CLIFFORD SHORE
British Sniper, Trainer, Theorist and Historian
Captain Clifford Shore played an important role in the development of Britain’s Second World War sniping capability by establishing an effective sniper training programme. His book With British Snipers to the Reich is also regarded as one of the classic works on sniping and is still considered an essential source today, both for its historical perspective and its insights on the deployment and use of snipers.
In early 1943, Shore attempted to establish a sniping school in England, but at the time there was little interest in his suggestion. However, Shore mentioned that there were at least some sniping schools in existence prior to that time. The first he discussed was a small one in Scotland designed primarily to teach ghillies, who were already good shots and expert stalkers, the use of telescopic sights and techniques for passing on their stalking and shooting skills. At least some sniping was taught at the Commando Training Depot in Scotland as well. Although Shore later discussed why he did not feel that the typical Bisley shooter made a good sniper, he commented that a sniping school established at Bisley early in the war did turn out some useful personnel. Another school in North Wales gave sniper training, but Shore felt that the most useful aspect of this school was a two-day course for battalion commanders which taught them to appreciate the use of snipers. He considered this, in some ways, more valuable than sniper training as it helped ranking officers to understand how to employ snipers. Although he mentioned that little sniping was done by the British Expeditionary Force in 1940, at least one source claims that one of the early impetuses for establishing the first British Second World War sniping schools was the success British ‘snipers’ had in delaying German infantry advances during the evacuation at Dunkirk. This discrepancy may result from semantics as some members of the BEF may have performed well at ‘potting’ Germans even though they were not trained snipers.
Later, in the months before the D-Day landings, Shore attempted to acquire sniping rifles to equip the best marksmen in his unit, but was unsuccessful. Even his attempts to acquire a scoped rifle, military or commercial, to take into combat were not successful. As his troops embarked for landings at Normandy, he had to be content with a Lee-Enfield P14 rifle with iron sights.
Upon landing on the beachhead, Shore immediately noticed the effectiveness of German ‘snipers’, who for the most part were actually infantry marksmen rather than trained specialists. Nevertheless, their aimed fire kept units pinned down on the beach, afraid to move inland. He immediately realized what a force multiplier trained snipers could be in slowing an enemy advance. He concluded that, if these regular troops acting as marks men could create so much fear, a ‘one shot, one kill’ trained sniper could wreak havoc. Shore astutely realized that the psychological effect of trained snipers could be even greater than their actual killing effect.
After the Second World War, but before his book was published in 1948, Shore talked with combat veterans and found that overwhelmingly they feared accurate sniper fire more than mortars, artillery, bombs, or machine guns. In simple terms, troops feared the bullet that had their name on it more than those marked ‘To whom it may concern’.
As a marksman himself and with a basic understanding of sniping, Shore covered his own officer’s insignia and ordered his NCOs to cover their chevrons since snipers normally shoot for officers, radiomen, NCOs, and others whose death can disrupt a unit. However, his commanding officer countermanded his orders, thus putting the troops in greater danger. Though Shore may have under stood snipers and sniping, obviously his superiors did not. This attitude did change as the war progressed and German snipers took their toll on officers and NCOs wearing soft caps, carrying binoculars or map cases, and lacking rifles or carbines. Eventually, standard procedure dictated covering rank insignia and avoiding other clothing or equipment that identified the user as an officer or NCO.
As his troops advanced out of the beachhead, Shore made it a point to examine any sniper hides which were discovered and showed special interest in how they were sited for best fields of fire. During the advance through Belgium and Holland, Shore’s unit still encountered occasional fire from German shooters, but he doubted they were true snipers. In Belgium, at least, the local Resistance generally eliminated the snipers but, though Shore was willing to purchase one had the Resistance captured it, they never acquired a true sniping rifle.
Shore also tried to follow up the myths he encountered about German sharpshooters including that there were trained women snipers, possibly French women married to Germans, or that there were German snipers operating from treetops. There were occasional Germans encountered in the treetops, but Shore felt most were observers rather than shooters. As a marks man himself, Shore found it difficult to believe that a German marks-man could get a solid shooting position while trying to remain in a tree. Additionally, shooting from the tree would make escape after a few shots almost impossible. Nevertheless he did note that he later saw German training manuals which illustrated the use of treetops as shooting positions.
