidate Euroscepticism in many states, not least in Germany and Italy, and has drawn the ire of international humanitarian organizations in terms of its content. It has also, once again, exposed divisions between member states that were first highlighted during the peak of the eurozone crisis, with some members being reluctant to follow Commission guidelines to accept the resettlement of refugees (European Commission 2016).
To start with, the agreement with Turkey has met with heavy criticism from humanitarian NGOs and similar organizations, alleging that the EU has disregarded the fact that Turkey constitutes no safe harbour for refugees. Turkey has in turn transferred refugees to countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, which can also be unsafe. Further, both on the Greek islands and the Turkish mainland, conditions for refugees are described, and frequently documented, as squalid and inhumane (Gogou 2017). The criticism is serious but disregards a key point: if the EU was to adhere to all of its international legal obligations it would hardly ever be able to reduce the flow of people entering through Greece and Italy. When it does not do so, it justifiably draws the ire of outside observers and NGOs. It is an extremely difficult position for the EU to be in.
Then there is the key issue of Turkey. A candidate country since 2005, Turkey has been making no progress in converging with the EU acquis for at least seven years. When negotiations began, Ankara’s reformist zeal was undermined by member state governments including in Austria (who promised a referendum on Turkey’s membership once negotiations are concluded) and in France, where then-president Sarkozy repeatedly argued that Turkey does not belong to ‘Europe’ (Öktem 2007). Ankara accused the EU of ‘double standards’ and a self-fulfilling prophecy soon emerged, and the Commission’s attempts to keep the process alive through initiatives such as the ‘Positive Agenda’ led nowhere (Demiral 2014). Stagnant relations between the two sides deteriorated sharply after the 15 July 2016 attempted coup d’état in Turkey, with Ankara cracking down hard on anyone remotely suspected of being involved, and Brussels has argued that Turkey is now sliding towards authoritarianism. President Erdogan’s belligerent anti-Western rhetoric has made matters worse, as have repeated threats by Turkey to call off the deal with the EU, having exposed the bloc’s feeble position on the matter (Wintour 2017). Those threats, in turn, result from the non-implementation of the visa liberalization programme and of the non-opening of new chapters, which the Union had mistakenly bundled together in 2016 to make the offer to Turkey more attractive.
Respect for human rights and the rule of law are meant to underpin EU external relations at all times but plans to replicate the deal with Turkey to incorporate states such as Egypt into similar programmes raise eyebrows. The trouble with Turkey is in fact indicative of the Union’s larger failure to play any meaningful role in the Syrian civil war and therefore to be able to project influence over any post-conflict regime. The long-lasting conflict has had immediate effects on Europe but the EU has left centre-stage to Russia and the United States. Regional powers such as Turkey and Iran have also been actively involved throughout.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the migration and refugee crisis, at least on the part of the Commission and member states such as Germany, has been the fusion of unwillingness by some member states to carry a (relatively light) burden of hosting refugees from the likes of Greece and Italy, often espoused by hard-right populist policies, tactics and proclamations. On resettlement and relocation, the Commission set up a mechanism in 2015 to relieve Greece and Italy from some of the overt pressure, and the deal with Turkey has reduced the numbers of people needing resettlement within the EU. Such a need still exists, however, and countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have consistently refused to shoulder any burden, despite funding being allocated to member states by the Commission for each resettled refugee (Commission 2017). The inevitable result has been ongoing infringement procedures against these member states. What is more troubling is the set of arguments used by such states to justify refusing to display solidarity, which has focused on the raising of the fictitious spectre of a ‘Muslim invasion’ of Europe, an overtly aggressive rhetoric against Chancellor Merkel’s policy to welcome migrants and refugees, and an assertion of state sovereignty over ‘Brussels diktats’ (Euractiv 2017). This discourse is by no means limited to those states, yet has acquired a degree of legitimacy among the political class that makes it increasingly difficult to keep a lid on such tactics.
