3
Doctrinal Similarities
The complementarity of reason and revelation need not always go hand in hand with an agreement between revelation and already existing philosophies. This is because philosophy is not always the rightful heir of reason. Yet, “not always” does not mean “never.” We know with all certainty that already at the turn of the second century CE there were anthologies that collected those fragments of outstanding pagan writers presentable as being in tune with Christian teaching:
Indeed, some of our people, who still continued their inquisitive labors in ancient literature, and still occupied memory with it, have published works we have in our hands of this very sort; works in which they relate and attest the nature and origin of their traditions, and the grounds on which opinions rest, and from which it may be seen at once that we have embraced nothing new or monstrous—nothing for which we cannot claim the support of ordinary and well-known writings, whether in ejecting error from our creed, or admitting truth into it.102
Independently of how this fact was interpreted and used, nobody denied that the ancient teachings contained seeds of truth, and even for Tertullian the whole history of philosophy could not be reduced to merely “Greece” plus “Athens” equaling “the love of error.” Here we will attempt to outline the accepted reach of the similarities while leaving the discussion of how these writings were used for chapter 4 of this book.
In our search for a reconstruction of the works mentioned by Tertullian we can find help in Christian apologies that frequently featured separate chapters devoted to this problem.103 They followed certain general principles—even if the evaluations of individual writers frequently demonstrate the presence of individual preferences—about the intellectual formation in particular pagan philosophical contexts, plus a varied range of enthusiasm about discovering the existence of such overlaps. The greatest attention was paid to those writings that stressed final causes which prove the existence of the one, immaterial, and transcendent God. The least attention was given to the mechanists, atheists, materialists, fatalists, and those who deprecated the rule of God’s providence over the world. These are the reasons why Plato was so popular, especially the Timaeus (its demiurge), Gorgias (the judgment of the soul), or the Seventh Letter (the inexpressibility of knowledge about God). It was also the reason why the Stoics garnered so much respect, especially because of their strict ideals about living properly. On the other hand, there was a universal rejection of the Atomists and Epicureans, because they did not subscribe to these principles. The intellectual tendencies of each writer account for the wide distribution of sympathies, and whether differences or similarities with Christian doctrine were stressed. As we recall, for these early Christian thinkers the teaching of Plato is considerably different from Christianity despite its similarities, whereas Socrates is a Christian who lived before Christ. On the other hand, even though Tertullian was full of doubts with regard to Socrates,104 he thought that the Roman Stoic Seneca was “often ours” (saepe noster).105 The philosophical ear of every individual Christian writer is the other factor (besides individual philosophical preferences) that determines the range of acceptable similarities. Tertullian sharply saw how it would be very difficult to square the immutable God of the philosophers (a God who does not offer much ground for hope) with the God of revelation. The critical mind of Tertullian did not ignore the difficulties standing in the way of all attempts at reconciling faith in God’s wrath with the immutable and dispassionate being of the First Cause.106 Yet, this does not mean that the God of the philosophers is the God of reason. On the contrary! For Tertullian, the testimony of the soul—the Stoic sensus communis, in other words, reasonable knowledge—demonstrates the unreasonableness of philosophical theses. Yet, this problem does not seem to trouble Justin Martyr at all.
The range of approved similarities also depends upon the willingness of the theologian to allegorically interpret the conclusions of philosophy. The allegorical method, which originated in the Alexandrian tradition, allows the interpreter to treat some of the philosophical texts as Christian texts encoded out of fear of exposing them to those who might profane them, or, to those who are the enemies of the truth.107 The roots of this hermeneutic method can be found in the allegorical interpretation of the mythologies found in Homer and Hesiod that were scoured for their hidden symbols, for example, either cosmological or ethical symbols (one instance of this is the work of the Stoic Corinthus). Philo of Alexandria played a seminal role in the development of this method as a tool for mediating between philosophy and revelation. For example, there is his commentary on the Pentateuch where he finds, among other things, a symbolic rendition of Stoic virtue. The allegorical method, which was primarily used to uncover the deeper spiritual sense of the scriptures, was also utilized as a way of adopting pagan philosophy for theology. Minucius Felix serves as a good Christian example. He saw the teaching of Thales on water as the ultimate archē as being analogous to the sacrament of baptism.108 We can console those who only see arbitrariness in allegory by pointing out how thanks to it we still have many pagan texts that otherwise would have been lost in the mists of time, because they would have been considered unintelligent, scandalous, or damaging.