In October 1944, Shore spotted a sign for a ‘Sniper School’ near Eindhoven, Holland, and convinced his commanding officer to allow him to attend. Once this was approved and he was at the school, Shore was in his element. He found that the instructors from the Lovat Scouts regiment, many of them Highland ghillies before the war, were excellent, and threw himself into the training in stalking, observation and shooting. Shore, the oldest officer on the course, was surprised to find that some of the other officers attending were surprisingly poor shots, even with excellent coaching. He also noted that some of the sniping rifles were quite inaccurate.
The wartime shooting standard for snipers coming out of training was the ability to hit a man’s head regularly at 200 yards and a man’s torso at 400 yards. These were minimum standards and most snipers could achieve these hits at longer distances.
The Sniper School curriculum covered various subjects:
General: Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Handling of Snipers;
Observation: General, Telescope, Binoculars, Location of Fire;
Fieldcraft: Concealment, Camouflage, Movement, Stalking;
Shooting: General, Sources of Error, Zeroing, the Sniper Rifle, Dusk Firing, Holding, Elevation Table, Aiming Off – Wind and Movement, Recognition of Targets, Judging Distance, Field Firing Exercises.
Major Underhill, who commanded the school, believed that a wartime sniping school should be located as close to the front lines as possible to allow trainees to get real sniping experience. However, by the time Shore’s class was ready to graduate, the front lines were moving rapidly due to the advance into Germany. In an attempt to give the trainees some actual sniping experience they were attached to the Highland Division after the Rhine Crossings. Another advantage Shore noted of the sniping school moving along with the advancing troops was that sniper instructors could spend a day or two at a time working with front-line ‘snipers’, some of whom had actually had little training. Although Shore notes that a German bullet came close to him at one point, it was not from a real German sniper, and he had little chance to use his newly acquired sniping skills before the end of the war.
British Sniper Equipment
As recommended by the Sniper School
No. 4 Rifle (T), Denison smock, face veil, Scout Regiment Telescope, binoculars, compass, 50 rounds .303 ball, 2 No. 36 grenades, 5 rounds tracer ammunition, 5 rounds armour-piercing ammunition, water bottle, 1 emergency ration.
Shore noted that although the above equipment was recommended snipers often adjusted what they carried to the mission.
The No. 4 Rifle (T) was the standard sniping rifle worked over by Holland & Holland. In his section on British sniping rifles, Shore spoke highly of the No. 4 Mk 1 (T) and pointed out that each rifle was selected for accuracy, then fitted with two metal plates to take the telescopic sight (No. 32 TS), a cheek rest, and a special shooting sling. The No. 32 TS scope was only 3-power and incorporated a drum for elevation adjustments between 100 and 1,000 yards. The Mk 1 version of the scope allowed elevation adjustments in 50-yard increments and the Mks II and III in 100-yard increments. A windage drum (‘deflection drum’ as Shore terms it) was located on the left side of the No. 32 scope. This scope was renowned for its durability, no doubt because it had originally been developed for use on the fully automatic Bren gun. Shore made a point of noting that an important part of training the sniper was inculcating the methods of caring for the sniper rifle properly as many weapons came into the sniping school that were virtually useless after time in the field.
The Denison smock had been designed for airborne troops. It was waterproof, windproof and camouflaged and had an array of pockets and proved very popular with snipers. Face veils camouflaged in brown and green broke up the outline and colour of the sniper’s face when in a hide.
A Scout Regiment Telescope was issued to each sniper team, with the spotter normally carrying it. This was a 20-power three-draw telescope with three sets of lenses. Some snipers, including many of the Lovat Scouts, considered the Scout Regiment Telescope too bulky, but Shore felt it performed well, as the Ross telescope which was also available was only a 15-power even though it was lighter. As with rifles, Shore emphasized that snipers had to learn to maintain and take care of their telescopes, especially learning not to scratch the lens when cleaning it. In discussing the advantages of the Scout Telescope, he pointed out that it was capable of picking up troop movements at over 16 kilometres. Among other hints offered by Shore was the importance of sniper and observer alternating on the telescope every twenty minutes or so to avoid losing concentration.
Binoculars were also normally issued. The types of bin oculars varied but they were normally carried by the sniper to scan for targets using their wider field of view. Binoculars were most commonly of 7-power, but Shore notes that his were of 10-power. If he spotted a potential target he would normally alert the spotter to check it with the telescope. One excellent point made by Shore is that the binoculars were especially valuable at dusk or in moonlight because of their light-gathering ability.
