TWENTY-TWO
October 2011–July 2013
Cameron’s stock with Conservative backbenchers is low and falling. He needs to avoid anything that will further unsettle the party. Above all, he should avoid introducing something that was neither in the election manifesto, nor the Coalition Agreement, and that threatens to undermine support for what he is trying to achieve on the economy and core domestic policy areas. Yet introduce something utterly unexpected is exactly what he chooses to do. Out of a blue sky, or so it would seem, he announces in his 2011 party conference speech that he is consulting over the possibility of legalising gay marriage. A bomb detonates in the party. Few issues so divide opinion both in the party at large or even within Number 10. Many see the initiative as a self-inflicted wound. Others see it as authentic Cameron, pursuing a course of action courageously regardless of the hostility it arouses.
Cameron believes that gay and straight people should be treated the same. At Oxford and beyond, some of his closest friends are gay. Before he became party leader he voted to retain a version of the controversial ‘Section 28’, banning the teaching of homosexuality in schools, but the following year he voted in favour of the Civil Partnership Bill.
In his speech to the party conference in Blackpool in 2005, which propelled his leadership bid, he went out of his way to endorse marriage: ‘We’ll support marriage because it is a great institution. So we’ll back it through the tax system.’1 He and Steve Hilton shared very similar beliefs about the importance of family stability. ‘Both of us felt very strongly about marriage and wanted to make it a central feature of his platform,’ says Hilton. Not all in Cameron’s court agreed: they saw marriage as old-fashioned, preachy and politically risky to talk about.2 In his party conference speech the following year, Cameron returned to the theme of the sanctity of marriage, but with a twist. ‘There is something special about marriage … what you are doing really means something,’ he said; ‘and by the way, it means something whether you are a man and a woman, a woman and a woman, or a man and another man.’3 By placing gay marriage in the context of family and social stability, rather than gay rights, this line drew applause from the party faithful – something that would have been unthinkable just years before. Cameron was saying that ‘we believe in marriage, we believe in it for everyone. At its heart, it’s about commitment, whether it’s straight or same sex, not about whether it’s men or women.’
Although not a man of traditional faith himself, Cameron is close to the Reverend Mark Abrey, vicar of St Nicholas’s Church in Chadlington near Dean, who helped clarify his thinking on marriage. At an Easter reception at Downing Street in 2014, Cameron says of him: ‘I can’t think of anyone who [is] more loving or thoughtful or kind than Mark.’4 Cameron’s non-doctrinal approach to religion helps to explain why he is comfortable with the concept of gay marriage. He was no exception: apart from evangelical Christians who vociferously opposed it, opinion polls suggested that a majority of Christians supported gay marriage.5
The crash in 2008 removed the whole issue of marriage and morality from the spotlight for a time, and only in the run-up to the 2010 election did it reappear. Hilton wanted Cameron to do something ‘that will show that we are not just pro-vested interests and pro-frumpy people in the shires, but we can be liberal and compassionate’. He tasked policy adviser Sean Worth to go and look at the subject. Worth produced a paper called ‘Gay Marriage’, which argued that right-of-centre parties in the US and elsewhere were often supportive of gay marriage for conservative reasons. This was encouraging as it would provide ammunition against social conservatives. But Andy Coulson came out ‘dead against it’. Putting it in the manifesto, he said, with the polls narrowing, would be a mistake. James O’Shaughnessy, who was writing the manifesto, thought similarly. ‘We took soundings from a number of groups: there was ambivalence towards it even from the gay community. They hear views that it is a bourgeois aspiration, that it won’t appeal to the gay community, and that for those who want it, there are already civil partnerships.’ The team conclude, ‘What’s the point if it is going to piss off a lot of people and not win us any votes?’ So it was quietly dropped from the manifesto, a decision that would return to haunt Cameron.
Fast forward to September 2011. Cameron is mulling over with his team about what he might say at the conference in Manchester the following month. He is being hammered over austerity, and there has been a spate of newspaper articles questioning what, if anything, he believes in. When prompted during an interview on the Today programme, he described himself as a ‘common sense Conservative’, eschewing the phrase ‘modern compassionate Conservative’ that had characterised his early period as party leader.6 In September, Andrew Cooper writes a memo to Cameron. ‘Abandoning modern, compassionate Conservatism would be a serious, potentially fatal, political error,’ he warns. It means continuing with ‘the modernising edge’ that he displayed in Opposition and not ‘subcontracting modern and progressive policies to the Lib Dems’. Cooper argues that Cameron should intervene to claim ownership of the issue of gay marriage. In doing so, he would have to overrule objections to a consultation from Iain Duncan Smith and Philip Hammond on the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee, and commit to legislation before the end of the parliament. It would also mean seeing off the Liberal Democrats.