Philosophy as a Guide to Life
Despite these many differences we can formulate a second principle, even if it is also burdened with exceptions. We must conclude there was a greater tendency to acknowledge the reasonableness of certain philosophical statements, than to acknowledge that all philosophers were sages (meaning, that they lived in full accordance with reason).109 With the exception of Justin, and even he had some reservations, Christians were unwilling to give their approval to philosophy’s similarities to revelation when faced with arguments that individual philosophers lived lives of perfection. The perfection of individual philosophers brings the issue to a head and ultimately allows for the most clear judgment of how much of ancient philosophy can be embraced by Christians. The most properly framed question does not attempt to determine whether there are accidental overlaps between philosophy and revelation, and it does not attempt to discover whether there is something reasonable in philosophy. Instead, the real question is as follows: is there enough truth in philosophy to guide one’s life according to its lights in order to live a life in accord with reason? That is, even if one cannot live a perfectly Christian life (impossible without revelation anyway), then can one at least live reasonably by following positive philosophy?
Tatian the Syrian is an example of a negative answer to this question. The heart of the matter for him is not in one’s opinion about the possibility of coming to know the truth, instead it is found in how philosophers were able to utilize that truth. His writings confirm our earlier distinction between being anti-philosophical and anti-rational. Tatian unswervingly admits that men possess the ability to know God naturally through his creatures110 and affirms a life lived in accord with reason.111 He also accepts as obvious the convergence of many philosophical truths and Christianity. However, even if this is what encouraged Saint Justin to look upon philosophy favorably, it became for his student, Tatian, the basis for polemics against philosophy. After all, why should we admire those who did not take advantage of the opportunity to read the book of nature granted to them by God? Why should we admire thieves who not only stole112 whatever was valuable in the concept of nature, but also destroyed the concept of nature by peppering it with lies, contradictions, and errors? Even though there are many traces of the truth (not everything was spoiled) in philosophy it would be very difficult to find examples of lives that could be admired by Christians without reservation, or, admired at all. Here is a sample of Tatian’s style: “What noble thing have you produced by your pursuit of philosophy? Who of your most eminent men has been free from vain boasting? Diogenes, who made such a parade of his independence with his tub, was seized with a bowel complaint through eating a raw polypus, and so lost his life by gluttony. Aristippus, walking about in a purple robe, led a profligate life, in accordance with his professed opinions. Plato, a philosopher, was sold by Dionysius for his gormandizing propensities. And Aristotle, who absurdly placed a limit to Providence and made happiness to consist in the things which give pleasure, quite contrary to his duty as a preceptor flattered Alexander, forgetful that he was but a youth; and he, showing how well he had learned the lessons of his master, because his friend would not worship him, shut him up and carried him about like a bear or a leopard.”113
Tatian’s opinions do not substantially swerve from mainline views about this matter, even though not all the Christian writers were equally fanatical and unconditional. Tertullian, who probably would have made an exception for Seneca, would in principle agree with Tatian. The philosophers had access to the truth, but they did not use the counsels of nature, nor what they had learned from Moses. “Therefore he who shall have the fear of God,” says Tertullian, “even if he be ignorant of all things else, if he has attained to the knowledge and truth of God, will possess full and perfect wisdom.”114 But this does not pertain to the philosophers who generally prefer to believe in falsehoods rather than the truth.115 The witness of their writings shows that they knew the truth at least partially. That they decapitated, maimed, and mixed the truth with falsehoods is witnessed by the numerous contradictions in their teachings and the general wickedness of pagan life. The cause of the errors is twofold: the lust for knowledge and the lust for fame.116 The problem does not only stem from the fact that the philosophers overlooked, misunderstood, or disbelieved in everything they took from the Scriptures. “The consequence of this is,” says Tertullian, “that even that which [the philosophers] had discovered degenerated into uncertainty, and there arose from one or two drops of truth a perfect flood of argumentation.”117 It seems philosophy is unsure and wavering, therefore it follows from this that philosophy is completely useless as a guide for life. There are no traces of perfection in it, furthermore, what passes as perfection is merely the by-product of the lust for fame, instead of being a proof of possessing the truth, and the strength of a mind liberated from the lower passions. This is the true face of the famed exploits of Empedocles, Anaxarchus, Xeno, Regulus, all whom Tertullian lists as being equal in courage with the Athenian Leaena.118 The perfections of Heraclitus or Peregrinus are also only too apparent.119 Tertullian does not waver in questioning the wisdom of Socrates, not only because some of his views are patent absurdities,120 but also because his actions reveal more hubris than one could expect from a rationality derived from knowledge of the truth.121