The final item of ‘observation’ equipment was a prismatic compass, carried by the sniper and used for reporting observed artillery or mortar targets or other information.
The main ammunition supply consisted of fifty rounds .303 ball. This standard rifle ammunition was carried in a bandolier and used for zeroing the rifle or normal shooting. Generally, snipers were issued with the standard 174-grain Mk VII load; however, some snipers tried to obtain the 175-grain Mk VIIIz boat-tail load which was intended for use in the Vickers machine gun and gave more range. The ‘z’ indicates the use of nitro-cellulose powder. This round had the reputation of being more accurate at ranges past 300 metres. Additionally, as the front one-third of the bullet’s interior was filled with aluminium, tenite (plastic), or even compressed paper, upon impact with flesh, the back-heavy bullet would tumble causing a larger wound cavity. This bullet remained stable in flight but would have retained more killing potential at longer ranges. Whatever ammunition the sniper chose, and for which he zeroed his rifle, he tried to have a good supply so he did not have to re-zero the rifle to a new load.
Snipers were also recommended to carry two No. 36 grenades. Also known as the Mills Bomb, the No. 36 grenade was a pineapple-type fragmentation grenade, carried by snipers in case they unexpectedly stumbled upon a German position during a stalk. Many snipers did not like crawling around with No. 36 grenades in their pockets!
Snipers were also instructed to carry both tracer and armour-piercing ammunition. Five rounds of tracer were to be carried in the right trouser pocket and were intended for use in indicating a target. Shore states that he never knew of a British sniper using his tracer ammo. The left trouser pocket was used for five rounds of armour-piercing ammunition. AP ammunition was used to shoot at German machine-gun positions as it would often put the machine-gun out of action with a hit.
A standard water bottle was slung over the shoulder and carried for refreshment. However, some experienced snipers would use water to dampen ground in front of their muzzle to keep dust from being kicked up. Or, to keep their water supply, they would urinate on the area to dampen it. An emergency ration was also recommended, useful if a sniper remained in position all day.
Shore also noted that tubes of camouflage cream were available at the sniping school but that most snipers used improvised materials such as blacking from cooking pots to break up the white of their faces and often made up burlap gloves to camouflage their hands.
Almost immediately upon graduation, Shore applied for a posting as instructor at the Sniping School. By the time his assignment came through, however, the war in Europe was over, and the school, which would be part of what came to be known as the British Army of the Rhine Training Centre, was now located in Germany. Prior to assignment to the Sniping School staff, Shore found his firearms knowledge often called upon to examine and repair ‘liberated’ firearms for other soldiers.
Once he reported to the Sniping School, Shore lectured on ‘History of the British Service Rifle’, ‘Small Arms Ammunition’, and ‘Comparison of British Small Arms with Other Countries’ Small Arms’. Though his time was spent in lecturing, Shore kept his stalking skills sharp by hunting with his friends among the Lovat Scouts NCOs assigned as instructors. Later, when he ran sniping courses, he often used some of the Lovat Scouts to demonstrate the ability to move long distances on stalks without being detected.
In With British Snipers to the Reich, Shore discusses how trainees soon learned that techniques of concealment and stalking were not rocket science:
The man of average intelligence quickly saw that fieldcraft was mainly the exercise of common sense, hunter’s sense: the avoidance of breaking skylines, looking around cover, not over it; keeping in shadow, mindful that the position of shadow can change; the merging into one’s background; the avoidance of isolated or conspicuous cover and all unnecessary movement. He realized the value of camouflage, the necessity of having some contrast in colour and tone so that a disruptive effect was obtained. He was shown what practical camouflage methods he could take towards personal concealment including the head and face covered with a camouflage veil; the hands smeared with camouflage cream, mud or dirt, or gloves; the body by wearing the Denison smock which could be improved for some purposes of concealment by tufts of hessian garnish stitched onto it; some protection for the rifle could be obtained by painting it or wrapping garnish around it; the body of his telescope could be covered by a face veil or an old khaki sock with the foot cut out; the binoculars obscured by a strip of camouflage hessian tied around the front of the bracket.
Emphasis was laid on the fact he should train himself to be able to ‘pierce’ enemy attempts at concealment; this had a double purpose – he became more careful with his own forms of camouflage . . .
