1tou autou, literally ‘by the same man’, has been rendered as ‘Michael of Ephesus’. Heylbut has not included the subtitle contained in Cod. Coisl. 161 (‘B’ in Heylbut’s edition): ‘On Happiness Fitting to a Contemplative Man’. The Aldine edition (‘a’ in Heylbut) attributes this commentary to Eustratius, but Michael’s authorship is certain.
2On the double nature of happy human beings, see also 571,23–572,12; 576,25–30; 578,17–25; 580,6–8; 588,34–6; 590,31–591,11; 591,18–19; 598,9–15; etc.
3Cf. 531,24–5.
4See below note 8.
5Michael is presumably thinking of the account of happiness offered in book 1.
6For the identification of happiness as activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, see, e.g. EN 1098a16–18. Mercken sees a parallel here to Anonymous in EN 1, 453,38, where happiness is defined as ‘an activity of the soul with pleasure over a complete life’, but the definition is widespread. As Michael reports at in EN 9, 510,13–14 the claim that (political) happiness occurs either ‘with pleasure or not without pleasure’, is made repeatedly. See, e.g. EN 1098b22–5 and 1099a7–22. Aspasius explains that in the former case pleasure is a part of happiness, while in the latter pleasure is present without being a part (in EN 1, 22,20–2).
7Cf. Damascius in Phaed. 1, §61, where Damascius describes anatasis eis to kreitton as a kind of positive death that amounts to the soul’s separating itself from the body, and in §121 he contrasts the life of purification with the life of contemplation, where the former prepares us for hê pros to anô anatasis, that is, for contemplation. And see Saffrey and Westerink’s note at Proclus Theol. Plat. 6.64,26. For other references to ascent, see Michael in EN 10, 529,14–15; 561,36; 579,14; 580,14; 591,4–9; 603,17–18; 603,29 with notes ad loc.
8The phrase ta aei hôsautôs ekhonta (see also 600,33 and 615,6–7) has a strong Platonic ring to it, especially in connection with talk of an ascent, though it can also be found in Aristotle, e.g. Metaph. 1026b27–8. Elsewhere Michael describes the objects of intellection in other language that is reminiscent of the Forms. They are described as ‘intellectual’ (noeros: 559,36; 591,21–4; 592,2), ‘divine’ (theios: 598,19; 599,25; in PN 12,20), ‘intelligible’ (noêtos: 529,18; 556,18; 581,6; etc.), ‘the Beings’ (to onta: in EN 9, 481,37; 483,19–20; 509,19–20.27; 518,15–16; in EN 10, 529,9; 532,23; 561,36; 573,13; 582,35), ‘best’ (aristos: 582,22; 597,16–19; 600,3).
9Heylbut, whom Mercken follows, refers us here to Enn. 6.9.9, where Plotinus offers a description of the soul’s life when it has completed its ascent, but since there is no explicit talk of the soul experiencing pleasure in Enn. 6.9.9, C. Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus’, Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 44 (2002), pp. 51–7 at p. 54 is right to question the correctness of this reference. His own suggestion, however, is surely wrong. Steel wants this to be a reference to ‘the celebrated opening passage’ of Enn. 4.8.1.1–3, where Plotinus recounts one of his own experiences of ascent, yet the support for Steel’s suggestion rests on a faulty construal of Michael’s enêrgêkotes at 529,21, which is the perfect participle of energein (to be active) and not of egeirein (to awaken) and so cannot be a reference to Plotinus’ egeiromenos at 4.8.1.1. The correct reference must be to 6.7.25–30 and perhaps specifically to 6.7.30.23–5. In 6.7.25–30 Plotinus is offering his exegesis of Plato’s discussion of pleasure and its relation to intellection in the Philebus, and at 6.7.30.23–7 Plotinus concludes that Plato and others speak of the life of the intellect as being mixed with pleasure because they are simply at a loss for words to describe the experience. Interestingly, Philoponus also cites Plotinus making a similar point at in DA 2.16–17, where 6.7.30.23–7 is again a likely candidate for the reference. Michael himself makes a very similar point in his comments on Aristotle’s Metaph. 1072b14: ‘Whenever our intellect, which is the intelligibles potentially, becomes the intelligibles actually from the pinnacle of knowledge and the exceedingly good life (tês agan euzôias), then we are living the best and most blessed life beyond all pleasure, and this is inexplicable in words but it is known to those who are experiencing this blessed state’ (696,33–6). It is striking that in this last passage Michael in fact contradicts what he says here, by characterizing intellection as ‘beyond all pleasure’, which is strictly speaking Plotinus’ view.
10Cf. 1174a13.
11Aristotle himself calls pleasure a ‘sign’ (sêmeion) of one’s state of being (EN 1104b3). That pleasure is not the end but only a ‘symptom’ or ‘shadow’ of the end is a point that comes up frequently in the introductions to Aristotle’s Categories. See, e.g. Philoponus in Cat. 3,3–4; Olympiodorus Proleg. 5,16–18; Elias in Cat. 112,14–16. The distinction between symptoms and parts is fairly common in the commentators, e.g. Dexippus in Cat. 24,12–18. K. Ierodiakonou discusses this passage in ‘Some Observations On Michael Of Ephesus’ Comments On Nicomachean Ethics X’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, Leiden 2009, pp. 185–202 at pp. 188–90, where she inter alia suggests that Michael’s use of this medical example together with his use of the term episumbainein might be a sign that Galen is in the background here. Michael frequently employs medical analogies in in EN 9–10. To be sure, this is to be explained in part by the fact that Aristotle himself makes comparisons to medicine in EN (e.g. 1104a9; 1112b4; 1138a30–1; 1143a3; 1144a4; 1145a7–8; 1180b8). Yet, at least some of Michael’s examples seem rather unnecessarily specific, e.g. his reference to patients with fevers due to putrefaction (in EN 10, 612,31 and 615,2) and his description of a diagnostic procedure (618,25–32; and see, more generally, Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, pp. 187–94). This, coupled with his particular interest in Aristotle’s biological treatise and Michael’s own reported physiological observations (for examples, see K. Praechter, ‘Review of Michael Ephesii In libros De partibus animalium commentaria’, Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen 168 (1906), pp. 861–907 at pp. 863–4), has led some scholars to suspect that Michael might have been a physician, cf. H.P.F. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, vol. 3, Leuven 1991, pp. 16–17; P. Frankopan, ‘The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for the Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries, pp. 45–62 at p. 50; and Ierodiakonou, ‘Some Observations’, p. 187. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 864n2, however, does point out that at least one passage speaks against this suspicion, namely in GA 215,30.
12Perhaps Michael is attributing the view described at EN 1152b8–10 to the masses.
13Cf. EN 7.11, 1152b1–8, where Aristotle says it is necessary to discuss pleasure and pain.
14The metaphor of ‘piloting’ in connection to virtue also comes up in Aspasius who says that those who rule rightly have one kind of virtue, while those being ruled rightly have another kind of virtue. In this context Aspasius uses the example of a pilot (kubernêtês) ruling sailors (cf. Aspasius in EN 8, 177,9–14).
15Heylbut refers to the discussion of pleasure in book 7, beginning at 1152b1ff., but Mercken’s reference to EN 1104b8–13 appears more relevant. And cf. 1118b23–7.
16Cf. Plato Gorg. 493B and Rep. 586B3–4, as well as Michael in EN 9, 505,31.
17In Aristotle the passage reads ‘[…] towards both virtue and the happy life’. Michael leaves out te kai ton eudaimona bion.
18Below at 533,22–4 Michael explains that the Form of the Good is signalled either by the adding the letter tau, as in the t’ agathon (as opposed to to agathon), or by adding the locution auto (‘itself’). Since Michael explicitly calls attention to the difference in sense between t’ agathon and to agathon, we have decided to preserve this distinction in the translation by translating the former as ‘the Good’ and the latter as ‘the good’ or (sometimes) as ‘what is good’. See also 537,5–6.
19Michael switches the verb form to third person plural, which could suggest that he has human subjects in mind here, but he frequently uses the third plural verb forms with neuter plural subjects.
20Cf. 529,8–9.
21See above note 8.
22See EN 1105b21–3, and cf. EE 1220b12–14; DA 403a17–18.
23Cf. Michael in EN 9, 472,22–473,4.
24Reading hup’ with the Aldine edition for Heylbut’s ap’ in 533,23.
25Reading haitines for hai tines in 533,24.
26Michael is referring to two ways of writing the word ‘the good’ in Greek, one in which the vowel of the definite article is contracted to result in the letter tau (t’ agathon) and one in which it is not (to agathon). Cf. 537,5–6. Michael is mistaken about the Platonists using the contracted definite article to indicate the highest principle. Cf. Michael [Pseudo-Alexander] in Metaph. 798,33–6 where Michael makes a comparable point, inspired in this case by Metaph. 1087b29–30. There he says that the Platonists distinguish between (to) auto and t’ auto, where the former is the contrary of allo and the latter of heteron.
27Here at 533,27 Michael has tou agathou instead of t’ agathou, but the context would seem to demand capitalization in the translation. See previous note and note 18 above.
28Plotinus famously likened the Good to the center of a circle, see, e.g. Enn. 1.7.1.20–4 and 4.4.16.23–4. One can find similar comparisons in later Neoplatonists, e.g. Proclus in Parm. 951,6–8 Steel.
29Michael’s text actually has tôn henôn (533,34) and ta hena (533,35), but presumably he means the henads, for which the Greek properly would have been tôn henadôn and tas henadas respectively. For a brief discussion of the difference between henads and monads in later Neoplatonism, see C. Steel, ‘Proclus’, in L. Gerson (ed.) The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Cambridge 2010, pp. 630–53 at pp. 646–7. This reference to henads and monads seems out of place in a commenary on Aristotle’s Ethics, but it is perhaps to be explained by Steel’s conjecture that Michael was working with a Neoplatonic commentary on Plato’s Philebus – perhaps the commentary by Damascius (see Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’, p. 54). Given the Philebus’ thematic focus on pleasure and hedonism, it would be reasonable for Michael to see a commentary on the Philebus as a valuable tool for his exegesis of Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure, and the Philebus is the dialogue in which Plato famously employs the terms ‘monad’ and ‘henads’ (see Phileb. 15A–B). The distinction between monads and henads is addressed once – also very briefly – in Damascius’ commentary on the Philebus at 44,1–6.
30This brief account of the Platonists’ views tells us a few things about Michael’s understanding of Platonism. First, it should be noted that Michael does not think of himself as a Platonist. He refers to the Platonists here in the third person, and he uses the past tense (edêloun 533,31–2 and elegon 533,35). Second, the little he tells us here about Platonic theory is drawn from post-Plotinian Platonism. He mentions – though he does not explain – the distinction between henads and monads (see note 29), which is most prominently associated with Syrianus, Proclus and Damascius but which has been attributed even to Iamblichus (see J. Dillon, ‘Iamblichus and Henads Again’, in H.J. Blumenthal and G. Clark (eds) The Divine Iamblichus. Philosopher and Man of Gods, London 1993, pp. 48–54). And his summary of the Platonists’ metaphysical hierarchy also appears to be post-Plotinian. Rather than giving the Plotinian hierarchy as One-Intellect-Soul, Michael appears to be referencing the triad Being-Life-Intellect, which is also strongly associated with Iamblichus and post-Iamblichean Platonism. It is striking and somewhat puzzling, however, that the triad given to us by Michael replaces Intellect with ‘the Living Thing Itself’ (to autozôon). In this connection it is noteworthy that Proclus argues that that the Living Thing Itself falls within this third principle (Intellect). See Proclus in Tim. 1.419,16–420,19 with J. Opsomer, ‘Deriving the Three Intelligible Triads from the Timaeus’, in A.-P. Segonds and C. Steel (eds) Proclus et la théologie platonicienne, Paris 2000, pp. 351–72 at pp. 360–2. Finally, Michael does not seem to think of Platonism as something developing in different directions over time, rather Eudoxus’ Platonism is simply identified with that of Proclus.
31Perhaps kat’ auton phanai ton Aristotelên at 534,6 should be deleted, which would simply give us the translation: ‘But enough about these things’.
32Reading t’ agathon for to agathon at 534,7. See above notes 18, 26 and 27.
33There are two claims at issue here: (i) that intellect or reason (or something analogous) is found even among non-rational animals, and (ii) that whatever quasi-rational principle non-rational animals have may be characterized as a ‘ray’ (augê) or ‘illumination’ (ellampsis) of intellect. While (ii) appears to be Platonic, (i) is more or less Aristotelian, even if it is not clear exactly which passages Michael has in mind. Heylbut cautiously suggests HA 8.1 (see his note ad 506,4–6), and he is followed by Konstan and Mercken. This suggestion finds some very limited confirmation in in EN 10, 538,23–33, where Michael returns to this issue and refers his readers to Aristotle’s biological treatises. Here one does find claims about certain animals having some natural capacity that is analogous to wisdom and understanding (see especially 588a29–31), and there is evidence that Michael was familiar with HA, though it is less clear whether he wrote a commentary on it (see in PA 88,23 and in PN 134,29–30, with K. Praechter, ‘Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare’, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 18 (1909), pp. 516–38 at p. 52 and idem, ‘Review’, p. 864. It is certainly possible to find other passages in the corpus where Aristotle credits at least some animals (e.g. bees) with something resembling intelligence (e.g. Metaph. 980b21–5; Protrepticus Fr. 1 and Fr. 9 Gigon (34,5–6 and 36,9–11 Pistelli)). Although Michael’s en allois (‘elsewhere’) indicates that he is thinking of some passages outside of EN, there are also some other passages within the EN that suggest something along the lines of (i), most notably at 1153b32 where Aristotle claims that ‘by nature (phusei) all things have something divine’ (ti theion). In his scholion on this passage the anonymous Byzantine commentator on book 7 paraphrases this ti theion as theian tina ellampsis (in EN 7, 455,15–18). Then again in 1073a4–5 Aristotle says that there is ti phusikon agathon even in tois phaulois. A scholion on the Parisian manuscript of the EN (cod. Parisiensis 1854) interprets tois phaulois as non-rational animals and also paraphrases ti phusikon agathon as nou tis ellampsis, though this ‘illumination’ is now identified as phantasia (J.A. Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis, vol. 1, Oxford 1839, 231,1–7). Cf. Michael’s own paraphrase at 538,27–9: theion ti kai ellampsis nou. In fact, the language of illumination comes up repeatedly in the commentary, e.g. 580,20; 585,11–12; 586,17–18; 591,2–4; 603,30–4. See below notes 67–9 and 330.
34See the Hippocratic De alimento 39 (145,12 Joly = 9.112 Littré). In both Joly and Littré the text runs phusies pantôn adidaktoi (‘natures of all things are untaught’), instead of Michael’s phusies zôôn adidaktoi, nor is Michael’s version included in either critical apparatus. Yet one often finds Michael’s version of this Hippocratic aphorism in other authors of late antiquity, notably Galen De usu partium 1.5,16 Helmreich (3.7,13 Kühn) and De locis affectis 8.443,17 Kühn; Philoponus in Phys. 311,3 Vitelli and Opif. 258,2 Reichardt.
35Reading ê for Heylbut’s hê at 534,31 (presumably a typographical error). Cf. Grosseteste’s vel pharmacum bibere.
36Reading ekeinon for ekeino at 534,33 (cf. touton at 534,31).
37Reading prostithemenên at 535,2 with EN 1072b23–4 for Heylbut’s protithemenên, which is presumably a typographical error, as noted already by Mercken ad loc. Heylbut has the correct prostithemenên in his critical apparatus ad loc. (and cf. 535,20; 537,14; etc.).
38Reading poiein with EN 1072b24 for poiei at 535,2. This is required since our subject [hêdonên] prostithemenên is in the accusative case.
39At EN 1172b25 Aristotle gives two examples, doing just acts (dikaiopragein) and being moderate (sôphronein). Of Michael’s two examples, dikaiopragia and theôria, the second diverges from Aristotle. Perhaps Michael’s text of the EN had phronein for sôphronein, and Michael is paraphrasing this as theôria.
40The division between dianoia (or ennoia) and lexis is common in Michael. See C. Luna, Trois études sur la tradition des commentaries anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Leiden 2001, pp. 197–99.
41At EN 1172b25 Bywater’s text runs auxesthai de to agathon hautô (‘the good is increased by itself’). Michael here offers auxesthai dê to agathon auto autô. Bywater has followed Ramsauer in changing the particle from dê, which he reports the manuscripts as having, to de. He also reports that one manuscript tradition has auto before hautô. Michael’s comments below make clear that he is not reading the dative pronoun as a reflexive pronoun.
42Placing a raised dot after legei at 535,14. Cf. Grosseteste’s ‘Est autem quod dicit:’ at 331,5.
43Michael’s text (eoike d’ houtos ho logos) diverges slightly from Bywater’s (eoike dê houtos ge ho logos).
44See the note ad 533,32–3.
45It emerges from the comments Michael offers below that his text of EN 1172b27–8 appears to have included a small addition that is not included in the texts or critical apparatuses of Bywater or Susemihl. Just after Aristotle’s pan gar meth’ heterou agathou hairetôteron ê monoumenon, Michael apparently read ouk an eiê toiouton (cf. 535,30). This same addition has been documented by Mercken, The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, p. 331 in the Latin tradition: aliud transcriptum habet sic: ‘omne enim cum altero bono eligibilius quam solitarium, non utique erit tale’. What is more, this addition appears to have been removed from 535,26 at some point in the text’s history of transmission, perhaps in order to make it conform to the received text of the EN, or perhaps simply due to a scribal error caused by the repetition of toiouton (cf. ‘means something like this’ – toiouton estin).
46The argument that follows (and cf. 535,35–6) seems to demand that we capitalize ‘Good’ here (535,27) and at 536,7, even though Michael’s text has to agathon instead of t’ agathon. See notes above ad 531,15 and 533,27.
47Aristotle himself employs the concept of a ten-thousandth part of a grain of millet to drive a point home in DS 445b31–446a1, though the context is different. And cf. Cat. 5b18–19.
48A case might be made for seeing EN 1097b18 as a possible source for this use of huperokhê, but it seems unlikely. There Aristotle speaks of huperokhê of goods and not of the Good, and the broader context there is whether happiness can be improved upon, which is not at issue here. It seems more like that Michael might be getting this language from a Platonic source. See, for example, the famous passage about the Good in the simile of the sun, where Plato describes it as: epikeina tês ousias presbeia kai dunamei huperekhontos (509B8–9 Slings), and cf. 536,39 below, where Michael – again in a Platonic spirit – calls the Good itself ‘the transcendent source of goods’. The topic at issue here – the Good’s surpassing the virtues – is also found in Neoplatonic texts, e.g. Proclus in Alc. 1 319,15–320,23. On Michael’s familiarity with Proclus’ commentary on Alc. 1, see below 603,24–34 and the notes ad loc.
49tou agathou. See note above ad 535,27. Cf. Grosseteste’s per se boni superexcellentia (333,50).
50See Plato Phileb. 20E–22B (and cf. 60A–61A).
51We capitalize here and at 536,36, even though Michael’s text has to agathon rather than t’ agathon. In fact, Bywater’s text has t’ agathon here, but that is clearly not what Michael’s text of the EN has. Below (537,5–6) Michael makes clear that this to agathon must be understood as t’ agathon.
52See above note 46.
