REFERENCE GUIDE TO SELECTED TOPICS

As this book comprises chapters that were published as individual essays rather than as a single book, I have chosen to provide the following reference guide to the broad themes of these essays rather than a traditional index. This reference guide is exhaustive neither of the topics covered nor the individuals discussed in the book, and does not necessarily provide every reference to those topics and individuals included. Moreover, there will be inevitable overlap among these broad themes.

—Gary L. Francione

OUR EXPLOITATION OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS

Our thinking about nonhuman animals is confused. For example, we simultaneously treat some nonhumans as members of our families and others as our food. Our “moral schizophrenia” about nonhumans is discussed at pp. 25–28, 135, 150, 163, 172.

Humans have historically justified their exploitation of nonhumans on three grounds. These are discussed at pp. 3, 28–29, 131n10, 178 (the Cartesian theory of animal automatons); pp. 3–4, 52n74, 178–79 (religious grounds); and pp. 4, 10–14, 29–30, 52–61, 123–25, 137–45, 157–60, 179–85, 210–29 (cognitive differences between humans and nonhumans).

THE ANIMAL WELFARE POSITION

The animal welfare position, which holds that we may use nonhumans for human purposes, is the prevailing contemporary framework that governs our relationship with nonhumans. This position maintains that although we may use nonhumans, we have a moral and legal obligation to treat them “humanely” and not to inflict “unnecessary” suffering on them. See pp. 1, 5–9, 30–36, 67–68, 133–34, 149, 171, 191–92.

However, the overwhelming amount of animal use by humans cannot plausibly be described as “necessary.” See pp. 7, 36–37, 68–69, 100–101, 149–50, 171–72.

Vivisection involves the use of nonhuman animals in experiments or for other purposes related to science and is arguably our only use of nonhumans that is not transparently trivial. The necessity of animal use for this purpose is discussed at pp. 37, 172–77; the moral justification for vivisection is discussed at pp. 64, 177–85.

Nonhuman animals are our property; they are things that we own. They have only the value that we accord to them. As a result, animal welfare, both as a social theory and as applied through animal welfare laws, fails to provide any significant protection for animal interests. The problems presented by the property status of animals and the failure of animal welfare are discussed throughout the book, but particularly at pp. 7–9, 19, 37–44, 69–71, 72–106, 135–37, 145–46, 150–52, 154, 160–64, 166, 193–96.

Ethical theory concerning nonhuman animals seeks to clarify how we should resolve conflicts between humans and nonhumans. These conflicts are, for the most part, ones we create because we regard animals as property and bring them into existence so that we can treat them as our resources. See pp. 13–14, 63–66, 152, 164.

Animals are property in the same way that humans who were enslaved were property. The law failed to protect human slaves just as it fails to protect nonhuman animals. See pp. 9, 46–51, 52–53, 61–63, 104–106, 128, 145–46, 166n70, 168, 196–98.

The animal welfare position reflects the view that animals do not care that we use them, but only how we use them. According to this position, nonhumans do not have an interest in continuing to live, but only have an interest in not suffering. This view is espoused by Bentham, Singer, and, arguably, by Sunstein, and is described at pp. 6, 53–54, 133, 143–44, 153–57 (Bentham); pp. 18–20, 54–55n81, 143–44, 153–57 (Singer); and pp. 153–57 (Sunstein). Regan defends the related position that death is a lesser harm for humans than for nonhumans. See pp. 13–14, 165n69, 210–29.

“New welfarism,” like classical welfarism, promotes the regulation of animal treatment, but seeks to go beyond traditional welfare theory and to provide greater protection for animal interests or to abolish animal use through incremental regulation. See pp. 2, 14–21, 106–16, 186–209.

Animal advocacy groups have effectively formed “partnerships” with animal exploiters by promoting supposedly “humane” animal products, by focusing on animal welfare reforms that effectively make animal exploitation more economically efficient, and by making animal exploitation more socially acceptable. See pp. 15–16, 72–96, 108–10, 126–27.