Throughout his time in Europe prior to attending and instructing at the Sniping School and while affiliated with the school, Shore had observed and developed his own ideas about what should be included in a sniping course. Upon return to his regiment prior to discharge, he got a chance to put his theories into practice when he was assigned to give sniper training to members of his unit.
In retrospect, Shore decided that the 10–14 day sniping courses run during the war were probably too short to give really effective training. However, they certainly proved better than no training and produced some highly effective snipers. He noted, too, that the school which moved along with the British Army in northern Europe was better organized and more effective than some others. As examples, he cited one school for troops in the Mediterranean which did not even have scoped sniping rifles. He did note, however, that the Mountain Warfare School in Lebanon incorporated sniping and stalking into its curriculum.
One of the most important conclusions Shore drew in relation to sniper training was that those acting as instructors should have combat-sniping experience. Not only did this make them more credible, especially when they were training combat veterans, but it allowed them to offer authoritative practical advice. In cases where instructors were chosen because of their ability as teachers, Shore felt they should spend at least some time on the front lines to add experience to their instructional ability. This was one reason why locating the sniper school near the front lines was highly advisable.
One aspect of the sniper to which Shore had given substantial thought was temperament and background. In With British Snipers to the Reich he commented:
But it is a fact that a sniper will kill with less conscience-pricking than a man in close combat. Personal feelings of remorse or questioning of motives will slow down a man’s critical killing instinct and the sniper who allows himself to fall into such a train of thought will not last long. It is imperative to look upon the killing of an enemy as swatting a fly, an unthinking, automatic action. Two things only should really interest the sniper – getting the job done and getting away unscathed. To become accustomed to ‘sniper killing’ is not so difficult or hard as close quarter killing. A man dies more slowly than the average person thinks; he often grins foolishly when he’s hit, the whites of his eyes roll upwards, death sweat gleams on his forehead and he sags to the ground with a retching gurgle in his throat – and it is difficult to hear that gurgle without emotion. The sniper is usually spared all this unless he’s quick enough to get his binoculars on his victim, or the ‘sniped’ is at such close range that the telescope sight will give him all the motion pictures he needs.
Sniping is not the vague, haphazard shooting of the unknown in a sort of detached combat. It is the personal individual killing of a man in cold blood, and is an art which must be studied, practised, and perfected. I often heard it said that a sniper should be a man filled with a deadly hatred of the Hun, or enemy. But I found the men that had seething hatred in their hearts for all things German, such as those who had lost their wives and children and homes in the blitzed cities, were not the type to make good rifle killers. The type I wanted was the man of cold precision, the peace-time hunter who had no hatred for his enemy but just a great interest in the stalk and the kill.
When one was in position for a shot there came an ‘inner freezing’; the breathing was not quite normal; the hearing sense was magnified and there came too that sense of excitement which all hunters know and which results in an unconscious nerve-hardening, and once the Hun was in the sight and the pointer steady at the killing spot there was no qualm of conscience about hitting him or taking life. The true hunter is never a butcher; he does not desire to kill for killing’s sake, but there is something elemental in the stalk and slaying which swamps every other feeling and makes the heart and brain exultant, and filled with action-elation.
Although British snipers were mostly involved in mobile warfare during the Second World War, Shore still emphasized the ability to build a hide or hides for situations where a sniper would be in position for any amount of time. A well-built hide would offer protection from the weather as well as concealment and should also offer the possibility of a limited amount of movement without detection. The size and structure of a hide would vary by terrain and material available. Shore emphasized that care must be taken that light would not shine from loop holes in a poorly constructed hide. Shore emphasized three warnings when shooting from a hide:
• the danger of firing from a hide at dusk or dawn when muzzle flash could give the sniper away;
• the danger of smoke showing when firing on frosty mornings and damp days;
• the need to dampen the ground outside the hide if danger of dust being thrown up existed.
A common problem noted by Shore was the tendency to build hides without enough headroom. Among possible locations he mentioned were beneath hedgerows, in rubbish heaps, in destroyed buildings, or in slit trenches with camouflage over head cover. When ruined buildings were used, it was recommended to build a rest well back from windows or loop holes so the sniper remained in shadow. Wherever the hide was built, Shore emphasized having good fields of fire and alter native hides which the sniper would use on a variable schedule.