Both sets of crises, the socio-economic and the migration/refugee one, are going nowhere, at least in the short term. The EU needs new policies and policy instruments to confront them, at least to avoid falling back on yet another round of introspection and self-doubt. But the populist challenge is harder still to confront, as it affects more and more states in the EU (and, of course, beyond). This undermines the very foundations of European unity and pits communities, and states, against each other in unforeseen ways. The next section examines the phenomenon in some detail.
The Populist Challenge
Some argue that economic recovery will extinguish populism. This is a major fallacy and policy-makers ought to ignore it. Improved economic conditions for the more vulnerable will reduce some of the populist appeal but will not deal with it entirely. The phenomenon of populism in politics is by no means new. Europe has struggled to contain it for a very long time, including in the post-war era. The ‘golden years’ of welfare capitalism and homogenous societies arguably made this appear less urgent, but recent decades have led to an explosion of questions pertaining to issues such as identity politics, often framed along the lines of the immigration debate. These have been put to effective use by populists, who are often aware of the fears and insecurities that rapid change can cause in communities, especially among the most vulnerable. There are of course populists of different persuasions, on both the left and right. What matters for this study is evidence that shows how supporters of right-wing populist parties tend to reject both EU integration and globalization, while supporters of left-wing populists tend to see European cooperation as an antidote to globalization’s destructive potential (De Vries and Hoffmann 2017).
Western Europe: Austria, France, Germany
Austria and France are instructive case studies of how right-wing populist politics had gone mainstream in Western Europe before the migration and refugee crisis erupted. Austrian politics was transformed in the late 1980s, when the Freedom Party (FPÖ) was taken over by a charismatic populist, Jörg Haider. The party’s links, at personnel and programmatic levels, to the country’s Nazi past became a major focal point. Haider ruthlessly attacked the ‘Proporz’ system of job-sharing in the public sector between the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Christian Democrats (ÖVP) as well as the ‘waste’ and ‘corruption’ that he saw as endemic in the ‘Brussels system’. By the late 1990s, FPÖ became the country’s second largest party and entered a coalition government with the ÖVP that lasted for eight years. The EU response to the FPÖ’s participation in government proved counter-productive, with soft sanctions imposed on the country prior to any violation of EU principles concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms. Following a period of decline and an internal party split in the FPÖ instigated by Haider himself before his death in 2008, in 2017 the FPÖ re-joined a coalition government with the ÖVP, after attracting 26 per cent the all vote.
In France, Marine Le Pen’s defeat in the second round of the 2017 presidential elections disguises the Front National’s (FN) longevity in French politics. The party’s founder, Marine Le Pen’s father Jean-Marie, made a name for himself in the 1980s through his anti-immigrant rhetoric, combined with outbursts against globalization and France’s multicultural society. In 2002, Le Pen shocked the political system by beating the centre-left candidate to enter the second round of the presidential elections. The incumbent Jacques Chirac was comfortably re-elected with more than 80 per cent of the vote in the second round, by uniting the ‘democratic camp’ and using Jean Marie Le Pen’s extremism to his advantage. By 2017, however, and despite Macron’s convincing victory, Marine Le Pen had rebranded the FN by dropping overt racism and by focusing on ‘radical Islam’ instead as the nation’s main threat. Combined with a toning down of its anti-EU rhetoric, the party was able to broaden its appeal and emerge victorious in local elections.
Still, populism has been able to intrude into the domestic political arena more recently as well, not least due to the twin economic and migration crises identified above. A number of countries, including Spain and Greece, spring to mind, yet the most suitable example may be the EU’s most powerful and influential state, Germany. The country had long appeared immune to populist pressures with the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) alternating in office since 1949, usually with the support of a smaller party, be it the Liberal Democrats or the Greens. The economic miracle of the post-war period had produced a consensus-seeking society, while the country had invested heavily in highlighting the failures that had led to the rise of Nazism, in educating the younger generation and in exorcising its past whenever necessary.