Cameron and Osborne are told that Lynne Featherstone, the Lib Dem Minister for Equalities, will be announcing Lib Dem support for gay marriage at their conference. Cameron has a clear choice: agree to her announcing it at the Lib Dem conference, which will require some form of corresponding announcement at the Tory conference, or block her from doing so, and risk the Lib Dems announcing it anyway, and leaking that the Conservatives had tried to stop them doing so. Cooper insists Cameron has an opportunity to reaffirm his modernising credentials. ‘There is no reason to allow this to be claimed as a Lib Dem internal victory. We should be doing it because we are a modern party opposed to discrimination against gay people, not because the Lib Dems compelled us to do it.’ Cameron is persuaded.
Another influence is Michael Salter, head of broadcasting in Number 10, described as Cameron’s ‘go-to gay’ on the issue. According to Pink News, Salter ‘played a key role in assisting the PM and other members of the government on LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender] policies, most notably equal marriage’.7 Cameron instructs a press briefing ahead of the Liberal Democrat conference stating that he will support gay marriage, scooping Featherstone’s announcement. Despite disagreements within Cameron’s camp – Coulson has gone but there are those who are still opposed – a section supporting gay marriage is drafted for Cameron’s conference speech.
What he says is, ‘I don’t support gay marriage despite being a Conservative. I support gay marriage because I’m a Conservative.’8 The phrase, Hilton recalls, comes from American politics. After Hilton’s departure the following spring, it becomes convenient to scapegoat him for having inserted gay marriage into the speech; but the decision has Cameron’s and Osborne’s fingerprints all over it. After the announcement is made, a lull follows. The hornets’ nest has been stirred. Cameron receives much praise for his stand and despite support from some religious people, religious bodies in general respond critically, believing that marriage is being redefined. Cameron and his team have very little idea quite how disconcerted and angry their party in the country is about to become.
On 15 March 2012, a twelve-week consultation on ‘Equal Marriage’ is announced. The public are invited to submit thoughts on changes to the law to allow same-sex couples to enter into civil marriage, and to allow those already in civil partnerships to convert it into marriage. At each fresh threshold, a heated debate takes place within Downing Street. Osborne and Cameron urge the policy forward. Oliver Dowden, who is close to MPs and to the party at large, is one of the more resistant. Ed Llewellyn, Kate Fall and Craig Oliver strongly agree with the policy, but are very worried about the timing. Messages from MPs are relayed in their meetings: ‘Don’t you imbeciles in Number 10 know anything?’ ‘Can’t you see how foolish this is?’ ‘Why are you doing this when everything else is falling apart?’ Cooper makes several presentations to backbench MPs citing private polling. ‘Of all the things this government is doing right now, it’s about the only one that is popular,’ he tells them, adding that the British public will quickly become used to a new social norm, just as it had done over abortion and civil partnerships.9 Some are convinced; many are not.
Opposition grows over the consultation period. The Church of England says the government ‘misunderstand[s] the legal nature of marriage in this country. They mistake the form of the ceremony for the institution itself.’10 A lobby group called Coalition for Marriage, in favour of traditional marriage and against any redefinition of it, claims it has collected 200,000 signatures: ‘This consultation is a sham,’ it says.11 To release some of the pressure, Cameron announces on 24 May that there will be a ‘free vote’ on any future bill. The media portrays this as yet another Cameron U-turn, coming on the coat-tails of pasties and caravans, and in the wake of all the U-turns of 2011–12.12 Clegg is not happy, and attacks the free-vote decision on The Andrew Marr show: ‘I don’t think this is something that should be the subject of a great free-for-all because we’re not asking people to make a decision of conscience,’ he says.13 The departure of Hilton in spring 2012 is seen as an opportunity to drop the proposals as he has been so closely identified with them. Cameron decides to pause, to take stock of party feeling. To coincide with the party conference in October, the Sunday Telegraph publishes a survey of party constituency chairmen showing that 71% want the issue to be abandoned, believing that it is having a detrimental effect on local constituency membership.14 Alan Duncan, a serving minister and the first openly gay Tory MP, is one of many critics: ‘It is losing us 20% of our membership. It is just so badly explained. Why are we doing it? To purge accusations of Blimpism? It is poison to the party.’15
Cameron and Osborne nevertheless take the decision that autumn to introduce a bill on gay marriage into Parliament. ‘Why are you doing this? Why are you doing this now?’ they are repeatedly asked in their meetings with the sceptics, who say that many gay people are happy with civil partnerships. The word ‘UKIP’ is being heard increasingly in Cameron’s ears: ‘Gay marriage may well be a factor fuelling its rise,’ says one, ‘adding weight to those who want to pull the plug.’ ‘I never thought David understood how very unpopular the issue was. If you believe something very strongly, you can be blind to how others think,’ says another. Cameron is aware that many elderly party members are deeply opposed, but still believes that he has the majority of public opinion behind him. ‘Out of all the correspondence he received from party members in his ten years as leader, this was the number one issue raised by a country mile,’ says Number 10 aide Laurence Mann.16 Andrew Feldman commissions detailed analysis of the impact of the gay-marriage issue on party membership, which confounds what many internal critics have been saying: it shows that the party lost more members through death than through members resigning during the passage of the bill.
