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Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 73–74
Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC), 3, 9, 165; as data center, 153, 165, 171–73; and debate over yield calculations, 61, 92–96; and NAS report of 2012, 220; role in monitoring nuclear tests, 41–42; Romney and, 73–74
Alewine, Ralph, 235; and AGU symposium on verification (1983), 105, 107; and anomalous seismic events, 155; and DARPA panel meetings on yield determination, 111–12; and DARPA’s Nuclear Monitoring Office, 141; and improved verification methods refuting claims of Soviet cheating, 124–25; opposition to full test ban, 103; opposition to release of data from IDC, 172–73; Sykes and, 117, 125; and yield determinations using Lg waves, 122
American Geophysical Union (AGU), 134, 206, 216; AGU symposium on verification (1983), 105–11, 128
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 105, 215, 246
ARCESS seismic array (Norway), 153
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 53
Atomic Energy Detecting System (AEDS), 3, 9, 23, 61
Azgir test site (western Kazakhstan): partially decoupled test at (1976), 46–47, 49, 54, 83, 89, 231; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 87–89; salt at, 50, 87–89
Benham test (1968), 80–82
“Big Ivan”/“Tsar Bomb” test (1961), 30
Bikini Atoll test site, 12
Billingslea, Marshall, 203
Blanca test (1958), 65–66
The Broken Connection: On Death and the Continuity of Life (Lifton), 257
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 100
China, 157; and CTBT, xi, 6, 37, 159, 162; current capabilities for monitoring, 171; earthquakes in, 175, 194; and LTBT, 37; and missile defense, 248; and NAS report of 2012, 219; nuclear tests, 14, 179; number of nuclear weapons, 15; and Pakistan’s nuclear program, 182–83; possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; salt deposits in, 50; tensions with India, 178–79, 240; test site (see Lop Nor test site)
Christmas Island test site, 31
Clinton, Bill, 6, 197; and CTBT, 35, 152, 160–62, 195–96, 199–201, 208, 210, 211; and CTBT task force, 211; halt to U.S. testing, 125, 137
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), xii, xiv; arguments against/opposition to, 17–20, 102, 103, 137–38, 141, 160–61, 198, 202–9, 211, 217; arguments for/support for, 19–20, 71–79, 196–99, 203, 206, 207; Bush (G. W.) and, 216–17; Clinton and, 35, 152, 160–62, 195–96, 199–201, 208, 210, 211; congressional hearings on (1971, 1972), 75–79; CTBT task force, 211–12; defeated in Senate (1999), 19, 35, 41, 162, 195–210; developments prior to Senate vote (1997, 1998), 195–200; and evasive testing, 41, 76–77, 205–7, 228–31; Kennedy and, 34; monitoring stations, xiv, 139–40 (see also monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests); and NAS report of 2002, 212–14; and NAS report of 2012, 217–31; negotiations (1977), 102; negotiations (1993–1996), 159–62; Obama and, 199, 217; and OTA’s independent review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 127; and political issues, 128, 196–97, 202, 208; problems with ratification and the UN’s Committee on Disarmament, 161–62; public opinion on, 19, 199, 207; Reagan and, 136–37; renewed interest in the 1980s and 1990s, 127–42; safeguards submitted by Clinton, 195–96; signers’ adherence to, 195; signers and nonsigning countries, 79, 87, 161–62, 187; signing of, 159; Sykes and Evernden’s Scientific American article on verification (1982), 103–4, 127–28; and TTBT, 6; and zero nuclear yield as limit, 18, 160, 204, 206, 211, 227
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 139, 143
Conference on Disarmament (CD), 139, 159, 161
Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests (1958, 1959), 25, 28–29
Conference of Experts (1958), 22–25, 64
Congress, U.S.: defunding of OTA, 199–200; and failure to ratify CTBT, 19, 35, 41, 162, 195–210; and funding for nuclear tests, 136–37; hearings on verification and testing (1985, 1986), 117–18; and OTA’s independent review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 118–19, 127; and renewed interest in a CTBT (1979–1996), 127, 136–37; short senate hearings and debate on CTBT prior to vote, 200–210; and TTBT, 136