53In Bywater’s edition the line in question (1172b31–2) runs oudenos gar prostethentos autô t’ agathon hairetôteron ginesthai, though he notes that in place of autô one manuscript offers auto, which is printed by Becker. Our text of Michael appears to offer conflicting versions of this line. In 536,26–7 and 536,34 Michael presents Aristotle’s text almost exactly as it is printed by Bywater. The full statement oudenos gar prostethentos autô to agathon hairetôteron ginesthai appears first at 536,26–7, and then at 536,34 Michael repeats the first part of it – oudenos gar prostethentos autô to agathon – again, and his comments that follow (cf. 536,36) make clear that the second part – hairetôteron ginesthai – is still on his mind. The only difference is that instead of t’ agathon Michael has to agathon, though his subsequent comments make clear that he would prefer to read t’ agathon and that we should nevertheless capitalize in the translation (see above notes ad 531,15; 533,27; and cf. 537,5–6). But in 537,3–10, where Michael addresses the lexis more specifically, we get something rather different. The first part now reads oudenos gar prostethentos tô auto to agathon, and the second part – hairetôteron ginesthai – seems to missing entirely. Given Michael’s complaint that this line is unclear (asapheian tina ekhei) and missing something, and given the pains he takes to explain it, it is possible that something like this version, odd though it is, is exactly what Michael had in front of him. Nevertheless, the tô at 537,4 is so odd that one is tempted to delete it. Perhaps it crept into the text somehow from his remark below en de tô prostethentos tô autoagathô (537,7). The problem with the missing second part has been partially addressed by Heylbut, who inserts to hairetôteron ginesthai anti into the text at 537,8 (but leaves the text at 537,4 without hairetôteron ginesthai). Certainly, the tou at 537,8 suggests that something has gone wrong with the text here, though I think Heylbut’s addition is an inadequate solution. Note that Grosseteste appears to have bonum (334,94) where Heylbut prints tou; in fact, Grosseteste’s text appears to depart from Heylbut’s in many ways. At least Michael’s final paraphrase at 537,9–10 looks to be intact.
54The addition in brackets is justified by what follows.
55‘Transcendent’ translates hyperousios, literally ‘beyond being’. Cf. above 536,7, where Michael speaks of the Good’s superiority (huperokhê), with the note ad loc. Both of these theses may be traced back to Plato’s famous characterization of the Good at 509B7–9 as beyond being (epekeina tês ousias) and superior (huperekhontos), which was then emphatically developed by the Neoplatonists.
56The hanging definite article is as odd in the Greek as it is in English, and it probably signals a problem in the text. See above note 53.
57See notes ad 531,15 and 533,27.
58The Greek ouden can be translated both as ‘nothing’ and ‘none’.
59On the difficulties of this text, see above note 53. If there is a lacuna, as Heylbut suspects, then his insertion is not enough to fix it. To paraphrase Heylbut’s suggestion, Michael is saying here: and in ‘the good itself becomes more choiceworthy’ Aristotle says ‘becomes more choiceworthy’ instead of ‘becomes more good’. Regardless of what went wrong with the text, Michael’s understanding of it at least may be safely inferred from the final paraphrase in 537,9–10.
60See above note 50.
61Michael’s use of the term anhêdonos is somewhat striking. Its use is not found at all in Aristotle or Alexander, yet it can be found in Neoplatonic discussions, notably in Damascius’ commentary on Plato’s Philebus (74,2; 86,4; 121,4; 124,2; 153,3) as well as in Plotinus’ discussion of the Philebus in Enn. 6.7.24–5.
62Michael has the singular ho de enistamenos for Aristotle’s plural hoi d’ enistamenoi at EN 1172b35–6. It is possible that Michael is thinking of a person here, but the repetition at 537,27 suggests that the implicit subject here is meant to be logos. In what follows Michael considers possible objections to the syllogism, following Aristotle’s discussion in 1172b35–3a5. First, Michael considers one who simply tries to reject the major premise out of hand, and he replies that this kind of objection is unsatisfactory, given the level of consensus on the matter (537,25–538,2). Next, he considers the possibility that this rejection of the major premise is grounded in the view that only the unintelligent or the non-rational seek pleasure, with the result that the major premise would fail to obtain. Here he has to consider two possible interpretations of the objection, depending on whether the objector means unintelligent human beings (538,2–23) or non-rational animals (538,23–33). Either way, Michael emphasizes that both non-rational animals and unintelligent human beings possess a principle – intellect in the latter and an illumination of intellect in the former – that naturally pursues its own good, and that intelligent human beings also seek their own good. So one cannot object that only some living things are involved in this pursuit. It is striking here that Michael seems committed to the view that the desire for one’s own proper good – whether for human beings or for animals – can only be explained by positing some connection to intellect.
63Reading enistanto for anistanto in 537,25. Cf. enistamenos in 537,22 and 27.
64Replacing the full-stop at 537,26 with a comma.
65Replacing the interrogative punctuation at 537,33 with a comma, and the full-stop at 537,35 with interrogative punctuation.
66Inserting mona after ta anoêta at 538,2. Cf. Heylbut’s report that the Aldine edition inserts mona after anoêta; Grosseteste’s sola at 336.37; and, finally, ta aloga mona at 538,25.
67The integrity of the text in question, namely ti phusikon agathon at 1173a4, has been suspected by scholars. Bywater notes phusikon agathon fort. secludenda, and Stewart, Gauthier and Jolif share this suspicion. Irwin likewise deletes these words from his translation. Other scholars have suspected only agathon. Gauthier and Jolif report that agathon is rejected by Thurot, Susemihl (though it is restored by Apelt), Rackham and Dirlmeier. Gauthier and Jolif, however, also report that ‘Michel d’Éphèse ne semble pas avoir lu agathon’ (822). They are presumably thinking of 538,21–2, where we just get estin phusikon, but he would appear to be reading it here at 538,11. It also appears to be present in the scholia to the Parisian MS (Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis, 231,4–5), where the scholiast interprets this ti phusikon agathon to be a reference to the phantasia, thanks to which each thing desires its own proper good. (The scholiast then characterizes this phantasia as an ellampsis nou. See note 68 and note 33 above).
68See EN 9, 516,24–6, where Michael refers this view to EN 6 (or book 7 according the Grosseteste’s Latin translation), though scholars have had trouble locating these claims there. Heylbut (followed by Konstan) refers to 6.2, 1139b4, while Mercken reports that this is not to be found in either book but refers to 1141a25–8 and 1143a35–b14. And cf. the possible reference to EE in the next note (note 69). We should be careful to distinguish this claim that every intellect seeks its own good, which would seem to apply above all to humans, from the broader claim (made below at 538,28–9) that even in non-rational animals there is some illumination of intellect that also seeks its own good. Cf. also in EN 9, 506,1–16.
69At Rep. 505D–E Plato proposes that every soul pursues the good and that it can do so because it ‘divines that the good is something’ (apomanteuomenê ti einai), a proposal that is taken up and developed by Plotinus in Enn. 5.5.12, and there is some reason to think that Michael is being influenced by Plotinus’ discussion. Plotinus includes Plato’s remark about ‘divining’ in his discussion, saying that ‘all things desire’ the good ‘as if they divined (hôsper apomemanteumena) that existence without it is impossible’ (5.5.12.7–9). Then he develops this idea by maintaining that this grasp of the Good is not subject to recollection because we are always in contact with it, twice emphasizing that it is present to us even in our sleep: kai koimômenois paresti (5.5.12.12) and hoti koimômenois parest (5.5.12.14). The idea that man ‘divines’ (apomanteuetai) the Good is repeated in Plotinus’ examination of the Philebus in 6.7.24–30, specifically at 6.7.29.21–2, but there is no talk of dreaming or sleeping there. We have already seen that Michael appears to have been acquainted with Plotinus’ examination of the Philebus in these chapters (see above note 9). We would like to thank Philip van der Eijk for bringing to our attention both the possible parallels to EE 8.2 (7.14), 1148a26–40 as well as the significant dissimilarity between this passage and what Michael is saying. Quite possibly Michael is thinking of MM 1207a35–b5, where Aristotle declares that there is ‘by nature’ (tê phusei) something in the soul whereby we ‘are impelled in a nonrational manner’ (hormômen alogôs) towards what befits us, an impulse which Aristotle likens to religious frenzy (enthousiazontes).
70Cf. Alexander Eth. Prob. 139,8–14.
71See above notes 33 and 69.
72Michael already advanced a similar claim at in EN 9, 506,2–3 and at in EN 10, 534,12–17 (see the note ad loc. as well as note 68 above).
73Cf. EN 1175a30–b1.
74Commentators frequently refer collectively to Aristotle’s biological treatises as Peri tôn zôôn, which we have followed Heylbut in presenting as a proper title. The exact reference is unclear. Heylbut doesn’t offer any suggestion, and Mercken says only quibus locis nescio. See the note above ad 534,12–17 regarding HA 8.1.
75Here Michael explains Speusippus’ position with reference to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean (cf. EN 1108b11ff.). On Speusippus’ argument, see also EN 1153b4–7 with C. Rapp, ‘Nicomachean Ethics VII.13–14 (1154a21): Pleasure and Eudaimonia’, in C. Natali (ed.) Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII, Oxford 2009, pp. 209–35 at pp. 211–13.
76Whereas for Aristotle (e.g. 1108b21–2; 1109a3–5) temperance is a mean between licentiousness (akolasia) and insensibility (anaisthêsia), Michael replaces the latter extreme with folly (êlithiotês). This substitution can also be found in other commentators, e.g. Ammonius in Isag. 67,23; Philoponus in Cat. 188,13–14.
77Michael’s switch to the plural here is somewhat disorienting. Presumably, he is thinking of Speusippus and his followers. Cf. his switch from Eudoxus to hoi peri Eudoxon at 536,16.
78in EN 538,35–539,19 = Speusippos Fr. 79 Parente = Fr. 81 Tarán.
79We owe this translation of mesê tini katastasei to R.W. Sharples (see Alexander Eth. Prob. 135,13–14).
80As Porphyry notes (in Cat. 127,10–12) the term poion is at times used as a synonym for poiotês, and that appears to be the case here. We have followed Steven Strange’s translation (ad loc.) of ‘qualification’ for poion in this sense.
81Reading ê for hê at 539,36, which is presumably a typographical error. Cf. Grosseteste’s vel at 399,24.
82Reading haitines for hai tines at 539,37.
83Cf. EN 1173a14–15.
84Cf. 1099a29–31; 1100b9–10; 1101a14–15; 1102a5; 1102a17–18; 1144a6; 1153b10–11; 1169b29; 1177a9–13; 177a16–17; 1177a22–5; 1177b23–5; 1178b7–8.
85Reading gar for kai at 540,19 with Vat. gr. (322v).
86There are problems with the text in 540,19–26, and it is possible that Michael means to be identifying health with its form and essence. On our understanding, in these lines Michael is discussing unmixed health, i.e. its form and essence, and in 540,26–38 he discussed mixed health, i.e. the healthy states of composites. One problem concerns hugieia at 540,20. We read to ti ên einai hugieias for to ti ên einai hugieia at 540,20. Another concerns to gar hugieia kai to ti ên einai hugieias anepitaton kai ananeton estin at 540,21. If this text is to be retained, the to hugeia might be taken as a reference to EN 1173a24 and translated thus: ‘For “health” (1173a24), i.e. the essence of health cannot be increased or decreased’. But Michael’s usual epexegetic particle is êtoi. Therefore, we read to gar <eidos> hugieias. Some support for both of these changes may be found in kai to eidos tês hêdonês kai to ti ên einai hêdonês at 540,25.
87The traditional identification of health with a certain krasis of the elements or humours, already found in the Hippocratic De nat. hom. 4 (6.40 Littré), is not infrequent among the commentators, e.g. Alexander De anima 25,6–7 and Mant. 162,10–11; Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 80,8–9. See also below in EN 557,28–9.
88Here (541,1) and at 541,8 Michael has the finite verb tithentai in place of Aristotle’s participle tithentes (1173a29).
89See note ad 541,1.
90Such a statement is not to be found in EN 1173a29–b4, but perhaps Michael is thinking of 1152b13.
91The text here is difficult. Heylbut prints mia gar esti kai hê autê homoia in parentheses at 541,23, but it is difficult to make sense of it that way. Grosseteste also sees the parentheses as extending to homoia, but he appears to be reading mia gar esti kai heautê(i) homoia: una enim est ipsi similis (‘for it is one and similar to itself’). A related remark at in EN 551,16 suggests, however, that hê autê is correct as it stands. One option would be to emend homoia to ousia (‘for [pleasure] is one and the same substance’), but we have attempted to preserve homoia and deal with this difficulty by closing the parentheses after hê autê, placing a comma there, and taking homoia as the predicate of ta merê. It must be conceded, however, that this solution makes the subsequent ouden oudenos difficult.
92Cf. 540,25–6.
93Michael (according to Heylbut’s text) has hoion to tou kosmou (541,27–8), instead of the hoion tê(i) tou kosmou (1173a33) printed by Bywater, who acknowledges that to is found in place of tê(i) in several manuscripts. Below at 541,29 Michael has hoion hê tou kosmou, which is much closer to Bywater’s text.
94See above note.
95The uniform nature of the movement of the sphere of fixed stars is the demonstrandum of DC 2.6, 288a13–289a10.
96The touto at 541,33 appears to refer back to ho de legei in 541,28. The men-de contrast here is marking the transition from dianoia to lexis in the comments. See Luna, Trois études, pp. 197–99, and cf. e.g. in EN 553,18–19 and 555,19–20.
97Phys. 202a7–8, cf. also Phys. 202b25–6.
98Perhaps Michael is thinking of 1173a33–4.
99Removing the comma after dunatai at 542,13, inserting a comma after estin at 542,13, and reading menei for menein at 542,14.
100The Greek term kinêsis can mean both (local) movement and, more broadly, change. Here the broader sense is really required, but we have continued to translate kinêsis and kineisthai with ‘movement’ and ‘to be moved’ respectively in order to allow the reader to better follow Michael’s arguments on pleasure and kinêsis.
101Literally, ‘that from which [it] began to change’ (ekeinou, aph’ hou êrxato metaballein).
102Reading aph’ hou for eph’ hou at 542,22. Cf. Grosseteste’s a quo at 344.57.
103Heylbut’s mer at 542,24 is a typographical error and should be men. (This correction is already to be found in the TLG text.) The men signals that we have first dealt with the thesis that pleasure is not a movement. The thesis that pleasure is not a coming-to-be is addressed in the next section.
104Heylbut directs us to Phileb. 53E5–7, where Plato does distinguish between means and ends, but Michael’s language (ou telos alla tôn pros telos; and cf. 542,36) strongly suggests that he is looking at Damascius in Phileb. §125 (tôn pros telos esti alla ou telos). This parallel recommends placing a raised dot after the second telos in 542,29. Cf. EN 1112b12 and 1113b3–4.
105Cf. Phileb. 42D5–7.
106At one point Damascius describes the neutral state as eupatheia (in Phileb. §190), but Michael seems to be thinking of eupatheia as a process synonymous with the natural restoration towards the neutral state. Cf. also Enn. 6.7.34–5.
107See Phileb. 31D8–9; 51B6–7; 53C4–5; 54D1.
108Michael might be taking over this argument from Aspasius in EN 7, 143,6–14.
109Adding a full stop after haima at 543,13.
110Cf. Aristotle Metaph. 1048b23.
111Changing the comma after touto in 544,11 to interrogative punctuation, as in Grosseteste.
112Changing Heylbut’s anaplêsôsin at 544,18 to Bywater’s (1173b8) anaplêrôsin (presumably a typographical error). Michael’s lemma leaves out the de after legousi at 1173b7, but this does not affect the sense.
113Cf. Metaph. 1057b8–11.
114Cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1397a7–19.
115This paraphrase (ouk ara anaplêrôsis hê hêdonê) at 545,1 is so close to the original (ouk ara anaplêrôsis hê hêdonê, 1173b11) that our insertion of quotation marks seems justified.
116In what follows Michael presents his understanding of Aristotle’s theory of pleasure, which involves a distinction between three things: (i) states, (ii) the activities of those states, and (iii) the processes of becoming that result from those activities, and he ultimately wants to connect pleasures with (ii) activities and thereby sets pleasures apart from (iii) processes of becoming. He illustrates this account primarily with reference to the pleasures of eating and drinking. There is first of all (i) the nutritive soul, which is a state of the body. When food or drink is present, the nutritive soul exercises (ii) its nourishing activity, and from this (iii) the process of the body’s being nourished follows. It is important to note that Michael strictly speaking does not identify activity and pleasure, rather he says that pleasure follows upon activity (545,9–14). Thus we must be careful to distinguish between process and pleasure here, even though both are said to ‘follow’ upon the activity. The difference between (ii) and (iii), which in the case of nutritive activities is apparently not simply reducible to a distinction between an action internal to the soul and an external action in the body, becomes even more important when applied to the domain of ethics. Here Michael again distinguishes between (i) the states of virtue and (ii) the activities of virtue, but he does not articulate what the ethical equivalent of the process of coming to be is.
117Cf. EN 1175a18–21 and 1175b30–5. This appears to be an attempt to harmonize the book 7 account of pleasure with the book 10 account, and it is drawn from Alexander Eth. Prob. 143,29–144,1, as the italicized text highlights.
118Cf. EN 1153b9–12.
119Reading epakolouthei <ê mallon> autôn tais energeiais hêdonê at 545,15 for Heylbut’s epakolouthei autais tais energeiais hêdonê, which is difficult to construe as it stands. Note that Grosseteste also appears to have read autôn for autais (ipsarum operationibus). The insertion of ê mallon would seem to be justified by the sequel, in which Michael repeatedly says that pleasure follows upon the activities. C.C.W. Taylor has suggested that Heylbut’s text might be translated as: ‘pleasure follows upon them [i.e. on states such as virtue and knowledge] in their very actualisations’.
120Michael’s choice of words here is somewhat infelicitous. He is broadly working towards distinguishing between activities of states and the resulting processes of becoming (see above note 116), but in these lines he describes ‘restoration’ (apokatastasis) first as identical to the activity of the vegetative soul (545,18–19) but then as something that follows upon this activity, i.e. as a process of becoming taking place in the body (545,22–3). The translation, working on the assumption that this is not just a slip and that Michael does indeed want us to think of two different senses of restoration, translates these instances differently, namely as ‘act of restoration’ and ‘(process of) restoration’.
121Note on to apokathistôn. One might think that, strictly speaking, it is the vegetative soul that is the agent doing the restoring, but Michael presumably means its activity here (see 545,6–8). Certainly, there is a sense in which the activity may be said to be what restores. This might have been made clearer by using the infinitive apokathistanai rather than the participle.
122See above note 120.
123Michael’s lemma leaves out the final two words in 1173b14, namely kai hêdonôn, which would give us ‘from pains and pleasures […]’.
124Reading noêsantes for noêsantos at 546,2. Cf. Grosseteste’s existimantes (350,17).
125In 546,4 Heylbut places the comma before to sôma, which would give us: ‘[…] in connection with the things that nourish, the body is no longer in pain […]’. But in 546,2–3 we were told that the ‘living thing’ is in pain, not the body. Moreover, in his previous comment Michael used the expression ta trephonta three times, each time in conjunction with to sôma: ‘the things that nourish the body’ (545,3.26.30). Thus, we take to sôma as the object of trephonta here, and assume the living thing is still the subject of lupeitai.
