61 Mechanised Battalion was the only conventional SADF unit based permanently in northern Namibia. Operating out of its base at Oshivelo, about 200 km south of the Angolan border, 61 Mech was the main destructive fist readily available on the ground to senior SA Army officers in the border region. Manned mainly by conscript national servicemen and a few regulars of the Permanent Force, 61 Mech had been deeply engaged in the cross-border war over a period of ten years. It had acquired a formidable reputation, and anyone posted to it was virtually guaranteed fighting action. It had no tanks permanently attached, but its soldiers operated the whole range of half-a-dozen or so different-function Ratel armoured cars and the family of exceptionally tough logistics vehicles which can keep pace with the Ratels over the roughest country.
32 Battalion, which bore the early brunt of the fighting in Operation Moduler, was by contrast a semi-conventional force, operating mainly in company or platoon strength without heavy weapons and on foot, although sometimes in mine-protected vehicles. It combined guerrilla, commando, and counter-insurgency capabilities, striking deep into Angola time and again on countless small to medium operations.
However, during major operations 32 Battalion acted mainly as a screening and mopping-up force for the main mechanised infantry thrust. Specialist units had gradually been attached to it on an ad hoc basis, but in southeastern Angola through August 1987 officers like Jan Hougaard and Robert Hartslief were constantly urging that, although 32 Battalion had performed many miracles, it could not continue to hold off 10,000 enemy troops backed by tanks and a range of the most modern missiles and fighter-bombers in the history of warfare.
It was inevitable that at some point the generals would see the need to involve 61 Mech. However, when the call first came it was for the proud unit to act merely in a deception role, rather as the charismatic and talented US General George Patton had been assigned by Eisenhower at the beginning of the 1944 Battle of Normandy to command 45 phantom divisions in southeast England to fool Adolf Hitler into thinking the Allied invasion would come from opposite the Pas de Calais.
‘At the end of June we were ordered to move up to the Bittersoet training area (about 30 km) southwest of Rundu, and from there we moved into Angola along the western bank of the Kavango River,’ said Major Laurence Maree, the deputy commander of 61 Mech whose natty, British military-style blond bristle-moustache failed to make him look older than his 28 years. ‘We moved around there for eight days, only in daylight, as a show of force so that Fapla would see us and be dissuaded from assembling its brigades at Cuito Cuanavale. However, the plan didn’t work because the enemy had such second-rate reconnaissance.’
Later 61 Mechanised Battalion reassembled at Bittersoet in full battle readiness. But the generals and politicians forbade the Ratels to cross the border to support 32 Battalion. Only a few Buffels were permitted to cross together with an MRL battery. At the tactical HQ near Mavinga Commandant Bok Smit, 61 Mech’s commander, joined in the planning conferences on countering the advancing Fapla brigades. It was agreed that if 61 Mech was eventually committed, its main task would be as the spearhead against 47 Brigade. But at this stage the plan was still only to deploy 61 Mech if a final defensive battle became necessary.
The restriction on 61 Mech was lifted at the end of August, at about the same time as the SAAF was given the go-ahead for cross-border attacks. On 2 September Bok Smit was flown by helicopter into Angola to join the planning team again at forward headquarters, and just before he left Bittersoet 61 Mech’s main force started to move towards Angola.
The convoy consisted of 55 Ratels of various configurations, five Rinkhals armour-protected ambulances, 62 logistics trucks and four recovery vehicles. A fleet of diesel tankers and trucks carrying tyres and other spares had gone on ahead.
It took the convoy a week to cover the 400 km to Mavinga over some of the most hostile, back-breaking and unforgiving ground in the world. ‘The sand was very loose,’ said Maree. ‘The vehicles overheated as they churned through it. Pipes burst and oil spurted out and was spread by the fans and compacted with whirling sand, leaves and twigs. We eventually learnt to lower our tyre pressures to make it easier to plough through the sand.
‘Until Luengue (100 km south of Mavinga) we moved by day. But then we came within range of the enemy Migs and we had to start moving at night only. It caused lots of problems.’
One of the main difficulties was navigation. The journey from Luengue to Mavinga is across a true wilderness where the leopard, the lion and the martial eagle are kings. There are no roads, no people, not a trace of development. The voyager must snake and twist northwards over low forest ridges and through valley grasslands, and find fording places across deep rivers.
The sandy soils are particularly fine and deep, and no sooner has one trail been opened up than the ruts become hopelessly deep and clogging and another trail has to be pioneered. This meant that the lead vehicles had to smash down trees and bounce over them. Headlights got smashed, engines became fiery hot and their grilles became blocked with dust and forest debris. Soldiers all the time had to watch for crashing timber; many South African casualties in the War for Africa came from trees falling across struggling trucks and armour. Later one 61 Mech troopie was killed when his Ratel dashed into tree cover after an air raid warning and he was crushed between the armoured car’s hatch and a hefty tree branch. Tiffies (mechanics) had to perform miracles and work 24-hour days to service and repair the machines and keep the columns moving.
‘We stopped at sunrise, spread the convoy, camouflaged everything under the trees, and then rested all day,’ said Maree. ‘At sunset we started again, but only one of our Ratels had night navigation electronics. It would set a course for Mavinga and then weave its way through the forest towards the destination. We had to move very slowly and stop constantly to check by radio that all 126 vehicles were within sight of each other.’
When one Ratel broke down, the driver and gunner were ordered to wait with the vehicle for tiffies coming up with the rearguard. The rearguard chose the wrong one of a number of trails, and the two 61 Mech men waited in the wilderness for a fortnight, working their way through all the food and water, before a search party found them.
By 7 September most of 61 Mech had arrived at its assembly point 25 km southeast of Mavinga. Colonel Ferreira had arrived in the battle zone just 48 hours earlier and had assigned Commandant Bok Smit and the bulk of 61 Mech to Combat Group Alpha to take on 47 Brigade when the moment was right.
The wait began.