The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions (OTA report of 1989), 134
decoupling/muffling underground explosions, 40–54; and claims of Russian evasive testing, 52–53 (see also under Russia/Soviet Union); and CTBT Senate debate, 205–7; databases on tests, 45–46; and difference between probability and possibility, 44; and limited size of cavities in Russian Federation, 87; misstatements and misleading inferences about, 40–45, 205–7; and NAS report of 2002, 214; partially decoupled Soviet test at Azgir (1976), 83, 89, 231; technological challenges of, 228–31; and testing in caves, 206; and testing in salt, 47(figure), 48(figure), 49–50; U.S. meetings on (1996 and 2001), 53–54; and U.S. overestimation of yields, 49; U.S. tests in very small cavities, 50–51. See also evasive testing
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA): and AGU symposium on verification (1983), 105–11, 128; and choice of consulting firms, 136; and claims of Russian cheating on TTBT, 105, 110; and debate over yield calculations, 103–4; and international seismic monitoring tests, 140; and negative views about monitoring, 128–31, 141; and opposition to full test ban, 103, 141; panel meetings on yield determination (1983–1985), 111–14; political influence of, 142; Research and Systems Development Initiative, 141–42
Defense Science Board, 98–99
Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), 53
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 53
Detecting the Bomb: The Role of Seismology in the Cold War (Romney), 22, 60, 74
earthquakes: and aftershocks of Benham test (1968), 80; determining depths of earthquakes and explosions, 62–64; and evasive testing, 76–77, 129–30; identification of, 23, 26–27, 66–69 (see also monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests); and International Monitoring System, 169–70; location of, 63(figure), 64(figure); locations in states of the former Soviet Union, 133; and monitoring countries of special interest, 174–94; and plate tectonics, 69–70; and “problem” or “anomalous” events (1972–2009), 143–58, 191–94, 192(figure), 193(figure), 227; seismic waves from, 24(figure); and U.S. concerns about verification as obstacle to treaties, 26–27. See also specific countries
Eisenhauer, Thomas, 93, 94
evasive testing, xiii–xiv, 76–77; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 40–54 (see also decoupling/muffling underground explosions); and detection of radionuclides, 163–64; and “hide-in-earthquake” scenario, 77, 129–30; and misinformation during CTBT Senate debate, 205–7; and NAS report of 2002, 214; and NAS report of 2012, 228–31; technological challenges of, 228–31. See also monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests
Evernden, Jack, 112; and analysis of monitoring the Soviet Union (1983), 129; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 109; and debate over yield calculations, 103, 104, 105, 107; and high-frequency seismic monitoring, 134–36; Scientific American article on verification (1982), 104, 127–28; and support for CTBT, 71–74; and variation in P-wave propagation, 60
France: and CTBT, xi, 37, 159; first nuclear test (1960), 29; and hydroacoustic and infrasound studies, 164; and LTBT, 37; number of nuclear weapons, 15; summary of weapons tests, 14; test site in Algeria, 69, 95, 101, 111; uranium from Niger, 191
Grafenberg seismic array (Germany), 122
Great Britain: and CTBT, xi, 102, 159; development and testing of nuclear weapons, 12, 14, 31; early attempts to identify nuclear tests, 21–22; number of nuclear weapons, 15
GSETT-1, GSETT-2, GSETT-3 (international seismic monitoring tests), 139–40
Hardhat test (1962), 52, 95
Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Nuclear Moratorium Amendment, 137
Helmberger, Donald, 98, 99
Herrin, Eugene, 3, 4; and DARPA panel meetings on yield determination, 112; and debate over yield calculations, 59, 60–61, 93–95, 98; and identification of anomalous seismic events, 154