Philosophy’s Irrationalities and Contradictions
The Apologists had two main reasons for rejecting philosophy as a way of life, meaning, as an alternative on equal footing with Christianity. The first is connected to how various philosophical viewpoints contradicted each other. The second is connected to obvious falsehood. The contradictions led to uncertainty, while falsehoods led to immorality.122
Let us begin with the notion of falsehood. Even though philosophy has many overlaps with Christian teaching, it also abounds in many conclusions not compatible with Christianity. The following topics are especially glaring areas of doctrinal difference: the doctrine of God, the soul, human nature, and ultimate happiness. The differences with the mechanists are glaring enough to not warrant a discussion; instead we shall concentrate upon a critique of false classical Greek theology. This argument derives from the belief that only true knowledge of the Author of reality, and attuning one’s life to his decrees, will lead to a life of perfection. This is closely connected to the presupposition about the close affinity between the best part of the human soul and God. A correct identification of God is then connected with the identification of what is best in humanity. Furthermore, only a life lived in accord with the best part of ourselves, a life that actualizes the most godlike part of ourselves, will lead to perfection. This manner of thinking, perfectly understandable to the Greeks, is also accepted by Tatian (based upon Genesis 1:26), who maintains that humanity is not only a rational animal, but also the image and likeness of God: “Man is not, as the croaking philosophers say, merely a rational animal capable of understanding and knowledge; for, according to them, even irrational creatures appear possessed of understanding and knowledge. But man alone is the image and likeness of God; and I mean by man, not one who performs actions similar to those of animals, but one who has advanced far beyond mere humanity—to God Himself.”123
We should understand this statement in light of Plato’s definition of philosophy as the work of divinization.124 When we take physical matter to be the god and principle of this world, then materialism will direct our lives and the passions will be acknowledged as the highest part of our nature. This way of thinking clearly applies not only to matter, but also to everything else that is lower than the true God. This is what Tatian had in mind writing about reducing the human to the animal, that is, reducing the reasonable to something lacking reason. The quality of one’s conversion will depend upon the ultimate principle ruling it: “Such is the nature of man’s constitution; and, if it be like a temple, God is pleased to dwell in it by the spirit, His representative; but, if it be not such a habitation, man excels the wild beasts in articulate language only; in other respects his manner of life is like theirs, as one who is not a likeness of God.”125 This manner of thinking already appeared in full force in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. Idolatry and immorality are the effect of accepting a false image of reality; it is the flip-side of a unified phenomenon. When we elevate something lower than God to the rank of the highest principle, then we simultaneously commit an act of idolatry and submit our lives to a principle that reduces our humanity to submission to its lower elements. “While claiming to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for the likeness of an image of mortal man or of birds or of four-legged animals or of snakes. Therefore, God handed them over to impurity through the lusts of their hearts for the mutual degradation of their bodies. They exchanged the truth of God for a lie and revered and worshiped the creature rather than the creator, who is blessed forever. Amen. Therefore, God handed them over to degrading passions” (Rom 1:22–26). Paul’s opinion is pithily compressed by Chesterton’s ironic claim that when people stop believing in God they will not stop believing, rather, they will believe anything. We should note how in this statement knowledge and virtue are closely tied, much as they are for the majority of ancient philosophers and writers. Whoever does not know God, and glorifies a false god-principle, cannot live a virtuous life. When God is not the structuring principle of our knowledge, when there is no God behind our judgments, then the religious name for this state of life is idolatry, while its moral effect is immorality.