Increasingly embracing an image of Germany as open and tolerant, the German political elite’s handling of the eurozone and migration and refugee crisis partly facilitated the growth of far-right populism. First came the eurozone crisis, which pitted Northern Europe against Southern Europe, and led to vicious anti-German sentiments in the Southern periphery. Importantly, the crisis led to the formation of a new populist party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Formed by Bernd Lucke, an Economics Professor at the University of Hamburg, the party argued against intra-EU solidarity and appealed to the basic instincts of the large swathes of the German population who were consistently told that they were bailing out the poorer South. When the migration and refugee crisis hit, the icing was put on the cake. Merkel’s leadership on the issue was portrayed as betrayal, even treason, and the AfD capitalized on the insecurity that the crisis produced, particularly in the east of the country. The AfD has now entered the federal parliament for the first time and threatens to unravel the consensus that has underpinned German politics for decades, and to fundamentally change the role played by Germany within the EU. The clear defeat of both CDU and SPD in the 2017 election has squeezed the political centre, and the agonising decision by the two parties to form another grand coalition in March 2018 could prove just what the AfD needs to boost its electoral fortunes even further.
Eastern Europe: ‘Illiberal Democracies’ and the Future of the EU
The challenge of populism is a threat to EU cohesion everywhere but has become especially acute in parts of Eastern Europe. In Hungary and Poland in particular, the combination of increasingly authoritarian tendencies on the part of large, governing parties and sustained criticism of ‘Brussels’ make for a toxic combination. Coupled with the weakness of civil society in these post-communist societies, developments in the said countries threaten to unravel EU foundations.
Hungary is an emblematic case. During the country’s transition to democracy in the late 1980s, Viktor Orban played a protagonist’s role in pushing for democracy and pluralism. Prime Minister in the 1990s, Orban has in the meantime undergone a radical political transformation. He is the most ardent supporter of the view that democracies need not be liberal in the Western sense (Rensmann et al. 2017) and has cultivated strong ties with Russia and Turkey. Popular at home and only really challenged domestically by the far-right Jobbik party, given the decline and fragmentation of the centre-left parties in the country (Veress and Veress 2018), Orban has used the migration and refugee crisis to securitize the problem (Szalai 2016) and to attack the EU’s resettlement and reallocation scheme. Orban has consistently lamented the ‘corruption’ and ‘failures’ of the socialists to enlarge his voter base. Stealing the clothes of Jobbik when expedient, Orban warns of an alleged ‘Muslim invasion’ of Europe and declares that come what may, Hungary intends to remain ‘loyal’ to its Christian roots. Attempting to portray himself as a defender of Western civilization, Orban has repeatedly stirred controversy with legislative initiatives allegedly aimed at diminishing media freedoms, reducing the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch, and intruding into the Central Bank’s independence. Opposition to his plans in Hungary remains muted while reactions in Brussels have not been particularly forceful either.
Poland constitutes an even greater challenge for the EU. Similar to Hungary and at an even higher level, the country’s economic performance during the eurozone crisis has been stellar. The country continues to grow above the EU average, unemployment is falling and so are rates of social exclusion (Keuschnigg and Owczarek 2017). And yet its politics drift apart from EU norms at an accelerating pace. The Law and Justice (PiS) party has provoked civil society outcry recently when it attempted to fully ban abortion. The fact that this attempt was not successful is not to say that PiS is not going to try again. Moreover, the government has imitated Hungarian practice by interfering with media freedoms. Reeling against ‘political correctness’ is another common feature of populist forces demonstrated by both Polish and Hungarian populist parties. They claim to speak for the ‘silent majority’, expressing the sorts of views that people think but do not dare voice.