High-Gain, Long-Period seismographs (HGLPs), 70–72, 76
Hoggar region (Algeria), 101
Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism (Lifton), 257
India: Clinton and, 197; consequences of nuclear exchange with Pakistan, 254; and CTBT, xi, 6, 20, 161, 162; and LTBT, 37, 79; monitoring of, 178–81, 230; nonparticipation in international monitoring, 166, 179; and NPT, 79; nuclear tests, 14, 37, 170, 178–81, 194; number of nuclear weapons, 15, 240; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 83–84, 180; Pokhran test site, 179; salt deposits in, 50; tensions with China and Pakistan, 178–79, 180–82, 240; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 192(figure), 193(figure)
INSAR (Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar), 164, 181, 229
International Data Center (IDC), 153, 162, 167; U.S. attempt to restrict data from, 171–73
International Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks, 169
International Monitoring System (IMS), 140, 153, 167(figure), 168(figure), 187; current operations, 166–71, 220; described, 162–63; and NAS report of 2002, 213–14; nonmilitary uses (tsunami warnings, etc.), 169–70; and North Korean nuclear tests, 176, 177(figure); and pros and cons of CTBT, 18, 202
Iran, 14, 187–91; and CTBT, 161, 187; and danger of transfer of nuclear technology to other actors, 247; and evasive testing, 54; geology and earthquakes, 187–91, 190(figure); and Israel, 247; and missile defense, 247; salt deposits in, 50
Israel: and CTBT, xi, 6, 159, 186; and Iran, 247; Israeli and South African nuclear cooperation, 185–86; and missile defense, 248; monitoring of, 185; and NPT, 79, 186; nuclear program, 14, 184–85; number of nuclear weapons, 15
Jaycor (consulting group), 53–54
Johnston Island test site, 25, 31
JVE (Joint Verification Experiment) explosion (1988), 123, 126
Kearsarge test (1988), 126
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), 6; and accusations of Soviet cheating, 163; countries participating, 37; and detecting radionuclides, 163; exclusion of underground testing from, 40, 69; Kennedy and, 21, 32–33, 35; negotiations following Cuban Missile Crisis, 32–33; positive and negative consequences of, 36–39; Senate approval of, 36; signing of, 33; support for and opposition to, 33–36; and Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 37
Long-Range Detection program, 9
Lott, Trent, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 216
Marshall, Peter, 96, 97, 101, 109, 112, 122, 124, 148, 159, 235, 237
Middle East, 187–91. See also specific countries
monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests: AGU symposium on verification (1983), 105–11, 128; Bache and Alewine's negative views about monitoring, 128–31; Bache’s letter to Sykes about high-frequency seismic monitoring, 134–36; and Berkner Panel, 26–27; black boxes, 27, 33; claims (refuted) that 1997 earthquake in Kara Sea was a nuclear explosion, 151–57; and Conference of Experts (1958), 22–25; and CTBT Senate debate, 202–7; current capabilities, 166–71, 219–21, 226–27, 256; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 40–54 (see also decoupling/muffling underground explosions); detection of hydroacoustic waves, 22, 164, 169; detection of infrasound, 21, 164; detection of radionuclides, 163–64, 170, 177, 220–21; detection of seismic surface waves, 65–66 (see also seismic waves); and detection vs. verification, 226; determining depths of earthquakes and explosions, 62–64; development of new seismographs for nuclear verification, 70–72; early attempts to identify nuclear tests, 21–25; early monitoring technologies, 21–22; and earthquakes, 22–23, 26–27, 143–58 (see also earthquakes; seismic waves); improved detection and identification capabilities, 62–74, 157–58, 162–71, 171(figure); international monitoring efforts, 139–40, 153, 162–71, 167(figure), 168(figure) (see also International Monitoring System); and lessons learned from 1997 anomalous seismic event, 156; and