Therefore, there is nothing unusual about Christians using this theme to critique both pagan religion and philosophy. “Now, then, clear out all the thoughts that take up your attention, and pack away all the old ways of looking at things that keep deceiving you. You must become like a new man from the beginning, since, as you yourself admit, you are going to listen to a really new message. Look at the things that you proclaim and think of as gods. See with your outward eyes and with your mind what material they are made of and what form they happen to have.”126 This statement is not only addressed against the gods of pagan religion, but also against the philosophical principles of reality. This is because all of the following practices name a phenomenon other than God as their ultimate principle: the barbarian cult of worshiping natural phenomena,127 oriental mysteries,128 the immorality of poetic and mythological Olympians,129 the cult of statues (made by human hands),130 philosophico-religious speculations about stellar intelligences, or the archai of the philosophers.131 The highest principle (archē) was always divine for the Greeks. This tendency was at the root of the popular Christian theory that it was the demons, fallen angels, who were the authors of false philosophy and religion. The demons are lower than God, bound to matter, and the object and cause of false worship, which dehumanizes humanity.132 We should not forget that the Christian theologians utilized many arguments lifted out of the Greeks, but against the Greeks. The critique of the anthropomorphism and immorality of polytheistic religion was—at least since the time of Xenophanes—a basic weapon in the Greek philosophical armory. The Christians borrowed weapons from this armory at will. It is enough to mention how three important fragments of Xenophanes survived only because they were so popular among Christians.133 The theory of Euhemerus of Messene, arguing that the gods were merely divinized humans, was also extremely popular.134 The Christians willingly used the heritage of the Greek poets, philosophers, and orators whenever it was useful to them. If anyone is offended by the lack of good will and superficial judgments of the Christian writers, let him reach for the works of, say, Lucian and he will realize how the pamphlets of he Apologists do not stray from the then-accepted tone of religious polemics. The only novelty of the Christian works lies in their awareness that the things they are discussing are a matter of life and death, even more, of eternal life and eternal death. This is obviously why the debt to the Greeks is not only a matter of form. It is enough to peek into Tertullian’s works to see with what ease the concepts of eternity, movement, permanence, or of the Prime Mover are put to work in criticizing pagan religion.135 It would be difficult to deny that the Christian effort to undermine Greek theology was accomplished through recycling Greece’s very highest intellectual achievements.
If falsehood leads directly to immorality then the contradictions discoverable upon comparing the positions of different philosophers prove that their theses are burdened by a lack of certainty and as such they cannot play the role of a solid foundation for spiritual transformation, “You mean of course, that pure and simple wisdom of the philosophers which attests its own weakness mainly by that variety of opinion which proceeds from an ignorance of the truth.”136 The widely discussed notion of the internal inconsistency of philosophy equally originated in the confrontation of particular doctrines with the expectations of Christians and the comparison of stances taken up in the most important controversies of ancient philosophy. For the Christians individual philosophers contradict themselves whenever they affirm certain truths thought to be Christian while they contradict others. However, in Christian writings, the theme of contradiction sprouted mainly out of the disagreements among opinions held by various philosophical schools.“For all these, having fallen in love with vain and empty reputation, neither themselves knew the truth, nor guided others to the truth: for the things which they said themselves convict them of speaking inconsistently; and most of them demolished their own doctrines. For not only did they refute one another, but some, too, even stultified their own teachings; so that their reputation has issued in shame and folly, for they are condemned by men of understanding.”137 The Christians were not direct participants of these debates, as outsiders they were content to observe the inescapable differences between philosophers. They were succored by a long line of skeptical philosophy, which since the times of Timon of Philus collected these divergences as an indirect proof of the inconclusiveness of the issues raised by the dogmatic philosophers. They were examples of isosthenia, that is, of the equal power of contradictory philosophical judgments.138
“[The] philosophers put forth their doctrines, saying things that neither sound the same, nor mean the same as one another.”139 The Christians were more than willing to expose this discord. Hermias, who wrote sometime near the end of the second century devoted a whole treatise to it. In his Derision of Gentile Philosophers Hermias presents the differences that divide the philosophers on questions as basic to our lives as happiness, the nature of the soul, reason, the ultimate principle, and even the concept of God. “What then must we term these things? They seem to me, to be a prodigy, or folly, or madness, or rebellion, or all these together.”140 I will not attempt to sort out how much Hermias owes his stylistic verve to Timon, but there is no doubt that he uses this style for an entirely different purpose, that is, to demonstrate the soundness of Christianity and the uselessness of philosophy as a sufficient guide toward perfection. “These things have I gone through,” writes Hermias in the last sentence of his work, “wishing to point out the opposition which is in their doctrines, and how their examination of things will go on to infinity and no limit, for their end is inexplicable and useless, being confirmed neither by one manifest fact, nor by one sound argument.”141 The lack of agreement proves philosophy’s lack of grounding, whereas its lack of certainty suggests its uselessness.
