1. To many, the terminology used to describe each side in the conflict often seems confusing. Each term has its own particular nuances.
On the Catholic side, nationalist is the term used to identify those who aspire to a united Ireland but believe that it should only be achieved by peaceful means. Republicans believe that physical force is a legitimate way of reaching the same goal. The mainly Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), led by John Hume, is a nationalist party. It was founded in 1970 as a radical non-sectarian political party but today only a tiny minority of its members are Protestants. The IRA and its political party, Sinn Fein (roughly meaning ‘ourselves alone’), are republicans, as are the IRA’s offshoots and their political parties.
On the Protestant side, unionists believe in maintaining the union with Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) and thereby Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Loyalists, like the Reverend Ian Paisley, are the more fervent or extreme unionists. The loyalist paramilitaries, most notably the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), believe that they are justified in using violence to defend the union against those who seek to destroy it.
2. Provos. The IRA and Sinn Fein, Peter Taylor, Bloomsbury, 1997, p. 8.
3. ‘Easter 1916’, William Butler Yeats.
4. The Green Flag. A History of Irish Nationalism, Robert Kee, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972, p. 575.
5. The Troubles. The Background to the Question of Northern Ireland, Richard Broad, Taylor Downing and Ian Stuttard, Thames Futura, 1980, p. 87.
6. Provos, op. cit., chapter one. This gives more details of the period, the War of Independence and the Treaty.
7. Britain and Ireland. From Home Rule to Independence, Jeremy Smith, Pearson Education Limited, 2000, p. 69. This refers to the so-called Curragh Munity of 20 March 1914 when army officers based at the Curragh military camp in County Kildare were given the choice of putting down unionist resistance in Ulster or being dismissed from the service. Sixty officers chose dismissal. It was hardly a mutiny but it was a warning to the Government that the loyalty of the army in the event of unionist resistance could not be taken for granted.
8. The three counties of the ancient nine-county province of Ulster that were excluded from the new six-county state of Northern Ireland were the border counties of Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan. Each of them had a clear Catholic majority.
9. Britain and Ireland, op. cit., p. 97. The revised oath required the new Irish Deputies (MPs) to be ‘faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and successors by law’.
10. Ibid., p. 96. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 6 December 1921 also established a Boundary Commission designed to review the borders of the new state of Northern Ireland. Lloyd George assured Collins that this would lead to the ‘essential unity’ of Ireland as the likelihood would be that the new boundaries would prove unviable and the six-county state would be absorbed by the new Irish Free State.
11. The Green Flag, op. cit., p. 741.
12. Michael Collins, Tim Pat Coogan, Arrow Books, 1991, p. 403.
13. Provos, op. cit., pp. 30–1.
14. States of Terror. Democracy and Political Violence, Peter Taylor, BBC Books, 1993, p. 120.
15. Uncle Remus. Legends of the Old Plantation, Joel Chandler Harris, 1881, chapter two, the Tar Baby story.
16. Provos, op. cit., p. 32.
17. Ibid., p. 22.
18. Loyalists, Peter Taylor, Bloomsbury, 1999, p. 53.
19. Since Protestant or ‘loyalist’ parades play such a central role in the events that unfold, the following is a brief account of the historical origins of the two main organizations that traditionally hold annual marches, the Apprentice Boys of Derry and the Orange Order. Both trace their origins to the religious wars in Europe of the late seventeenth century when Ireland was caught up in the wider power struggle between the European superpowers, Catholic France and Protestant Holland. The Dutch Prince, William of Orange, feared that England under the Catholic King James II was becoming a satellite of his enemy, King Louis XIV of France. He invaded England and seized the throne from King James. William became King William III and proclaimed the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 in which the Protestant faith and the Protestant succession to the throne were assured. James fled to France and then with his French allies returned to Ireland to attack England from the rear in the hope of regaining the throne. In 1688, his army prepared to lay siege to Londonderry.
The Apprentice Boys of Derry are the Brotherhood founded at the start of the nineteenth century to cherish the memory of the thirteen young apprentices who closed the gates against the invaders. Whenever the Apprentice Boys march, they are reliving history and drawing strength from the victory of their ancestors. Their annual celebrations begin in December, the month the siege began, when the Apprentice Boys construct and then burn a sixteen-foot effigy of the traitor, Lundy (the Governor of Derry who advocated surrender). They end the following August, in the days after the siege was lifted, when Apprentice Boys’ ‘clubs’ from all over the province gather in Derry to march through the city and around its walls. It was this parade on 12 August 1969 that became the catalyst for the introduction of British troops into the Northern Ireland conflict.
Historically, the Protestants’ victory was sealed on 11 July 1690 when their champion, King William, defeated King James at the Battle of the Boyne. (Although Protestants traditionally celebrate their champion’s victory on 12 July every year, the battle was actually fought on the 11th. The confusion arose from a misunderstanding of the 1752 calendar reform.) The Protestant succession to the English throne was secured and ‘Remember 1690’ became another slogan of Protestant defiance.
The Orange Order was founded over a century later in 1795, following a skirmish between Protestants and Catholics near the village of Loughgall in County Armagh. The Protestants won, withdrew to a nearby inn and formed the Orange Order, named after King William of Orange. The huge ‘Orange’ parades throughout Northern Ireland on 12 July celebrate ‘King Billy’s’ famous victory at the Boyne. Traditionally, many Catholics see these marches as ‘triumphalist’ which is why loyalist parades have long been a flashpoint.
20. Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 59–63.
21. Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969. Report of Tribunal of Inquiry, Chairman the Hon. Mr Justice Scarman, HMSO, Cmnd. 566, April 1972, p. 68.
22. Provos, op. cit., p. 48. This section gives a more detailed account of the Battle of the Bogside and the participation of some of those who subsequently became prominent IRA leaders in Derry.
23. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–99, Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Gill & Macmillan, 1999, p. 14. Bernadette Devlin had been elected to Westminster on 17 April 1969 in the by-election brought about by the death of the sitting Unionist MP, George Forrest. She stood as a unity candidate. The turn out was an astonishing 92 per cent. She was twenty-one at the time and the youngest MP to be elected to the House of Commons for half a century. In the Westminster election of 1 May 1997, Martin McGuinness, standing for Sinn Fein, won the same seat.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 50.
2. Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969, op. cit., p. 121. This provides the best, most accurate and detailed account of the confused events in Derry and Belfast in the critical days of August 1969.
3. Ibid., p. 127. The Protestant force Paisley referred to was the Ulster Protestant Volunteers, a branch of the Ulster Constitution Defence Committee of which Paisley was Chairman. For more details of both bodies, and Paisley’s involvement in them, see Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 35 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 131.
5. Republican Movement is the composite term for the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein.
6. Lost Lives. The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles, David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton, Mainstream Publishing, 1999, p. 34. The book is an indispensable companion to the conflict, detailing the circumstances of every death on every side.
7. Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969, op. cit., p. 193.
8. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 70.
9. Interview with James Callaghan recorded for Timewatch, ‘The Sparks that Lit the Bonfire’, reporter Peter Taylor, BBC television, 27 January 1992.
10. Interview by the author for ‘A Soldier’s Tale’, BBC television, 7 August 1994.
11. The NLF won the battle to inherit power and formed the Soviet-backed People’s Republic of Yemen.
12. With The Prince of Wales’s Own. The Story of a Yorkshire Regiment 1958–1994, H.M. Tillotson, Michael Russell, 1995, p. 29.
13. Provos, op. cit., p. 57.
14. Law and the State. The Case of Northern Ireland, Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard, Martin Robertson and Company, 1975, p. 139. The Yellow Card is thought to have been introduced as a result of the army’s shooting of nineteen-year-old Daniel O’Hagan during a confrontation with a crowd in Belfast’s New Lodge area on 31 July 1970. The circumstances were disputed. The army said he was a petrol bomber. Local people said he was not. The circumstances in which a warning was given were unclear. For details of the shooting of O’Hagan see Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 55.
15. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 38. The soldier was Trooper Hugh McCabe of the Queen’s Royal Irish Hussars. He was stationed in Germany and home on leave at the time. His family lived in the Divis Flats complex at the city end of the Falls Road. He was killed by an RUC bullet.
16. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1. 1968–71, Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan, Blackstaff Press Limited, 1973, p. 47. The three volumes are unique day-by-day accounts of events covering this critical early period. Volume 3 also covers 1974.
17. Interview with James Callaghan for Timewatch, op. cit.
18. Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland, Belfast, HMSO, Cmnd. 535, October 1969, p. 12.
19. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1, op. cit., p. 48.
20. ‘Exceedingly Lucky’. A History of the Light Infantry 1968–1993, Anthony Makepeace-Warne, Sydney Jary Limited, 1993, p. 39.
21. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1, op. cit., p. 48.
22. ‘Exceedingly Lucky’, A History of the Light Infantry 1968–1993, op. cit., p. 40.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 67.
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 29.
3. Ibid., p. 63.
4. The structure of the IRA goes back to the civil war when, on 26 March 1922, the anti-Treaty forces of the IRA called a General Army Convention at the Mansion House in Dublin. The Convention is made up of IRA delegates drawn from units from all over Ireland, North and South. The Convention elects a twelve-person Army Executive which then elects a seven-person Army Council. The Army Council effectively runs the war under the direction of the person it elects to become its Chief of Staff. However, the IRA’s supreme body is the Army Convention and it has to approve all key decisions. In more recent times, these would include the IRA’s decision to allow members of the Republican Movement to participate in the power-sharing executive and Stormont assembly that were the result of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998; and the IRA’s decision to put its weapons ‘beyond use’ in 2000.
5. Provos, op. cit., p. 67.
6. Timewatch, ‘The Sparks that Lit the Bonfire’, op. cit. From transcript of the original interview with Sir Oliver Wright.
7. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1., op. cit., p. 42.
8. The Lambeg is a drum almost the size of a man which is struck contrapuntally with flexible drumsticks to produce a thunderous warlike roar. Its origin is unclear.
9. In Holy Terror. Reporting the Ulster Troubles, Simon Winchester, Faber & Faber, 1974, p. 31.
10. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 26.
11. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1, op. cit., p. 63.
12. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 48.
13. In Holy Terror, op. cit., p. 57.
14. Provos, op. cit., p. 75.
15. Ulster. New edition – The Story up to Easter 1972, the Sunday Times Insight Team, Penguin Special, Penguin Books, 1972, p. 211.
16. Provos, op. cit., p. 76.
17. Ibid., p. 77.
18. In Holy Terror, op. cit., p. 63.
19. Pig in the Middle. The Army in Northern Ireland 1969–1984, Desmond Hamill, Methuen, 1985, p. 36.
20. Ulster. New edition, op. cit., p. 213.
21. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1, op. cit., p. 70.
22. The British Army in Northern Ireland, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Dewar, Royal Green Jackets, Arms and Armour Press, 1985, p. 47.
23. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 53. See also Ulster. New edition, op. cit., p. 215.
24. The British Army in Northern Ireland, op. cit., p. 47.
25. Ibid.
26. Ulster. New edition, op. cit., p. 220.
27. Provos, ibid., p. 82.
28. Before the Dawn. An Autobiography, Gerry Adams, William Heinemann in association with Brandon Book Publishers Ltd, 1996, p. 141.
29. Ulster. New edition, op. cit., p. 220.
30. Provos, op. cit., p. 81.
1. Freedom Struggle. By the Provisional IRA. No publisher named, presumably for security reasons. 1973, p. 20.
2. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 56.
3. Before the Dawn. An Autobiography, op. cit., p. 145.
4. Ulster. New edition, op. cit., p. 244.
5. Provos, op. cit., p. 90.
6. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 64.
7. States of Terror, op. cit., p. 146.
8. Provos, op. cit., p. 90.
9. Ibid., p. 91.
10. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1, op. cit., p. 96.
11. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 1, op. cit., p. 98.
12. Memoirs of a Statesman, Brian Faulkner, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978, p. 78.
1. Law and State. The Case of Northern Ireland, op. cit., p. 58. The full name of the legislation that covered internment is the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922. It was renewed every year until it was made permanent in 1933. It finally lapsed in 1980.
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 21.
3. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism. Chairman: Lord Parker of Waddington, HMSO, Cmnd. 4901, March 1972, p. 12.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Ibid., p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
7. Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, Peter Taylor, Penguin Special, 1980, p. 20.
8. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, op. cit., p. 12.
9. Provos, op. cit., p. 92.
10. European Commission of Human Rights. Application no. 5310/71. Ireland against the United Kingdom. Report of the Commission (Adopted on 25 January 1976), p. 185.
11. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 116.
12. Ibid., p. 36.
13. Report of the enquiry into allegations against the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on 9th August 1971, Chaired by Sir Edmund Compton, GCB, KBE, HMSO, Cmnd. 4823, November 1971, p. 22.
14. Ibid., p. 16.
15. Ibid., p. 12.
16. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 38.
17. Report of the enquiry into allegations against the security forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on 9th August 1971, op. cit., p. 71.
18. Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism, op. cit., p. 5.
19. Ibid., p. 22.
20. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 115.
21. Ibid., p. 127.
1. An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Northern Ireland 1969–1993, Malcom Sutton, Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994, p. 6.
2. In Holy Terror, op. cit., p. 168.
3. Provos, op. cit., p. 114.
4. ‘Bloody Sunday: An Open Wound’, Peter Taylor, Sunday Times Magazine, 26 January 1992, p. 16.
5. ‘A Soldier’s Tale’, BBC documentary, transmitted 7 August 1994.
6. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 42.
1. Future Military Policy for Londonderry. An Appreciation of the Situation by CLF, 14 December 1971. ‘SECRET’. This is a critically important memorandum marked ‘Secret’ written by Major-General Robert Ford, Commander Land Forces (CLF), Northern Ireland, to the GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo. It was revealed by the Saville Inquiry, the judicial tribunal set up by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on 29 January 1998 to re-examine the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’. This chapter contains new material uncovered by the Inquiry.
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 115.
3. Ibid., p. 112. More details of the circumstances in which Cusack and Beattie were killed are contained here.
4. Future Military Policy for Londonderry, op. cit.
5. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 88.
6. Future Military Policy for Londonderry, op. cit.
7. Ibid.
8. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 145.
9. Daily Telegraph, 28 March 2000.
10. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 145.
11. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 135.
12. The Situation in Londonderry as at 7 January 1972. Memo from Major-General Robert Ford to the GOC, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Tuzo. Marked ‘PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL’. Revealed by the Saville Inquiry.
13. Irish Times, 30 March 2000.
14. In Holy Terror, op. cit., p. 189.
15. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Vol. 2. 1972–73, Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan, Blackstaff Press Ltd, 1974, p. 151.
16. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 143.
17. Irish Times, op. cit. Statement provided by Edward Heath to the Saville Tribunal.
18. On 1 February 1972, the Minister of State for Defence, Lord Balniel, confirmed to the House of Commons that ‘the arrest operation was discussed by the joint Security Council after decisions had been taken by Ministers here’. Cain Web Service, Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal – Summary and Significance of New Material, Points 111–150, text by Irish Government, p. 1. This internet site is a valuable repository of much of the ‘Bloody Sunday’ archive (http//cain.ulst.ac.uk).
19. Provos, op. cit., p. 117.
20. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by the Rt Hon Lord Widgery, OBE, TD, HMSO, 18 April 1972, p. 7.
21. Ibid., p. 7.
22. These are documents released by the various political and security authorities to the Saville Inquiry.
23. Provos, op. cit., p. 119.
24. Ibid., p. 118.
25. Ibid., p. 116.
26. Ibid., p. 118.
27. Ibid., p. 119.
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 149. See also Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson, Fourth Estate, London, 2000, p. 92. At the time of writing, this is the most comprehensive and up-to-date account of ‘Bloody Sunday’. It contains not only the personal experience of the writers, who investigated ‘Bloody Sunday’ at the time as members of the Sunday Times Insight team, but important material uncovered by the Saville Inquiry.
2. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by the Rt Hon Lord Widgery, OBE, TD, op. cit., pp. 12–14.
3. Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit., p. 119. The authors make a clear connection between the shooting of Donaghy and Johnson and the shot fired by the Official IRA. They believe that it was fired in retaliation for the shooting of the two men. The Paras, however, insist that the single shot came first.
4. Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. The Truth, edited by Don Mullan, Wolfhound Press, 1997, pp. 86–8. This contains much of the new evidence in the form of witness statements that was an important factor in Tony Blair’s decision to set up the Saville Inquiry.
5. This is confirmed by Lord Widgery in Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, op. cit., p. 13.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 121.
8. Ibid.
9. Interview from full transcript of interview with ‘Phil’ for BBC documentary ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’, transmitted 28 January 1992.
10. Provos, op. cit., p. 122.
11. Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. The Truth, op. cit. Many of the details of those killed are taken from here and from Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit.
12. The suggestion has been made on the basis of forensic and eye-witness evidence in Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. The Truth, op. cit., and by Channel Four News in its investigation of 17 January 1997. Shots from the walls were also noted in the Brigade radio log, pirated by an amateur radio enthusiast in the Bogside area. See also Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit., p. 209.
13. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by Lord Widgery, O.B.E., T.D., op. cit., pp. 8 and 14, respectively.
14. ‘Remember Bloody Sunday’, op. cit.
15. British Irish Rights Watch ‘Bloody Sunday’ – Submission to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions, British Irish Rights Watch, London, 1994.
16. Provos, op. cit., p. 123.
17. Those Are Real Bullets, Aren’t They?, op. cit., p. 224.
18. Provos, op. cit., p. 124.
19. Cain Web Service, Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery Tribunal – Summary and Significance of New Material, op. cit., p. 6.
20. Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, by Lord Widgery, O.B.E., T.D., op. cit., p. 38.
21. Ibid., pp. 35 and 37.
22. House of Commons Official Report. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 29 January 2000, columns 501–3.
23. Guardian, ‘The Bloody Sunday Inquiry: Special Report’, John Mullin. Taken from the Guardian news unlimited website. The intelligence documents were revealed by the Saville Inquiry, Guardian, 7 April 2000.
24. Independent, 28 March 2000.
25. BBC News Web Site, www.bbc.co.uk 5 September 2000.
26. Daily Telegraph, 19 August 2000.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 131.
2. Ibid., p. 131. Responsibility for the Abercorn bombing has never been satisfactorily resolved, although few have any doubt, despite Seán MacStiofáin’s denial, that it was the work of the Provisional IRA. The most likely explanation is that it was a Provisional bomb that went off prematurely.
3. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 2, op. cit., p. 161.
4. Provos, op. cit., p. 133.
5. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 168.
6. Memoirs of a Statesman, op. cit., p. 152.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 135.
8. In 1952 General Templer, later Field-Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, was appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations in Malaya with a brief to direct the civil and military aspects of the campaign against the communist insurgents.
9. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,475.
1. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 2, op. cit., p. 181.
2. Ibid., p. 185.
3. Before the Daum, op. cit., p. 198.
1. Who Dares Wins. The Story of the SAS 1950–1992, Tony Geraghty, Warner Books, 1993, p. 401.
2. Gangs and Counter-Gangs, Major Frank Kitson, MBE, MC, Barrie & Rockcliff, 1960, pp. 76ff.
3. Northern Ireland 1968–73. A Chronology of Events. Volume 2, op. cit., p. 177.
4. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 182.
5. Belfast Telegraph, 3 May 1973.
6. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 269.
7. Ibid., p. 275.
8. Ibid., p. 274.
1. The ‘back-badge’ is a reference to the Gloucesters’ right to wear a small badge depicting a sphinx at the back of their berets in addition to the normal badge at the front The tradition stems from an engagement against the French in 1801 at the Battle of Alexandria. When the French cavalry attacked from the rear, the Gloucesters were given the order, ‘Rear rank, right about face!’ and, holding their fire until the last minute, shattered the enemy’s charge. The Gloucesters thus fought the enemy back to back and the battle was won. Today the ‘back-badge’ is worn by all members of the Regiment into which the Gloucesters were amalgamated, the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment.
2. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 378.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 152.
2. Gerry Kelly was one of the 38 IRA prisoners who escaped from the Maze prison on 25 September 1983. He was subsequently arrested by Dutch police in a flat outside Amsterdam on 16 January 1986 following a tip-off from British intelligence. Another senior IRA figure and Maze escapee, Brendan ‘Bik’ McFarlane, was arrested with him. In the apartment keys were found to a container parked nearby in which were stored fourteen rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition and four huge drums of nitro-benzine, the basic ingredient of many IRA bombs. Kelly and McFarlane were subsequently extradited and returned to serve their sentences in the Maze prison.
3. Provos, op. cit., p. 156.
4. Provos, op. cit., p. 162.
5. Sinn Fein signed up to the ‘Belfast’ or ‘Good Friday’ Agreement of 10 April 1998 in which it agreed to participate in a power sharing Executive with David Trimble’s Ulster Unionists.
6. Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 127ff.
7. Ibid., p. 136.
8. Ibid., p. 131.
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,476.
2. Northern Ireland 1968–74. A Chronology of Events. 1974 Volume 3, Blackstaff Press, p. 55.
3. For a more detailed account of the Dublin and Monaghan bombs see Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 125 ff.
4. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 259.
5. Provos, op. cit., p. 171.
6. Ibid.
7. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 480.
8. Ibid., p. 490.
9. The IRA, Tim Pat Coogan, HarperCollins, 1995, p. 518.
10. Error of Judgement. The Truth about the Birmingham Bombings, Chris Mullin, Poolbeg, 1986, p. 207.
11. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 245.
12. Ibid., p. 96.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 175.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 176.
4. Northern Ireland 1968–74. A Chronology of Events. Volume 3, op. cit., p. 179.
5. For further details of the Republican Movement’s minutes and an analysis of the ups and downs of the ‘truce’, see Provos, op. cit., chapter 13.
6. After his first arrest on 30 December 1972, Martin McGuinness admitted IRA membership. He made the following statement to the Court: ‘For over two years, I was an officer in the Derry Brigade of the IRA. We have fought against the killing of our people. Many of my comrades have been arrested and tortured and some were shot unarmed by British troops… I am a member of Oglaigh na hEireann [the IRA] and very, very proud of it … We firmly believed we were doing our duty as Irishmen.’ Provos, op. cit., p. 153.
7. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,475.
8. For more details of the activities of the ‘Shankill Butchers’ see Loyalists, op. cit., Chapter 13.
9. Real Lives, op. cit., p. 574.
10. Ibid., p. 588.
11. Ibid., p. 599.
12. Ibid., p. 568.
13. Extract from original Republican Movement minutes as viewed and noted by the author.
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 610.
2. 22 SAS is the Regiment’s operational wing and consists of four ‘Sabre’ Squadrons that do the fighting. They are known as A, B, D and G, each consisting of around seventy men. Each Squadron is divided into four ‘troops’ of sixteen men which in turn are divided into four four-man teams. To its members, the SAS is known as the ‘Regiment’ and to its men on the ground as the ‘Troop’.
3. Ambush. The War between the SAS and the IRA, James Adams, Robin Morgan and Anthony Bambridge, Pan Original, 1988, p. 76.
4. SAS Terrorism. The Assassin’s Glove, Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray, personal publication, July 1976, p. 6.
5. Ambush, op. cit., p. 77.
6. The SAS in Ireland, Raymond Murray, Mercier Press, 1993, p. 172.
7. Ibid., p. 173.
8. SAS Terrorism, op. cit., p. 16.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 32.
11. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 178.
12. Ibid., p. 179.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 199.
2. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 109.
3. Report of a Committee to consider, in the context of civil liberties and human rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland, Chairman: Lord Gardiner, HMSO, Cmnd. 5847, January 1975, pp. 5, 7 and 34.
4. Provos, op. cit., pp. 198–9.
5. Author’s own calculation from statistics.
6. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 664.
7. Ibid., pp. 663–4.
8. Ibid., p. 665.
9. Paying the Price, Roy Mason, Robert Hale, 1999, p. 123.
10. Ibid., p. 171.
11. Ibid., p. 171.
12. Ibid.
13. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 115.
14. Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, op. cit. This is a detailed account of the use of the emergency legislation and the consequences that led to the IRA hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981.
15. Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, op. cit., p. 193.
16. Ibid., p. 194.
17. Ibid., p. 71.
18. Pig in the Middle, op. cit., p. 220.
19. Beating the Terrorists?, op. cit., p. 355. Under the Emergency Provisions Act suspects could be held for questioning for up to three days. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, they could be held for up to seven.