LTBT, 33; and misstatements on evasive testing, 41–42; monitoring countries of special interest, 174–94 (see also specific countries); and NAS report of 2002, 213–14; National Technical Means (NTM), 33, 133, 164, 202, 219; new technologies (1963–1973), 62–74; and OTA’s independent review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 118–19, 127, 128, 132–35, 142; and plate tectonics, 69–70, 188; and political issues, 73–74, 132, 142; “problem” or “anomalous” events (1972–2009), 143–58, 158(figure), 191–94, 192(figure), 193(figure); seismic monitoring by U.S. scientists in the Soviet Union, 131–32; Sykes and Evernden’s Scientific American article on verification (1982), 103, 104, 127–28; Sykes et al.’s analysis of monitoring the Soviet Union (1983), 128–29; U.S. attempt to restrict data from IDC, 171–73; U.S. paper on anomalous events submitted to UN (1972), 143–45. See also on-site inspections; satellite imaging; seismic arrays; seismic magnitudes; seismic waves; seismology; yield
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 131–32
Nevada Test Site, 23–24, 31, 59, 224; and aftershocks of Benham test (1968), 80–82; calibration of test site, 121; “chemical kiloton” test (1993), 178; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 108–9; earthquakes at, 187; JVE (Joint Verification Experiment) explosion (1988), 123, 126; monitoring of, 187; peaceful nuclear explosions at, 84; and plate tectonics, 69; and P wave propagation, 59–60; rock types at, 23, 52, 56–58, 93, 97; seismic monitoring by U.S. and Soviet scientists, 132; subcritical experiments, 224; tests in very small cavities, 50–51; and TTBT, 92; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 193(figure)
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 79–80, 160; and CTBT, 20; extension in 1995, 80; provisions of, 79–80; signers and nonsigning countries, 79, 87, 179, 186, 187; withdrawal of North Korea, 20, 79, 175
NORSAR seismic array (Norway), 88, 97, 122
North Korea, 37; and CTBT, 6, 162, 175; current capabilities for monitoring, 230; and danger of transfer of nuclear technology to other actors, 247; detection of nuclear tests in, 163, 164, 169, 174–78, 177(figure), 220, 227; earthquakes in, 174; and evasive testing, 54; lack of salt deposits, 50; and missile defense, 247; and NPT, 79; nuclear tests, 14, 163, 164, 170, 175, 177, 178, 194, 220, 227; number of nuclear weapons, 15; Punggye-ri test site, 175; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 192(figure), 193(figure), 194; withdrawal from NPT, 20, 79, 175
Novaya Zemlya test site, 30, 92; and anomalous events/earthquake activity, 143, 145–51, 146(figure), 147(figure), 172, 193(figure), 227; current capabilities for monitoring, 171, 221, 227, 230; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 109; and magnitude bias, 236–37; published yields of nuclear tests, 235; and radionuclide monitoring, 221; salvos (multiple tests conducted close in time), 235–36; and seismic arrays, 149(figure), 149–50; and Soviet strategic weapons, 234; subcritical experiments, 224
The Nuclear Express (Reed and Stillman), 14, 183
Nuclear Test Ban: Converting Political Visions to Reality (Dahlman et al.), 139
nuclear tests: and history of nuclear weapons development, 7–16; hydronuclear tests, 224–25; location of test sites, 15(figure); possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; public opposition to, 19, 21, 92, 207; salvos (multiple tests conducted close in time), 235–36; television interview of 1986 on controversy over nuclear testing, 114–17. See also evasive testing; monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests; yield; specific countries and test sites; and following headings
nuclear tests, atmospheric: banned by LTBT, 8, 21, 36; and infrasound detection, 21, 164; Soviet tests, 10, 12, 24, 29–30; and U.S. and Soviet proposals to halt testing, 20–21; U.S. tests, 10–12, 11(figure), 24–25