After the war, Shore made it a point to talk with as many snipers as he could to assemble as much useful data as possible. He was particularly interested in determining the missions which snipers could perform most effectively. Among those he cited as best suited to the sniper sections assigned to British battalions were: control of no-man’s land between the British and enemy positions, elimination of enemy machine-gun crews, assumption of hidden positions in no-man’s land to snipe at enemy positions (he cited many cases of eliminating German sentries as they were entering or leaving positions), elimination of enemy artillery or other observers, elimination of officers and NCOs (British snipers were trained to recognize German and other enemy rank insignia), and making use of their spotting scopes to function as observers to gather intelligence for their own unit. Battalion officers seemed especially to appreciate the sniper’s value in dominating no-man’s land since it allowed troops to be pulled back from the front line during the daytime for rest or hot food.
Shore pointed out as well some instances where he felt snipers could be invaluable but for which they were not used very often during the war. Snipers are invaluable in the counter-sniper role to neutralize enemy snipers left behind to slow an advance. He also pointed out that use of snipers to infiltrate through enemy lines ahead of an advance, so that they could engage enemy weapons crews from the rear and eliminate them, could speed an advance and break-through dramatically.
In discussing the counter-sniper role, Shore made some interesting comments about the ‘dummy heads’ which had been widely used in the trenches during the First World War to draw enemy sniper fire so that the snipers could be located and eliminated. Although British sniper schools usually had a few of these heads, which were of high quality, in the Second World War the mobile nature of warfare rendered them of little use. Still, at times when a particularly annoying German sniper was at work, one of the dummy heads might be deployed.
The more he analysed successful deployment of snipers, the more Shore felt that a hunting background was a huge advantage. For example, he found that many skilled hunters acting as snipers could identify enemy movement by watching the reaction of animals in the area. He also noted that a good precept for British snipers was to attempt to emulate a successful poacher! When discussing snipers from various countries, he emphasized the success of those with a hunting back ground. For example, he noted how successful Norwegian mountain hunters were at sniping from the mountains at Germans in villages during the invasion and occupation of Norway. Likewise, Shore praised the skills of Finnish snipers who were skilled hunters and woodsmen.
In fact, Shore concluded that a successful background as hunter was a much better indicator of success as a sniper than marksmanship skill of the type attained on the ranges at Bisley. He felt that, in addition to learning to take a shot at a partially hidden target, hunters had developed the ability to estimate range and windage quickly and practically. His own experience was that teaching trainees about minute of angle for making elevation and windage adjustments was generally not successful for most. Additionally, hunters had a better feel for terrain and choosing shooting positions where sun would not glint on telescope lenses or muzzle blast would not throw up debris. In his discussion of how a sniper training programme should be run, Shore even suggested that hunting of game should be part of the curriculum.
Shore used some Australian snipers who were former kangaroo hunters as an example of his thesis. Many of these men killed substantial numbers of Japanese using the same skills which allowed them to place a shot carefully enough not to damage a kangaroo pelt and lower its value. He also noted that many Australian snipers were trained to shoot at longer ranges than typical British snipers. This is not to say there were not British snipers who could shoot at long range. He also mentioned a technique used at longer ranges when multiple snipers were working together. If they could not agree on the range to the target, each sniper would set his sights for the range he believed correct and all would shoot simultaneously at the enemy. Normally, at least one shot would be true. This same technique of using multiple snipers was sometimes used for very long range shots as well and often proved successful.
Shore made an interesting observation about British snipers operating against the Japanese in the tropics. Their success was noticeably less than in Europe, and Shore speculated that this was at least partially due to the fact the heat caused them to carry out their mission wearing just shirt sleeves which did not allow cushioning for the elbows or shoulder when in the shooting position. He suggested that lighter clothing of the bush-jacket type with padded elbows and shoulders would have improved performance substantially.
Shore felt that many of the tales of Soviet snipers were propaganda and that they were not as good as portrayed. He did feel there were some very effective snipers who had grown up in the Urals or Siberia and were skilled stalkers or hunters, but suggested that they were the exception. At least some of the rationale for Shores’s conclusions came from debriefing Germans after the war who had fought on the Eastern Front, many of whom claimed that they had faced few if any skilled snipers. It may be argued, however, that many of the most successful Soviet snipers fought at Stalingrad, and the Germans who had faced them were still in POW camps in the Soviet Union for many years after the war and could not be interviewed by Shore.