20. Provos, op. cit., pp. 217–18. This gives the background to ‘Life Behind the Wire’ and the interview with Desmond Irvine.
21. Ireland. The Propaganda War. The British Media and the ‘Battle for Hearts and Minds’, Liz Curtis, Pluto Press, 1984, p. 58.
22. Ibid., p. 59.
23. Paying the Price, op. cit., pp. 205–6.
24. Beating the Terrorists?, op. cit., p. 286.
25. Paying the Price, op. cit., p. 213.
26. Ireland. The Propaganda War, op. cit., p. 67.
27. Paying the Price, op. cit., p. 215.
28. Beating the Terrorists?, op. cit., p. 329–32. This is a more detailed account of the impact of the Bennett report on the critical parliamentary arithmetic.
1. Provos, op. cit., p. 201.
2. Ten Men Dead. The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, David Beresford, Grafton Books, 1987, p. 153.
3. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 716.
4. Ten Men Dead, op. cit., p. 158.
5. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 215.
6. Ibid., p. 221.
7. Big Boys’ Rules. The Secret Struggle against the IRA Mark Urban, Faber & Faber, 1992, p. 62.
8. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 763.
9. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 235.
10. Ibid., p. 244.
11. Ibid., p. 244.
12. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 770.
13. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 241.
1. Future Terrorist Trends ended up in the hands of the Republican Movement and was published in its weekly newspaper, Republican News. This particular copy of Brigadier Glover’s report is thought to have been ‘lost’ in transit to its destination in the Midlands. It is possible, although highly unlikely, that the loss was deliberate to alert the public and politicians to the threat that lay ahead. Although it is marked ‘Secret’, it is the analysis that is sensitive not the detail.
2. Beating the Terrorists?, op. cit., pp. 345–7.
3. Northern Ireland. Future Terrorist Trends, Brigadier J.M. Glover, BGS (Int) DIS, 2 November 1978. Leaked or lost document revealed in Republican News.
4. Lost Lives, op. cit., pp. 793–5.
5. Ibid., p. 799.
6. Holding the Line. An Autobiography, Sir John Hermon, Gill & Macmillan, 1997, p. 102.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 255.
8. Ibid.
1. The Provisional IRA, Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, Corgi Books, 1993, p. 350.
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 204.
3. Ibid.
4. Paying the Price, op. cit., p. 209.
5. Provos, op. cit., p. 219.
6. Ibid., p. 221.
7. Paying the Price, op. cit., p. 209.
8. Ibid., p. 210.
9. Ibid.
10. Provos, op. cit., p. 222.
11. Paying the Price, op. cit., p. 211.
12. The Downing Street Years, Margaret Thatcher, HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 389–90.
13. Provos, op. cit., p. 229.
14. Ibid.
15. INLA. Deadly Divisions. The Story of One of Ireland’s Most Ruthless Terrorist Organisations, Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, Tore, A Division of Poolbeg Enterprises Ltd, 1994, p. 173.
16. Provos, op. cit., p. 229.
17. The Downing Street Years, op. cit., pp. 389–90.
18. Ibid., p. 233.
19. The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 392.
20. For fuller details of the IRA hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981, see Chapters 16 and 17 of Provos, op. cit.
21. Ibid., p. 235.
22. The Downing Street Years, op. cit., pp. 390–1.
23. Provos, op. cit., p. 237.
24. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 148.
25. Ibid. The actual figures were Sands 30,492 and West 29,046.
26. The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 391.
27. Ibid.
28. The Diary of Bobby Sands. The First Seventeen Days of Bobby’s H-Block Hunger Strike to the Death, Republican Publications, Dublin, June 1981.
29. Provos, op. cit., p. 243.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 251.
32. The Downing Street Years, op. cit., p. 393.
1. Detailed accounts of John Stalker’s inquiry and his subsequent suspension from it are recorded in several books including the author’s Stalker. The Search for the Truth, Faber & Faber, 1987; John Stalker’s own account in Stalker, Harrap, 1988; Sir John Hermon’s account in Holding the Line. An Autobiography, Gill & Macmillan, 1997, and the account of John Stalker’s Manchester businessman friend, Kevin Taylor (with Keith Mumby), The Poisoned Tree. The untold truth about the police conspiracy to discredit John Stalker and destroy me, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1990. Whilst John Stalker and I do not disagree on the facts, we differ in our interpretations of them. Mr Stalker believes he was the victim of a conspiracy to remove him from his inquiry because he was getting too close to highly sensitive material whereas I believe that he was stood down for other reasons.
2. Holding the Line. An Autobiography, op. cit., p. 149.
3. Lost Lives, op. cit., pp. 908–10.
4. Holding the Line. An Autobiography, op. cit., p. 150.
5. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 927.
6. Ibid., p. 1,347.
7. Stalker. The Search for the Truth, Peter Taylor, Faber & Faber, 1987, p. 99.
8. Ibid., pp. 83–4.
9. Ibid., p. 81.
10. Ibid., p. 89.
11. Ibid., p. 41.
12. Ibid., p. 105.
13. Ibid., p. 33. In the wake of the furore Lord Justice Gibson’s remarks unleashed, he subsequently issued a qualifying statement in which he said, ‘I would wish most emphatically to repudiate any idea that I would approve or the law would countenance what has been described as a ‘shoot to kill’ policy on the part of the police.’
14. Ibid., p. 71.
15. Kevin Taylor had been under surveillance by the Greater Manchester Police because of his alleged association with a group of Manchester criminals known as the ‘Quality Street Gang’. Taylor protested his innocence of any wrongdoing and, after many years of contentious litigation, emerged with his reputation restored but a financially ruined man. To him, the compensation (reported to be £2.4 million, cf., Sunday Telegraph, 6 September 1998) he finally received from the Greater Manchester Police Authority’s insurers, who deemed it less expensive to settle than fight, was small compensation for the trauma and penury he and his family had endured. The story of Kevin Taylor and his relationship with John Stalker is incredibly complex and covered in detail in the books of the author, John Stalker and Kevin Taylor listed in note 1 above.
1. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 290.
2. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 966.
3. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 290. This is from the account of the SAS soldier given at the inquest.
4. Ibid., p. 290.
5. Ibid., p. 312.
6. Ibid., p. 370.
7. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,003.
8. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 329.
9. Ibid., p. 330.
10. Ibid., p. 331.
11. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,003.
12. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 333.
13. Ibid., p. 338.
14. Ibid., p. 342.
15. The statistics include the two ‘Det’ killings referred to in the introduction, ‘Frank’s Story’: Declan Martin and Henry Hogan, killed on 21 February 1984. The other ‘Det’ killing was of Eugene McMonagle of the INLA, killed on 2 February 1983.
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,473. The precise overall death toll from 1969 to the end of 1979 was 2,192. The precise security force total – British army, UDR, RUC and RUC Reserve – for the same period was 584.
2. For the complex details of the gun-running scandal in which Haughey and others were charged but acquitted, see States of Terror. The Politics of Political Violence, Peter Taylor, BBC Books, 1993, pp. 129–46.
3. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 141.
4. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, Sydney Elliott and W. D. Flackes, Blackstaff Press, 1999, p. 273.
5. Ibid., p. 273.
6. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 174.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 250.
8. Ibid., p. 282.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 283.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., pp. 283–4.
13. Lost Lives, p. 970.
14. The Provisional IRA, op. cit., p. 425.
15. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 996.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 997.
18. Details of Patrick Magee and quotes from him are taken from an interview conducted by journalist Tom McGurk for the Dublin newspaper Sunday Business Post. The interview was published on 27 August 2000.
19. 25 Years of Terror. The IRA’s War against the British, Martin Dillon, Bantam Books, 1994, p. 222.
20. Magee’s Open University dissertation was on ‘Irish post-colonial representations in popular fiction’, i.e. a study of the way that Gerald Seymour, Tom Clancy and many other best-selling authors fictionalized the conflict.
21. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 186.
22. The Anglo-Irish Agreement. Commentary, Text and Official Review, Tom Hadden and Kevin Boyle, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 1989, p. 18. The other references to the Agreement are taken from the same source. The Commentary is an invaluable guide provided by Professors Hadden and Boyle.
1. For a more detailed account of Loughgall see Provos, op. cit., chapter 19. A photograph of Tony Gormley, Eugene Kelly, Seamus Donnelly and Declan Arthurs is included in the photographs. They are shown standing alongside the memorial to Martin Hurson in Cappagh in 1986, the year before the SAS ambush at Loughgall.
2. Ibid., p. 275.
3. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,074.
4. Provos, op. cit., p. 272.
5. Ibid., p. 275.
6. Ibid., p. 274.
7. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 376.
8. Provos., op. cit., p. 276.
1. The attack took place on 23 March 1987.
2. Death on the Rock and Other Stories, Roger Bolton, W.H. Allen/Optomen, 1990; p. 189.
3. Ibid., p. 190.
4. Ibid., p. 191.
5. Mairead Farrell had been sentenced to fourteen years for a bomb attack on the Conway Hotel, Dunmurry. For a detailed account of her life, see the author’s Families at War, BBC Books, 1989.
6. Provos, op. cit., pp. 259–65. The ‘supergrasses’ (or ‘converted terrorists’ in official language) were former members of republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations prepared to give evidence against their former comrades. The phenomenon flourished in the early 1980s, beginning in 1981 when an IRA man from Ardoyne, Christopher Black, agreed to give evidence against thirty-eight people. Thirty-five were convicted and sentenced, many on Black’s word alone. In the months that followed, other republican and loyalist ‘terrorists’ agreed to do the same, invariably on the understanding that they would receive leniency in return. The supergrass system was finally discredited and collapsed in 1986 when the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of eighteen republicans who had been convicted on Black’s uncorroborated testimony. Savage was alleged by a supergrass to have been a member of the IRA and involved in causing an explosion.
7. Phoenix. Policing the Shadows. The Secret War Against Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix, Hodder & Stoughton, 1996, p. 134.
8. Cf., The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1961, p. 943. The Roman Emperor was Titus Flavius Vespasianus (AD 69–79), who, before being formally appointed as ‘Emperor’ by the Senate, had stopped a rebellion amongst the Jews in Palestine and established peace in every corner of the Roman Empire.
9. Some of the key Special Branch officers involved were among the twenty-five army, police and MI5 senior intelligence officers killed on 2 June 1994 when the Chinook helicopter in which they were travelling to a security conference in Scotland crashed in fog on the Mull of Kintyre.
10. Who Dares Wins, op. cit., p. 287.
11. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,112.
12. Who Dares Wins, op. cit., p. 293.
13. Ibid., p. 297.
14. Ibid., pp. 567–8.
15. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 402.
16. Ibid., p. 403.
17. There is an important discrepancy in the British and Spanish accounts as to when the white Renault was parked. The British say it was parked on the Sunday. A senior Spanish police officer involved in the surveillance operation told the Independent (23 May 1989) it was parked on Saturday, the day before. If this was the case, the British would have had plenty of time to establish whether it contained a bomb. The discrepancy is pointed out in The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 403.
18. Who Dares Wins, op. cit., p. 304.
19. Ibid., p. 306. The following SAS soldiers’ accounts are all taken from this source based on their testimonies at the subsequent inquest.
20. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,119.
21. Ibid., p. 1,122.
22. Ibid.
23. The Windlesham/Rampton Report on ‘Death on the Rock’, Lord Windlesham and Richard Rampton QC, Faber & Faber, 1989, p. 54. This is the report of the investigation instigated by Thames Television into the making of the programme. It cleared the programme makers of any impropriety. A full transcript of ‘Death on the Rock’ is included.
24. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,114.
1. Regina v. Brian Nelson Before the Right Honourable Lord Justice Kelly on Wednesday 29 January 1992 at Belfast Crown Court. Evidence of Witness ‘Colonel “J”, transcript p. 1.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3. ‘Time to Come Clean over the Army’s Role in the “Dirty War”’, John Ware, New Statesman, 24 April 1998, p. 16. John Ware did the seminal work on the Brian Nelson story and first revealed the MISR forms.
4. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 169.
5. Deadly Intelligence, State Involvement in Loyalist Murder in Northern Ireland, British Irish Rights Watch, February 1999, p. 5.
6. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–99, op. cit., p. 231.
7. ‘Revealed. How the Army Set up Ulster Murders’, John Ware and Geoffrey Seed, Sunday Telegraph, 29 March 1998.