Osborne is unwavering. He tells the team: ‘It will send out a message if we do this; and it will send out a message if we don’t do it.’ Cameron says, ‘Unless you are making some Neanderthal judgement on gays, those who are gay should have the same rights as those who are not.’ ‘There is something very stubborn about David Cameron. He wants to do this and he really doesn’t like the attitudes of those who are against,’ says another in his team. The risk of not pushing ahead and being seen to be weak is a seminal consideration. Following the messy aftermath of the omnishambles Budget, he adamantly refuses to countenance anything that might be construed a ‘U-turn’. Another reversal could, he believes, irrevocably define his administration as weak and indecisive. If they are going to do it, they daren’t risk doing so any later, with the European elections in 2014 and the general election a year later. They must do it now. ‘How can we speed this up?’ soon becomes the mantra of Number 10. In a rare public intervention outside his Treasury brief, Osborne writes an article in The Times on 13 November 2012, arguing that ‘Successful political parties reflect the modern societies they aspire to lead,’ and that there is significant support in the country for gay marriage.17 The consultation report is published on 11 December. It finds that gay marriage is supported by the majority of respondents. Critics are quick to point out that the majority is narrow, and that submissions had been accepted not just from the UK but from all over the world.18
Late in the day, Cameron decides he will try and win over Conservative grass-roots and religious opponents. ‘If there is any church or any synagogue or any mosque that doesn’t want to have a gay marriage it will not, absolutely must not, be forced to hold it,’ he says.19 In his New Year’s interview with Andrew Marr in January 2013, he says that marriage needs to be reformed to allow all couples to benefit from tax breaks, incentives and benefit triggers.20 Iain Duncan Smith had argued that tax breaks and gay marriage should have been linked from the outset, which would have strengthened the political argument in its favour. For the time being, Cameron can only announce this as an aspiration because of Liberal Democrat opposition.
The Marriage (Same Sex) Bill is introduced by Culture Secretary Maria Miller on 24 January 2013. She is selected to steer the bill through the Commons because she is seen to be a mainstream Conservative rather than a moderniser, who could present the measure as a ‘sensible and modest change’.21 Many backbenchers fail to see it as either sensible or modest. ‘If I hear one more person call this a “free vote” I am going to hit them,’ says one. ‘People are being told that their careers are over if they go against the prime minister on this.’22 Senior Conservatives, including Philip Hammond, Owen Paterson and Gerald Howarth, are saying publicly they disagree with the bill. Many opponents claim they had supported civil partnerships (although when Number 10 checks the record, it turns out that most had not). On the day of the first vote, 5 February, Osborne, Hague and May publish a letter in the Telegraph declaring their support and encouraging other MPs to vote for the bill.23 No less than 136 Conservatives are unmoved by their plea and vote against, with 127 registering support and five abstaining, including Attorney General Dominic Grieve, who makes known his unhappiness with the law underpinning the bill, not voting. Paterson and Welsh Secretary David Jones are the only two members of the Cabinet to vote against the bill. It passes by 400 to 175 votes due to Lib Dem and Labour support. Having more than half his party voting against or abstaining, even on a free vote, is a bitter blow: ‘Few prime ministers have faced such an extensive rebellion in their own ranks,’ says the New York Times.24
When Cameron is under pressure, he has two responses: ‘kick the issue into touch’, as he would say, or ‘get it over and done with as soon as possible’. His taking the second option on gay marriage doesn’t seem to be helping. Opposition is intensifying as the bill goes through Parliament. The chief whip Patrick McLoughlin had not exaggerated when he told him that it was going to cause a lot of trouble in the party. Within the PM’s circle, it remains a running sore. To Lynton Crosby, whose influence is increasing over 2013, it is a distraction (even though he personally supports the move). ‘You’re fucking off the party big time,’ is his blunt assessment. Chairman of the 1922 Committee Graham Brady thinks gay marriage caused more difficulty between Cameron and the parliamentary party than any other single issue over the five years. The 1922 executive counselled very strongly not to push ahead at such a volatile point, though many have no objection to gay marriage in principle. They think the proposal has appeared from nowhere and, because it was not included in the manifesto, lacks any clear mandate. ‘It showed a cavalier attitude and dismissiveness of the views of others. It felt again like the party was being bounced, without significant reassurance or preparation.’25
The conservative political philosopher Phillip Blond believes this issue, more than any other, split the Conservatives in these years. ‘Cultural conservatives were deeply alienated by it because it broke with the conservative tradition as many understood it.’26 Backbencher Edward Leigh is one such: ‘We should be in the business of protecting cherished institutions and our cultural heritage. Otherwise what, I ask, is a Conservative Party for?’27 Backbencher Roger Gale argues similarly: ‘It is Alice in Wonderland territory, Orwellian almost, for any government of any political persuasion to seek to come along and try to rewrite the lexicon. It will not do.’28 Liam Fox articulates the views of many Conservative ministers as well as backbenchers: ‘The damage was caused because in the minds of many, it represented the victory of liberal-dinner-party, metropolitan thought over the wider party. For many others who didn’t have strong views on the subject, they were asking “What on earth does it gain us?”’29 But most Cameron loyalists believe he was right to push ahead despite internal opposition. ‘It wasn’t a matter of party management for him – he genuinely believes in it. I don’t think somehow if he had held more tea parties for sceptical backbenchers at Number 10 or met church leaders more often it would have made a difference.’
