Contents

Acknowledgments

Part INature and History of the Problem

2Is There a Literature on Experts?

A Simple Taxonomy

Berger and Luckmann

Defining “Expert”

3Two Historical Episodes in the Problem of Experts

The Socratic Tradition

Expert Witnesses in Law

4Recurrent Themes in the Theory of Experts

The Well-Informed Citizen

Democratic Control of Experts

Market Structure

Information Choice in the Context of the Literature on Experts

Part IIFoundations of the Theory of Experts

5Notes on Some Economic Terms and Ideas

Spontaneous Order

6The Division of Knowledge through Mandeville

The Division of Knowledge

7The Division of Knowledge after Mandeville

Menger to Hayek

Part IIIInformation Choice Theory

8The Supply and Demand for Expert Opinion

The Economic Point of View on Experts

Identifying the Commodity and Defining “Expert”

Information Choice Theory

Honest Error and Willful Fraud

The Economics of Experts Fills a Niche

The Demand for Expert Opinion

The Supply of Expert Opinion

9Experts and Their Ecology

Motivational Assumptions of Information Choice Theory

The Ecology of Expertise

Part IVExpert Failure

10Expert Failure and Market Structure

Two Dimensions of Expert Failure

Identity, Sympathy, Approbation, and Praiseworthiness

Observer Effects, Bias, and Blinding

11Further Sources of Expert Failure

Normal Accidents of Expertise

Complexity and Feedback

Incentive Alignment

The Ecology of Expertise

Monopsony and Big Players

Comments on the Market for Ideas

Epistemic Systems Design

12Expert Failure in the Entangled Deep State

Expert Failure and America’s Entangled Deep State

Closing Remarks