126This example of the relationship between a shadow to a walking man is found a couple of times in the commentaries on the Categories to illustrate something that is very closely connected to another without being part of its essence (parakoluthêma; cf. above 545,13), e.g. Ammonius in Cat. 27,26–7 and Philoponus in Cat. 33,15–18. Of particular interest is a passage in David’s commentary on the Categories, which makes this same comparison of a shadow’s relation to a walking man to pleasure’s relationship to activity (in Cat. 112,11–16).
127Cf. 545,9–12.
128Reading aisthêsesin at 546,12 for Heylbut’s athlêsesin. As Heylbut notes in the critical apparatus, one manuscript has athlêsi crossed out with aisthêsesi written above it. The correctness of aisthêsesin may be inferred from Michael’s examples: akouontes, aisthanomenoi and theômenoi (546,19–20). This is also much closer to Aristotle’s text (cf. 1173b17–18).
129See note ad 535,9.
130There are a couple of differences between Michael’s text at 546,26–7 endeeis gar ginomenous kai prolupêthentas hêdesthai sumbainei tê anaplêrôsei and Aristotle’s text at 1173b14–15 endeeis gar genomenous kai prolupêthentas hêdesthai tê anaplêrôsei. The former difference is easily explained, and perhaps Michael’s text should be genomenous. The sumbainei probably crept up from 1173b16.
131This is not an actual quotation from Aristotle, though it is loosely derived from 1173b18–19.
132Michael’s text (eponeidistous hêdonas legoit’ an) diverges slightly from Bywater’s (eponeidistous tôn hêdonôn legoi tis an).
133Cf. in EN 533,10–13.
134in EN 1148b19–21 we read about a woman who slits open pregnant women and devours their children. Aristotle himself does not identify this person by name, but in the anonymous commentary on this passage (in EN 427,36–428,1) certain details are added. Namely, she is identified by name as Lamia, and she said to have lived near the Black Sea (which is presumably taken out of context from EN 1148b22). Moreover, the bizarre motivation for her actions is given: ‘because she lost her own children’.
135There is a slight deviation from Bywater’s text: legoit’ an (547,20) for legoi tis an (1173b25), and ou mên hai apo (547,21) for ou mên apo (1173b26).
136hai apo tês tôn arrenôn aphroditês could also be translated as ‘those deriving from the sexual desire of males’, but Michael’s target is presumably homosexual desire.
137Cf. 567,35–8.
138Cf. 571,1–6; 574,19–20; 575,21–2; 577,29–578,9.
139For Michael’s use of dunamei with legein, see Luna, Trois études, pp. 204–5.
140Cf. EN 1121b5–10; 1159a12–25.
141Cf. 1173b33–1174a1.
142Heylbut’s text has t’ an at 548,23 for Bywater’s d’ an at 1174a1.
143Heylbut’s text has epipherei at 549,21 for Bywater’s epipheroi at 1174a5.
144The text here (especially sunezêse kai epedramen at 549,34) is difficult, and it is possible that Grosseteste’s convixit et accurrit is closer to the original.
145At 550,7 Heylbut’s text has pasai hai aretai where based on EN 1174a9 (pasa hairetê) we would expect something like pasai hairetai. Similarly, at 550,10 Heylbut prints pasa aretê. Encouraged by Grosseteste’s Latin translation, which has neque omnis eligibilis at both places, we read hairetai and hairetê respectively, which also make better sense of the entire passage.
146The above is one possible translation of the lemma, one which corresponds to the sense that Michael first examines in 550,14–20. At 550,20–34 he considers a second possible interpretation, one which he seems to find more appropriate and which would correspond to the following translation of the lemma: ‘Whether [pleasure] is a substance (ti d’ esti) or a some such (poion ti) should become clearer to us if we start from the beginning’.
147Perhaps Michael is thinking of Phys. 4.11–12. Cf. Philoponus in Phys. 702,14–16 Vitelli.
148Now to be translated as ‘is a substance’. See above note 146.
149Reading kai to melan with the Aldine edition for to melan at 550,23.
150Inserting ê before poion ti at 550,23.
151Now to be translated as ‘or a some such’. See above note 146.
152This is the topic of the comment on the following lemma (551,3–552,28).
153In contrast to movements, which are not present as simultaneous wholes. Cf. holê homou at in EN 551,30 and see Simplicius in Phys. 778,22 and 1139,7–8.
154Cf. in EN 541,23.
155Reading oikia for oikeia at 551,33. Cf. Grosseteste’s domus at 361,97.
156Michael appears to misunderstand the term rhabdôsis, which refers rather to the fluting of the column. This misunderstanding has already been noted ad loc. in Liddel and Scott.
157Heylbut refers to Vitruvius 4.1,2 mutuli (mutila).
158The reference is not clear. Heylbut refers tentatively to chapter 14, and Mercken – also tentatively – to chapters 14–15. Both also point to PA 639b2–3.
159Perhaps tês needs to be read for tou at 552,14, but presumably Michael has implicitly switched from hê badisis to to badizein, which would make no difference to the sense.
160Cf. 553,26–7.
161See DC 269a18–23 (cf. Phys. 265a13–b16).
162EN 1174a15–19.
163Reading heterou for heteron at 553,6.
164Michael’s text (dêlon de hôs hetera t’an eiê allêlôn) at 553,7 diverges slightly from Bywater’s (dêlon oun hôs heterai t’an eien allêlôn).
165Phys. 6.3 (233b33–234b9).
166See note ad 535,9.
167Michael’s (minor) point is that Aristotle’s text at 1174b10–11 (ou gar pantôn tauta legetai) should be ou gar kata pantôn tauta legetai. It is difficult to convey the difference in sense in English, but the kata conveys a stronger sense of predication, which he emphasizes below at 553,21 by switching from legesthai to katêgoreisthai.
168The capitalization is in Heylbut’s text. Aristotle himself often refers to his ‘arguments on motion’, e.g. DC 272a30–1, 275b22, GC 318a3–4. As Michael indicates at in EN 552,17–18, he understands this as a reference to Phys. 6–8. Heylbut (followed by Mercken) refers to Phys. 6 with DC 280b26.
169Michael seems to be thinking of the mention of aisthêseôs in 1174b14. This line of text is the focus of the rest of his comments in this section.
170Pasês oun aisthêseôs pros to aisthêton energousês at 553,34–5 is not marked as a quote by Heylbut, but it is a very close paraphrase of EN 1174b14: aisthêseôs de pasês pros to aisthêton energousês. The translation requires pasês to be rendered as ‘any’ instead of ‘every’ (as it is translated below).
171oude aisthêseôs pasês pros to aisthêton energousês esti kinêsis ê genesis (554,4).
172See note ad 548,10.
173Michael’s lemma has tôn hupo tên aisthêsin keimenôn at 554,24. The keimenôn is not included in Bywater’s text.
174Cf. Ps.-Simplicius in DA 148,14 and Steel’s note ad loc.
175Cf. 559,14–16 and the note ad loc.
176Reading hêdonên for aisthêsin (‘sense’) in 555,16.
177See note ad 535,9.
178Michael has de at 555,20 for Aristotle’s gar at 1174b16.
179At 555,20 Michael omits Aristotle’s einai prior to dokei at 1174b16.
180There are at least two distinct conceptions of ‘completeness’ at work in EN 10.4. In the first half of the chapter (1174a13–b14), Aristotle is working with a conception of ‘completeness’ that applies equally to all activities (in contradistinction to movements and comings-to-be). All activities are complete in this sense insofar as they possess the entire form at every moment. But starting in 1174b14 Aristotle begins to articulate another sense of ‘completion’, according to which some activities are more complete than others. Here completion depends on the excellence of the subject and object. In these lines Michael is invoking this distinction. If some activity a is not performed by an excellent subject and directed at an excellent object, it is not complete in the latter sense, but it is still complete in the former sense, since it is an activity.
181Inserting dia prior to tês toiautês epistrophês at 556,13–14 with Vat. gr. 269 (330r). Cf. Grosseteste: per talem conversionem.
182Reading protaseôn for protaseôs at 556,19, which appears to be what Vat. gr. 269 (330r) has.
183This three-fold division appears to correspond to the distinction between sensation (aisthêsis), rational thought (dianoia) and contemplation (theôria) at 556,11–12. The man who is looking at the external world is engaged in sensation, and the man who is engaged in contemplation has turned towards himself and established himself among the intelligibles. Michael’s characterization of dianoia, however, is somewhat ambiguous. He says that the person engaged in dianoia is ek protaseôs eis epiphoras epaniôn (556,19). In the translation above, this is taken as a reference to syllogistic reasoning, which fits with his characterization of dianoia as epistêmonikê gnôsis at 556,13, where epistêmonikê gnôsis would be understood to refer to the epistêmê of the Posterior Analytics: knowledge acquired by syllogistic deduction. This accommodates protasis in its usual sense of ‘premise’, and epiphora can certainly have the sense of conclusion (cf. e.g. Ammonius (?) in An. Pr. 68,13–14 Wallies: ho d’ hêmeis legomen sumperasma, ekeinoi epiphora kalousi). Moreover, dianoia is often understood as a kind of discursive reasoning that moves from premise to conclusion (e.g. Philoponus in DA 2,2–3 Hayduck). The ambiguity stems from the fact that Michael’s epaniôn, which really means ‘to ascend’, is an odd choice to describe the movement from premise to conclusion. Possibly, then, Michael’s understanding of dianoia is more Platonic than the translation allows and could be picking up on the dianoia of Plato’s divided line, which serves as a means of ascent to the intelligibles. Cf. Grosseteste’s ex priori ad superlationem ascendens (369,16–17).
184That is, the way in which the sense-object and the sensation complete the faculty of sensation.
185In this section Michael is concerned to show that the manner in which pleasure completes an activity is not comparable to the transition from the state of first actuality (or second potentiality) to second actuality. In the subsequent section of the commentary, Michael intends to show that it is also not comparable to the transition from first potentiality to second potentiality (or first actuality). See below note 204.
186DA 3.2.
187Reading toutôn for toutois at 557,5. The parallel passage in Michael’s in GA (see note below) also has toutôn at 84,5. Cf. Grosseteste’s horum sensibilium (370,14).
188The entire passage stretching from 556,37 to 557,8 is drawn verbatim from Alexander De anima 38,21–39,8 Bruns, of which Caston offers a helpful analysis in the notes to his translation (pp. 139–40). The same passage is found again with a few minor variations in Michael’s commentary on Aristotle GA 83,36–84,8.
189This translation changes the punctuation slightly by placing a comma after aisthêtikon at 557,14 and deleting the comma after energeia(i) at 557,15.
190Cf. Grosseteste’s propter operationes at 370.52.
191EN 1175a30–1. Cf. 1179b21.
192Cf. EN 1175a32–3.
193This entire sentence (557,22–4) is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 133,25–7.
194EN 1174b25–6.
195Reading hugieia for hêgieia at 557,27. Cf. Grosseteste’s sanitas (371,66).
196Reading to hugiainein for ta hugiainein at 557,29, which as Mercken notes ad loc. is presumably a typographical error. Cf. Grosseteste’s sanum esse (371,68).
197This notion of being ‘irreproachably healthy’ (amemptôs hugiainein) is Galenic. Cf. e.g. Galen Ars medica 293,8; 338,15; 359,11; 383,15 Boudon; Nat. Fac. 190,6 Helmreich; QAM 70,12–13 Mueller.
198On the role of sense-objects ‘provoking’ (ekkaleisthai) the senses to activity, cf. Themistius Paraphr. in DA 17,28–9 and 92,1–4 Heinze and Porphyry Sent. §16.
199Cf. Ps.-Heliodorus Paraphr. in EN 216,30–2 Heylbut.
200In place of toutesti (‘and that means that’) at 558,6, Grosseteste has cum sensus sit potentissimus et ad potentissimum sensibile operetur 372,89–90), which is effectively a quotation of EN 1174b28–9: epeidan hê te aisthêsis ê(i) kratistê kai pros toiouton energê(i), which may be translated: ‘whenever the sense is best and is active in relation to such’, i.e. in relation to something excellent.
201Cf. e.g. Philoponus in DA 27,12–13; 275,4–5; 301,9–11 Hayduck; Elias (?) in Cat. 240,37–9 Busse; Sophonias Paraphr. in DA 124,20–2 Hayduck.
202Reading ho before aisthêtikos in 558,16.
203Cf. 494,13–17 and 556,25–6.
204Throughout this passage Michael is focusing on the case of a subject in a condition of first potentiality being perfected in the sense that it is brought to the second potentiality (or first actuality) by the acquisition of a state (hexis). That is, with reference to Aristotle’s example of the boy becoming literate from DA 417a21–30, he is focusing on the case of the illiterate boy (first potentiality) becoming literate (second potentiality or first actuality) by the acquisition of the knowledge of how to read and write.
205That is to say, the state elevates the subject to the second potentiality (or first actuality), but the subject is not yet exercising that skill (second actuality).
206That is, potentially in the sense of first potentiality.
207That is, actuality in the sense of first actuality (or second potentiality).
208According to Galen (De semine 94,8–11 De Lacy), the Hippocratic author of De natura pueri makes the moment of the embryo’s full articulation, which is when the extremities are separated and hair and nails are formed, the point at which the embryo becomes a zôon, at which point it would have sensation and motion (cf. Nat. Puer. 21.1 Lonie). In Michael’s commentary on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, he says that the sensitive soul comes to be present in the embryo at some point (in GA 83,13), and throughout the pregnancy this power then remains in a state of second potentiality, since there are no objects of sense in the womb (in GA 84,5–9). Only at birth is this power present qua second actuality (cf. in GA 83,31–2).
209Despite Michael’s use of the term energein (‘to be active’), he is still thinking of the second potentiality or first actuality.
210This refers to the infamously enigmatic analogy at EN 1174b33 (hoion tois akmaiois hê hôra), though Michael gives only a paraphrase: hôsper tê(i) akmê(i) epiginetai hê hôraiotês. Aristotle’s term hôra is sometimes translated with ‘the bloom of youth’, and this is also a possible translation of Michael’s hôraiotês. But at 554,32 Michael says that the spoken word and musical voice participate in hôraiotês, so ‘the bloom of youth’ does not seem to capture Michael’s intended meaning.
211Michael’s uncommon pairing of these two adjectives potheinotera kai erasmiôtera at 559,8 bears an uncanny resemblance to Plotinus Enn. 6.7.32.35–6: potheinotaton kai erasmiôtaton.
212Michael’s text (kai pros allêla ekhontôn ton auton tropon) at 559,12 differs from Bywater’s only by placing ekhontôn before ton auton tropon instead of directly after it.
213Cf. in EN 555,1–4. One frequently finds beauty defined in terms of the symmetry of a body’s parts (often in conjunction with good colouring), e.g. Alexander in Top. 134,18–19; SVF 2.278; 2.392; and 2.471–2; Galen Thrasybulus 45,1–2 Helmreich; Cicero Tusc. 4.31; Augustine De civitate dei 22.19; Simplicius in Phys. 1067,15–17; Syrianus in Hermog. 62,21–2. See also Plato Phileb. 64E6–7. Neoplatonists, however, emphasized that beauty was a higher cause than symmetry, see e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.6.1 and 6.7.22.24–6.
214Some of the language in 559,14–16 is very Neoplatonic. Neoplatonists often invoke the comparison of beauty to light, e.g. Hermias in Phdr. 185,12–13; 188,11–16 Lucarini and Moreschini; Plotinus Enn. 5.8.3.4–6; Porphyry Ad Marcellam §13; Proclus Theol. Plat. 1.108,23–5 Saffrey and Westerink. On the Neoplatonic use of the poetic term epinêkhesthai (‘to float upon’), see note 5 in Saffrey and Westerink’s edition of Proclus Theol. Plat., ad 1.108,18 (p. 158). On Michael’s appropriation of the Neoplatonic term anthos (‘bloom’), see Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’, pp. 54–5.
215Bywater punctuates ê kamnei as a question, but Michael appears to take it as a straightforward answer, and Heylbut punctuates it here and at 559,20 as a statement.
216The reference is not entirely clear. Heylberg suggests ‘1169b31?’. Mercken refers to Michael’s comments on this passage at 511,33–512,1.
217This passage is strongly reminiscent of Galen’s discussion of vision in PHP 7, in which he describes the role that psychic pneuma plays in the distribution of visual power (see especially 454,5ff. and 460,28–33, and cf. 306,17–23 De Lacy). According to Galen, the pneuma is emitted from the eye, but he does not appear to connect this with exhaustion, as Michael does here. See also Nemesius’ summarizing appropriation of this material in Nat. Hom. §7 (57,16–62,25 Morani). This appears to be the only place where Michael refers to ‘psychic’ (psukhikon) pneuma (as opposed to ‘innate’ (sumphuton) pneuma). We would like to thank Philip van der Eijk for sharing his thoughts on this passage and bringing these passages of Galen and Nemesius to our attention.
218This is presumably the heart, cf. in GA 223,11–17 and in PN 50,29–51,15.
219This final general statement is somewhat misleading. In fact, Michael does not think that all activity involves the loss of pneuma, since he has already stated that pure intellectual activities do not give rise to fatigue.
220Metaph. 980a21–2.
221Cf. this report by the medieval Jewish traveller Benjamin Tudela, who visited Constantinople in 1161–2: ‘Close to the walls of the palace is also a place of amusement belonging to the king, which is called the Hippodrome, and every year on the anniversary of the birth of Jesus the king gives a great entertainment there. And in that place men from all the races of the world come before the king and queen with jugglery and without jugglery, and they introduce lions, leopards, bears, and wild asses, and they engage them in combat with one another; and the same thing is done with birds. No entertainment like this is to be found in any other land’ (M.N. Adler (trans.) The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela. Critical Text, Translation and Commentary, New York 1907, p. 21). See also K.N. Ciggaar, Western Travellers to Constantinople. The West and Byzantium, 962–1204. Cultural and Political Relations, Brill 1996, pp. 60–2).
222‘At first, then’ translates ta men oun prôta, which appears to be what Michael is reading for Aristotle’s to men gar prôton at 1175a7. Michael’s rephrasing is not as superfluous as it seems in English, since the Greek is somewhat more ambiguous.
223Michael’s lemma has hapanta (‘all [living things]’) for Bywater’s hapantes (‘all human beings’) and leaves out the final hapantes ephientai (‘all human beings seek’).
224Elsewhere we translate zôon with ‘living thing’ but in what follows Michael is interested in contrasting zôa with plants.
225This definition of soul is taken almost verbatim from Aristotle DA 412a27–b1 and 412b5–6.
226The connection between ‘life’ (zên) and ‘boiling’ (zein) is attributed to some Presocratics by Aristotle in DA 405b26–8. There the connection is certainly etymological, but Aristotle’s point is that some men took heat to be the foundation of life and that this is reflected in the etymology. Similar accounts that connect life and boiling via heat are reported by some Neoplatonists, e.g. Iamblichus DA §8 and Philoponus in DA 92,5–6. But more frequently one finds Neoplatonists appropriating this etymological connection between ‘life’ and ‘boiling’, but dropping the connotation of heat and making the emergence of a processional activity the salient point in the boiling analogy. See e.g. Plotinus Enn. 6.5.12.9 and 6.7.12.22–3; Damascius De principiis 2.144,25–6, and see the note by Westerink and Combès ad loc. for further references. Michael is also thinking of boiling in terms of its connection to activity. To this extent Michael’s employment of the metaphor might be said to be Neoplatonic, but he is not necessarily taking on the full Neoplatonic theory of life. He seems rather to be using this metaphor to capture Aristotle’s own theory of the emergence of soul in DA 2.1. What Michael says here seems to bear a strong resemblance to Simplicius (?) in DA 30,16–17, and cf. 98,13–14.