The final debate on the bill takes place on 21 May. Various amendments are discussed, including proposals raised by David Burrowes (Conservative MP and Owen Paterson’s parliamentary private secretary), who believes the bill undermines traditional marriage and wants changes to ‘protect the liberty of conscience for people who believe marriage should stay as it is’.30 The bill passes its third reading by 366 to 161. Only 40% of Conservative MPs support it. Despite intensive lobbying by Cameron and the Number 10 machine, Tory support has fallen away.
The focus now moves to the House of Lords. On 25 May, Conservative peers are said to be plotting a revolt against the passage of the bill.31 Baroness Warsi is reported as being asked by Cameron to take the bill through the Lords but refuses to do so.32 Opposition is led by a former chief constable and crossbencher, Lord Dear. By ‘trying to defeat the bill on the second reading, rather than trying to ambush it with amendments at committee stage’, the government is let off the hook. On 15 July, the Lords pass the bill after a short debate and without a formal vote. The chamber is packed with peers wearing pink carnations.33 Two days later, the bill receives Royal Assent. Cameron’s team experience momentary relief. A warning from the Coalition for Marriage, which claims nearly 700,000 supporters (about five times the number of members of the Conservative Party), is seen by some as a harbinger of what is to come. ‘They are just ordinary men and women, not part of the ruling elite.’ The repercussions, says its chairman Colin Hart, ‘will be felt at the next general election’.34
Cameron has a new problem. Have they achieved a heroic victory to proclaim from the rooftops? His team debate whether they should reap the benefit from the passage of the bill, or say nothing about it and sweep it under the carpet. In September, the issue comes to the fore, when they discuss whether he should mention it in his party conference speech. He plays it safe, saying the government is ‘backing marriage’.35
Six months later, on 29 March 2014, the first same-sex marriages take place. Cameron sends congratulations cards to the initial couples to marry. He hopes that the ‘country … is growing stronger socially because we value love and commitment equally. Let us raise a toast to that – and [to] all those getting married this weekend.’36 ‘I believe that our country should feel proud that almost uniquely in the world, leaders from across the political spectrum put aside their differences to unite in favour of equality for all, regardless of their sexuality,’ he continues.37 ‘Only the right to marry … is true equality,’ Clegg had said in 2013. ‘Let every member – young or old – of our LGBT community, know that they are recognised and valued, not excluded.’38
The gay-marriage saga has lasted three years. It has shown all sides of Cameron, and displayed him at both his best and his weakest. It is one of his principal achievements as prime minister. Yet why exactly did he take such an unnecessary risk? He himself offers an explanation: ‘I am proud of what I did, and what is more, if we hadn’t done it, we would have had endless pressure with Members of Parliament wanting to introduce legislation. People don’t think of that when they criticise me for doing what I did. It got the decision done.’39 A fair point, if something of a post hoc rationalisation. He drove it forward for a variety of reasons: because he believed it was the right thing to do, and was convinced by Cooper’s strategic argument that it could bring a political dividend. He didn’t then want to be seen to do a U-turn, which he felt could permanently undermine the government’s reputation following months of bad headlines. He also had Osborne by his side all the way. A more experienced leader would have prepared the ground better and done more to win over allies once the initiative had been launched. It exposed both his naivety and deficiency as a strategic thinker. It had been removed from the 2010 manifesto because of the objections from one media counsellor, Coulson; and it may never have been allowed to make it to the statute book had another adviser been in play earlier: Lynton Crosby.