8. Regina v. Brian Nelson, op. cit., p. 53.
9. Sunday People, Greg Haskin, 17 September 2000.
10. For a detailed history of the Finucane brothers and family, see Rebel Hearts. Journeys Within the IRA’s Soul, Kevin Toolis, Picador, Second Edition, 2000, pp. 84 ff. Seamus was arrested and gaoled with Bobby Sands in 1976 for fire-bombing the Balmoral Furniture Company showroom near the nationalist Twinbrook estate on the outskirts of Belfast. Dermot was sentenced to eighteen years in 1982 for an attack on a security force patrol. He was one of the thirty-eight IRA prisoners who escaped from the Maze in 1983.
11. New Statesman, op. cit., p. 17.
12. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 207.
13. New Statesman, op. cit., p. 17.
1. Although most SAM 7 missiles were found when the Eksund was seized, some were included in the previous shipments on board the Kula and Villa. It is believed that the IRA only fired one, at a helicopter in South Armagh, but it was successfully deflected by its electronic counter-measures (ECM). It is thought that the other SAM 7s were not used either because of a lack of professional expertise or, more likely, technical problems with the firing mechanism.
2. Phoenix, op. cit., p. 163.
3. Lost Lives, op. cit., pp. 1,473–5. The death toll of British soldiers including the UDR was as follows: 1982 – 39; 1983 – 15; 1984 – 19; 1985 – 6; 1986 – 12; 1987 – 11; 1988 –34.
4. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 217.
5. Provos, p. 309.
6. The SAS in Ireland, op. cit., p. 440.
7. Ibid.
8. Provos, op. cit., p. 309.
9. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,179.
10. Ibid., p. 1,183.
11. Ibid., op. cit., p. 1,239.
12. Provos, op. cit., p. 310.
1. Lost Lives, op. cit., pp. 1,473–4. The calculation 1982–1998 is inclusive.
2. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 261.
3. The Israeli foreign intelligence service, Mossad, the equivalent of Britain’s MI6, tracked down and assassinated those Palestinians it believed were connected with the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. Mossad was assisted by the Israeli equivalent of the SAS, Sayeret Matkal (States of Terror, op. cit., p. 5).
4. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 563.
5. Northern Ireland, A Chronology of the Troubles, 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 208.
6. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 565.
7. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,205.
8. The Politics of Irish Freedom, Gerry Adams, Brandon Books, 1994, p. 64.
9. Northern Ireland Office Press Notice, 26 September 1988.
10. Provos, op. cit., p. 316.
11. Ibid., p. 318.
12. Ibid., p. 321.
13. John Major. The Autobiography, John Major, HarperCollins, 1999, p. 238. Chapter 19, ‘Into the Mists: Bright Hopes, Black Deeds’, is a comprehensive account of Major’s critical role in the peace process.
14. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,268.
15. Provos, op. cit., p. 324. This gives a detailed explanation of the unfortunate circumstances in which it happened.
16. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 440.
1. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 306.
2. Provos, op. cit., p. 328.
3. Ibid., p. 330.
4. For a more detailed account of the messages exchanged between the British and the Provisionals in 1993, see Provos, op. cit., pp. 331 ff.
5. Setting the Record Straight. A Record of Communications between Sinn Fein and the British Government October 1990–November 1993, published by Sinn Fein, pp. 26–7. These are Sinn Fein’s record and minutes of the critical dialogue between the Republican Movement and the British Government in 1993. The quotes in this paragraph are taken from HMG’s document submitted to the Provisionals.
6. Ibid., p. 27.
7. Ibid.
8. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,317.
9. Ibid., p. 1,314.
10. Setting the Record Straight, op. cit., p. 28.
11. According to the Sinn Fein minutes, the Contact had met the British Government Representative on 26 February 1993 when he had passed on the message about HMG being prepared to talk to Sinn Fein on condition that there was a ‘no violence’ understanding ‘over 2/3 weeks of private talks’. For ease of comprehension I have incorporated this in Sinn Fein’s account of the meeting between McGuinness and Kelly and the BGR.
12. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,318.
13. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 444.
14. For the involvement of the loyalist UDA/UFF and the UVF in the peace process see Loyalists, op. cit., chapter 18, ‘Backstage’.
15. For the detail of the involvement of Albert Reynolds in what became known as the ‘Hume–Adams’ formula, see Provos, op. cit., pp. 335 ff.
16. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,329.
17. Provos, op. cit., p. 338.
18. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,329.
19. Irelandclick.com, 10 August 2000.
20. Provos, op. cit., p. 340.
21. Ibid., p. 341.
22. Setting the Record Straight, op. cit., p. 44.
23. Provos, op. cit., p. 342.
24. Ibid., p. 343.
1. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 238.
2. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 287.
3. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 455.
4. Ibid., p. 457.
5. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,475. The figures were: 1994, loyalists 37, IRA 19; 1993, loyalists 47, IRA 36; 1992, loyalists 36, IRA 34.
6. Ibid., p. 1,368.
7. Provos, op. cit., p. 346.
8. Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 239 ff. The Drumcree ‘stand-off began in 1995 and carried on every year thereafter. The Portadown Orangemen demanded the right to return to Portadown down the nationalist Garvaghy Road following their annual service at Drumcree Church. They insisted this was their ‘traditional route’. The residents of the Garvaghy Road objected, with the result that ‘Drumcree’ became an annual flashpoint. In 1995, David Trimble had joined hands with his DUP rival, Ian Paisley, in celebration at the end of the march down the Garvaghy Road in the teeth of nationalist protests.
9. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 484.
10. Ibid., p. 483.
11. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 237.
12. Provos, op. cit., p. 351.
13. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 486.
14. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,389.
15. Ibid.
1. Bandit Country. The IRA & South Armagh, Toby Hamden, Hodder & Stoughton, 1999, p. 6.
2. Ibid., p. 247.
3. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,391.
4. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 326.