227Cf. in EN 481,32–7 and 591,4–5; Simplicius in Phys. 4,29–31 Diels.
228Cf. in EN 528,5–6 and 602,35.
229Cf. in EN 570,31–2.
230Cf. in EN 603,15–18.
231Heylbut places a comma after semnas (‘holy’) at 561,37, which I have changed to a full stop (following Grosseteste). With Heylbut’s punctuation ‘our reason’ would become the subject of energei (‘is active’), but it seems more likely that Michael is now simply turning to examine EN 1175a12–14. Hence I have supplied ‘each’ as the implicit subject, even though Michael does not include Aristotle’s hekastos at EN 1175a12. Michael also has en toutois (‘in these things’) at 561,37 for Aristotle’s toutois at 1175a13. The en initially seems awkward, given the tê akoê without en at 561,38 (and EN 1175a14), but as the sequel makes clear, Michael understands the tê akoê as a further specification of the kind of musician that is meant.
232The text here is difficult: philomathê de legei tên dianoian ton eidota tous harmonikous logous. One option would be to read tôn eidotôn for ton eidota (see Heylbut’s critical apparatus ad loc.), which would give us: ‘he calls “studious” the rational thought of those who know the harmonic principles’. This appears to be what Grosseteste is reading: amatorem autem disciplinae dicit mentem scientium harmonicas rationes. But Michael’s point appears rather to be that there are two kinds of musical men, one of whom is philomathês, so I think it is preferable to read tê(i) dianoia(i) for tên dianoian at 562,3 (with EN 1075a14).
233‘Principles’ translates logoi, which could also be rendered ‘ratios’.
234Cf. Damascius in Phd. 2.51.4–5 Westerink.
235The distinction between two kinds of musician can also be found in, e.g. David Proleg. 64,20–2; Plotinus Enn. 6.3.16.23–4. Some details of this passage recall Plato’s discussion of the kinds of tekhnai in Phileb. 56A–57A. Although he does not distinguish there explicitly between two kinds of musician, he does distinguish between two kinds of practitioners of other tekhnai, and the discussion there begins with music and progresses upwards to arithmetic. (Cf. also the ascent in Rep. 525A–530B, where Plato does describe a kind of studious musician, but he is ranked higher than the arithmetician there.)
236Given that Michael has just distinguished two kinds of musician, the musician by hearing and the ‘studious’ musician, it would seem that ho de philomathês is meant to refer to the latter kind of musician. But now Michael introduces a third individual: ho de arithmetikos. It is grammatically permissible to translate this as ‘the arithmetic musician’, but that would conflict with the two-fold division.
237Cf. EN 1175a17.
238Heylbut’s ‘1178a18’ is a typographical error.
239See above in EN 559,4 and cf. 564,14.
240The following discussion is heavily indebted to Alexander Eth. Prob. (Problem 23), especially 144,9–33, much of which is being taken over verbatim by Michael. Individual instances of this are indicated in italics below.
241This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,9–12.
242Alexander also makes a brief point about shameful pleasures: hêdonas de aiskras oudepote hairesthai eulogon (Eth. Prob. 144,12–13).
243Heylbut’s text has hôste ean mê hai at 563,9, but the negation cannot be right, as Grosseteste’s translation (qaure, si quidem…) corroborates. We read hôste ei hai men, following Bruns’ text of Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,13.
244This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,13–17.
245Heylbut’s text has poterou kharin at 563,16, but Grosseteste’s translation (utrum utrius gratia) suggests that this should be emended to poteron poterou kharin, which is also found in Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,18. The translation of these lines has been drawn from R.W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ethical Problems, Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, London 1990, ad loc.
246The punctuation in 563,17–18 has been changed to conform to Bruns’ text of Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,19–20.
247This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,18–24.
248This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,25–6.
249Interestingly, Michael exchanges Alexander’s aidiotêtos (everlastingness) with diamonês (continuation), perhaps owing to Christian concerns about the everlastingness of the world and its contents.
250Reading toutôn at 563,33 (with Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,31) for Heylbut’s toutois.
251This passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 144,26–35. The translation of these lines has been drawn in part from Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ethical Problems, ad loc.
252Heylbut does not mark phainetai d’ oun sunezeukhthai tauta at 563,36 as a quotation, but it is very close to Aristotle’s sunezeukhthai men gar tauta phainetai at 1175a19–20.
253The italicized text (564,5–8) appears to be drawn from Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,15–16.
254See above in EN 559,4 and 562,32.
255Cf. 1175a26–8.
256Cf. Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,28–9; 124,28–9; 137,34–5.
257Geometry is Aristotle’s own example (1175a32), but this passage is taken almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 133,25–7.
258This passage is found nearly verbatim in Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,24–7. The entire first argument appears to be drawn from Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,24–31, which invokes the contrast between the temperate and the licentious man, which is not found in EN 10.5. As Michael says below (565,14–15), only the second argument is articulated by Aristotle himself.
259holôs ton mê prosomilounta gunaiki. Here we are taking the holôs to be modifying the negation mê in 565,7, since it is difficult to see how this could be intended as a generalization of the previous point.
260This is effectively a paraphrase of Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,27–31.
261As Michael says (565,14–15), this second argument is provided by Aristotle himself (at 1175b1–6), including the example of a conflict between a lover of flute and discussion. Nevertheless, Michael still seems to be writing with one eye on Alexander, who also transitions from the previous argument to this argument (Eth. Prob. 120,31–121,5). Whereas Aristotle speaks more generically of a conflict between flute-playing and discussion (tois logois 1175b3–4; ton logon 1175b6), for Alexander (as with Michael) there is a conflict with ‘story-telling’ (muthologein 121,3), and both introduce story-telling with a qualification (Alexander pher’ eipein 121,3; Michael ei tukhoi 565,17).
262Michael omits Aristotle’s touto (1175b7) after de at 565,25.
263Yet another example seems unnecessary, but Michael presumably wants to drive home the point that this competition between pleasures is not limited to cases of conflict between reason and the senses, rather it occurs even between the various senses.
264Michael using two different words at 565,32 and 565,33: kitharisis and katharôdia, which technically have two distinct meanings, playing the lyre and accompanying the lyre in song, respectively. But I suspect that Michael intends them to have the same sense here, and so I follow Grosseteste in giving synonymous translations (citharizatione). Similarly at 565,38 (tou kitharôdountos).
265Michael has hetera at 566,3 for Aristotle’s heteron (1175b11).
266This sentence is not included in Grosseteste’s Latin translation.
267Michael omits Aristotle’s malist’ at 1175a13. Michael’s inclination to take these lines to be about chariot-racing (as opposed to stage acting) might well be due to the popularity of horse and chariot races in Constantinople’s famous Hippodrome. See above note 221.
268Michael is presumably thinking of 1175a30, but cf. 1175a17 with his almost identical comment at 562,17–18.
269This line appears to be inspired by Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,5–7 = Eth. Prob. 152,26–9.
270Elsewhere enantios is translated as ‘contrary’, but in this case Michael’s examples make clear that he is thinking more along the lines of contradictories. The odd claim here is that taking intense pleasure in activity a means that one is pained by not doing a. This sounds like addiction, but Michael’s examples (e.g. writing) do not fit addiction. See also his example of philoinoi at 606,19–20 and the note ad loc.
271567,17–27 is largely taken from Alexander’s Eth. Prob. 125,9–19, and the above translation follows Sharples’ translation of that passage in some respects. It is worth noting that Alexander in this passage goes somewhat further by suggesting that only natural pleasures are strictly speaking pleasures, with unnatural pleasures being called so ‘homonymously’. Michael omits this point. Cf. also 570,8–571,25.
272At this point (Eth. Prob. 120,5–6) Alexander adds ‘and has its being in this’ (kai en toutô autê to einai).
273These lines are drawn almost verbatim from Alexander Eth. Prob. 120,4–7. Strikingly, although Michael appears to take the premises directly from Alexander, he chooses to formulate the conclusion himself. Perhaps this is because Michael thought Alexander did not sufficiently distinguish between pleasures and objects of pleasure.
274Mercken points to 1174b31–1175a3. Michael has repeatedly stated this point above, see especially 550,31–4 and 564,1–2, and cf. 551,3–552,28; 558,33; 562,35–6.
275At 568,29 we read ei dê hê men oikeiotatê esti tê energeia(i), <hê> de hêtton oikeia for Heylbut’s ei dê hê men oikeiotatê esti, tê energeia(i) de hêtton oikeia. Cf. Grosseteste’s Si utique haec quidem propriissima est operationi, haec autem minus propria (391,27–8).
276Michael has eoiken hê at 568,30 for Aristotle’s eioike ge at 1175b34.
277Reading the dative hulê(i) for Heylbut’s nominative hulê at 569,21.
278That is, when the planets appear not to move as they transition between forward and retrograde motions.
279See 567,17–27.
280As Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 902 notes, that Michael is originally from Ephesus (though he is writing this commentary in Constantinople, as 610,11–12 shows) is also confirmed by the titles of several manuscripts and to some extent by in GA 149,19–20. See also the note ad 620,20.
281This paraphrase (tas men homologoumenas aiskhras hêdonas ou phateon hêdonas) is so close to Aristotle’s original text (tas men homologoumenôs aiskhras dêlon hôs ou phateon hêdonas, 1176a22–3) that the quotation marks seem justified.
282Reading tais aretais with Vat. gr. 269 (338r) for Heylbut’s tais hêdonais at 571,23. Grosseteste’s text (delectationibus at 395,37) conforms to Heylbut’s text.
283That is, Aristotle discussed this in EN 1. Cf. above 529,9–10 and below 576,25–30.
284Michael’s remarks about the expression tupô – which appears to have puzzled Grosseteste, who simply transliterates it (398,90) – reflect that he is probably thinking back to Aristotle’s own use of the term in EN 1094b11–27, where we find Aristotle also explaining tupôi both in terms as what holds ‘for the most part’ (1094b21; cf. in EN 605,1–9) and with reference to a mathematician (cf. Michael’s geometer and EN 1098a29–32).
285Michael repeatedly identifies the true or real human being with the intellect, cf. 576,29–30; 578,21–2; 579,15–16; 591,18–19.
286For eugeneia and euteknia, cf. EN 1099b3. For tês hulês khorêgia, cf. tês ektos khorêgias at 1178a24, tois ektos kekhorêgêmenous at 1179a11 and tois toioutois hikanôs kekhorêgêmenôn at 1177a30 (and cf. in EN 590,1).
287Aristotle repeatedly refers to the philia that parents have for their children as ‘natural’, cf. EN 1155a16–18 and 1163b24.
288It is striking here that Michael interprets the three kinds of friendship in terms of the three Platonic parts of the soul. In EN 8.3–4 (1156a6–b32) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of friendship in a somewhat different manner. One kind of friendship is based on the useful and beneficial and can be found mostly among older people and those who looking to their own advantage. A second one is transitory and based on pleasure and exists mostly among the young. A third one arises among those who resemble each other in excellence, and is long-lasting and complete (cf. EN 1156a10–1156b19). Michael’s association of familial love with the appetitive part of soul, and of utilitarian love with the spirited part is striking, to say the least. See also in EN 9 482,15–483,20. Note also that at 1156b18–19 Aristotle describes complete friendship as ‘bringing together’ (sunaptei) all the attributes that friends should have, not their souls, but cf. Simplicius in Epict. 37,275–7 Hadot (89,11–13 Dübner).
289These lines are strongly reminiscent of Plato’s Philebus and especially its reception by the Neoplatonists. Cf. Michael’s hê noera zôê […] anêdonos ousa […] hê hêdonê […] anous ousa kai pasês eperêmenê (572,19–23) with Proclus in Remp. 1.269,18–22: ho dê kai ho en tô Philêbô Sôkratês ezêtêsen te kai diêrthrôsen, apodeixas hôs oute hêdonê to agathon hêmôn estin oute nous, hê men anous ousa kai lêphtheisa pantelôs, ho de anêdonos kai houtos pantelôs. And cf. Damascius in Phileb. §6 and §74.
290Changing the punctuation in 572,25 by placing a raised dot after theôria and changing the raised dot after prosupakouein to a full stop.
291Reading auta for autô at 572,27. Cf. the Latin ipsa of Grosseteste at 399,27.
292Heylbut punctuates this as a quotation, not because Michael is actually quoting Aristotle, but simply because the construction uses nominatives with finite verbs. Cf. EN 1095a18–21 and Aspasius in EN 9,14–17.
293The text in italics is almost verbatim Aspasius in EN 10,24–6. As Konstan notes ad loc., Endymion is portrayed as living in a state of perpetual sleep. Cf. 1178b19–20 (and MM 1185a9–11) with in EN 598,10.
294Reading phutikôn for phusikôn at 573,2.
295The text in italics is almost verbatim Aspasius in EN 10,26–8. For these examples, cf. EN 1176a34–5 and 1095b32–1096a2.
296Heylbut refers us to 1098a16–18; cf. 1100a4–5 and 1100a14–16.
297Michael appears to be reading panta (573,18; cf. Grosseteste’s omnia at 400,55) for Aristotle’s prattein at EN 1176b8–9.
298Michael’s perekhousin hautous hêdeis pros ekeina hôn ephientai at 574,15 is close enough to Aristotle’s hôn ephientai en toutois parekhousi sphas autous hêdeis at 1176b15 to justify the quotation marks.
299Michael’s ageustoi tugkhanousin ontes eilikrinôn hêdonôn at 575,6–7 is close enough to Aristotle’s ageustoi houtoi ontes hêdonês eilikrinous at 1176b19–20 to justify the quotation marks.
300Heylbut gives no reference. Mercken (ad 402,16) refers to 1173b16–20 with Michael’s comments at 546,18–38.
301Michael’s hekastô hairetôtatê estin energeia hê kata tên oikeian hexin at 575,19–20 is close enough to Aristotle’s hekastô d’ hê kata tên oikeian hexin hairetôtatên energeia at 1176b26–7 to justify marking it as a quotation.
302cf. EN 1176b18.
303Changing the comma after paidian in 575,25 to a raised dot, and the raised dot after eudaimonein to a comma.
304Aristotle actually says that we choose everything (hapanta 1176b30) except happiness for the sake of something else. Michael reduces this to ‘many other things’ (alla polla 575,32) and underlines Aristotle’s hôs eipein at 1176b30 in order to avoid any confusion about virtuous action also being an end in itself.
305At 576,23 Michael’s text omits the kai after aei in Bywater’s text at 1177a4. This allows the remaining kai to be understood epexegetically, which better fits Michael’s comments that follow.
306See MM 1184b27–31 and EN 1101a14–16.
307Michael’s khôristheis de tou sômatos estin auto touth’ hoper esti at 576,30–1 is too close to Aristotle’s khôristheis d’ esti monon touth’ hoper esti (DA 430a22–3) to be a coincidence. In the following line Aristotle concludes that this intellect is ‘alone immortal and everlasting’ (430a23).
308Presumably the reference is to DA 3.4–5.
309Something appears to have gone wrong with the text here, as we have only the participle legôn with no finite verb, but the sense is clear enough.
310Michael has the singular eudaimonikôteron at 577,6 instead of Aristotle’s eudaimonikôtera at 1177a6.
311This is a heavy-handed paraphrase. Michael’s concern appears to be that by calling the activity of intellect merely ‘more conducive to happiness’ Aristotle seems to be implying that this activity is distinct from happiness. That is to say, Michael wants to understand eudaimonikôteron not as ‘more conducive to happiness’ but as something like ‘more deserving to be called “happiness” ’.
312There is certainly no shortage of passages in the EN where Aristotle says that happiness is an end (cf. 1097a30–4; 1097b20–1; 1101a18–19; 1176a30–2; 1176b30–1), but the expression ‘end of goods’ (telos tôn agathôn) might signal that Michael is thinking rather of MM, e.g. 1184a14 and 1184b9. Cf. Michael’s explicit references to MM at 576,28 and 577,25.
313Cf. MM 1185a3. Interestingly, Michael refers to the MM rather than to EN 1100a1–3.
314The phrasing of this sentiment bears a certain similarity to a common paraphrase of Plato Laws 653A7–9. Cf. David Proleg. 36,22–3; Elias in Isag. 17,12–13; Philoponus in DA 160,34–5; Philoponus (?) in DA 491,3–4; Proclus in Tim. 92,4–5; Simplicius in Cat. 193,24; etc.
315Michael adds kai before ho tukhôn in 577, 30. The kai is not present in the lemma, and Michael might not mean for it to be seen as part of the quotation.
316Heylbut’s text reads epêgage kai malista tou aristou (577,31), but it appears to be missing something, even if this is not marked in Heylbut’s edition. We are following Grosseteste’s Latin translation here: induxit et bestiale non minus optimo, id est et maxime optimo (406,11–12). As Mercken plausibly conjectures, the gap in our Greek text might be due to homoeoteleuton. The kai malista tou aristou remains difficult, but the translation above appears to capture the sense of the comments that follow.
317Inserting apolausin with Vat. gr. 269 (341r) after gar at 577,32, which is left implicit in Heylbut.
318Michael’s oudeis metadidôsin eudaimonias tô andrapodôdei (578,6–7) is close enough to Aristotle’s eudaimonias d’ oudeis andrapodô metadidôsin (1177a8–9) to justify quotation marks.
319The Neoplatonists developed a scale of virtues according to which each of the cardinal virtues could be instantiated at different levels. The differentiation of this scale begins with Plotinus Enn. 1.2, is then taken further by Porphyry Sent. §32, and receives even further elaboration by later Neoplatonists. Already in Plotinus we find an account of the ‘political’ or ‘civic’ instantiation of the virtues, which in fact refers not primarily to one’s actions in the city but to the relation of the three parts of soul (the tripartite soul being likened to a city, following the analogy of Plato’s Republic). Thus, the ‘political’ instantiation of virtues involves reason ruling harmoniously over the other two parts. For Plotinus and Porphyry the ‘political’ virtues were the lowest level of virtue possible. The level of virtues of character was a late (post-Porphyry) addition to the scale, which can be found, for example, in Damascius (in Phaed. §139) and Olympiodorus (in Phaed. 8, §2). The virtues of character were thought to stand one step below the political virtues, as they were a matter of mere habituation and right opinion and were found primarily in children and some animals. On the scale of virtues, see D. O’Meara, Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford 2003, pp. 40–9 and C. Wildberg, ‘Πρὸς τὸ τέλος: Neuplatonische Ethik zwischen Religion und Metaphysik’, in T. Kobusch et al. (eds) Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens, München and Leipzig 2002, pp. 261–78.
320In these lines (578,18–579,1) Michael appears to be thinking of political virtue primarily in psychological terms. One often finds Neoplatonists using the term ‘political’ to describe virtues relating to instilling the correct psychological order in the tripartite soul, presumably because they are implicitly invoking Plato’s analogy between the soul and city from the Republic (e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.2.1.15–21 and 1.2.2.13–20; Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 172,5–12; see previous note). This allows for a neat account of the relationship between political and contemplative virtue: the former provides the necessary psychology groundwork for the latter. Nevertheless, although Michael emphasizes the psychological aspect of political virtue here, elsewhere he makes clear that political virtue is not merely a psychological affair (e.g. 582,30–1).
