CHAPTER 1

National Interests

During the course of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand established unprecedented levels of strategic cooperation. Such cooperation, however, should not obscure the existence of significant and persistent differences during and after the conflict. All four states held different views about the future of security and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. This chapter provides a broad survey of events from the end of World War II through to the early years of the Cold War. It contrasts U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand national interests as well as regional objectives in the Asia-Pacific to show that postwar relations between all four states were not always conducive to future cooperation.1 Differences in national interests, military capabilities, economic preferences, domestic-political contexts, and security concerns repeatedly undermined cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

The United States of America

Following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States formally entered World War II. U.S. involvement was vital if the United Kingdom was to defeat Nazi Germany and withstand a Japanese assault on the British Empire. On learning of the Japanese attack, the British prime minister Winston Churchill wrote in his diary, “I knew the United States was in the War now up to the neck, so we had won after all.”2 Hitler’s decision to declare war against the United States after the events at Pearl Harbor even saved President Franklin Roosevelt the trouble of legitimizing war against Germany.³

The history of World War II is widely viewed as a global conflagration between the Allied and Axis powers. Recognizing the existence of a series of regional conflicts within a broader global struggle, however, provides a more nuanced account of events.⁴ The United Kingdom and the United States adopted a “Germany first” strategy, prioritizing the defense of the British homeland alongside Middle Eastern and Mediterranean assets. The Allies would consequently follow a holding approach in the Asia-Pacific, which would contain Japanese power until they had vanquished Germany. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to invest considerable military resources in the region. Under General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. forces in the Pacific would soon go on the offensive and wrest back control of areas occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army. Many in the British government found U.S. efforts troubling and believed that their U.S. ally should have focused on prosecuting the war in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.⁵

To promote wartime efficiency, the two powers eventually agreed to a division of labor. The United Kingdom assumed responsibility for British India and Southeast Asia and took strategic leadership in the Mediterranean. The United States took leadership in the broader Pacific region, with China also coming under its purview. As the war continued, the United States came to have a greater say in operations throughout the Mediterranean and Western European theaters. The United States would eventually insist on the opening of a second front in northern France and ensured that an American, Dwight D. Eisenhower, would act as the supreme allied commander for Allied forces invading France in June 1944. Such decisions largely reflected the United States’ growing power. On multiple military and economic indexes, from military production to spending, the U.S. dwarfed the United Kingdom.⁶ In addition, the United States alone in 1945 possessed atomic weaponry.

The shifting balance of power between the United States and its Western allies allowed the U.S. to extend its influence around the world.⁷ As David Reynolds notes, this included the Pacific, East Asia, and the Middle East, areas where the United Kingdom had tended to lead: “World War II, then, marked a decisive moment in the shift of world power, and each government often formulated policy with one eye on the Axis and the other on its rival ally.”⁸ Determining strategic priorities in the Asia-Pacific was often fraught with difficulty. Following the launch of an offensive strategy in the South Pacific in 1943, tensions between the Allies mounted as they approached Japan. The refusal of U.S. commanders to give the United Kingdom much of a say in how to manage Japan’s final defeat angered many senior officials in London. As the British field marshal Lord Alanbrooke complained in his diary, “We want a greater share in the control of the strategy in the Pacific and [the United States] are apparently reluctant to provide this share.”9 U.S. reluctance reflected reasonable concerns that the United Kingdom would prioritize reclaiming its lost Asian territories over actually defeating Japan.¹⁰ In such circumstances, British self-interest risked considerable amounts of U.S. blood and treasure.

A fundamental tension underlay disagreements concerning strategic decision making in the Asia-Pacific. Many Americans at the highest levels of office felt the British remained unable to accept that the struggle to attain and retain imperial holdings had heavily contributed to the current war. Roosevelt and Churchill repeatedly clashed on the issue of whether the United Kingdom should reclaim its fallen Asian empire after the conflict. As far as Roosevelt viewed matters, it was preferable that the peoples of the Asia-Pacific be afforded political autonomy from their European rulers. U.S. policymakers held racist views, to be sure, heightened by the barbarism of the war in the Pacific.¹¹ Roosevelt nevertheless believed that postwar stability would be better guaranteed by promoting sovereignty and self-determination. The president subsequently proposed that European colonial territories throughout the Asia-Pacific be placed under an international trusteeship, which would eventually allow former European colonies to be granted full sovereignty. Such a solution mirrored the United States’ handling of the Philippines’ approach to full independence. This proposal met fierce resistance. Churchill believed that questions about sovereignty were a decision for the British Empire, not the United States. When Roosevelt broached the subject of turning British colonies into trusteeships at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Churchill was furious about “fumbling fingers” that were “prying into British heritage.”¹²