nuclear tests, underground: and collapse of cavities, 49–50; containment issues, 134, 206–7, 229; craters produced by, 57(figure), 58, 84, 86, 88, 129, 179; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 40–54 (see also decoupling/muffling underground explosions); detection of (see monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests); excluded from LTBT, 69; Soviet tests, 24, 46–49; U.S. overestimation of Soviet yields, 49, 55–61, 69–70, 91, 97, 99, 100, 232–34, 237; U.S. tests, 23–24, 41, 45–46, 49, 56–58, 80–82 (see also specific tests); U.S. tests in very small cavities, 50–51. See also evasive testing; Threshold Test Ban Treaty; specific test sites
nuclear tests, underwater, 21, 23, 24
nuclear tests, negotiations and debates over banning, xiv, 22; Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests (1958, 1959), 25–29; and missile defense, 248–49; negotiations and debates in the 1990s, 159–62; negotiations in the 1950s and early 1960s, 17–39; negotiations in the 1970s, 1–6, 91, 102, 126, 233; negotiations in the 1980s, 120, 136; pros and cons of banning nuclear tests, 17–20 (see also under Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). See also Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Congress, U.S.; Threshold Test Ban Treaty; specific presidents
nuclear war, dangers of, 12–13, 242–58; Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 31–32, 240–41; dangers of hair-trigger alerts and unauthorized launches, 242–44; and MIRVs, 38; nuclear winter, 251–55; and public opinion, 21; steps to reducing nuclear threat, 249–50; and tensions among India, China, and Pakistan, 180
nuclear weapons: accidents and false alarms (1950–2007), 244–46; development of, 7–16; “low-yield” nuclear weapons, 216, 221–22; number in various countries, 15; one-point safety of, 224, 244; Soviet–U.S. parity in strategic nuclear weapons, 232–41. See also ICBMs; MIRVs; yield
nuclear weapons laboratories, 7, 14, 33, 34, 35, 40, 84, 110, 196–97, 215–16
nuclear weapons stockpile, 137–38, 215–16; and CTBT Senate debate, 197, 203–4; current status, 219–20; life extension programs (LEPs), 220; and NAS report of 2002, 213; and NAS report of 2012, 218–19; Stockpile Stewardship program, 195, 197, 199, 213, 219
on-site inspections, 69, 87, 102; and CTBT, 19, 22, 162, 165, 203, 218; and LTBT, 33–34; on-site measurements of yield, 120–21
Operation Hardtack, 24, 25, 29
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 7
Pakistan, 37; Clinton and, 197; consequences of nuclear exchange with India, 254; and CTBT, xi, 6, 20, 162; and danger of transfer of nuclear technology to other actors, 183; earthquakes in, 183–84; identification limit for, 175; Khan and, 182–83; nonparticipation in international monitoring, 179; and NPT, 79; nuclear tests, 14, 170, 179, 181–84, 194; number of nuclear weapons, 15, 240; salt deposits in, 50; tensions with India, 178, 180–82, 240; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 192(figure), 193(figure)
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), xiv, 83–90; and India, 83–84, 180; purposes of, 83–85, 89, 90; and Soviet Union, xiv, 5, 43, 53, 83, 86(figure), 86–90; and U.S., 43, 83–86
Piledriver test (1966), 52, 95
President’s Science Advisory Panel (PSAC), 43
Punggye-ri test site, 175
radioactive fallout, 20; containment issues, 134, 206–7, 229; detection of radionuclides, 163–64, 170, 220–21; and LTBT, 36; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 85
radiochemical method of yield measurement, 120
Reagan, Ronald: and claims of Soviet cheating on TTBT, 59, 103, 105; and CTBT, 136; and missile defense, 246, 248; and PNET, 104; and SALT II, 234; and TTBT, 104–5, 120; and U.S.’s desire to continue testing, 131
Richards, Paul, 203; and identification of anomalous seismic events, 153, 154; and NAS report of 2002, 212; and NAS report of 2012, 218; and OTA panel, 118, 119; Seismology Seminar course, 138; studies of Indian explosions, 181; studies of North Korean explosions, 177; studies of Soviet explosions, 53, 124
Rio Blanco test (1973), 85
rock types, 50, 55–58, 95; in Algeria, 101; and debate over yield calculations, 97; at Nevada Test Site, 23, 52, 56–58, 93, 97; in North Korea, 50, 176; at Soviet test sites, 24, 50, 56, 87–89, 97