321Regarding Michael’s appropriation of the Platonic language of ascent, see note 8.
322The phrase diakubernôsa ta sumpanta at 579,28 (diakurbernôsa is a typographical error) recalls Plato’s often quoted description of God as t’ anthrôpina diakubernôsi sumpanta (Laws 709B8).
323See Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 5.13.88.2–3 (noun men en psykhê theias moiras aporrhoian hyparkhonta), who attributes this view to the Platonists. Just before this (5.13.87) he attributes to Plato himself (along with Pythagoras and Aristotle) the view that theia(i) moira(i) ton noun eis anthrôpous hêkein, and cf. Theodoret Curatio 5.28 (130,4–5 Raeder). D. Wyrwa, Die christliche Platonaneignung in den Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien, Berlin and New York 1983, pp. 283ff. discusses possible Platonic sources for these statements, though, as he sums it up, these statements are ‘schwierig […] zu verifizieren’. H. Dörrie, Von Platon zum Platonismus. Ein Bruch in der Überlieferung und seine Überwindung, Opladen 1976, p. 85 and others have suggested Tim. 30B. Note that Vat. gr. 269 (342r) appears to have noeran for moiran.
324Heylbut refers us to EN 1153b32, and he is followed by Mercken, but there Aristotle says only that all natural things are divine. Perhaps Michael is also thinking of PN 463b14–15, where Aristotle states that nature is daimonion but not divine (hê gar phusis daimonia all’ ou theia).
325Michael’s lemma leaves out touto and einai (EN 1177a18–19), but this does not affect the sense.
326See note ad 529,7.
327See e.g. 1102a9–10, and cf. EN 1177b13–14 (with in EN 582,30–1) and 1180a14–18.
328See note on 529,15.
329Cf. Michael [Ps.-Alexander] in Metaph. 618,3–13; David in Isag.
330Reading the dative energeia(i) at 580,15 for the nominative energeia, which also corresponds to Grosseteste’s Latin operatione (though cf. Mercken’s apparatus ad loc.) and to dunamei nous at 580,19.
331This talk of the rational soul being ‘allotted’ the ‘guardianship’ over a body is reminiscient of Plato’s Myth of Er. Cf. 583,22–3.
332Aristotle GA 736b27–8 (and cf. 744b21–2). This redescription of Aristotle’s nous thurathen doctrine in terms of illumination (ellampsis) strikes a Neoplatonic chord (and cf. e.g. 591,26–8). In his commentary on Aristotle’s GA he touches upon this again, offering us this tantalizing remark: ‘For the best and most divine end comes to be in us when we have received the nous thurathen. Elsewhere I have discussed in greater detail what this [nous thurathen] is and where it comes from and when it shines (ellampei) upon us’ (in GA 84,28–30). Unfortunately, it is not clear what texts Michael means to be referring to, though the text immediately preceding this passage suggests a possibility. For at in GA 84,9 Michael begins his short discussion of the rational soul, and much of this discussion (84,12–26) is drawn verbatim from Alexander in DA 80,24–81,15. If we accept the proposal that Michael routinely refers to Alexander’s commentaries as if they were his own (see Luna, Trois études, pp. 66–71), Michael here might be referring us to Alexander’s commentary on DA. Alexander does not explicitly describe the nous thurathen in terms of ellampsis, though the analogy to light is already found in Aristotle DA 430a14–15 (also cf. Alexander DA 88,23–89,4 and Mant. 107,29–34; 111,32–6; 113,3–6. On Michael’s familiarity with Mant., see 584,2–3). Michael Psellus also understands Aristotle’s doctrine of the nous thurathen in terms of ellampsis. See Michael Psellus Schol. ad Joh. Clim. 30,9–12 Gautier, which is sometimes included among the fragments of Aristotle’s De philosophia: Fr. 15b Ross (not included by Gigon).
333The text of the lemma – eti sunekhestatê· theôrein te gar mallon dunametha sunekhôs (580,23–4) – differs slightly from Bywater’s text – eti de sunekhestatê· theôrein [te] gar dunametha sunekhôs mallon – but there is no difference in sense.
334For ‘enduring’ (monimon), cf. EN 1100b2–16, and for ‘difficult to take away’ (dusaphaireton), cf. EN 1095b26.
335Michael is presumably thinking of Aristotle’s discussion of the first principle in Metaph. 12. In his commentary on Metaph. 1072a32–b14, Michael writes: ‘But if the first cause, which is the first good, is infinite (apeiron), the [subject] that is seeking it would never attain the entirety of its goodness, as it does in the case of the particular goods. For this reason [the first cause] will always be inciting motion as an object of love that is unattainable (hôs erômenon akatalêpton)’ (in Metaph. 695,36–9). There Michael also describes the first cause as being intelligible and desirable ‘by its own nature’ (cf. 694,4–15).
336Erasmiôteron kai potheinoteron. Cf. note ad 559,8.
337In 581,31–582,2 Michael describes three kinds of activities in terms of increasing amount of time we spend in connection with them, where this amount of time is a function of the kind of object the activities are directed at. He is envisioning the time we spend in connection with them as a sum of two intervals: (a) the time we spend being drawn to it (phora, pheretai) which ends when we attain the object of desire (teuxis), and (b) the time we then spend enjoying, consuming and being filled by the object (apolausis, plêrôsis) which ends when we achieve satiety (koros). Although it is possible to say that this time (a + b), taken by itself, is long or short, Michael adds a further consideration for comparison and evaluation: (c) the time we spend neither being drawn to nor enjoying these things.
The first case (i) Michael describes is the most straightforward. He is presumably thinking of a rather quotidian object of desire such as food or drink. We (a) attain it easily (and thus quickly), and it (b) doesn’t take long to consume it and become sated. Moreover, once we are sated, there is (c) a fairly long interval (in comparison to the time to get food and eat it) before we feel the need to eat again. Such activities, that is, activities directed at such objects, are least continuous.
The second case (ii) is a bit murkier. He means to be describing activities that are moderately continuous insofar as a + b is rather long and c short, which seems clear enough. But he adds the qualification ‘the more we are enjoying them, the more we long for them’ (581,35–6), which is somewhat problematic, as it would suggest that there is never any satiety (but that is explicitly said to be the case only in (iii) – here satiety appears to be possible, followed by brief spells of relief from the desire), and because he says nearly the same thing of the object of case (iii). It is also not clear what sort of examples he has in mind, but what he says about mathematics and music in the following section (582,7–10) makes these likely candidates. These, in any case, would be good examples of activities where one’s enjoyment increases one’s interest in pursuing them. Moreover, since all of this is meant to support his claim at 581,18–20 that contemplative activity is more continuous than political activity, we must assume that (ii) includes political activity.
Finally, there is case (iii). Strikingly, he uses the singular relative pronoun here, suggesting that there is only one object of this type – god (ho dêmiourgos hêmôn 582,2, but see note ad loc.). We are told only that there is no satiety with respect to this object, that is, that b is endless, without comment on the exact duration of a, viz. the question of attainment (teuxis). So only contemplation is truly continuous, interrupted only briefly by various intrusions.
338Kai hê ep’ auta phora kata brakhea ginetai kai ek dialeimmatôn. The Latin translation diverges from our text here: et ad ipsa latio secundum breve fit et non ex distantiis.
339At 581,37 Michael uses a singular relative pronoun (hou de) to describe the third class of object of desire (see note 337 above). This suggests that he is thinking, here at least, of only one thing as being the focus of true continuous activity, namely God. Hence, we have translated kai epexegetically here. Yet we should bear in mind that Michael at times describes contemplation as being directed at a plurality of intelligible objects, e.g. 580,14–16 and 586,17–19. See above note ad 529,15.
340Heylbut prints tê megalê suntaxei in lower case, but Michael appears to be referring to Ptolemy’s famous Almagest, which was also known by the titles Syntaxis Mathematika and Megalê Syntaxis (for the latter cf. e.g. Asclepius in Metaph. 359,32).
341Michael has tô timiô (‘and nobility’) for Aristotle’s tô bebaiô (‘and stability’). He also has ekhein hêdonas for Aristotle’s hêdonas ekhein, and kathariotêti for Aristotle’s kathareiotêti, but these two variations do not affect the sense.
342See above 569,8–570,5.
343Cf. below in EN 589,23–4.
344Cf. note ad 578,18.
345Removing Heylbut’s parentheses around 582,31–3.
346Cf. in EN 575,7–8, where Michael claims that Aristotle defines pure pleasures as those that neither are directly mixed with pain nor followed by pain or regret. See also 566,31–5, where Michael appears to be drawing this claim from Alexander.
347Michael has dê for Aristotle’s de.
348Inserting pros before tousde tinas in 583,5. Cf. the Latin amicitiam habere ad hos aliquos (415,46).
349Michael has ho sophos kai ho dikaios for Aristotle’s sophos kai dikaios in 1177a29.
350See also 580,18 and note ad loc.
351The distinction between ‘principally chosen’ (prohêgoumenon) and ‘necessary’ (anankaion) is found frequently, e.g. Alcinous Didask. 3.2; Plotinus Enn. 6.3.16.30–1; Simplicius in Phys. 249,19–22. And see J. Wilberding, ‘Automatic Action in Plotinus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 34 (2008), pp. 443–77 at notes 39 and 82.
352See above 583,21–2, where we are told that the contemplative man pays no attention to the secondary goods except the necessary ones.
353Following Heylbut’s suggestion of reading eudaimosin for eudaimonias in 583,36. Cf. Grosseteste’s politicis felicibus (416,80).
354See Alexander Mant. §20, 159,15–168,21.
355Reading prôtê with a for prôtôn at 584,11. Cf. the Latin ‘et primo in virtuosis’.
356For this account of justice as the proportional (kata analogian) distribution according to merit (kat’ axian), see Aristotle EN 5.3, 1131a10–b24 and Michael’s comments (in EN 5, 18,1–24,22).
357583,20–1.
358Michael has ekhein at 586,27 for Aristotle’s ekhôn at 1177a34.
359Given Michael’s explication of these sunergoi, it seems more accurate to translate it with ‘contributors’ rather than ‘collaborators’.
360Changing Heylbut’s comma to a full stop at 585,11.
361Michael’s text has kai holês ekeinou ousês at 585,12. Vat. gr. 269 (345r) appears to have kai holês ekeinês ousês, which could be translated as ‘and the [soul] is whole’.
362The references are unclear. Heylbut admits quos locos voluerit non scio, though he suggests Rep. 613A, and Mercken has nothing to add. Rep. 496C–E, where Socrates compares the true philosopher in a city to a man in the company of wild animals and urges philosophers to withdraw from society and ‘lead a quiet life and do their own work’ (cf. Odysseus’ choice of life as a private individual who does his own work at Rep. 620C), is perhaps a more likely point of reference. Plato was commonly thought to subscribe to the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness and that, consequently, external goods make no contribution (e.g. Hippolytus Refutatio 20.5 and Olympiodorus in Alc. 10,12ff.), though Plato’s actual views on the value of external goods are difficult to establish with certainty (cf. e.g. T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics. A Historical and Critical Study, 3 vols, Oxford 2007–9, pp. 1.89ff.). Cf. Michael in EN 10, 601,4–5.
363Heylbut refers to 1169b3, but see also the phutikôteron-argument beginning at 1170a13.
364Michael has doxeia d’ an at 585,16 for Bywater’s doxai t’ an at 1177b1. There is no significant difference in sense.
365Heylbut refers to EN 1172b20 (and cf. 534,34–9).
366Cf. 588,36–589,4.
367kai pantos mallon alêthestaton at 585,28 is difficult. We suspect that the text needs to be changed to either kai pantos mallon alêthes estin or kai pantos allou alêthestaton, cf. pantos gar allou mallon alêthes at 510,18.
368Reading monê for monon at 585,31. Heylbut reports that monon is what he sets for the manuscripts’ mê, but monê is more likely than monon to have shortened into mê, especially in light of Aristotle’s monê di’ heautên (1177b1), which Michael cites at 585,16–17.
369The lemma does not include Aristotle’s einai at 1174b4.
370Elsewhere Michael does use the comparative eudaimonesteros, e.g. 580,30 and 590,9 (and cf. eudaimonikôteros at 577,6).
371‘Immediate contact’ translates epaphê, which is found inter alia in Neoplatonic descriptions of the superior cognition of the intellect, e.g. Plotinus Enn. 1.2.6.12–13: ê sophia men kai phronêsis en theôria hôn nous ekhei· nous de tê epaphê and Iamblichus De communi mathematica scientia VIII 33,19–20 Festa: tas te gar ideas hoionei kat’ epaphên ekhein ho nous ta ontôs onta ousas, or even superior to that of the Intellect, e.g. Plotinus Enn. 5.3.10.42–3 and 6.7.36.3–4, where Plotinus also employs it in conjunction with gnôsis: hê tou agathou eite gnosis eite epaphê megiston. Cf. also e.g. Hermias in Phaedr. 64,17 Couvreur (68,24 Lucarini and Moreschini) and 191,14 Couvreur (200,4 Lucarini and Moreschini). The term reappears at in EN 10, 589,20 and 596,11. Cf. in Metaph. 714,21.
372Deleting the ta prior to kata ta agatha at 586,16. The ta does not appear to be in Vat. gr. 269 (345v).
373Heylbut’s eupatheia might seem suspect in connection with the activity of contemplation (cf. eupragia at 590,3) but is confirmed by a parallel passage in in Metaph. 699,33–6, where Michael also describes contemplation as euzôia and refers to those who have experienced it (tois to makarion touti pathousi pathos). This coupling of euzôia and eupatheia might be derived from Plotinus Enn. 1.4.1.5. For Michael’s familiarity with Enn. 1.4, see below 598,25–599,10 and notes ad loc. Vat. gr. 269 (345v) has a lacuna here, skipping from eite euzôia to hôs ho Epikouros.
374Heylbut prints apraxia, which is effectively a synonym for skholê: leisure or non-acting. But the Latin has imperturbation, which suggests that Grosseteste was reading ataraxia, which is in any case the Epicurean ideal. Also, in what follows Michael seems to thinking of skholê as a kind of freedom from disturbance (cf. tarakhê at 587,11.15 and the conjunction of askholos and tethorubêmenos at 586,30). Vat. gr. 269 (345v) is of no help here (see preceding note).
375Michael has the plural hai energeiai at 587,4 for Aristotle’s singular hê energeia at 1177b7.
376Changing Heylbut’s full stop after ginointo at 587,17 to a comma, which finds some corroboration in Grosseteste’s Latin translation (423,59).
377all’ oukhi tous kath’ hêmas korakas. Something might have gone wrong with the text here. Diels has suggested reading kolakas for korakas, which would give us something like ‘not the flatterers among us’, but this strikes me as a marginal improvement at best. Perhaps the idea would then be that lack of leisure is a problem for those who take their civic jobs seriously, but not for those fraudsters who land these jobs but do not care about doing them well. Grosseteste has sed non eos qui secundum nos corvos (423,63).
378Michael’s text is a very close paraphrase of EN 1177b9, and the gar shows that Michael is effectively presenting it as a quotation. Michael has oudeis gar to polemein hairetai kharin tou polemein for Aristotle’s oudeis gar hairetai to polemein tou polemein heneka.
379See Aristotle Phys. 1.5, e.g. 188b21–3.
380In contrast to Michael, modern scholars (e.g. Ross, Irwin, Broadie and Rowe) usually understand kai par’ auto to politeuesthai together with peripoioumenê. In other words, this phrase is not telling us that the political man is lacking leisure even when he is not acting, but that what he is trying to achieve in political action goes beyond the activity itself.
381Heylbut’s text has pôs an ton houtôs ekhonta phêseian an tis askholon einai at 588,18, which would give us the question: ‘How could anyone say that such a man is lacking leisure?’ But this cannot be right, as is partly corroborated by the Latin qualiter utique sic habentem dicet utique aliquis vacantem esse (425,96–7). Perhaps euskholon – though this would be a hapax legomenon in Michael – or en skholê should be read for askholon. Given duplication of the particle an in the question (also found in Grosseteste’s utique … utique), we suspect that tis en skholê might have been corrupted into an tis askholon.
382The participle ousan is missing at 588,19, but it is present in Michael’s inverted quotation at 588,20, so we have inserted it back here.
383The lemma omits the men at 1177b16.
384Michael is drawing his list of elemental features from 1177b20–1, which is itself a summary of the features discussed in 1177a19–b15.
385Perhaps kata or pros should be inserted prior to auto in 589,1. Cf. 589,3 and 585,26.
386Cf. 585,25–7.
387Michael omits Aristotle’s dê prior to eudaimonia and has anthrôpô for Aristotle’s anthrôpou, but there is no significant difference in sense. Michael is reading 1177b24–5 as the apodosis of a long conditional beginning at 1177b16. Cf. his paraphrase of the conditional at 588,29–35, where his paraphrase of 1177b24–5 is the apodosis.
388The word order is inverted, but Michael’s megethei kai kallei at 589,10 is effectively a quotation of kallei kai megethei at 1177b17. Michael’s hai kat’ aretên politikai praxeis at 589,9 is picking up on Aristotle’s tôn … kata tas aretas praxeôn hai politikai at 1177b16.
389See note ad 586,10.
390See above in EN 582,21–30.
391Inserting a full stop after hairetê at 589,26.
392Whether or not a longer life increases one’s happiness or not was a common topos in ethical discussions in antiquity. Plotinus even devotes a small treatise to it (Enn. 1.5). Michael here interprets Aristotle as subscribing to the view that one’s happiness does increase with time, which is striking for at least two reasons. First, this cannot be said without qualification to be a fair construal of Aristotle’s view. Happiness, like pleasure, is an activity for Aristotle, and as such it should be complete at every moment (EN 1174a17ff.). This would also appear to be the upshot of Aristotle’s argument that the good is no more made more good by duration than white is made more white by duration (EN 1096b3–5 and EE 1218a10–15). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s demand here that happiness be given ‘a complete length of life’ (and cf. EN 1098a18 [on which see Stewart ad loc.]; 1100a5; MM 1185a4–9) stands in stark contrast to the Stoic position that the person who is happy and virtuous for a moment ‘in no way falls short of someone who employs virtue for ever and lives blissfully in virtue’ (A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols, Cambridge 1987, 63I), and Michael is focusing on this difference here. Secondly, Michael’s interpretation gives us some insight into his relationship to Neoplatonism. Plotinus argued that happiness is an activity of our intellect and as such is in the domain of timeless eternity rather than time, so that duration can add nothing. Rather than emphasizing the similarities between the views of Aristotle and Plotinus, which many scholars do (e.g. R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford 2000, pp. 240–1), Michael attributes to Aristotle a view that is directly opposed to that of Plotinus. See also in EN 10, 600,15–26 and the following notes 394, 395 and 399.
393Michael often refers to Aristotle as daimonios, e.g. in EN 5, 1,16; in EN 9, 529,4; in PA 16,13; in Metaph. 812,9–10 and 829,30.
394In contrast to the Platonists, who distinguish political virtues from virtues of character, Michael sees Aristotle and the Peripatetics as treating the two synonymously. See above 578,15–16 with the note ad loc.
