Meanwhile, to the south and west of Sinclair-MacLagan’s line across the Ancre, Monash’s 3rd Division was arriving just as the German assault against Dernancourt got underway. Along the northern slopes of Morlancourt Ridge his 10th Brigade was taking up position, while the 11th Brigade was holding the southern slope, which reached the northern banks of the river Somme at the town of Saillyle-Sec. The 9th Brigade was spread out along the northern side of the Somme back to the town of Corbie, at the junction of the two rivers, acting as a flank guard and reserve force. Monash’s men were effectively isolated in a triangular position, with their flanks and rear cut off by the rivers Ancre (north) and Somme (south), converging about 5 kilometres to their rear. This junction was around 14 kilometres south-east of Albert and 14 kilometres east of Amiens.1
With just hours to spare, Monash managed to insert his division into the hole in the line defined by the junction of the two rivers along Morlancourt Ridge. Until now, this ground had been screened only by units of British cavalry and a composite brigade of British troops manning old French trenches. Monash was to advance his division east so that he would link up with the northern flank of the British Fifth Army, south of the Somme; the British soldiers were currently believed to be somewhere west of Bray, about 12 kilometres east of Corbie. Indeed, Bray and the large town of Morlancourt, about 4 kilometres directly south of Dernancourt, had been captured by the Germans just hours before, which blocked any advance by the 3rd Division beyond this point.2
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The whole position to the south of the Australians, held by the remnants of the Fifth Army, was extremely fluid, with British troops still fighting a rearguard action and continuing to slowly fall back. Among them was ‘Carey’s Force’, led by 51-year-old professional soldier Brigadier George Carey of the British 9th Brigade, which consisted of a composite brigade of 3000 men made up of frontline troops, tunnellers, railway workers, signallers and many others originating from different units, including the British 18th and 61st infantry divisions (Fifth Army), the British 1st Cavalry Division (Third Army), the Canadian Railway Battalion, and around 500 American troops. This brave commander and his men had for three days managed to bridge the growing gap between the British Fifth and Third armies and in the process hold back the German advance towards Amiens from below the Somme.3
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Meanwhile, news had reached Monash that the Germans had broken through the Fifth Army’s line at Harbonnières, about 5 kilometres south of the Somme. It was also reported by airmen that Germans to the north were infiltrating around the British Fifth Army’s northern flank by crossing onto the southern bank of the river, having constructed a temporary bridge at Cerisy, 3 kilometres east of Sailly-Laurette in Monash’s sector. If this was allowed to continue, there was a danger of turning the northern flank of the British Army. The same airmen assessed that the Germans appeared to be making for Corbie via Villers-Bretonneux, which could result in Monash, on the opposite side of the Somme, having to withdraw his division or face being cut off if the Germans advanced in any strength here. This was confirmed by German prisoners, who said their objective was Corbie. To help counter this, the Third Army released the British 1st Cavalry Division. Monash had to protect the Fifth Army’s northern flank by seizing the village of Sailly-Laurette, which lay south-east of Sailly-le-Sec. He ordered the 44th Battalion to cover all river crossings from Corbie to Sailly-le-Sec, confident that with the 9th Brigade in reserve he could handle anything the Germans threw at him in this direction. Even so, he knew he had to urgently breach the hole in the line just beyond Sailly-Laurette.4
Sailly-Laurette was partly nestled in an upper gully just beyond the major north–south Sailly-le-Sec spur. The terrain between the two rivers folded into a number of deep grass-covered gullies. Only a few of their steep terraced slopes had been ploughed or contained woods. The lower slopes towards the river Somme were fringed with marshes. Across the river on its southern banks the slopes rose gently, covered with a long line of trees following the ancient Roman road running from Amiens directly eastwards through Villers-Bretonneux and beyond. The Australians observed crowded military traffic – the remnants of the British Fifth Army – along this road, but whether it represented a general British advance or a retreat could not be known. Most suspected the latter.5