Romney, Carl, 3, 9, 22, 23, 125; background and reputation, 73–74; and debate over yield calculations, 59, 60–61, 93–95, 98–99, 100; and evasive testing, 41–42; opposition to full test ban, 103; political influence of, 73–74, 94, 99; and SAIC (consulting firm), 136; and TTBT, 58
Russia/Soviet Union: accusations of cheating during treaty negotiations, 30–31; atmospheric tests, 10, 12, 24, 29–30; breakup of Soviet Union, 64, 133; chemical explosions, 51–52, 152; claims (refuted) of cheating on test ban treaties, xiii, 59, 69, 91, 98, 103, 105, 110–11, 114–17, 119, 124–25, 151–57, 163–64; claims (refuted) of evasive decoupled testing, 52–53; claims (refuted) that 1997 earthquake in Kara Sea was a nuclear explosion, 151–57, 172; and CTBT, xi, 2, 102, 159, 215 (see also Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty); degraded weapons programs, 251; development and testing of nuclear weapons, 10, 12; downing of U-2 spy plane (1959), 28; and early proposals to halt testing, 20–22; earthquakes in, 63(figure), 64(figure), 133; end of moratorium on testing (1961), 29; ICBMs (SS-17, SS-18, SS-19), 31, 233–34, 237, 243; and missile defense, 248; and “missile gap,” 31; moratorium on testing (1958), 21, 29; moratorium on testing (1985), 131; and NAS report of 2012, 219; nuclear tests of 1961 and 1962, 29–31; number of nuclear weapons, 15, 238–40; peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), xiv, 5, 43, 53, 83–90, 86(figure); possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; “problem” or “anomalous” events in (1972–2009), 143–58; seismic monitoring by U.S. scientists in the Soviet Union, 131–32; Soviet–U.S. parity in strategic nuclear weapons, 37, 232–41; subcritical experiments, 224; summary of weapons tests, 14; test sites (see Azgir test site; Novaya Zemlya test site; Semipalatinsk test site); and TTBT, xiv, 1–6, 103 (see also Threshold Test Ban Treaty); underground tests, 24, 46–49, 61 (see also specific test sites); underwater tests, 23; U.S. distrust of, 31, 34, 59; U.S. overestimation of Soviet yields, 49, 55–61, 69–70, 91, 97, 99, 100, 232–34, 237; withdrawal from START II following U.S. withdrawal from ABM Treaty, 215. See also nuclear tests, negotiations and debates over banning
SAIC (consulting firm), 136
salt: and chemical explosions, 51–52; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 46, 47(figure), 48(figure), 49–50, 87; location of salt deposits, 50, 88; and monitoring in the USSR, 128; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 83, 85, 88–89; testing in, 43, 49–50, 228, 230
salvos (multiple tests conducted close in time), 235–36
Sanity and Survival in the Nuclear Age: Psychological Aspects of War and Peace (Frank), 256
satellite imaging, 164, 224; and anomalous events, 157; collapsed craters detected by, 57, 84, 86, 88, 89, 129, 179; and CTBT, 256; “double flash” detected (1979), 185–86; improved resolution, 164; and LTBT, 33; and monitoring India, 179, 181; and monitoring North Korea, 178; and National Technical Means, 33, 133; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 83, 84, 86, 88, 89; and refutation of “missile gap” claims, 31
S-CUBED (consulting firm), 136
seismic magnitudes, 28–29; conversion of magnitude to yield, 29, 94–95 (see also yield); defined/described, 27–28; magnitude bias (mb bias), 94, 97, 101, 103–4, 123, 236–37; mbLg magnitude scale, 121–22; seismic magnitude mb, 28, 56, 58; and TTBT, 58; and U.S. overestimation of yields of Soviet underground tests, 55–61 (see also under yield); and variation in P wave propagation in upper mantle, 55, 58–61, 60(figure); and variation in rock type, 55–58
Seismic Verification of Nuclear Testing Treaties (OTA report of 1988), 118–19, 132–35, 142