395This hypothetical objector might be Plotinus. Not only does the focus on the present moment (en tô nun at 590,15; en tô nun tô enestêkoti 590,21) here resonate with Plotinus’ emphasis on the present moment in Enn. 1.5 (en tô paronti 1.5.2.10; en tô enestêkoti at 1.5.8.1–2), but Michael also twice invokes a locution reminiscient of Plotinus’ treatise (see next note). Moreover, immediately following this objection Michael introduces a final argument to the effect that more noble deeds are possible in a longer period of time (590,21–6), and this is an argument that Plotinus himself addresses in the final chapter of his treatise (Enn. 1.5.10). The view that Michael expresses here should be compared to in Metaph. 714,12–31 where he seems to adopt the very (Plotinian) position that he criticizes here.
396Here and at 590,20 Michael uses the locution ‘the extension of time’ (tês tou khronou parataseôs) which recalls the title of Plotinus’ treatise Ei en paratasei khronou to eudaimonein. See above note ad 589,30.
397We bracket hoti at 590,18, following Heylbut’s suggestion in the apparatus.
398In the expression pampolla kai megista prattein kai theôrein at 595,25 we understand pampolla kai megista as the object of both prattein and theôrein.
399Cf. Plotinus Enn. 1.5.10 and see above note 392.
400The tripartite psychology is Platonic, as is the characterization of the appetitive part as a ‘many-headed beast’ (Rep. 588C7–8 and 589B1–2) and of the spirited part as ‘lion-like’ (590A10, cf. 588D2 and 588E7).
401The content of 591,2–5 is very Neoplatonic.
402Cf. in EN 481,36 and 560,27.
403Michael’s use of the term anepistrophos here is a bit difficult. It is a Neoplatonic term that ordinarily bears negative connotations, with the prefix an- serving as an alpha primitive and a resulting meaning along the lines of ‘incapable of reversion’ (e.g. Proclus El. Theol. prop. 42 [44,20 Dodds] and 44 [46,4 Dodds]). It is possible that Michael is using anepistrophos here in the sense of being ‘unturned’ toward the sensible world (as opposed to ‘unturned’ towards the intelligible world or towards oneself, which is its usual sense), but given Michael’s language of ascent in this passage (anaphugein 591,4; akrôreian 591,5; cf. katiousan 591,3 and rhepontos 591,10), it seems likely that Michael intends the an- here not as an alpha primitive but as a contraction of compositional preposition ana (upwards, back), which would give us the sense of ‘having turned upwards’.
404Cf. EN 1170a12 and 1179b6, where Aristotle refers to Theognis, and EN 1100a11–15 and 1179a9 where he refers to Solon. Stewart ad loc. concludes that ‘the saying was evidently proverbial’ after producing a number of credible references, including Aristotle Rhet. 1394b24 (where Aristotle is quoting Epicharmus Fr. 263 Kaibel) as well as Pindar, Sophocles, Antiphanes and a further anonymous source. One must suspect that Michael is deducing that Theognis and Solon are responsible simply from the proximity of this maxim to Aristotle’s references to each of them in 1179a–b.
405That is to say, the body and the non-rational parts of soul. Note that Michael identifies intellect with reason (e.g. in EN 9, 482,19–20; in EN 10, 572,1–2), so the emphasis here is on the presence of these non-rational elements.
406Plato Theaet. 176B.
407On the illumination by God, cf. 580,20 and note ad loc.
408Heylbut’s text varies slightly from Bywater’s. Compare ei gar tô onkô smikron esti, dunamei kai teleiotêti polu mallon huperekhei (591,28–30) with ei gar kai tô onkô mikron esti, dunamei kai timiotêti polu mallon pantôn huperekhei (1177b34–1178a2). Most significant here is Michael’s reading of teleiotêti (‘completeness’ or ‘perfection’) for Bywater’s timiotêti (‘dignity’), which is corroborated by the Latin perfectione (429,23), but as Heylbut already points out in the critical apparatus, in the brief discussion that follows Michael is explaining not the completeness or perfection but the dignity of the intellect (cf. to timion at 591,33 and timiôterai at 592,1). Hence, we read timiotêti with Aristotle for teleiotêti at 591,29.
409Michael has hekaston einai for Bywater’s einai hekastos, but there is no difference in sense.
410In his comments on book 9, Michael offers a somewhat different interpretation of tinos allou at EN 1178a4. There he says, meaning by tina allon the irrational part of the soul (in EN 9, 480,28–9), but here he is taking tinos allou to be a reference to the man of politics or the man of gratification.
411Michael’s text omits hekastô at 1178a5: ‘what is proper to each by nature’.
412The reference appears to be to 1176a3ff.
413Cf. 570,8–571,11 ad 1176a3ff.
414Cf. 570,8–571,11 ad 1176a3ff.
415Note that Michael changes Aristotle’s word-order in a way that slightly alters the sense.
416Mercken refers to 1104b3–1105a13, and cf. 1106b18–23; 1121a3–4; 1172a19–23.
417The following discussion is heavily indebted to Alexander Eth. Prob. (Problem 24), especially 146,14–25. Individual instances of this are indicated in italics below. Here Alexander begins by formulating a problem: how we can say that we choose the virtues for their own sake, if they are in fact chosen in order to moderate the affections (146,14–16). He illustrates this problem by going through the virtues in the same order in which we find Michael going through them here: courage, moderation, liberality and magnificence, high-mindedness and ambition, mildness and justice. Alexander solves this puzzle (146,29ff.) by emphasizing that the virtue chosen for the sake of some mean is itself identical to that mean, but Michael shows little interest in the solution.
418See especially 1106b16–28; and cf. 1104b13–14; 1109b30; 1119a11–15; 1121a1–3. Strictly speaking, Aristotle never says that the virtues ‘moderate’ (metrein) the affections – Michael appears to be drawing this from Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,16.20 – but Aristotle does come close. He repeatedly says that the virtues are concerned with (peri) the affections (cf. 1106b16.24; 1104b13–14; 1109b30), and he says that virtue is a kind of mesotês and that it is stokhastikê tou mesou (1106b27–8). Cf. also 1166a12–13. Michael refers back to this discussion at in EN 10, 597,32–3.
419Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,16–17. Cf. Aristotle EN 1115a6–8 and 1115b17–20.
420Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,17–18. Michael calls attention to Aristotle’s restriction of temperance’s scope to the subset of bodily pleasures connected to touch (1118a9–1118b1, especially 1118a29–32). Cf. Michael’s characterization of touch at 569,21–5 as the least pure and least valuable of all of the senses, due to the domination of the material.
421Liberality and magnificence are discussed in EN 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Michael appears to be suggesting here that these two virtues are concerned with practical actions as opposed to pleasures and pains, but see EN 1120a25–30.
422Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,19–21.
423Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,21–2. High-mindedness is discussed in EN 4.3. Michael (following Alexander) appears to be using the term ‘ambition’ (philotimia) to refer to Aristotle’s nameless virtue of EN 4.4. For Aristotle himself, philotimia refers to the case of excess regarding this virtue, see 1125b21–3.
424Mildness is discussed in EN 4.5.
425Alexander Eth. Prob. 146,22–5. Justice is the subject of EN 5. Cf. Michael in EN 5, 7,31–2. For the characterization of the human being as a political animal by nature, see EN 1097b11 and Pol. 1253a7.
426Reading kai at 593,21 for Heylbut’s pai, which is a typographical error.
427The Latin translation has ex qua (431,88) for Heylbut’s hês at 593,24.
428See above 593,4–5.
429Iamblichus is usually credited with introducing natural virtue as the lowest rung on the Neoplatonic ladder of virtue, and it has been suggested that Aristotle was the source (see e.g. Westerink ad Olympiodorus in Phaed. 8.2–3 and O’Meara, Platonopolis, p. 46). The locus classicus of natural virtue in the Aristotelian corpus is EN 6.13, where Aristotle invokes a concept of physikê aretê that is supposed to stand in contrast to virtue proper. Aristotle’s remarks here and elsewhere reveal that he is in possession of some concept of virtue that is innate as opposed to inculcated (EN 1103a18–19; 1151a18–19; 1179b21–6; and MM 1197b36–1198a9). He describes human beings as in some sense possessing the virtues ‘directly from birth’ (1144b5–6), and he allows that such ‘natural states’ (physikai hexeis) belong not only to children but even to beasts (1144b8–9), accompanied by some brief discussions of the natural virtues of beasts (e.g. EN 1116b31–1117a1 and HA 608a11–21). Moreover, Aristotle’s understanding of good fortune (eutukhia), which he characterizes as a natural non-rational impulse towards good things, also effectively amounts to a kind of natural virtue (MM 1207a35–b5 and EE 7.14). At EE 1247b24–5 he characterizes such people as naturally desiring what they ought, when they ought and in the manner they ought to desire. Yet it was the Neoplatonists, not Aristotle (though cf. 1154b11–13), who explicitly connected natural virtue to the krasis of the body (e.g. Olympiodorus in Phd. 8.2.2–3; David Proleg. 38,32–39,9). It should also be emphasized that Aristotle did not think that natural ‘virtue’ should really count as virtue at all (see EN 2.1, and cf. MM 1185b38–1186a8 and EN 1116b31–1117a9). See also following note.
430The suggestion that some powers (dunameis), virtues and activities of soul depend on the mixtures of the body is reminiscient of Galen’s treatise Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur. That Michael had some exposure to QAM is clear from the fact that he points to it at in PN 135,28–30 and emphatically calls Galen polumathestatos. Shortly before that passage, Michael further notes that Alexander’s characterization of the soul given in his De anima is close to Galen’s by quoting De anima 1,2–4 (cf. in PN 135,25–8 with V. Caston, ‘Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern’, The Philosophical Review 106.3 (1997), pp. 309–63 at p. 351). Galen repeatedly hints at the differences of small children which by nature, and that is to say by means of their mixture, tend towards different virtues or vices (cf. De moribus 25 and 29 Kraus and QAM 32,14–33,5 Müller). Character traits that pertain to children by nature cannot be changed to the opposite (cf. De moribus 28 Kraus). These character traits belong to us ‘first by nature, then afterwards by habit; habit is an acquired nature, a second nature, as it were’ (De moribus 47,15–17 Kraus, translated by Davies). But Galen seems to admit that these natural character traits only belong to the non-rational parts of the soul (cf. De moribus 25 Kraus), while there is also a different kind of nobility of the soul coming from knowledge (cf. De moribus 44 Kraus) whose dependence on the mixure is not clear.
431Moving Heylbut’s second comma in 593,35 to after proteron. Cf. EN 1175a29–b1 along with 564,16–566,23 and 567,30–568,8.
432Cf. Aristotle EN 1131b12–13. And see Michael in EN 9, 462,26–8.
433Cf. Alexander Eth. Prob. 142,22ff. and Mant. 153,28ff.
434There appears to be a minor lacuna in the Greek text after sôphrôn at 594,19. Our insertion has been drawn from the Latin translation (435,90–2), regarding which Mercken notes ad loc.: per homoiotel. om. codd.
435See Aristotle EN 1144a7–9.
436For the construction to tês lexeôs, cf. Luna, Trois études, pp. 201–2.
437Reading de hautais for de autais at 595,15. Note that Bywater’s text here has d’ autai at 1178a19. We have added ‘[…]’ because Michael’s exegesis that follows pertains also to the sequel.
438Michael’s text has de at 595,24 for Aristotle’s gar at 1178a23.
439This is the summary of a thought that Michael derives from Aristotle’s PA 641a36–b12 and which he comments on at in PA 6,38–7,15. The passage in PA begins by articulating a problem: if natural science is about soul in its entirety, including both sensation and intellect, then since intellect and the intelligibles are correlated subjects, there will be nothing left for philosophy to study. Aristotle solves this problem by defining the natural philosopher’s scope – at least within the context of PA – as limited to soul insofar as it is a cause of locomotion, and to noêtikon is, Aristotle notes, not the cause of locomotion (641b7). (That nous is in fact a source of heavenly motion in Metaph. 12 is not addressed here.) In his commentary ad loc. Michael faithfully presents Aristotle’s view, but as in our passage here, he does draw the further conclusion that the study of intellect and the intelligibles belongs to theology.
440Heylbut’s text has gar at 595,29 for Bywater’s d’ an at 1178a24.
441Here (595,35) Michael paraphrases the final words of EN 1178a24–5, replacing êthikês with politikês. Cf. 595,31.
442Cf. 1177a28–9 and Michael’s explanation at 583,17–584,26: the contemplative man, on the one hand, only requires the necessary resources for the preservation of his body. Only those things that prevent his body from getting in the way of contemplation by being famished or severely ill are necessary. By contrast, the political man requires people, adversaries and certain possessions in order to be active in accordance with his virtue.
443Reading hôs for ho at 596,13.
444Michael is equivocating here between two senses of the term ‘liberal’. He justifies calling the temperate person ‘liberal’ by appealing to the cultural sense of being suitable to a free man or gentleman: his prudent behaviour is free and not forced on him by external agents or laws. (Cf. 605,24–7 below where he calls ‘liberals’ those who have not been enslaved by softness and intemperance and who were soundly raised by their educators or relatives.) But when Michael insists that the temperate man’s liberality requires money, he is using ‘liberal’ in the very different sense of being generous. This is the sense in which Michael usually employs the term (cf. 539,7–8; 13–16; 584,17–18).
445This paraphrase is close enough to warrant the quotation marks. Michael has kai toutôn at 597,9–10 for Aristotle’s tôn toioutôn at 1178b6–7.
446‘The appropriate acts’ translates ta kathêkonta, which is a term central to Stoic ethics. See Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, §59, and note that they are translating the term as ‘proper functions’. This is the only occurrence of the term in Michael, and he gives us little reason to read Stoic theory back into his use of the term here. Cf. also Elias’ definition of justice at in Isag. 8,12. Perhaps more striking than Michael’s use of this term is what follows: pros tous phoitôntas eis auton (597,10–11). In order to practice his humanity, the contemplative man does not have to go out of his way to help people; he merely has to perform the appropriate acts towards those who come to him.
447For other instances of tou hoti, cf. e.g. in PN 8,16–17; 48,12–13; 94,10–11; in PA 19,4–5; in SE 29,30.
448Cf. the entire argument of EN 10.7 (1177a12–1178a8).
449This is only a paraphrase, but Michael’s use of the nominative case requires quotation marks.
450Cf. in EN 10 593,8–25.
451This remark should be compared to Michael in EN 5, 66,4–9, where Michael frames this issue as a doctrinal difference between Plato and Aristotle. Plato, he claims, attributes virtues to the gods, whereas Aristotle does not, since doing so would saddle the gods with the affections as well. Cf. Aristotle MM 1200b14 and EN 1145a25–7. What is interesting about these two passages in Michael’s commentary on the EN is just how swiftly Michael dismisses the suggestion that virtue, and in particular individual virtues such as justice and courage, could belong to God. After all, the Neoplatonic scala virtutum was designed to explain precisely this – the special sense in which justice, courage, moderation and wisdom can be attributed to the gods. So Michael has missed the perfect opportunity to discuss the higher virtues in the Neoplatonic scala.
452Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of justice in EN 5,3–5, especially 1132b31–3. Cf. above 594,4.
453On the difference between the continent and the resistant, see EN 1150a32–b1.
454Michael’s close paraphrase of 1178b18–20 has phamen for Aristotle’s hupeilêphasin, and Michael also understandably changes the plural autous, which refers to the gods, to the singular to theion. Also, for hôsper at 1178b19 Michael has hôs. Cf. the mention of Endymion made at 573,1.
455The adverb teleiôs (‘completely deprived’1178b25) is not included in the lemma (see below note 459). The entire section that follows here is devoted entirely to this one sentence.
456The following report (598,20–34) is included in SVF 3.17, but see below note 460.
457We would like to thank Katerina Ierodiakonou for pointing out to us that Michael might not mean to be distinguishing between earlier and later Stoics, and that the alternative translation ‘and the subsequent Stoics’ might be preferable. Cf. also Cramer, Anecdota Graeca e Codd. Manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis, 244,10–11 = SVF 3.376.
458Presumably this refers to Aristotle and not Michael.
459Recall, however, that Michael does not exactly see the non-rational animals as being completely bereft of intellect. He repeatedly describes them as receiving at least an illumination of intellect, see 534,15–17 and the note ad loc. Hence, it is perhaps not merely an oversight that Michael’s lemma omits Aristotle’s teleiôs at 598,17. Cf. also 599,37–8.
460There is wide agreement among scholars of Plotinus that Michael is drawing the following section (598,25–599,10) from Plotinus Enn. 1.4.1.1–15. See e.g. P. Kalligas, The Enneads of Plotinus. A Commentary, vol. 1, Princeton 2014, pp. 164–5; K. McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia. A Commentary on Ennead I.4, Oxford 2006, pp. 42–54; and W. Himmerich, Eudaimonia. Die Lehre des Plotin von der Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen, Würzburg 1959, p. 163n2. The attribution of these arguments and positions to the Stoics and Epicureans, however, is not to be found in Plotinus and would appear to be a conjecture on Michael’s part. In light of this, qua testimonia on the Stoics and Epicureans Michael’s reports here ‘lack […] any independent historical value’, as Kalligas points out, The Enneads of Plotinus, p. 165. In the passage that follows, Michael presents us with four arguments, and we have numbered these in the translation. Michael is not slavishly copying or paraphrasing these arguments from Plotinus, but there is a clear correspondence: argument 1 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.1–3 with 4–5), argument 2 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.1–3 with 3–4), argument 3 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.8–10) and argument 4 (cf. Enn. 1.4.1.10–15). And see below note 472.
461We translate eupathein with ‘feeling good’ rather than ‘feeling well’ since the latter is usually synonymous with ‘being healthy’ and eupathein here is probably meant to be something more positive than that. The term eupathein occurs in Plotinus Enn. 1.4.1 (see note 460 above), but the connection that Michael makes here between eupathein and Epicurus is not to be found in Plotinus and appears to be spurious. In the surviving works, we find only one instance of eupatheia, and this occurs in a context (Letter to Herodotus 64) that has nothing to do with happiness. Presumably, Michael is led to this connection because he understands eupathein along the lines of having a pleasant experience. In point of fact, eupathein – or at least eupatheia – would sooner be a piece of Stoic terminology (see McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia, p. 49).
462The argument that immediately follows is concerned rather with living according to nature – not feeling good. Perhaps something has gone wrong with the text. In any case Michael does return to feeling good at 599,2.
463The following report (599,6–10) is also included in SVF 3.17, but see above note 460.
464Inserting ouk prior to ousa at 599,11, following Grosseteste’s Latin translation: non existens augmentationis et declinationis at 442,69.
465Cf. Aristotle Physics 2.1. Michael’s focus is on (iii), cf. ‘the nature responsible for producing the natural [creatures]’ (599,19).
466That is, the natural ‘happiness’ of achieving one’s zenith by becoming a healthy, fully mature adult.
467Michael talks about tina homoitêta in anticipation of homoiôma ti in 1178b25.
468See Metaph. 1074b33–5 and 1075a3–5 (cf. 1072b21). The phrasing here echoes the last line of Michael’s comments on Metaph. 1174a28–b35: autos to nooun autos to nooumenon (in Metaph. 712,36).
469Recall, however, that Michael does allow non-rational animals to partake in an illumination from intellect. See above 534,15–17 and the note ad loc.