It really might seem like Justin stands on the other side of the barricades from the perspective of Tatian, Hermias, or Tertullian. This is because he not only tries to prove doctrinal similarities, but, it also seems, he argues for such a wide range of these similarities because, in principle, they allow for the attainment of Christian perfection before the coming of Christ. The issue at hand is extremely important, because philosophy, above all, as we have already argued, is a way of life in competition with Christianity; it is a method whose aim is to reach happiness understood as the state proper to the perfection of human nature. And yet Justin’s position, upon closer inspection, is not an exception in this case. His affirmation of the lives lived in perfection—those of Socrates or Heraclitus for example—is qualified by reservations, which leave no doubts about Justin’s most important commitments.
The philosophers, because they did not know the fullness of the Word, often contradicted each other.142 While these contradictions were proof that, “on the more important points [the philosophers] appear not to have possessed the heavenly wisdom, and the knowledge which cannot be spoken against.”143
Let us stop here. This is an important statement for understanding Justin. It means that Socrates, through living in accordance with the logos, lived a perfect life, but the foundation of his decision was not certain and properly understood truth, instead it was an uncertain opinion. In the language of ancient philosophy this does mean that Socrates was a sage, but only by chance, because he reached his natural perfection through a happy convergence of coincidences, blind chance, or, and this is probably what Justin hoped, through freely given grace without regard for human merits. This is not a compliment the Greek philosopher might have anticipated or accepted. Such a judgment clearly discredits the philosophy of Socrates, if we are to understand it as a path toward an authentic human life. It places his philosophy on the side of matters worthy of attention, rather than those worthy of imitation.144
We should take a look at what Saint Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, had to say: “And faith is produced by the truth; for faith rests on things that truly are. For in things that are, as they are, we believe; and believing in things that are, as they ever are, we keep firm our confidence in them. Since then faith is the perpetuation of our salvation, we must needs bestow much pains on the maintenance thereof, in order that we may have a true comprehension of the things that are.”145 This is the true, dispassionate view of reality, the unfulfilled Stoic postulate of: katalepsis ton onton! This view, and there is universal agreement upon this, can only be reached through the teaching passed on by the apostles. Despite all their differences Justin agrees with Tertullian when it comes to this issue. There is only one real philosophy which leads to the knowledge of God and results in sanctity. The philosophers do not know this philosophy: “What philosophy is, however, and the reason why it has been sent down to men, have escaped the observation of most; for there would be neither Platonists, nor Stoics, nor Peripatetics, nor Theoretics, nor Pythagoreans, this knowledge being one.”146 Thereby the uniqueness of Christianity as the way of perfection is preserved. “And yet it is the truth,” says Tertullian, “which is so troublesome to the world, that these philosophers affect, but which Christians possess.”147 “But straightway a flame was kindled in my soul,” writes Justin about his conversion, “and a love of the prophets, and of those men who are friends of Christ, possessed me; and whilst revolving his words in my mind, I found this philosophy alone to be safe and profitable.”148
102. Tert., Test. 1, ANF 3, 174.
103. See: Min. Fel., Oct. 19.3–15; Clem. Al., Protr. 6.67—7.76.
104. Tert., Ap. 14.7; 21.1–2; 39.12–13; Nat. I.4. Adolf Harnack wrote about the relationship of the fathers of the church to Socrates in his classic study “Sokrates und die Alte Kirche” [Socrates and the Old Church], 24–48. See also: Thomas Deman, Chrystus Pan i Sokrates [Christ the Lord and Socrates] (No English translation is available —trans.)
105. Tert., An. 20.1. On Tertullian’s relationship with Stoicism see the following: Colisch, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 13–29.