Populism in both Hungary and Poland is deep-rooted and both ruling parties are popular, and polling around 40 per cent of their respective electorates. Yet they constitute a threat to other member states by refusing to share a common burden on the migration and refugee issue, using a relentless Euroscepticist discourse at home and doubting EU usefulness in many policy areas, not least with respect to law and order. On the part of the EU and regarding Poland, what broke the camel’s back was the government’s sustained interference with the judiciary, which has not come to a halt despite repeated warnings from Brussels. In December 2017, the Commission triggered Article 7 of the EU Treaty, according to which, the EU is entitled to impose sanctions when there is a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ of the EU’s core principles (Cuddy 2017). The rule of law being at the core of the dispute, the EU has now issued a formal warning against Poland. The reaction by Warsaw has been predictable, with the government refuting that it puts EU democratic values at risk and counter-arguing that the EU’s actions are politically motivated (Boffey and Davies 2017). Should the Polish government opt not to yield to pressure, the EU may find itself in an impossible position. The EU could opt to impose the harshest sanctions possible against Poland by suspending its voting rights in the Council and to cease the distribution the Structural Funds that the country is entitled to, but such a decision requires unanimity, and Warsaw’s loyal ally, Viktor Orban’s Hungary, has made it clear that his country would block such a move.
Developments in these countries will be followed with great interest across the EU and beyond. Triggering Article 7 indicates that leading EU officials now feel that EU values and principles are challenged from within the bloc. At this point, the question of whether countries like Poland have ever been truly democratic or not (Hanley and Dawson 2017) is not the most pressing issue for the EU. What is at stake is much bigger: does the EU constitute an assemblage of member states who share sovereignty on issues they choose and have the right to go their own way otherwise? Or does it, in the wake of major crises and at a time of global turbulence, seek to provide moral inspiration to those who pay due respect to fundamental democratic norms and values, and therefore seek to safeguard those, not least among its own member states? Which way the Union eventually develops will have huge repercussions. Allowing member states to get away with policies that disregard what the EU sees as fundamental values opens Pandora’s Box for more violations in the future. It would also send a signal to candidate countries that respect for the rule of law and minorities’ rights may be less of a stringent condition than has hitherto been claimed.
Conclusion
Emmanuel Macron beat the FN’s Marine Le Pen comfortably in the second round of France’s presidential elections in 2017. In Austria, for the first time in the country’s post-war history, a former leader of the Green Party was elected President of the Republic. In Germany, and despite the AfD’s popularity, Christian and Social Democrats remain the largest parties and have formed a new coalition government. At EU level and according to the Pew Research Centre, the EU’s popularity has bounced back after reaching record lows in recent years and trust towards EU institutions is moving upwards again (Stokes et al. 2017). In early 2018, such facts appear to suggest that the populist tide has reached its peak.
This chapter has suggested that such a conclusion is premature and dangerous. Brexit, the socio-economic crisis and the ongoing challenge of how to integrate migrants and refugees constitute inter-related challenges for the EU and for its member states. When faced with a large crisis in the past, the EU was able to close ranks and move forward by deepening integration. The pace and direction of integration has accelerated since the 1980s, while enlargement has made the EU less homogenous. More importantly, the rule ceases to apply at a time when crises are heading in the EU’s direction thick and fast.
In that context, then, and despite positive signs, the future of the EU remains far from secure. The survey quoted above which points to a recovery of the EU’s popularity also suggests that the EU’s handling of the economic, refugee and migration crises are questioned by most EU citizens. The EU faces multiple crises simultaneously, and the way in which it will choose to handle them will determine its future. On the socio-economic crisis, maintaining a positive economic momentum is helpful to avoid an implosion, but is by itself inadequate to restore (or to build) cohesion in the EU. Structural reforms imposed during the crisis era and the politics of austerity pulled member states apart and undermined socio-economic convergence, which is the glue that keeps the eurozone states together in one cogent bloc. The Pillar of Social Rights is thus an opportunity not to be missed. The migration and refugee crises have no easy solutions but the challenge must be confronted. The EU needs to display solidarity both with the member states most seriously affected and with those that seek a better life among its states. This is even more pertinent at a time when the United States under President Trump appears unwilling to fulfil its traditional role in the world.
All in all, EU cohesion will be maintained, and the EU’s future secured, only if the crises addressed here are met with bold political and economic reforms. Reinforcing social Europe, reforming the eurozone to make its institutions politically accountable, and using all available instruments to ensure member states continue to respect basic EU norms and values, are ways to resolve the impasse and to diminish the attractiveness of populist political forces.
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