470Michael’s lemma does not include the final words in 1178b27: tês toiautês energeias huparkhei, which we have supplied in brackets above. Cf. 600,6.
471Inserting a comma after esti at 600,3 and removing the comma after theôrousi in the next line.
472This application of the potential-actual distinction to blessedness and happiness is striking. Cf. in EN 9, 512,2–5, where Michael employs this distinction in a similar manner to distinguish between the excellent (spoudaios) and the happy (eudaimôn) person: the spoudaios is someone who has complete virtue but, because he is not active, is only potentially happy. By contrast, the happy person is actually happy because she is active. Such an application of the potential-actual distinction is not to be found in Aristotle, but it is found in Plotinus at Enn. 1.4.4.9–15, and we have already seen evidence that Michael has been consulting Enn. 1.4 (see above note 460).
473Changing the full stop after eiê at 600,7 to a raised dot.
474Here Michael appears to single out out self-contemplation as the very activity that distinguishes the divine first intellect from the human intellect. Whereas God’s contemplation is directed at Himself, ours is directed at God. This God-directed conception of contemplation fits with a number of other passages where Michael describes the highest human intellectual activity in terms of receiving an illumination from God, e.g. 580,19–22. But the present passage should be compared to 603,15–21, where Michael says that our contemplation is directed at our own minds, and that our likeness to God is to be explained in terms of self-reflection (see note ad loc.), as well as to in Metaph. 698,34–699,25 (cf. Alexander Mant. 109,23–110,3), where Michael distinguishes human intellection from divine intellection in terms of the latter’s continuity compared to the former’s intermittent nature. Elsewhere, Michael often refers to other entities as the content of contemplation, though the exact identity of these entities is unclear (see above note 8).
475The term indalma is Neoplatonic. Cf. Michael in Metaph. 697,8–11.
476Michael proposes two exegetical options, and he appears to find both of them correct. The first takes Aristotle to be making a point about the scope of the two predicates’ extensions: the class of living things for which the one predicate obtains is the same as the class for which the other predicate obtains. The second options understands this ‘extension’-talk in temporal terms: happiness obtains for as long as one contemplates. Michael’s example here of ‘six hours’ is telling, as it reveals his conception of happiness to be intermittent. One is happy only in those moments when one is contemplating. Cf. Michael’s remark above (600,4–6) that one is only potentially happy when one is not contemplating, and see above in EN 10, 589,29–590,24.
477The expression kata sumbebêkos is usually translated as ‘accidentally’ or ‘incidentally’. Michael is attempting to discern not just the exact meaning of sumbebêkos but also of kata. In this quotation we give the neutral translation of kata as ‘in accordance with’, but in what follows Michael appears to be proposing two different ways of construing kata. For the first proposal we have stuck with the neutral translation, but on the second proposal kata is clearly being construed as a synonym to dia, and so we have translated it there as ‘by virtue of’.
478The verb stephanousthai need not have political connotations; it is used more generally of the bestowing of honors, e.g. on athletes (cf. EN 1099a2–4 and EE 1219b8–10). Nevertheless, it is a striking choice of example given that Michael has been commissioned to write this commentary by Princess Anna Comnena (see the introduction). For the second example, cf. Aristotle Pol. 1268a8–11, where Aristotle reports that in many cities the children of men who had fallen in battle were maintained at public expense.
479Cf. Michael in EN 10, 585,9–14 and the notes there.
480Mercken refers here to Michael in EN 10, 583,17–29.
481Michael has krisis at 601,17 in place of Bywater’s praxis at 1179a3–4, though Bywater acknowledges that krisis is present in some MSS.
482Reading hupo for apo at 601,20.
483Reading oud’ for ouk at 601,32, as suggested by Heylbut in the critical apparatus.
484Cf. Simplicius in Phys. 1318,10–13.
485In Aristotle’s report Anaxagoras is not explicitly talking about himself but about ‘some’ (tis) happy person. Michael incorporates this tis below at 602,20: the masses see Anaxagoras as someone (tina) unhappy and strange.
486Deleting the comma before ho Anaxagoras at 602,20.
487Cf. Michael in EN 9, 528,5–6.
488Michael’s lemma includes a final einai which is left implicit in Bywater’s edition, though it is in some MSS.
489The thought here is thoroughly Neoplatonic: if A lies beneath B in the ontological hierarchy, A is not equal to B in terms of its substance, but A can become like B by virtue of its activity, that is, by turning towards B. The same thought is found, for example, in Porphyry’s Ad Gaurum 6.2 (42,17–24 Kalbfleisch). It should be noted that Michael’s in GA provides us with good reason to think that he had been exposed to at least some of the Ad Gaurum (see J. Wilberding, Forms, Souls and Embryos. Neoplatonists on Human Reproduction, New York and Oxford 2016, pp. 111–18 and T. Dorandi, ‘Pour une histoire du texte du traité Ad Gaurum attribué à Galien’, in L. Brisson et al. (eds) L’embryon: formation et animation, Paris 2008, pp. 123–37 at p. 131), but Michael was likely to have encountered this thought in other sources as well (see below note 491). Here and elsewhere (556,18 and 561,27; in EN 9, 481,32) Michael describes the human intellect as engaged in self-contemplation: it has a vision of itself and thinks itself. This should be compared to 600,7–15 above (and see note ad loc.). The ethical focus of becoming like God is central to Platonic ethics, with textual roots in Theaet. 176A–B; Tim. 90A=NE; and Symp. 207E–209E, but Michael is quite right about it also being found in the EN, especially at 1177b33: eph’ hoson endekhetai athanizein. See D. Baltzly, ‘The Virtues and “Becoming like God”: Alcinous to Proclus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004), pp. 297–321 and D.N. Sedley, ‘The Ideal of Godlikeness’, in G. Fine (ed.) Plato 2. Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul, Oxford 1999, pp. 309–28.
490This fits well with what Michael has to say about the faculty of representation in his commentary on Aristotle’s PN. There he offers a discussion of Aristotle’s claim that thinking without representation is impossible (PN 449b31–450a1; cf. DA 427b15–17 and 432a8–9), which would seem to rule out the non-representational thinking that Michael is insisting on here, but Michael distinguishes pure thought from representative thought, which he identifies with dianoia: hê gar dianoia ouden allo estin ê nou meta phantasias energeia (in PN 33,1–2). The faculty of representation prevents the intellect from thinking in a pure manner by importing magnitude and extension into the thoughts (in PN 10,21–6), and in this way it obstructs intellect’s contemplation of the intelligible and divine objects of thought (in PN 12,19–22). Michael (in PN 10,21–6) associates this imperative to rise above phantasia with Plato, as does Philoponus (in DA 2,26–3,5) who refers specifically to the Phaedo. There appears to be a scholarly consensus that the reference is to Phaed. 66D, though the phantasia is not specifically mentioned there.
491The italicized section of text is drawn partly verbatim and partly by paraphrase from Proclus in Alc. 1 245,9–247,14. This passage is briefly discussed in Steel, ‘Neoplatonic Sources’, pp. 55–7.
492Here Michael adds something that is not in the Proclus text. Cf. Plato’s description of the sensible things as ‘what is opined by opinion with non-rational sensation’ (Tim. 28A2–3). Plato does not explicitly link doxa and phantasia there, but Proclus does. Cf. note 490 on the connection between phantasia and lower forms of thought.
493On the union with the highest principle, see also 591,3 (henôsas heauton pros to prôton agathon); 579,4 and 580,14 (henôsis pros ta kreittô).
494The epopteia was the culminating act in the mysteries of Eleusis. See the note by Saffrey and Westerink ad Proclus Theol. Plat. 1.44,6 (p. 143n2). Presumably, Michael is thinking of a more general theological sense, such as is attributed to Plato by Clement of Alexandria Strom. 28.176.2, where epopteia is described as the fourth, theological division of philosophy.
495Michael omits malisth’ at 1179a20: ‘… belong most of all to the wise man’. But cf. the malista at 604,8.
496The question mark gives expression to the interrogative particle ar’. Michael’s lemma only gives the protasis and omits Aristotle’s te at 1179a33, which as Bywater reports is not included in all the MSS. Without the te, it seems right to take the kai epexigetically. Cf. 605,1–2.
497Michael use of protrepsasthai at 604,18 appears to anticipate Aristotle’s own invocation of protreptic at EN 1179b7.
498This seems to be the sense of this phrase hina mê legômen anankaion. Cf. anankaion at 604,30 and dei at 604,33.
499Aristotle’s hikanôs eirêtai tois tupois (1179a34) was omitted in the lemma at 604,11–12. Here Michael also substitutes epeidê for ei.
500One use of the expression tois tupois, cf. note 284.
501Replacing the comma after biblia in 605,5 with interrogative punctuation, as in Bywater at 1179a35.
502Changing Heylbut’s eiper at 605,13–14 to ei pôs, as printed by Bywater at 1179b3 and as appears to be written in Cod. Coisl. 161 (162r). Cf. Grosseteste’s si aliqualiter at 453,62.
503Michael’s lemma omits pros to prior to poiêsai at 1179b4–5.
504In Aristotle the term kalokagathia refers to the totality of virtue (see EN 1124a1–4, where megalopsuchia is said to be the crowning achievement of virtue that is impossible with kalokagathia, and EE 1248b8–11). We translate kalokagathia with ‘noble excellence’ and the adjectives kalos k’ agathos as ‘noble and excellent’.
505Cf. Theognis Elegies 434. Plato also cites this line in the Meno at 95E6–7.
506See EN 1172b5–7.
507Cf. EN 1094a22–3 and 1172a23–5; with in EN 531,3–6.
508Heylbut marks a lacuna after dunantai at 605,23, but Vat. gr. 269 (356r) contains an additional line of text here that presumably was accidently omitted in the copying process due to the repetition of dunantai. The text in question, which we have translated above in angled brackets, appears to read: poiêsai de kalous kagathous dikha <tou?> protrepein astheneis mallon kai adunatoi eisin. eipôn de hoti protrepsai kai parormêsai dunantai.
509Cf. EN 1150b1–6.
510Although Michael does not mention the laws here, in 608,30–609,2 he will make clear that the laws also play a central role in education.
511Regarding some of the ambiguities surrounding Michael’s use of the term eleutherios, see above note 444.
512Inserting poiêsai before êthos at 605,28 with Vat. gr. 269 (356r). Cf. Aristotle’s poiêsai at 1179b9 and Grosseteste’s facere at 454,78, and see Michael’s apotelesai kai poiêsai at 606,5.
513Here and in what follows Michael has katakôkhimon for Bywater’s katokôkhimon at 1179b9. Despite the fact that Michael’s term katakôkhimon is better attested than katokôkhimon, it is the corrupted form. See J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols, Oxford 1892, ad 1179b9.
514Michael seems to have four stages in mind here. (i) The first stage is achieved via a sound upbringing. Those at this stage are said to be ‘liberal’ (605,24–5), and because they have some conception of what is noble (606,10) as well as a sense of shame (606,12–13), they are amenable to ethical discourses and exhortations. Further below Michael will add that this stage also involves the casting off of false opinions (607,5). He classifies this stage as a kind of ‘virtue’ – albeit not true virtue – and the young person at this stage may be characterized as katakôchimon ek tês aretês, i.e. made amenable by virtue – that is, by one’s sound upbringing – for the next stages (606,1–4). This kind of ‘virtue’ is comparable to the character virtues of the Neoplatonists (see above note 319). (ii) The next stage consists in listening to these discourses, which in turn lead to (iii) practical actions. And these discourses and practical actions together lead to (iv) noble-mindedness (606,5–6), at which point we may speak of virtue in the strict sense (605,30). See also 608,20–7 below.
515Michael’s text has adunatei (606,8) for Bywater’s adunatein (1179b10).
516Heylbut has inserted pros tês kalês agôgês aidêmones ontes peitharkhousin into the text at 606,14 on the basis of the Aldine edition, but it is also present in Vat. gr. 269 (356r). Cf. also Grosseteste’s a bona ductione, verecundi existentes, oboediunt at 454,98–455,99.
517On the concept of aidos in Michael, see G. Arabatzis, ‘Michael of Ephesus on the Empirical Man, the Scientist and the Educated Man (In Ethica Nicomachea X and In De Partibus Animalium I)’, in C. Barber and D. Jenkins (eds) Medieval Greek Commentaries, pp. 163–84 at pp. 166ff.
518Vat. gr. 269 (356r) appears to have epagomenas after nomou in 606,16.
519See e.g. 1104b30–2. Mercken refers to 531,7–10.
520Cf. above 567,4–12 where Michael defines the pain opposed to activity’s proper pleasure as the pain one experiences when one is not engaged in the activity in question. This sounds like addiction, which fits well with Michael’s example here, but in 567,4–12 his examples include playing the lyre and writing, which are difficult to make sense of in this context. Possibly, he is thinking of someone who is so utterly passionate about writing that any time spent not writing is torture. If this is right, then Michael thinks that someone can also, conversely, be passionate about not writing. What is most striking about all of this is Michael’s implicit claim that there is no neutral state in these cases – only pain and pleasure – which appears to have interesing implications for his views on punishment (cf. 608,4–10).
521Reading hêdeiai with the Aldine edition and Vat. gr. 269 (356r) for Heylbut’s hêdonai in 606,22. Cf. Grosseteste’s delectabiles at 455,9. Michael’s language of there being true pleasures bears a closer affinity to Plato than to Aristotle, who prefers rather to talk of ‘natural’ or ‘per se’ pleasures (e.g. 1169b32 and 1170a1, but cf. Protrep. B92 Düring).
522See EN 1095a2–13.
523Cf. Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 173,4–8.
524Cf. 604,28–35.
525At 607,16 Michael has nomous for Bywater’s nomois and omits tên trophên kai ta epitêdeumata at 1179b34–5, which changes the sense considerably.
526Once again, at 607,20 Michael has nomous for Bywater’s nomois and omits tên trophên kai ta epitêdeumata at 1179b34–5, which changes the sense considerably.
527Michael has ginomena (with Susemihl) for Bywater’s genomena at1179b35–1180a1.
528Inserting <karterein kai> before Heylbut’s antekhein at 607,22, with Vat. gr. 269 (356v) and Cod. Coisl. 161 (163r).
529The orthês at 1180a2 is omitted in Michael’s lemma (‘a correct rearing and fosterage’).
530We insert <tou> prior to pôs at 607,31, cf. Schol. in NE (e cod. Paris. gr. 1854), 1160a22: toioutôn te khreia nomôn, kai eti tou pôs ton hapanta bion diodeuteon. Vat. gr. 269 (356v) appears to have eti to pôs.
531Michael’s paraphrase at 607,31–2 is close enough to Aristotle’s 1180a4–5 to warrant the quotation marks.
532When Michael writes ta gar enantia tôn enantiôn iamata at 608,7–8, he appears to be invoking Hippocratic doctrine, cf. De flatibus 92,8 Heiberg: ta enantia tôn enantiôn estin iêmata. Cf. Olympiodorus in Alc. 1 174,17–175,1. In this case the Hippocratic doctrine is understood to mean that we should not penalize people haphazardly but by denying them their most cherished pleasures.
533Here Michael starts off by giving what looks like a rather literal interpretation of Aristotle’s comparison of the base person to ‘a beast of burden’ (1180a2): base people should be flogged like donkeys (and cf. 609,15–16). But then Michael switches to a more metaphorical (and much less brutal) interpretation, according to which the punishment consists simply of the pains that result from refraining from base activities. The implicit assumption in the background is once again that there is no neutral state between pain and pleasure (see above 567,4–12 and 606,19–20 and the notes ad loc.).
534As Mercken (ad loc.) indicates, the reference is to 1179a31–1180a5.
535At 608,17 Michael omits the tinos prior to phronêseôs at 1180a22: ‘… from a sort of prudence …’ . The tinos is included at 609,3.
536Presumably Michael means 1180a14–21.
537This paraphrase is close enough to Aristotle’s text 1180a15–17 to warrant being marked as a quote.
538This is not the place for a full discussion of Michael’s views on the voluntary and involuntary, as there are only two very short passages in in EN 9–10 where instances of the terms ekôn and akôn occur: here and at 609,18–21. Michael has more to say about these concepts in his commentary on EN 5 (e.g. in EN 5, 49,21–50,3).
539Reading huieis for hugieis at 608,32, cf. Mercken’s filios at 460,39.
540Michael will come back to this thought in more detail in 611,31–612,2.
541Cf. Eustratius in EN 6, 350,13.
542Mercken refers to 1143b11–14.
543At EN 1143b13–14 Aristotle describes older people as having an eye formed from experience. And again in 1114b5–12 he deals with a special kind opsis that one is naturally endowed with and by which one correctly judges what is good. Cf. also the related discussion in 619,4–8.
544Even if we read agei for agein in 609,15 with the Aldine edition (and cf. Grosseteste’s ducit at 461,57), there appears to be a lacuna here.
545We have been translating biazesthai with ‘to suffer (or exercise) violence’ and bia with ‘(threat of) violence’. This is partly motivated by the wish to distinguish biazesthai and its cognates from anankazein (‘to force’) and iskhuein (‘to have power’) and their cognates, and partly by certain passages where ‘violence’ seems best to capture Michael’s meaning (e.g. 608,34–5). Yet as this remark shows, biazesthai can have the much broader sense of ‘to be forced’, which can also be said of one persuaded by an argument.
546See above note 533.
547See above note 538.
548Cf. 612,8–15.
549Michael’s lemma contains several divergences from Bywater’s text: it has dê at 610,1 for Bywater’s de; it omits the ê that Bywater inserts at 1180b25; it has poiêsthai (610,2) for pepoiêsthai (1080b26); and it does not include the final words trophês te kai epitêteumatôn (1080b26).
550As has been noted by W.L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, Oxford 1887, vol. 2, pp. ii–iii, Michael of Ephesus and Eustratius refer to Aristotle’s Pol. by the title Politeiai rather than Ta Politika, the Greek title now associated with the treatise. By way of explanation, Newman points us to a number of passages in the Pol. (1274b32; 1293b29; 1260b12; 1289a26) that describe the treatise as concerning itself with politeiai. In addition to books 3 and 4, Mercken directs us to Pol. 1269a29–1273b26, where Aristotle declares Sparta, Crete and Carthage to have the best constitutions.
551This passage is our evidence for Michael’s having written this commentary in Constantinople. See e.g. Praechter, ‘Review’, p. 902.
552The plural ekhontes at 610,13 is grammatically difficult and perhaps needs to be changed to ekhôn.
553Cf. Od. 9.114–15.
554As Mercken indicates, see Pol. 2 and especially Pol. 1269a29–1273b26.
555Michael’s lemma has malista at 610,32 for Bywater’s mallon at 1180a32, though he does not seem to make much of the malista in the comments that follow. Cf. the note ad the lemma 1180b11.
556Mercken refers to Pol. 1279a22ff. plus books 4 and 6. See above note 550.
557The dê at 611,21 is not found in Bywater’s text.
558See also below 615,15 and note ad loc.
559Michael has iskuhei at 611,31 for Bywater’s eniskhuei at 1180b4. According to Bywater’s text, ta nomina kai ta êthê are operative in the city, while hoi patrikoi logoi kai ta ethê are operative in the household. Yet as he also reports in the apparatus, some MSS make ethê operative in the city and êthê in the household (and see Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ad loc.), and this appears to be what Michael’s text has, though Michael’s text might not even contain the final kai ta êthê. Michael repeatedly associates nomoi and ethê (611,21.32.34; 612,6; 620,10). The argument for reading ethê rather than êthê in connection with the city is that customs would seem to have the greater claim to being shared than characters, and that Aristotle himself connects the two at 1181b22. If êthê is correct, then it is in the sense of ‘national character’ (Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, ad loc.).