The president quietly dropped his proposal for fear of creating a fundamental break within the wartime alliance that could hinder progress toward the strategic priority of defeating the Axis powers. More pressing concerns therefore concealed these difficulties for the time being. Nevertheless, U.S.-UK differences concerning the future of the British Empire were acute and, as the Allies appeared to be moving closer to victory, ongoing tensions intensified in the minds of Allied policymakers.¹³ Consequently, as W. M. Roger Louis explains, “the wartime archives amply reveal that the sense of historic antagonism between Britain and the United States continued to exist along with the spirit of co-operation generated by the war.”¹⁴ Churchill nevertheless downplayed such U.S.-UK tensions thereafter, even softening such differences of opinion in his published account of the history of World War II.15

The wartime meetings held at Yalta are crucial to understanding the future of the postwar world. Agreements about the partition of Germany, the future of Eastern Europe, and the nature of reparations were vigorously debated by the Allied powers. The decisions reached at Yalta were also important to the future security of the Asia-Pacific. Secret agreements reached between Joseph Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt would see the Soviet Union occupy the Japanese-held Sakhalin and Kuril islands. Agreement was reached to also allow the Soviet Union access to Port Arthur, which China then controlled.¹⁶ Stalin immediately grasped the longer-term strategic ramifications of the secret Far East agreements. Ownership of these islands would provide the Soviet Union with control over the Sea of Okhotsk and gave the Soviet navy access to warm-water ports in the east.¹⁷ Possession of these ports would allow the Soviet Union to exercise naval influence in the Pacific Ocean. Stalin was not the only one to notice the strategic benefits that possession of these islands provided to the Soviet Union. As the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee reported in March 1946, if the Soviet Union developed its naval power, its influence could now extend to the South Pacific, where it could pose “[a] major threat” to Western interests.¹⁸ U.S. concessions to the Soviet Union largely reflect the context of wartime cooperation and ambitions for the postwar world. Roosevelt sought continued Soviet cooperation against Germany and Stalin’s agreement to declare war against Japan thereafter. In addition, the president wanted Soviet support for the World Organization concept, later known as the United Nations, to which he was passionately committed. In order to achieve these ambitions, Roosevelt provided the Soviet leader with certain incentives.¹⁹

U.S.-Soviet discussions about ceding parts of the Asia-Pacific to Soviet authority occurred bilaterally. Roosevelt and Stalin had negotiated the agreement on the Sakhalin and Kuril islands without informing Churchill. Bilateral diplomacy at Yalta reflected a clear disparity in comparative military capability and economic power between the members of the Grand Alliance, which was especially pronounced in the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-Soviet discussions about placing Korea under some sort of trusteeship, which also occurred without Churchill’s knowledge, further demonstrated the comparative decline of British influence.²⁰ U.S.-Soviet bilateralism so concerned the prime minister that he subsequently insisted he sign this secret Far East agreement on hearing reports of its existence. The prime minister believed his signature would help convey the impression that the United Kingdom remained on par as a great power with the United States and Soviet Union.21

By the time of the Potsdam conference, held later that year in July and August, Harry Truman had assumed the presidency following Roosevelt’s sudden death. A change of personalities was matched by a change in strategic realities as Germany was defeated and occupied by the members of the Grand Alliance. The Allies’ focus now shifted to a European peace settlement and the conclusion of the war in the Pacific. In Truman’s estimation, the defeat of Germany alongside the United States’ possession of the atomic bomb meant that the U.S. would not have to be as accommodating to Soviet or British demands.²² There was a clear hardening in U.S. diplomacy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Potsdam thus became a “divorce settlement” between the members of the Grand Alliance. As Marc Trachtenberg explains, the agreements at Potsdam essentially meant that the United States and Soviet Union would “pull apart” from one another and divide the continent of Europe into two spheres of influence.²³ Such divisions were mirrored throughout the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. vigorously exerted its authority by steadfastly refusing to allow Soviet influence over the strategic direction of the Allied war effort against Japan. Plans for the invasion of the main home islands of Japan assumed an effort predominately led by U.S. forces, which limited the United Kingdom’s role. The use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in conjunction with the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war, brought about the hasty surrender of Japan.²⁴ The United States subsequently assumed control of Japan and its accompanying islands before the arrival of any Soviet troops.