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At noon Monash issued orders for a 2000-metre advance of his whole division later that afternoon, in two advances of 1000 metres each. The second advance was to occur only after all advances from the first 1000 metres had been consolidated. The first advance would be along the ridge the division was already holding; the second would be to the crest of the next cross-ridge, about 1000 metres short of Morlancourt (held by the Germans), which lay within the next valley. This second advance would occur only if Sailly-Laurette to the south had been taken.6
This general advance was something new for the troops, who had been slogging it out in the mud and flooded trenches of Flanders Fields. There, advances were measured in a few hundred metres at best, and were paid for with appalling casualties. The operational boundary between the 10th and 11th brigades was defined by the Corbie and Bray road, which ran along the centre of the ‘peninsula’ between the two rivers towards Morlancourt. The 10th Brigade was north of the road and the 11th Brigade was south of it. The general advance was uncharacteristic of Monash, who was usually involved in meticulous planning – which certainly was not the case here as, unknown to Monash, Brigadier Walter McNicoll, commanding his 10th Brigade, had already reached the first objective. As such, McNicoll decided during the first part of the advance that one of his reserve units, the 40th Battalion, would be brought forward, and during the second phase his other reserve unit, the 39th Battalion, along with the 40th Battalion, would be thrown forward 1000 metres to their next objective.7
However, orders got mixed up and at around 5 p.m. the 40th Battalion advanced towards the German lines in open ground through the very centre of the Australian front line and beyond, with both flanks exposed. A number of German batteries were positioned on the ridge beyond Morlancourt and fired a barrage of shells into the advancing Australians. This was followed by machine-gun fire and at this point about a quarter of the men were either killed or wounded. The remainder continued their advance.8 As recorded in the battalion history, ‘there were few old trenches and practically no shell-holes [due to the recent recultivation of the old battlefields]. The ground over which we were attacking would have been a pleasure to plough; as a golf-links or football ground it was ideal; but as a place to advance over under heavy machine-gun fire it was a failure.’9
Major Leslie Payne, a 29-year-old commission agent from Newtown in Tasmania, was then acting CO of the 40th Battalion. He understood that the 41st Battalion (11th Brigade) to his men’s right would advance with them – this is recorded in the battalion diary. A patrol was sent to the right to find the ‘missing’ 41st Battalion without success: it had received no such orders.10 As recalled by Captain Frank Green, a 29-year-old civil servant from Browns River in Tasmania who later became the historian of the 40th Battalion:
Soon after crossing the Treux–Sailly-le-Sec road we met with a surprise. The enemy was seen advancing in several columns, about 2500 yards [2300 metres] in front, as he came over the ridge immediately south of Morlancourt. We continued on, wondering what sort of mix-up it would be when we met, and the enemy halted for a few minutes. He hesitated, deployed, came on a hundred yards, hesitated again, and then went to ground, presumably to dig in. His machine guns were pushed out in front, and the enemy fire became heavier than ever. After an advance of 1200 yards beyond the original line held by the 10th Brigade, in face of the heaviest machine-gun fire and scattered artillery shelling it was impossible to advance any further, and we dug in on a line about 400 yards west of the Treux–Sailly-Laurette road, to wait for the further advance at 7 p.m.11
The supporting Australian and British artillery was almost non-existent, with those few shells fired falling behind the Tasmanian’s advanced line. The battalion suffered around 150 casualties, one being Major Payne, who was wounded. A drizzling rain now set in.12
Immediately south of the 10th Brigade, Brigadier Harold Cannan, a 36-year-old insurance manager from Brisbane commanding the 11th Brigade, was focused on trying to take Sailly-Laurette. A number of outposts had been established forward of the main Australian line by the 42nd and 43rd battalions (11th Brigade) just short of Sailly-Laurette in the south to the right flank of the 40th battalion (10th Brigade), but the village still lay in German hands.