560In what follows Michael offers two alternative solutions to a perceived tension between EN 1180b3–5 and EN 1180a18–21. On the first interpretation (611,34–6; cf. 608,30–5) in both passages the force in question is the soft power that the father has to influence his children, and the tension is alleviated by saying that the father’s sphere of influence is limited: only well brought-up children are amenable to this soft power. On the second interpretation (611,36–612,2), the tension is alleviated by distinguishing between two kinds of power: here in 1180b3–5 Aristotle is granting that the father has soft power, whereas above in 1180a18–21 Aristotle was denying that the father has any hard power worth mentioning.
561This is effectively what Michael says in 608,30–5.
562Cf. 608,34–5.
563Michael’s paraphrase of EN 1180b3–5 at 612,5–7 is close enough to warrant the quotation marks.
564Michael’s second dia at 612,9 is not found in Bywater’s text.
565On the problem surrounding the suspicion of ill-will, cf. 609,27–37. Given all the good that the father has provided for his children, the suspicion of ill-will would be wholly anomalous. The remark at the end about true goods and apparent goods might recall Aristotle’s distinction between the friend and the flatterer (1173b31–1174a1): the father is a friend, not a flatterer, because he has the genuine good of his children in mind, and not merely the appearance of good. On the asymmetric relationship between parents and children, cf. e.g. EN 1158b21–3 and Michael in EN 9, 470,13–29 and 473,7–474,3.
566Reading to aoriston with the Vat. gr. 269 (357v) for Heylbut’s to ariston at 612,21–2.
567This same example is found in Hermogenes Peri staseôn 40,11–14; 82,10–13 Rabe (and cf. Syrianus in Hermog. 194,2–195,5), and our translation owes a debt to M. Heath’s translation of Hermogenes, Hermogenes. On Issues. Strategies of Argument in Later Greek Rhetoric, Oxford 1995, pp. 34 and 55. Michael also employs this case at in EN 5, 67,10–33, again as an example of a just exception to a universal law. See also Ps.-Heliodorus (on whose identity, see J. Barnes, ‘An Introduction to Aspasius’, in A. Alberti and R.W. Sharples (eds) Aspasius. The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, Berlin and New York 1999, pp. 1–50 at p. 13) in EN 109,11–14 (translated in W.M. Hatch, The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle, London 1879, p. 295).
568With this whimsical depiction of the Spartans’ well-known practice of exercising naked (cf. Thucydides Hist. 1.6), Michael appears to be poking fun at the Spartans. Although Michael (following Aristotle) is prepared to acknowledge that Sparta is superior to many other constitutions, he still emphasizes that it is in need of serious correction (see above 610,1–19).
569In the EN Aristotle uses the adjective euphuês only three times (1114b8 and 12; 1144b34). In book 6 it turns up in the context of his remarks on natural virtue (1144b34), where he uses it to characterize the person who is naturally best suited for one virtue but not for another. (Note that while the virtues in the strict sense are mutually entailing, this is not the case with these so-called natural virtues, on which see above note 429.) It is not clear whether the two instances in book 3 should be understood in precisely this sense. Michael’s own use of the term here might prima facie seem to be wholly a matter of natural intellectual talent and to have no bearing on ethical matters, but see below 613,23–614,2.
570Michael’s paraphrase is close enough to Aristotle’s text to justify the quotation marks.
571exakribousthai generally means ‘to be made more exact or more complete’. Above in the discussion of pleasure Michael (following Aristotle) talks of a pleasure exakribein an activity, which we translated as ‘honing’ the activity. In this discussion of improving skills, ‘achieving proficiency’ seems best to capture what Michael is after with exakribousthai and the related adjective akribestês.
572Michael’s lemma has de for Aristotle’s dê (1180b11) and malista for Aristotle’s mallon (1180b11), though in his comments below Michael argues only for the comparative (cf. akribesteros at 613,17–18 and 32; mallon at 613,20, 22 and 24).
573Michael’s example anticipates Aristotle’s own example in the next lemma at 1180b14.
574Note that Grosseteste’s text here has circa pugilativam vel exercitativam vel grammaticam (467,17), to which Mercken notes that exercitativam vel is omitted in the Greek MSS due to homoioteleuton. Vat. gr. 269 (357v) supports Heylbut’s text.
575Michael’s lemma has men tou kath’ hena arista at 614,3 for Bywater’s men <an> arista kath’ hen at 1180b13–14. Note that the men has been replaced by an at 614,12.
576Reading to kath’ hekaston with Vat. gr. 269 (358r) for Heylbut’s to katholou at 614,7. Heylbut’s text does have the support of Cod. Coisl. 161 (164r) and Grosseteste (468,29–30).
577Deleting Heylbut’s second an in 614,7.
578Heylbut’s text has epimelêtheiê an at 614,12 for Bywater’s epimelêtheiê men <an> at 1180b13. Cf. above ad 614,3–4.
579Reading ho with Vat. gr. 269 (358r) for Heylbut’s hê at 614,13 (cf. ho at 614,14). Michael also has to katholou for Bywater’s katholou at 1180b14.
580On the uncertainty regarding the extent of Michael’s knowledge of medicine, see above note 11.
581It is perhaps surprising to see Michael identifying the theôrêtês with the tekhnikos, but Vat. gr. 269 (358r) confirms this in even stronger language: boulomenon tekhnikon kai theôrêtên genesthai – esti de to theôrêtikon t’auton tô tekhnikô.
582On the uncertainty regarding the extent of Michael’s knowledge of medicine, see above note 11.
583Michael appears to be reading kai gnôristeon where Bywater has ka’ keino gnôristeon at 1180b22. The text of the EN embedded in Cod. Coisl. 161 has ka’ keino gnôristeon (164v).
584On the expression aei hôsautôs ekhein, cf. 529,14–15 and the note ad loc.
585Michael’s lemma has beltious di’ epimeleias for Bywater’s di’ epimeleias beltious and elides Bywater’s de and the second eite.
586This remark about the laws being ‘unerring’ or perhaps ‘infallible’ (aptaistos) is prima facie in tension with Michael’s remarks about the deficiency that necessarily accompanies laws insofar as they are universal statements (see 611,22–8 and 612,20ff.) The latter view is clearly also Aristotle’s, see e.g. EN 5 where Aristotle states that all laws qua universals err in certain individual cases (1137b14–16) and that it is the responsibility of the ‘decent’ (epieikês) person to correct for these deficiencies (on this role of the decent person, see H.J. Fossheim, ‘Justice in Nicomachean Ethics Book V’, in J. Miller (ed.) A Critical Guide to Aristotle’s Ethics, Cambridge 2011, pp. 254–75 and C. Horn, ‘Epieikeia: the Competence of the Perfectly Just Person in Aristotle’, in B. Reis (ed.) The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics, Cambridge 2006, pp. 142–66). In his commentary on this passage in EN 5, Michael faithfully paraphrases Aristotle’s views (see especially in EN 5, 67,4–68,5, where he once again employs the example of the alien ascending the walls [see above note 567]), and there is no attempt to save the laws from this critique. The translation of aptaistos as ‘unerring’ (rather than ‘infallible’) is an attempt to assuage this tension. Perhaps Michael only means to be saying that the law is unerring – not in the sense that it infallibly orders the just outcome in each particular case – but in the sense that its orders are reliable and consistent over all cases.
587Vat. gr. 269 (358v) has diakrinein for Heylbut’s krinai at 615,18, but there is little difference in sense. Cf. diakrinein at 615,16–17.
588A close but condensed paraphrase of EN 1180b26–7. Michael’s construal of Aristotle’s diatheinai at 1180b26 is particularly interesting.
589Mercken refers us to Pol. 1288b10ff. See above note 550.
590Given how frequently both Aristotle and Michael use medical examples in their respective ethical works (see above note 11), it is certainly surprising to see that Michael has hippikês at 615,26 for Aristotle’s iatrikês (1180b27). It is possible that something has gone wrong in the transmission of Michael’s text here, but hippikês is confirmed by Grosseteste (470,85) and Vat. gr. 269. If the transmitted text is sound, then perhaps this remark about the equestrian art is best understood with reference to Michael’s remark that the legislative art is part of the political art (615,25). The equestrian art is a more appropriate analogy than medicine insofar as it, like the legislative art, is clearly subordinated to a higher art, namely generalship (EN 1094a9–14). Indeed, if we follow Aspasius (in EN 1, 4,24–7) the esquestrian art is itself subordinated to politics.
591Heylbut follows Bywater in printing the interrogative particle ar’ (with a circumflex accent) both in the lemma (615,29) and in the comments (615,31), but the particle is given with an acute accent in both the lemma and the comments in Cod. Coisl. 161 (164v) and Vat. gr. 269 (358v), as well as in the text of the EN embedded in Cod. Coisl. 161. Michael is concerned that one might be tempted to read ar’ oun as an interrogative construction, because there should be no question that we should be doing these things next. Bywater’s text, however, is surely right.
592Reading touto eipôn epêgagen with Vat. gr. 269 (358v) for Heylbut’s touto epêgagen eipôn at 615,34.
593Michael’s text has kai for Bywater’s te kai at 1180b31–2.
594Aristotle defines rhetoric as a dunamis of persuasion in Rhet. 1355b25–6, and he distinguishes it from proper tekhnai by the fact that the former has a universal scope of application, whereas with the latter each has its own determined area. Yet it is not Aristotle that Michael refers to here by hoi palaioi. It seems likely that the Gorgias rather than the Politics is in the background here. See below 616,35 and note ad loc.
595As Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, vol. 3, 131 notes, the politician and the legislator are often mentioned in combination in the Pol., e.g. 1274b36; 1288b27; 1309b35; 1326a4. See E. Schütrumpf, Aristoteles. Politik, 4 vols, Berlin 1991–2005, ad 1274b36, who sees this as a ‘Gleichsetzung’ of the two and points out that it is already to be found in Plato (Polit. 309D; Laws 638D; 688A; 693A; etc.). Cf. 619,14–15.
596Reading prosbibazei for Heylbut’s probibazei at 616,17 with Vat. gr. 269 (358v) and Cod. Coisl. 161 (164v).
597Cf. 466,36 and 617,23–4.
598Heylbut marks what follows as a quotation, since Michael is speaking in the voice of Aristotle in these lines. Although no closing quotation mark is given in Heylbut’s text, it is clear that Michael is speaking in Aristotle’s voice until 616,28.
599This translates hoi nun politeuomenoi at 616,25 (also at 616, 29 and 34, and cf. hoi politeuomenoi at EN 1181a1), where Michael’s nun must be understood as referring to Aristotle’s time, as the examples make clear. See note ad 616,18.
600Michael’s lemma leaves out the final phainontai at 1181a4: ‘For they obviously neither […]’.
601Heylbut refers to Gorg. 484D, which Mercken rightly rejects. His own suggestion of Gorg. 517B–C and 518E–519A is certainly more plausible, but Michael might simply be thinking of Gorg. 465A2–6, where Plato distinguishes between tekhnê, which can provide a logos, and empeiria, which cannot. Note how Michael unpacks Aristotle’s dunamei tini (1181a2) as empeiria kai alogô tribê at 616,26–7 (cf. alogon pragma at Gorg. 465A6). This is in any case a passage that is frequently cited by the commentators and others, e.g. Ammonius in Int. 223,7–8; Anon. in Int. 104,17–18 Taran; Asclepius in Metaph. 5,23–4; Elias in Cat. 191,19–20; Galen De experientia medica 94 Walzer; Olympiodorus in Gorg. 12,2; Philoponus in DA 54,25–6; 57,12–13; 61,33–4; Psellus Theol. 68,63–5; Syrianus in Hermog. 6,13–14. Michael frequently makes reference to the Gorg. in his in SE. See also the note ad 617,25 below.
602Michael appears to be interested in making Aristotle’s remark here conform to the latter’s three-fold division of rhetoric (Rhet. 1358b6–7): forensic (dikanikon), deliberative (sumbouleutikon) and epideictic (epideiktikon). Thus, the ‘popular’ (dêmêgorikous) speeches are understood to refer to the ‘deliberative’ speeches. This distinction is frequently invoked by commentators, who sometimes substitute panêgurikon for epideiktikon and associate each with three goals: to kalon, to dikaion and to sumperon (though sometimes one of these is replaced by to agathon). E.g. Proclus in Alc. 1 183,21ff.; Hermias in Phaedr. 219,11–19; Elias in Isag. 21,18–23; Syrianus in Hermog. (passim); David Proleg. 72,3–25. Cf. 616,32.
603We are translating Heylbut’s êdesan ta politika at 617,7 here. Vat. gr. 269 (359r) appears to have êdesan ta politika kai tên politikên epistêmên.
604Michael’s text apparently diverges from Bywater’s in one and perhaps even two ways. First, he has mallon after sunêtheias at 617,16, which Bywater omits. As Bywater himself notes, the mallon is included in some MSS, and some scholars prefer to keep it (e.g. Irwin ad loc.). Second, Michael’s text might not include the final word politikoi (1181a11). At least this might be inferred from 617,16–18, where he appears to be explaining mallon as mallon politikoi.
605Michael’s emphasis on the What-is-F? question (cf. 616,9–10.26; 617,24.25.30.32; 619,21) seems to strike a Platonic chord. The basis in Aristotle’s text for posing this question is EN 1181a22: holôs gar oude poion ti estin ê peri poia isasin. Cf. Michael’s invocation of Plato’s Gorg. above at 616,35 and the note ad loc.
606Cf. Plato Apol. 19E3–4. Note that the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) also includes Polus’ name.
607Here the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) appears to have kai logou kai peiras for Heylbut’s kai tautês at 617,27–8: ‘deprived of both theory and experience’.
608Reading estin hôsper an ei tis legei hoti hê Sôkratous kheir kai ho Sôkratês tauton ê hê arithmêtikê kai hê mathêmatikê with the Vat. gr. 269 (359r) for Heylbut’s estin ê hê arithmêtikê kai hê mathêmatikê at 617,31.
609Our translation reflects that Michael’s text omits Aristotle’s suniasin at 1181a20–1.
610Bywater’s tis at 1181b1 is omitted in Michael’s text at 618,16–17.
611Cf. the discussion in the note ad 618,12.
612Michael’s switch from the singular ‘person’ in 618,26 to the plural verb legousin at 618,27 makes it difficult to determine the subject. It is possible that Michael means for the implicit subject to be the medical books themselves (ta biblia), as he routinely uses plural verbs with neuter plural subjects. If that’s right, then he might be offering us a brief glimpse into the world of Byzantine medical texts. Yet the participles dielthontes and eipontes at 618,32–3 strongly suggest that people are the subject throughout this passage. On Michael’s medical background, see above note 11.
613The distinction between homoiomeric and organic disease is Galenic, see e.g. De methodo medendi 10.135 K. and De morborum differentiis 6.836–80 K., with B. Gundert, ‘Krankheit’, in K.-H. Leven (ed.) Antike Medizin. Ein Lexikon, Munich 2005, pp. 530–33 at p. 532.
614These are three forms of evacuation: through the veins; through the mouth, colon and bladder; and through the skin. We are reading a third dia prior to hidrôtôn at 618,32 with Vat. gr. 269 (359r).
615The text is difficult, and Vat. gr. 269 (359v) is no help here. Heylbut prints tois men empeirikois kai tois logikois hama ôphelimos (619,1–2), which must be understood as referring to two separate groups of people – those who have theory and those who have experience – saying that the division is at once useful to both groups. This seems unsatisfactory because it would have Michael conceding that some people can profit from this division even in the absence of experience. At the very least, the distinction between these logikoi and those who just read books would need more explanation. It might be possible to retain Heylbut’s text, if we read this as a reference to two schools of medicine: ‘… at once useful both to the rationalists and the empiricists’, i.e. the division is helpful regardless of your theoretical background, as long as you have experience, too. Still, it seems unlikely that Michael would use these terms in this academic sense, when he has just been discussing logos and peira in the ordinary sense. Therefore, we simply delete the second tois. The importance of experience for the physician is also underlined at in EN 5, 8,11–9,3.
616Heylbut’s text here is difficult. Vat. gr. 269 (359v) has tois iatrikois for tês iatrikês at 619,3.
617See Michael’s remarks on the ‘eye’ gained from experience at 609,7–10 (and see note ad loc.), where he identifies this eye with prudence. There is some tension between EN 1114b5–12 and 1143b11–14 as to whether this eye comes from experience or nature, which partially explains Michael’s euphuesterois here.
618Michael’s lemma reverses Bywater’s word order of anereunêton and tôn proterôn at 1181b12–13 and omits Bywater’s to at 1181b13.
619Cf. Pol. 1274a22–b28. See above note 550.
620Reading beltion with Vat. gr. 269 (359r) for Heylbut’s to beltion at 619,18.
621Cf. Pol. 2 (1260b27–1274b28) where Aristotle reviews ideal and existing constitutions and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. See above note 550.
622On the What-is-F? question, see above note 605. Cf. Pol. 1274b32–4.
623Cf. Pol. 2.1–6 (1260b27–1266a30).
624Heylbut’s hoion pôs hê dêmokratia takhtheisa, which he inserts on the basis of the Aldine edition, is also included in Vat. gr. 269 (360r).
625Heylbut and Mercken refer us to Pol. 1291b30–1292a38. Cf. also Pol. 1309b35–1310a2.
626The MSS actually present us with two rather different conclusions to the commentary, one secular and one Christian in tone. The Christian conclusion given above is a translation of the final lines of Heylbut’s text (620,15–20), which correspond to the final lines of Cod. Coisl. 161 and, with some minor variations, to the final lines of the Vat. gr. 269 (360r). Vat. gr. 269, however, actually contains an additional (secular) conclusion, as has already been noted in G. Mercati (ed.), Codices Vaticani Graeci. Tomus I. Codices 1–329, Rome 1923, p. 354. The secular conclusion is given first as a seamless continuation of the commentary, and it reads as follows (following Mercati): hôde men oun telos ekhetô, kai hai eis to kappa skholai kai auto to kappa. tauta men emoi Mikhaêl tô Ephesiô, kai houtôs, ei de tis allos ekhoi kallion legein, houtos ouk ekhthros all’ ho panaristos tôn emoi philôn esti. (‘Let the comments on book 10 and book 10 itself reach their end here. These things [have been written] by me, Michael of Ephesus, and [have been written] this way. But if someone else should be able to speak in a finer manner, this person is not hateful [to me] but my very best friend’.) The second, Christian, conclusion is appended below this one and separated off by crosses. (Mercati (ed.), Codices Vaticani Graeci, p. 354 says this is by the same hand that made other additions earlier in the MS, prior to the start of Michael’s comments on EN 10.) Two brief points may be noted here. First, it is clear from the amount of repetition that the two conclusions are meant as alternative endings. Second, the secular conclusion, if authentic, is the only place – putting the titles of his works aside – where Michael refers to himself by name and as being from Ephesus. There is only one other passage that offers evidence for Michael’s hailing from Ephesus, namely in EN 10, 570,21–2 (see note ad loc.).