World War II marked a watershed in U.S. foreign policy.²⁵ U.S. politicians became far more engaged in shaping international events to maintain U.S. security. Truman was certainly determined to play a central role in international affairs. The president carried out a veritable revolution in the field of foreign and national security policy. Under his orders, the government grew to include a Central Intelligence Agency, an integrated war planning bureaucracy, and a central signals interception agency. Truman effectively established the national security state. By the time he left office, foreign policy issues had become a central part of U.S. politics.²⁶

Throughout the summer of 1945, Truman made a concerted effort to implement his predecessor’s vision for the international system. The United States would stand at the center of world politics. It would become a founding member of the United Nations, hold the chair of the World Bank, and establish the dollar as the world’s premier reserve currency. In contrast to its allies, the United States had experienced an economic boom during World War II, which created enormous growth in industrial production. The global order subsequently became increasingly reliant on U.S. economic and military power.27

The restoration of a flourishing European economy became central to U.S. conceptions of a stable postwar world. One of the lessons taken from the origins of World War II was that economic imperialism and inequality had fueled the fires of nationalism and revisionist ambitions. A stable economic order, which provided opportunities for all states, would reduce the likelihood of another global war. Alongside economic prosperity, Roosevelt had hoped that international cooperation among the great powers—namely, the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China—would maintain global security. Deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations soon undermined visions of a new international order. Uncertainty about U.S. intentions did little to calm Stalin’s anxiety about aggression from the West.²⁸ Truman’s actions therefore brought about a clear hardening in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Yet there was no conscious decision taken by the president or his chief adviser and secretary of state, James Byrnes, to expel Soviet influence from the Asia-Pacific. Truman chose not to reverse the decisions reached at Yalta, explaining to the Soviet minister of foreign affairs Vyacheslav Molotov that if all parties honored their agreements there would be no quarrel.²⁹

Such hopes proved illusory as the state of U.S.-Soviet relations continued to deteriorate in the postwar period. Truman and his national security team soon came to believe that the Soviet Union posed an existential security challenge to the United States. In order to meet such a threat the Truman administration concluded that it was imperative for the United States to “contain” Soviet power and influence.³⁰ The secretary of the navy James Forrestal spoke for many in Washington when he noted that there was no point in dealing with Stalin with “understanding and sympathy” as he only understood the currency of power: “We tried that once with Hitler. There are no returns on appeasement.”³¹

Such forceful diplomacy required considerable military strength.³² Washington remained deeply concerned that its nuclear arsenal alone would be insufficient to win any future war against the Soviet Union. Following the end of World War II, the United States had rapidly demobilized its forces. By 1947, the Soviet Union had such a material advantage in military power in Europe that some U.S. policymakers demanded the return of military conscription.³³ Cooperation with other powers in Europe therefore became essential to provide the military strength necessary to withstand any potential Soviet challenge. The United Kingdom assumed special importance due to its military, economic, and political position in Europe. In a detailed State Department memorandum, the situation was set out clearly: “If Soviet Russia is to be denied hegemony of Europe, the United Kingdom must continue in existence as the principal power in Western Europe economically and militarily.”34 The United States also sought to preserve Western influence throughout the Middle East because of its significant petroleum reserves and strategic importance to U.S. national security interests.³⁵

The U.S. thus prioritized Europe and the Middle East in its efforts to contain Soviet influence but did not neglect the Asia-Pacific. World War II had encouraged the United States to take a more rigorous approach toward securing the region, especially maintaining military rights to utilize a number of Pacific islands. During the war, the United States had lacked sufficient permanent bases to station its naval and aerial forces with which to project its power against Japan.³⁶ U.S. assets had instead been stationed and deployed from islands that were captured from Japanese control or leased islands from allies including those from New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom.³⁷