Always interested in sniper tactics, Shore made note of the use of Soviet snipers who would move into forward positions prior to a Soviet offensive. Once the artillery preparation of the German lines had taken place, the snipers would fire at troops preparing to meet the Soviet advance. He also noted the use of armoured shields by Soviet snipers so they could occupy forward positions. These forward Soviet snipers often sniped at machine-gun positions or used tracer ammunition to pinpoint a tank or artillery position for Soviet artillery. Shore expressed some scepticism about the effectiveness of this technique, though he did make an interesting point about use of tracer when he noted the Soviets were using white tracer which got lost against the snow, while the Germans used red tracer which showed up well against the snow.
From D-Day onward, Shore had attempted to gather information about German snipers and came to the conclusion that there were really few trained snipers deployed. Once again, this may have been because most German snipers were deployed on the Eastern Front. He did note, however, that in Italy British troops encountered some very skilled German Fallschirmjäger snipers. In discussing the tactical use of snipers, Shore commented that the Germans missed a real chance to disrupt Allied air support by not deploying a few snipers in the wooded areas surrounding the hastily built airfields from which aircraft flew in support of Allied advances. The occasional sniper kill would have made airmen and support personnel maintaining the aircraft much less free to move around the airfields and would have tied down infantry in the sniper suppression role.
On at least one occasion an instructor from the sniping school was in Italy and made at least two kills at 650 metres, a distance at which the Germans felt safe. This same instructor related to Shore a good example of the strategy that is often involved in sniping/ counter-sniping encounters:
Jerry was very keen to find out where we were; we knew that he could not see us. One day he put up a dummy target over his trench to draw our fire whilst he watched through a periscope situated nearby. Both the dummy and the periscope I picked up through my telescope, and so I am quite sure he was most disappointed at the failure of his ruse.
Next day we expected the obvious – that he would try a little bout of counter-sniping. So at dawn we watched the only piece of cover he could get to during the hours of darkness where he could snipe back at us under 300 yards range. Like a Good Little German he had done the obvious and he was there all right. One burst from a Bren which had been lined up in readiness for him finished him off before he had time to become a nuisance.
Of course, it is important to bear in mind that the Lovat Scouts, the best snipers and stalkers in the British Army, had been deployed to Italy in 1944 where their mountaineering, stalking, and sniping skills were put to good use.
Shore was a great believer in the British system of using a sniper/observer team as it enabled the observer to use his more powerful spotting scope to help the sniper find targets as well as offering psychological support to avoid some of the loneliness of sniping. Shore felt the perfect weapon for the observer was the M1 Carbine, which could be carried easily, but gave substantial firepower if needed. Debriefing Germans after the war, he found that many of them believed that the British system of using a sniper and observer team gave a definite advantage compared to German snipers. He allowed for individual preference, however, and noted that some snipers preferred to operate entirely alone.
A practical use of multiple snipers occurred along the Lamone River, where a patrol had crossed, then come under fire. Although the patrol escaped back across the river, one wounded soldier was left behind. By British use of multiple snipers, the Germans were kept from approaching the wounded soldier until a boat, under cover of the snipers, could be sent across to rescue him.
As he developed his own sniper programmes, Shore drew on his wartime experience and the experiences of others. It has already been pointed out that Shore did not feel standard bulls-eye shooting was good training for snipers other than to evaluate their marksmanship initially. He concluded that the perfect sniper training range would offer a variety of terrain which would allow training in observation, stalking and camouflage, and practical shooting at three-dimensional dummy targets. This training area should be available twenty-four hours a day so day and night training could be carried out. Also counter to standard wisdom among competition shooters, Shore believed that snipers should be taught the value of shooting from a rest as often they would have to use a rest of some type to take their shot.
In sniper courses and during demonstrations of sniper employment for battalion or higher command officers, Shore noted that an extremely useful demonstration of the ‘economy of force’ value of the sniper was having a sniper fire at targets versus a Bren gun firing at the targets at a like distance. Each was to engage six targets and, invariably, the sniper prevailed.
