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AT THIS POINT, the main distinction between the natural community of Adam the first and the covenantal faith community of Adam the second becomes clear. The first is a community of interests, forged by the indomitable desire for success and triumph and consisting at all times of two grammatical personae, the “I” and the “thou” who collaborate in order to further their interests. A newcomer, upon joining the community, ceases to be the anonymous “he” and turns into a knowable, communicative “thou.” The second is a community of commitments born in distress and defeat and comprises three participants: “I, thou, and He,” the He in whom all being is rooted and in whom everything finds its rehabilitation and, consequently, redemption. Adam the first met the female all by himself, while Adam the second was introduced to Eve by God, who summoned Adam to join Eve in an existential community molded by sacrificial action and suffering, and who Himself became a partner in this community. God is never outside the covenantal community. He joins man and shares in his covenantal existence. Finitude and infinity, temporality and eternity, creature and creator become involved in the same community. They bind themselves together and participate in a unitive existence.*

The element of togetherness of God and man is indispensable for the covenantal community, for the very validity of the covenant rests upon the juridic-Halakhic principle of free negotiation, mutual assumption of duties, and full recognition of the equal rights of both parties concerned with the covenant.1 Both parties entering a covenantal relationship possess inalienable rights which may only be surrendered by mutual consent. The paradoxical experience of freedom, reciprocity, and “equality” in one’s personal confrontation with God is basic for the understanding of the covenantal faith community.†

We meet God in the covenantal community as a comrade and fellow member. Of course, even within the framework of this community, God appears as the leader, teacher, and shepherd. Yet the leader is an integral part of the community, the teacher is inseparable from his pupils, and the shepherd never leaves his flock. They all belong to one group. The covenant draws God into the society of men of faith: “The God before whom my fathers did walk—the God who has been my shepherd all my life.” God was Jacob’s shepherd and companion. The covenantal faith community manifests itself in a threefold personal union: I, thou and He.*

* The whole concept of “I shall be with him in trouble” can only be understood within the perspective of the covenantal community which involves God in the destiny of His fellow members. Vide Sanhedrin, 46a; Yerushalmi, Sukkah, 4, 3.

1.The giving of the law on Mount Sinai was a result of free negotiation between Moses and the people who consented to submit themselves to the Divine Will. The Halakhah treats the Sinai and Moab covenants in categories and terms governing any civil agreement. The Talmudic opinion (Shabbat 88a), , that there was coercive action on the part of God during the Sinai revelation, does not refute our thesis. The action to which the Talmud refers was taken after the covenant had been voluntarily transacted on the preceding day (the fifth of Sivan) according to the chronology elaborated by Rashi (based on the Mekhilta). Even Nachmanides, who disagreed with Rashi and accepted the opposite view to the Mekhilta, placing the transaction on the seventh of Sivan after the ultimatum had been issued to the community, must admit that the latter obligated itself to abide by God’s will prior to the revelation, as it is distinctly stated in Exodus 19:8. Nachmanides differs with Rashi only with reference to the solemn formalization of the covenant as told in Exodus 24:3–8.

In light of this, the Talmudic saying (loc. cit.) is puzzling inasmuch as coercion was applied only to the implementation and not to the assumption of the covenantal obligation. To be sure, this phrase is not to be construed in its literal meaning, since no scholar has ever questioned the validity of the Sinai covenant even prior to its reaffirmation in the days of Mordecai and the other men of the Great Assembly to which the Talmud (loc. cit.) refers. The idea underlying this phrase is to be understood as referring to a moral mitigating circumstance rather than a juridic-Halakhic defense. See Chiddushei ha-Ramban, ad locum.

It appears that God required two commitments on the part of the community: a general one to abide by the will of God while the community was still unaware of the nature of the commitment and a specific one concerning each individual law. The second commitment was assumed under constraint. Vide Mekhilta quoted by Rashi, Exodus 20:1; Rashi and Nachmanides, Exodus, 24:1. See Tosafot, Shabbat 88a, sub , and Kiddushin, 61b.

The reason for introducing an element of coercion into the great Sinai covenant, in contradistinction, prima facie, to the Biblical story, lies in the idea that covenantal man feels overpowered and defeated by God even when he appears to be a free agent of his own will.

† The strange Aggadic stories about a theoretical Halakhic “controversy” between the Almighty and the Heavenly Academy ( ) and about R. Joshua b. Chanania’s rejecting a Divine decision which favored a minority opinion over that of the majority are characteristic of the intimate Halakhic-covenantal relationship prevailing between man and God. Vide Bava Mezia 59b and 86a.

* Vide Leviticus 26:12, Sifra and Rashi.