Following the end of the war, the United Nations placed the formerly Japanese-controlled islands under an international trusteeship. Leases to exercise military rights on the Allied-controlled Pacific islands were also set to expire within six months of Japan’s surrender. This presented a strategic dilemma for the U.S., which wished to support the UN but also to maintain its military rights in the region into the postwar world. U.S. policymakers understood that Pacific bases would provide the United States with the necessary outposts for projecting military might throughout the region if ever required. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued, the United States should never be caught strategically unaware again as it had been in 1941.³⁸ Bases throughout the Pacific were, as the JCS reasoned in July 1945, “an inescapable requirement for United States security in the event of a failure of the United Nations Organization to preserve world peace, but that the provision of this system of bases will contribute materially to the effectiveness of that organization in maintaining peace throughout the world.”³⁹ Similar arguments were advanced the following year.⁴⁰ Following bureaucratic battles in Washington, Truman ultimately supported a compromise, creating trustee-ships for former enemy-controlled islands but with the specific condition that the United States would maintain its existing military rights.⁴¹

The United States was prepared to be as forceful as necessary with its wartime allies to acquire the rights to island bases in the Pacific Ocean. U.S. diplomats brushed aside antipodean efforts to discuss the issue, arguing that it was imperative for the U.S. to retain its military rights on these islands. When Francis Forde, deputy prime minister of Australia, brought up the matter with Truman in June 1945, the president dismissed it.42 Efforts by Carl Berendsen, New Zealand’s minister to the United States, to discreetly settle the matter failed to lead to any positive results for antipodean interests.⁴³ Australia’s minister for external affairs, H. V. Evatt, had attempted to achieve some sort of U.S. regional security guarantee in exchange for British Commonwealth cooperation over Pacific island bases, but these attempts also proved ineffective.⁴⁴ As one Australian official noted, the United States was “not discussing” the matter. The U.S. was instead demanding that the British Commonwealth simply rubber-stamp its approval for U.S. military bases throughout the Asia-Pacific.⁴⁵ Efforts by Australian and New Zealand officials to extract some sort of post-war U.S. security guarantee as a quid pro quo for allowing U.S. control over certain Pacific islands proved unsuccessful.⁴⁶

Truman gave clarity to U.S. ambitions when he publicly declared at the beginning of 1946 that the United States would continue to control the Pacific islands it had utilized in the war. By the summer of 1947, the United States administered some ninety-eight islands and island clusters under a United Nations trusteeship and secured approval for military bases on Allied-controlled territories. The trusteeship was essentially a facade; the islands were to function as U.S. military bases. As the then U.S. secretary of state George Marshall made clear in his testimony before the U.S. Senate, “We have provisions in the agreement which allow us almost complete liberty of action.”⁴⁷ This episode demonstrated that the United States was preparing to take a much more assertive approach to securing its international interests throughout the Asia-Pacific. Such rigorous diplomacy may have disgruntled officials in Canberra and Wellington, but Washington had been extremely successful at promoting its strategic interests in the region.⁴⁸

More tensions would emerge between erstwhile allies. The Truman administration promoted the ideals of free trade and sought to strengthen its economic position in the region, which brought U.S. interests into direct conflict with the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Complicating relations was the issue of the imperial preference system as practiced throughout the British Empire.⁴⁹ The U.S. State Department remained especially unhappy about exclusive Australian–New Zealand–British economic cooperation and special tariffs, which came at the expense of U.S. interests. Imperial preference could impede wider economic revival in the region, especially postwar trade with Japan, and therefore posed a threat to U.S. security ambitions. Of special concern for U.S. policymakers was Australia’s practice of entering into long-term bulk purchase agreements. Such agreements, by channeling trade and fixing prices, threatened to undermine the structure of international trade, particularly if replicated throughout the rest of the British Empire. Difficult negotiations between Britain and the United States had occurred on this issue in late 1945. London ultimately pledged to promote multilateral trade and end the system of imperial preference in the future.50 In the meantime, the U.S. would encourage relevant states to question their support for the imperial preference system.⁵¹

One of the key questions for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific, and an issue that would continually divide the Western powers, was the future of Japan. U.S. policymakers were clear that the answer would be largely determined in Washington. Dean Acheson, the U.S. secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, noted in his memoirs, “We had no intention of denying the participation that our allies, especially the Commonwealth allies who had fought the Far Eastern battles from the beginning, were entitled to. But we were determined that it should be advisory.”⁵² MacArthur, citing his ability to understand the “Asian mind,” consequently assumed de facto leadership of Japan as the supreme allied commander for the Allied powers and implemented sweeping changes to Japanese society soon after the war ended.⁵³