106. See: Tert., Test. 2.
107. Clement gives a thorough explanation of the allegorical and symbolic methods, all the while stressing the apophatic character of revelation itself (Str. VI.XV.126.1–4). On allegory in Greek, Jewish, and Christian thought see: Zieliński, Jerozolimy, Ateny, Aleksandria [Jerusalem, Athens, Alexandria], 94–145. Also see the chapter entitled “Symbolism” in Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria, 168–74.
108. Min. Fel., Oct. 19.4. We should also mention that the allegorical interpretation leads not only to uncovering religious elements of philosophy, but also the philosophical elements in the Bible.
109. Domański, “Metamorfozy pojecia filozofii,” 21.
110. Tatian writes: “Him we know from His creation, and apprehend His invisible power by His works.” Tat., Or. 4, ANF 2, 66.
111. That a life lived in accord with reason is a life lived in accord with the will of God is apparent, for example, when he says that demons deceived humanity by saying that even the most irrational earthly life could be in accord with reason if lived in harmony with the stars. See: Tat., Or. 9.
112. Ibid. 1.35–40. See: Iust., Apol. I.44.8–10; I.44.59–60. Min. Fel. Oct. 20.1; 34.5. Tert., Ap. 19.
113. Tat., Or. 2, ANF 2, 65. Here I am developing an argument I began in my earlier book Arcyparadoks smierci [The Archparadox of Death], 141–42. When we read the Apologists we should remember the Christians do not have a monopoly on deriding the philosophers and their lives. This harsh style of writing even earned itself the name (derived from the cynical philosopher Menippos) of Menippean satire. Whoever has read the satires of Lucian knows the severity of his judgments do not take a back seat to Tatian: pointing out the disharmony between teaching and life is crucial for him. For example, “Everything they preach—how they scorn money and fame, consider beauty the only good, are above anger, look down their noses at celebrities and address them as equals—god knows is fine and wise and wonderful, very much and truly so. But they teach these very things for pay! They worship wealth, their mouths water for money, these creatures who are more snappish than curs, more timid than rabbits, more fawning than monkeys, more thieving than weasels, more lascivious than jackasses, more quarrelsome than cocks” from Lucian, Pisc. 34, 351–52.
114. Tert., Nat. II.2, ANF 3, 130.
115. See: Tert., Test. 1.
116. See: Tert. Ap. 46.7.
117. Tert., Nat. II.2, ANF 3, 130. Clement of Alexandria supports Tertullian’s position when he says, “Since, therefore, truth is one (for falsehood has ten thousand by-paths); just as the Bacchantes tore asunder the limbs of Pentheus, so the sects both of barbarian and Hellenic philosophy have done with truth, and each vaunts as the whole truth the portion which has fallen to its lot.” Clem. Al., Str. I.XIII.57.1, ANF 2, 313. A similar view of philosophy’s interminable divisions came to life much later from the pen of Boethius of Dacia.
118. See: Tert., Ap. 50.4–9.
119. See: Tert., Mart. 4.
120. Tert., Nat. I.4. Here Tertullian is particularly concerned with the problem of placing demons above God. See: Tert., Ap., 14.7; 22.1–2. See: Stępień, “Ojcowie Koscioła i demon Sokratesa” [Fathers of the Church and the Daimonion of Socrates], 242–51.
121. The episode in The Republic (457c–d) where Socrates puts forward his theses about polygamy are used as a proof of Socrates’s immorality and are treated by Tertullian as a form of prostitution (see: Ap. 39.12–13). Tertullian is also willing to seriously consider the Athenian accusations of corrupting the youth (See: Ap. 46.10).
122. Here he seems to be relying upon Irenaeus’s distinction between the godless and sinners. The godless are those who do not know God and do not worship him, whereas the sinners are those who know God, but do not follow his commands, instead they flout them. See: Iren., Demonstr. 2.
123. Tat., Or. 15, ANF 2, 71.
124. There is an exhaustive discussion of philosophy understood as divinization in my book Arcyparadoks śmierci [The Archparadox of Death], 205–37.