THE ANIMAL RIGHTS / ABOLITIONIST POSITION

“Animal rights,” properly understood, means the abolition of animal use and not the regulation of animal treatment. This theme runs throughout the book, but is discussed particularly at pp. 1–2, 13, 21–23, 25, 62–63, 65, 70, 106–16, 127–28, 146, 148, 151–52, 164, 166, 188, 191–92.

To treat animals as “persons” does not mean that we treat them in all respects as we treat humans, but rather, that we apply the principle of equal consideration and treat human and similar nonhuman interests in a similar way. However, if animals are property, the principle of equal consideration will have no meaningful application to their interests because animals will be regarded as “things” without protectable interests. See pp. 12, 18–20, 44–66, 105–106, 143–46, 151, 153–64, 166, 168, 189–90, 193–98.

A right is a way of protecting an interest. A right protects an interest even if the consequences of violating the interest would benefit others. See pp. 20, 49, 168, 177–78, 192.

Although there is a great deal of disagreement about what human interests ought to be protected by a right, there is general agreement that all humans, irrespective of their particular cognitive characteristics, have a basic, pre-legal moral right not to be treated as the property of others. The basic right not to be treated as property, or the right to equal consideration of one’s fundamental interests, is discussed at pp. 12, 49–52, 70, 145, 151, 168–69, 189, 193–98, 221–22.

To say that a nonhuman has a basic right not to be treated as property is another way of saying that nonhumans, like humans, have intrinsic or inherent value that precludes their being treated as our property or as commodities with only extrinsic or conditional value. See pp. 23, 50n71, 60–61n97, 67–71, 103–105, 135–36, 151n12, 162, 210–29.

If a nonhuman animal is sentient, or subjectively aware, we should accord that nonhuman the basic moral right not to be treated as our property. No other cognitive characteristic is required. Nonhumans do not have to have minds that are similar to human minds to be full members of the moral community. See pp. 10–14, 54–61, 123–25, 129–47, 152, 157–60, 165–66, 179–85.

The theory of animal rights denies the welfarist position that animals do not have an interest in continued existence and only have an interest in not suffering. See pp. 10–11, 13–14, 54–57, 144, 157–60, 165–66.

Recognizing the right of nonhumans not to be treated as property requires that we stop bringing domestic nonhumans into existence and that we leave nondomesticated nonhumans alone. To the extent that we have conflicts with the latter, we should apply the principle of equal consideration to resolve such conflicts. See pp. 13, 63–66, 128, 146, 152, 164.

The moral baseline of the animal rights / abolitionist movement is veganism, which involves not eating, wearing, or using animal products. Just as someone who opposes human slavery should not own slaves, a person who objects to animal exploitation should not consume animal products. See pp. 16–17, 65, 101, 107–16, 122, 127–28, 147.

ANIMAL LAW

“Animal law” has become a specialty legal practice. For the most part, this practice, and most law school courses that focus on the doctrines promoted thereby, reinforce the property status of animals. See pp. 116–21, 123.

From 1990 until 2000, Anna Charlton and I operated the Animal Rights Law Clinic at Rutgers University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey. This was the first time in the history of American legal education that students received academic credit for working on actual cases involving animal issues at the same time that they studied the philosophical foundations of the abolitionist approach to animal rights. See pp. xv, 121–23.

 

 

Hundreds of individuals, including philosophers, lawyers, and animal advocates are discussed and cited throughout the book. The following are those whose views are of particular relevance:

 

Aquinas, Thomas

Bentham, Jeremy

Bryant, Taimie L.

Carruthers, Peter

Cohen, Carl

Damasio, Antonio

Darwin, Charles

Descartes, René

Favre, David

Garner, Robert

Griffin, Donald

Hobbes, Thomas

Ibrahim, Darian

Kant, Immanuel

Locke, John

Mill, John Stuart

Rawls, John

Regan, Tom

Reppy, William A., Jr.

Rollin, Bernard E.

Shue, Henry

Singer, Peter

Steiner, Gary

Sunstein, Cass

Watson, Alan