The second phase of the operation was now underway even though Sailly-Laurette had not been captured. To the north, just on dusk, the 39th Battalion moved to the left of the stranded 40th Battalion and, like them, dug in. About an hour later the those from the 42nd and 43rd who had earlier established a number of outposts along the right flank of the 40th Battalion down to the river Somme.13
A few hours later, three companies from the 44th Battalion made an assault against Sailly-Laurette. They advanced in darkness from Sailly-le-Sec Spur down into the valley towards the small village nestled in the upper folds of the eastern slope of the valley. They quietly passed the outposts established by the men of the 42nd and moved another 100 metres, then halted in an old French trench. It was here that ‘B’ Company’s leader, Captain Cyril Longmore (a 30-year-old professional soldier from Fremantle in Western Australia), was to take up a position in reserve while ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies made the assault against the village. The Germans held the next spur overlooking the village in strength – the approach to the village was covered by a well-sited and entrenched machinegun position in the village cemetery.14
The men from the 44th Battalion were about 300 metres from the village when the rain increased. They were approaching the cemetery when a white flare was fired, quickly followed by a burst of machine-gun fire and the odd rifle shot from further up the slope. The men stayed upright and didn’t move a muscle, knowing that any movement would be a giveaway. As soon as the flare burnt out they moved forward again, unsure whether they had been seen. As they approached within 100 metres of the cemetery another flare went up; it fell between the two dispersed companies. If there had been any doubt before, there was none now. Machine-gun and rifle fire thundered into the Australian position, with the area lit up by flare after flare. They were bathed in light while all around them was darkness. The rain continued to pour, with light reflecting off the oilskin jackets they were wearing to protect them from the rain.15
The Australians could hear the German officers yelling orders. So far the Australians had suffered over 60 casualties, among whom was Private George Henry, a 20-year-old farmhand from Bridgetown in Western Australia. His mate Private William Kuser, a 25-year-old horse driver from Bayswater in Western Australia, recalled: ‘I was only a few yards away from [George] and heard him call out “Billy, I’m hit”, but that was all he said. We had to retire about ten minutes afterwards, and he was left there.’16 (Private Henry has no known grave and is commemorated on the Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux.) The Germans continued to pour fire into the exposed Australians, who took cover where they could. Even above the torrent of fire, wounded men could be heard calling for help. Dead and dying Australians were lying just short of the German picket line. A number of their fellow soldiers scrambled forward to drag them away as best they could and in the process became casualties themselves.17 There was no point in trying to advance.
Indeed the Germans holding the village were members of the 3rd Grenadier Regiment, who had earlier spotted the Australian advance as recalled in the regimental history: ‘The covering parties of the 6th Company of the regiment soon detected their [Australian] approach. The attacking force was correctly estimated at two companies, and was allowed to come within about 100 metres, when it was met with a sudden burst of rifle and machine-gun fire. Three machine-guns of the attached company, emplaced before the village, played a conspicuous part in defeating the attack, one of them firing 3,000 rounds. The regiment’s claim to have counted in front of the position 37 [Australians].’18
Captain William Rockliff, a 35-year-old Gallipoli veteran and former schoolteacher from Cottesloe in Western Australia, ordered the men to retire, with any wounded that could be found, back beyond the outposts of the 42nd Battalion. Despite the volume of enemy machine-gun fire, men ‘slung their rifles and assisted many of the wounded back to safety’.19 The surviving Lewis gunners provided covering fire as the men moved back by sections. On reaching the Australian positions they dug in; Longmore’s men of ‘B’ Company stayed out in front holding the old French trench.
Throughout the night wounded Australians stranded in noman’s land could be heard calling out for help. Western Australian privates Harold Hicks, a 19-year-old engine cleaner from Collie, and Sidney Mountain, a 19-year-old farmhand from Fremantle, went out on three occasions and brought in casualties despite the intense enemy machine-gun fire. Likewise, Private George Sowerbutts, a 29-year-old farmhand from Boyup Brook in Western Australia, went out and brought in two wounded men. All three were later awarded the Military Medal for their efforts that night.20