5. Daily Telegraph, 3 July 1997.
6. Ibid.
7. Daily Telegraph, 5 June 1997.
8. Daily Mail, 3 July 1997.
9. Guardian, 22 October 1997.
10. An Phoblact, 17 February 2000.
11. Lost Lives, op. cit., p. 1,399.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 1,400.
14. Death of a Soldier. A Mother’s Search for Peace in Northern Ireland, Rita Restorick, Blackstaff Press, 2000, pp. 1–2. This is Rita Restorick’s moving and courageous account of the impact of her son’s death and what it drove her to do.
15. Bandit Country, op. cit., p. 303.
16. Maginn was also found guilty of the murders of Thomas Gilbert Johnston, a former UDR soldier, in Keady in 1978, and Lance-Bombardier Paul Andrew Garrett, also in Keady, in 1993.
17. Daily Mail, 6 October 2000.
1. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 329.
2. Ibid.
3. John Major. The Autobiography, op. cit., p. 493.
4. Ibid., p. 489.
5. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 341.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 341–2.
8. Ibid., p. 345.
9. Ibid., p. 348.
10. For details about the formation of the ‘Real’ IRA, see the updated paperback edition of Provos, op. cit., pp. 355–62.
11. For details of the breaches of the loyalist and IRA cease-fires during the all-party talks, see Provos, op. cit., pp. 367–70 and Loyalists, op. cit., pp. 244–8.
12. Loyalists, op. cit. p. 250.
13. Irish News, 10 April 1998.
14. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 250.
15. Remarks made by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on his visit to the University of Ulster, Coleraine, 20 May 1998, Northern Ireland Information Service.
16. Provos, op. cit., p. 373.
17. The Agreement. Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations, HMSO, Cmnd. 3883, April 1998, p. 22.
18. The Agreement. Agreement Reached in the Multi-party Negotiations, op. cit., p. 20.
19. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
1. Remarks made by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on his visit to the University of Ulster, Coleraine, op. cit.
2. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 365.
3. Provos, op. cit., p. 377.
4. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 365.
5. Ibid., p. 368.
6. Ibid., pp. 371–2.
7. Loyalists, op. cit., updated paperback edition, p. 260.
8. The former IRA ‘supergrass’ was Éamon Collins (45) who was battered to death near his home in South Armagh. He had been one of the IRA’s fiercest critics and had taken to ‘naming and shaming’ prominent republicans. He had written a book, Killing Rage (1997), in which he had spoken out against the IRA and its works. He had rashly returned to live in South Armagh and had received several death threats. Only fifty people followed his coffin (Real Lives, op. cit., p. 1,467).
9. Real Lives, op. cit., p. 1,441.
10. RUC Press Release, Omagh bombing, 16 August 1998.
11. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 130.
12. Speech of David Trimble MP to the Labour Party Conference, Ulster Unionist Party, 30 September 1998.
13. Loyalists, op. cit., p. 256.
14. Northern Ireland. A Political Directory 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 133.
15. Northern Ireland. A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999, op. cit., p. 389.
16. Loyalists, op. cit., updated paperback edition, p. 265.
17. Ibid., updated paperback edition, p. 266.
18. Ibid.
19. Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 2 July 1999, p. 4.
20. Ibid., pp. 3 and 8.
21. The Way Forward. A Joint Statement by the British and Irish Governments, 2 July 1999.
22. Daily Telegraph, 23 June 1999.
23. World Socialist Web Site. British cabinet reshuffle, 15 October 1999.
24. Loyalists, op. cit., updated paperback edition, p. 269.
25. Guardian, 22 December 1998. Peter Mandelson, the architect of ‘New’ Labour’s electoral landslide in 1997, had been given a loan of £337,000 by Geoffrey Robinson to buy a £475,000 house in London’s Notting Hill. Mandelson had not notified either the Prime Minister or the Permanent Secretary at the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of the loan. The matter was controversial because the DTI was investigating Robinson’s financial affairs. Mandelson insisted that there was nothing wrong with the loan. ‘At all times I have protected the integrity and professionalism of the DTI,’ he said. ‘Geoffrey Robinson asked for confidentiality and I respected that. I do not believe that accepting the loan was wrong. There is no conflict of interest in this. The loan was always intended to be short-term and I am repaying the remainder of the loan in full with the help of my mother.’
26. Guardian, 3 December 1999.
27. Ibid.
28. Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 31 January 2000,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/000211dc-nio.htm.
29. Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 11 February 2000,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/000211dc3-nio.htm.
30. Joint Governmental Statement from the Irish and British governments, 5 May 2000,
http://ince.org/assembly/proposal0500.html.
31. Statement on the Inspection of IRA Weapons Dumps – Martti Ahtisaari and Cyril Ramaphosa, 25 June 2000,
http://www.nio.gov.uk/000626a-nio.htm.
32. Ibid.
33. Irish Times, 24 August 2000.
34. Ibid.
35. BBC News, Web Site, www.bbc.co.uk, 7 October 2000.
36. Ibid., 4 November 2000.
37. Guardian, 25 January 2001.
38. Independent, 26 January 2001.
39. Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2001.
1. Irish Times, 9 June 2001.
2. In the Northern Ireland Assembly election of 20 October 1982. It was the first time Sinn Fein had contested a Stormont election.
3. In the local government elections of 7 June 2001.
4. BBC News Web Site, www.bbc.co.uk, 12 June 2001.
5. The American writer Mark Twain, author of Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn, cabled from Europe to the Associated Press that the report of his death was ‘an exaggeration’.
6. BBC News Web Site, op.cit., IRA Statements 1998–2001, 14 August 2001.
7. An Phoblacht/Republican News, 20 September 2001.
8. Taken from the appendix to the IRA’s training manual known as the ‘Green Book’.
9. BBC News Web Site, op.cit., 23 October 2001.
10. Ibid., 23 October 2001.
11. Ibid., 23 October 2001.
12. Ibid., 26 October 2001.
13. Ibid., 7 November 2001.
14. Ibid., 28 August 2001.
15. Ibid., 12 December 2001.
16. Independent, 13 December 2001.
17. Ibid.
18 An Phoblacht/Republican News, 6 December 2001.
19. Independent, op.cit.
20. Guardian, 17 August 2001.
21. Irish Times, 12 December 2001.
22. BBC News Website, op.cit., 12 December 2001.
23. Guardian, 13 December 2001.
24. Daily Telegraph, 13 December 2001.
25. Irish News, 14 December 2001.
26. BBC News Web Site. op.cit., 23 October 2001.