125. Tat., Or. 15, ANF 2, 71.
126. Ad Diog. 2.1, ANF 1, 214.
127. See: Arist., Apol. 3, ANF 9, 265. There Aristides argues the following: “The Barbarians, then, as they did not apprehend God, went astray among the elements, and began to worship things created instead of their Creator; and for this end they made images and shut them up in shrines, and lo! they worship them, guarding them the while with much care, lest their gods be stolen by robbers. And the Barbarians did not observe that that which acts as guard is greater than that which is guarded, and that everyone who creates is greater than that which is created. If it be, then, that their gods are too feeble to see to their own safety, how will they take thought for the safety of men? Great then is the error into which the Barbarians wandered in worshiping lifeless images which can do nothing to help them. And I am led to wonder, O King, at their philosophers, how that even they went astray, and gave the name of gods to images which were made in honor of the elements; and that their sages did not perceive that the elements also are dissoluble and perishable.”
128. Clement of Alexandria, toward the end of a document concerned with the mysteries writes, “Such are the mysteries of the Atheists. And with reason I call those Atheists who know not the true God, and pay shameless worship to a boy torn in pieces by the Titans, and a woman in distress, and to parts of the body that in truth cannot be mentioned for shame, held fast as they are in the double impiety, first in that they know not God, not acknowledging as God Him who truly is; the other and second is the error of regarding those who exist not, as existing and calling those gods that have no real existence, or rather no existence at all, who have nothing but a name.” Clem. Al., Protr. 2.23.1., ANF 2, 177.
129. “The Greeks, then, because they are more subtle than the Barbarians, have gone further astray than the Barbarians; inasmuch as they have introduced many fictitious gods, and have set up some of them as males and some as females; and in that some of their gods were found who were adulterers, and did murder, and were deluded, and envious, and wrathful and passionate, and parricides, and thieves, and robbers. . . . Thus, O King, have the Greeks put forward foulness, and absurdity, and folly about their gods and about themselves, in that they have called those that are of such a nature gods, who are no gods. And hence mankind have received incitements to commit adultery and fornication, and to steal and to practice all that is offensive and hated and abhorred. For if they who are called their gods practiced all these things which are written above, how much more should men practice them—men, who believe that their gods themselves practiced them.” Arist., Apol. 8, ANF 9, 269. See: Clem. Al., Protr. 4.46–63; Min. Fel., Oct. 23.1–13.
130. See: Ad Diog. 2.1–10; Min. Fel., Oct. 24.5–8.
131. “Let us then run over, if you choose, the opinions of the philosophers, to which they give boastful utterance, respecting the gods; that we may discover philosophy itself, through its conceit making an idol of matter,” writes Clement of Alexandria while discussing the doctrines of Thales, Anaximenes, Diogenes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles. He strove to mention just about every philosopher, so that their errors would not be passed over in silence. See: Clem. Al., Protr. 5.64–66, ANF 2, 190.
132. This factor was also usually combined with the cult of stellar intelligences. See: Tat., Or. 7, 9; Min. Fel., Oct. 26.8; Tert., Ap. 22; Iust., Apol. I.5.2.
133. Clem. Al., Str. V.XIV.109.1–3; VII.VII.22.1. See: Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, 157.
134. Tertullian devoted the whole second part of To the Nations (especially Nat. II.3–6) to this topic.
135. Tert., Nat. II.2, ANF 3, 130.
136. Ibid.
137. Theo., Ad Autol. 3.3, ANF 2, 111.
138. Cicero, in his On Academic Skepticism, gives a comical picture of the irresolvable controversies between various philosophical schools—only the skeptics came out on top. The Christians probably willingly took in the skeptical critique of the Dogmatic school. It is telling that this particular fragment from Cicero came down to us through Saint Augustine, who cited it in its entirety and only critiqued its conclusion in favor of the skeptics. See: Augustinus, Contra Accademicos III.7.15–16.
139. Herm., Irr. 1 in: The Writings of the Early Christians of the Second Century, 193.
140. Ibid. 2, 194.
141. Ibid. 10, 199.
142. Iust., Apol. II.10.3.
143. Ibid. II.13.3., ANF 1, 193.
144. See: Clem. Al., Str. VII.VIII. 59.5.
145. Iren., Demonstr. 3 in Lay, Readings in Historical Theology, 69.
146. Iust., Dial. 2.1. ANF 1, 195.
147. Tert., Nat. I.4., ANF 3, 112.
148. Iust., Dial. 8.1. ANF 1, 198.