Shore hoped that his book would help avoid the common problem of developing a sniper training programme during wartime, then losing the skills during peacetime, to the extent that sniper rifles deteriorated in storage from lack of use and maintenance. He also hoped to argue for snipers to be included in the unit organization of an infantry battalion. Shore pointed out that in some of the units where snipers were employed most usefully, they were assigned to the support company and were under direct orders from the battalion commander through the support company commander. Placing snipers under an officer with sniper training was also deemed most effective rather than having the sniper unit commanded by an NCO who would have less ability to influence decisions on their employment. This was rarely the case, however. Standard organization of a battalion sniping section consisted of one sergeant, one corporal, two lance corporals, and four privates.
As part of sniper employment Shore was also emphatic that snipers should have clear-cut missions rather than just be sent to wander the front lines. But, at one point, he admitted that there were some very effective ‘lone wolf’ snipers who could be employed very effectively by just sending them where the action was.
Combining his own background in shooting and hunting, his sniper training, and his experiences with snipers and their rifles, Shore drew some conclusions about the characteristics of the ideal sniper rifle. Shore began his discussion by pointing out that the traditional military sniping rifle in the British forces had been a service rifle chambered for the standard service round and chosen for above average accuracy, then fitted with a telescopic sight with windage and elevation adjustments.
Shore, however, argued that a smaller calibre than .303-inch firing a lighter bullet at higher velocity, would be preferable for the sniper as it would shoot flatter and hence require less adjustment for range. He offered .276 as a likely calibre. Shore also felt that a 4-power or 5-power scope would be desirable. In discussing his ideas with experienced snipers, Shore found most agreed, though he did receive comments that they would like to see better lens covers for the scope, that they would like to see it lighter in weight, though of 4- or 5-power, and they would prefer it to be mounted by sliding on rather than the screw-on method used on the No. 4 Mk 1 (T). As an alternative to the higher-velocity .276 round, Shore also mentioned the possibility of using a high-velocity, accurate .303 round designed for snipers. Should snipers not be able to receive a supply of the special ammunition, they could still use standard service .303 ammunition.
Shore’s contribution to sniping was not in the number of kills he registered. Instead, it was in his observation and analysis of sniper training and tactics and his reportage of his conclusions in With British Snipers to the Reich. As Shore’s book did not initially appear until 1948, its influence was primarily felt in sniper training for Korea and later conflicts. However, as a sniper trainer during the Second World War, Shore did impart some of his knowledge to various snipers whom he instructed. In fact, he felt the necessity of sound instruction so important that he put off his own return to Great Britain and discharge for some weeks single-handedly to run sniper courses for NCOs in his unit.
In 1946, ‘By Command of the Army Council’ a manual titled Small Arms Training: Sniping was published to gather the information learned regarding training and use of snipers during the war. Much of the information about sniper training is obviously based on the sniper schools established during the war and which Shore had attended. Whether Shore made any contribution is unknown as no authorship is attributed. However, this manual, taken in conjunction to With British Snipers to the Reich, would undoubtedly offer a wealth of information to future trainers of snipers.
Certainly, Shore would not disagree with the section on ‘Characteristics and Training of Snipers’ early in the manual:
7. A fully trained sniper can be defined as a soldier, who is trained to locate an enemy, however well hidden, who can stalk or lie in wait for him unseen, and who is an expert shot with the rifle. His object is to kill with one round. He is the big game hunter of the battlefield, and must combine the art of the hunter, the wiles of a poacher and the skill of a target shot, with the determination to seek out his enemy.
8. He must be trained not only in rifle marksmanship, but also to a high degree in observation and in fieldcraft. Without great skill as an observer, he will seldom be able to find suitable targets; and without a comprehensive knowledge of fieldcraft, he will rarely get to a fire position within shot of his quarry; thus observation and fieldcraft must be thoroughly understood by him.
Certainly, the comments about the sniper as big game hunter or poacher could have been made by Shore but also by some of his cohorts from the Lovat Scouts. As in With British Snipers to the Reich, the publication of Small Arms Training: Sniping shows a clear intent to avoid the mistake of letting sniping knowledge and training stagnate as after the First World War.
References
As well as Clifford Shore’s own book, With British Snipers to the Reich (Greenhill Books, 1997), the following are recommended.
British Army Instructions on Snipers and Sniping (The War Office, 1946)
John Plaster, The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting (Paladin Press, 2008)
Ian Skennerton, The British Sniper: British and Commonwealth Sniping and Equipment, 1915–1983 (Privately published, 1984)