seismic waves, 23, 24(figure), 227; and debate over yield calculations, 93–98, 101, 103–4, 109–10, 111; detection of seismic surface waves from explosions, 65–66; first motions of seismic P waves, 64–65; and identification of anomalous seismic events, 143–44, 148, 150, 151(figure), 227; Lg waves, 121–26, 177; Love waves, 70–71, 110; Ms – mb method, 66–69, 67–68(figures), 143–44, 184; and plate tectonics, 69; Pn velocities, 96; pP waves, 23, 24(figure), 65; P waves and seismic magnitude mb, 28; P waves compared to Lg waves, 122; Rayleigh waves, 71, 109–10; use of high-frequency seismic waves for distinguishing nuclear tests from earthquakes (e.g., high-frequency P to S wave ratios), 129–30, 130(figure), 132, 134–36, 150, 151(figure), 153, 156, 170, 175, 176(figure), 177, 184, 187, 227; variation in P wave propagation in upper mantle, 55, 58–61, 60(figure)
seismology, xii, 3; and crust and mantle studies aided by peaceful nuclear explosions, 89; determining depths of earthquakes and explosions, 62–64; development of new seismographs for nuclear verification, 70–72; lack of knowledge of, among hardline opponents of arms control, 114–17, 203; and plate tectonics, 69, 96; tectonic release, 94, 109–10. See also decoupling/muffling underground explosions; monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests
Semipalatinsk test site (eastern Kazakhstan), 104, 109; calibration of test site, 121; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 108–9; and debate over yield calculations, 109–11, 113; and detection of chemical explosions, 214; first underground tests, 24, 25, 61; and hide-in-earthquake scenario, 77; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 86–88; published yields of nuclear tests, 234–35; rock types, 24, 97; seismic magnitudes for tests at, 106(figures); seismic monitoring of test site by U.S. scientists, 131–32; tectonic release at, 94, 109–10; as test site specified in TTBT, 92; unidentified seismic events/nuclear explosions, 193(figure)
Smiling Buddha test (1980), 180
South Africa: Israeli and South African nuclear cooperation, 185–86; nuclear program and destruction of inventory, 186–87; nuclear tests, 186; summary of weapons tests, 14
Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Cochran et al.), 61
Springer, Donald, 3, 56, 58, 84, 96, 97, 101, 112, 126
Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (Killian), 44
Stoessel, Walter, 2, 3, 4
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), 102, 215, 234
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 246
Sykes, Lynn, xi–xv, 127; and AGU meeting of 2000, 216; and AGU symposium on verification (1983), 105, 107; and analysis of monitoring the Soviet Union (1983), 128–29; and anomalous seismic events, 144, 153–55; and Bache’s letter about high-frequency seismic monitoring, 134–36; background, 4; and congressional hearings (1985, 1986), 117–18; and CTBT Senate debate, 202, 203, 207–8; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 109; and DARPA panel meetings on yield determination, 111–14; and debate over yield calculations, 59, 60–61, 69–70, 91–92, 94–101, 103–5, 107, 109–10; and decoupling/muffling underground explosions (“big hole” hypothesis), 45, 48, 53–54; and FAS article (2000) on CTBT, 202, 203; and FAS earthquake article (1997), 202; and hearings on CTBT (1972), 76–78; and HGLP experiments, 71; and identification of underground explosions, 66; and monitoring aftershocks generated by Benhan test (1968), 80–82; and monitoring countries of special interest, 174–75, 183–84, 187–88, 194; and NAS report of 2002, 214; and NAS report of 2012, 218; and negotiations on Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1–6, 91; and NRDC, 131; and OTA’s independent review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 118–19; and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 87; public involvement with test ban issues (1980s and 1990s), 138; recognition of contributions, 128; and refutation of claims of Russian cheating, 105, 110, 114–17, 119; Reviews of Geophysics article on verification (1987), 134; Scientific American article on verification (1982), 103, 104, 127–28; Scientific American article on yields of Soviet strategic weapons (1987), 232–37; Seismology Seminar course, 138; and television interview on controversy over nuclear testing (1986), 114–16
Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (NAS report of 2002), 212–14
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), xiii, xiv, 30(figure); claims of Russian cheating, xiii, xiv, 59, 69, 91, 98, 103, 105, 123; limits set by, 5–6, 126; negotiations on, xiv, 1–6, 91, 126, 233; provisions of, 92; ratification of, 103; Reagan administration and, 104–5, 120, 136; revised protocol of 1990, 125–26; signing of, 83, 90, 126; Soviet assessment of (2006), 126; verification of, and debate over yield calculations, 91–126; and yield vs. seismic magnitude as measure of maximum size of underground tests, 58, 83, 93
Timerbaev, Roland, 5, 126
Tiny Tot test (1965), 51, 52
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water. See Limited Test Ban Treaty
United States: accusations of Soviet cheating, xiii, xiv, 30–31, 59, 69, 91, 98, 103, 105, 110–11, 114–17, 119, 124–25, 151–57, 163–64; atmospheric tests, 10–12, 11(figure), 24–25; chemical explosions, 51–52; claims (refuted) that 1997 earthquake in Kara Sea was a nuclear explosion, 151–57; concerns about verification as obstacle to treaties, 26–28, 34, 202, 206; development and testing of nuclear weapons, 7–14; distrust of Soviet Union, 31, 34, 59; early attempts to identify nuclear tests, 21–25; end of moratorium on testing (1961), 31; “flexible response” doctrine, 37; “massive response” doctrine, 37; moratorium on testing (1958), 29; moratorium on testing (1992, 1995), 137, 160; number of nuclear weapons, 15, 238–40; peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 43, 83–86; possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; Soviet–U.S. parity in strategic nuclear weapons, 37, 232–41; subcritical experiments, 224; summary of weapons tests, 14; test sites (see Amchitka Island test site; Bikini Atoll test site; Christmas Island test site; Johnston Island test site; Nevada Test Site); underground tests, 23–24, 45–46, 49–51, 56–58, 80–82, 84–86 (see also specific tests); underwater tests, 23; upgrading weapons programs, 250–51. See also Congress, U.S.; monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests; nuclear tests, negotiations and debates over banning; specific treaties and presidents
U.S. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, xiv; NAS report of 2002, 212–14; NAS report of 2012, 217–31
U.S. National Authority, 165
U.S. National Data Center, 153
Vela Uniform program, 62, 66, 74
World-Wide Standardized Seismograph Network (WWSSN), 65, 70
yield: and AFTAC panel, 93–96; and Carter administration science panel (1977), 100–101; CORRTEX method of yield measurement, 120–21, 123, 125; and damage to nearby structures as limit on size of tests, 108–9; DARPA panel meetings on yield determination (1983–1985), 111–14; debate over yield calculations (“yield wars”), xiii, xiv, 59, 91–126, 227; and Defense Science Board ad hoc panel (1977), 98–99; limits of detection, 214, 230; “low-yield” nuclear weapons, 216, 221–22; measured using Lg waves, 121–26; and NAS report of 2002, 214; and OTA’s independent review of test ban issues (1986–1988), 118–19, 133; path effects and possible bias, 103–4 (see also seismic magnitudes); possible technical achievements for different yield ranges, 221–25; published yields of Soviet nuclear tests, 234–35; radiochemical method of yield measurement, 120; resolution of debate by close-in monitoring/calibration of test sites and improved techniques, 103, 120–26; and Soviet–U.S. parity in strategic nuclear weapons, 232–41; and Soviet ICBMs, 233–34; and television interview of 1986 on controversy over nuclear testing, 114–17; and TTBT, 93; uncertainties in measurements, 120, 123–24; U.S. formulas for estimating Soviet yields, 94, 100, 107, 113–14; U.S. overestimation of Soviet yields, 49, 55–61, 69–70, 91, 97, 99, 100, 232–34, 237; yields of Soviet and U.S. tests, 30(figure); yields required for testing by inexperienced and experienced states, 214, 219, 221–25. See also monitoring and identification of nuclear weapons tests; seismic magnitudes