Mirroring concerns about the future of Germany, Truman’s advisers concluded that if Japan fell into the possession of the Soviet Union, the Communist bloc would harness its economic and industrial might and threaten U.S. interests throughout the region.⁵⁴ The primary threat posed to Japan by the Soviet Union was internal subversion, whereby an indigenous Communist party controlled by Moscow would take power, as most policymakers viewed an outright invasion as improbable. Many believed that MacArthur’s control of Japan risked internal subversion because his leadership had not brought about the economic improvements necessary to dissuade the population from being swayed into supporting Communism.⁵⁵ Assuring Japan’s economic recovery therefore became a central component of U.S. strategy for Asia-Pacific security. Following the signature of the Japanese instruments of surrender, the issue of a formal peace treaty was left unresolved. In the U.S. estimation, such a treaty was essential to end occupation and facilitate economic recovery. The peace treaty would ideally be nonpunitive and allow for Japan’s industrial revival. As such, the U.S. had adopted a pragmatic line to rehabilitate Japan in preparation for a potential Cold War confrontation in the region.⁵⁶

The United States’ commitment to the Asia-Pacific was complicated by interdepartmental rivalries, especially between the JCS, the State Department, and the White House, who disagreed about the importance of the region.⁵⁷ The Truman administration was nevertheless committed to securing a number of Pacific islands to maintain U.S. aerial and naval bases. In doing so, the United States would be suitably positioned to project its military power throughout the region if necessary.58 Yet such efforts pale in comparison to U.S. efforts throughout Europe and the Middle East where U.S. diplomats were at the forefront of establishing united economic, industrial, and, eventually, military responses to the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ The Truman administration had prioritized other concerns and had not yet established a clear foreign policy for the Asia-Pacific.⁶⁰

The United Kingdom

British policymakers had long debated whether the United Kingdom should pursue an imperial defense policy or one that focused on homeland defense. One of the perennial fears about taking a more rigorous approach to the German threat in the interwar period had been that Italy and Japan would take the opportunity of a European war to expand their own imperial ambitions. World War II proved such predictions correct. Once the United Kingdom became engaged in a fight for its survival inside Europe, Italy and Japan moved to seize Britain’s imperial possessions. The war highlighted the delicacy of the United Kingdom’s hold on its empire. By the start of 1942, the Japanese had overrun Britain’s numerous Asian assets, while Italian and German forces fought to secure possession of British interests in the Middle East and North Africa. Even maintaining a hold over India, the “jewel in the British crown,” looked far from certain following the surrender at Singapore in February 1942.⁶¹

With the adoption of the “Germany first” strategy, the United Kingdom prioritized the defense of the homeland and its interests in Africa and the Middle East over that of its Asian empire.⁶² To be sure, the United Kingdom, drawing on enormous contributions from its empire, remained engaged in heavy fighting throughout the Pacific during the war.⁶³ Sustained interest in this region was understandable. The Japanese Imperial Army had conquered large swaths of Asian territory. It had also brought about the surrender of the British army at Singapore.⁶⁴ Yet much of the burden came to fall on U.S. shoulders. When Churchill dispatched a naval taskforce to Sydney in 1944 to prepare for a planned invasion of Japan in the following year, the British fleet paled in comparison to the U.S. contribution. It is with good reason that historians refer to the British fleet in the Pacific as “attached” to the U.S. fleet.⁶⁵

Shifting geostrategic realities did not mean that the United Kingdom would suddenly relinquish its imperial holdings throughout the region. Agreement at Yalta to pursue the unconditional surrender of Japan meant that there could be no negotiated settlement of the war, which in turn committed the United Kingdom to long-term military operations in the Asia-Pacific.⁶⁶ The British government was determined to reclaim all of its imperial possessions throughout the region, for matters relating to both prestige and strategy.67 Churchill had insisted that British forces personally reclaim Singapore and Hong Kong and oversee the surrender of Japanese forces in the Dutch East Indies and Indochina.⁶⁸ By the end of the war, and in spite of the enormous cost involved and international criticism generated, the United Kingdom had reclaimed its Asian empire. As Churchill boasted in private in late 1944, “‘Hands off the British Empire’ is our maxim and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff merchants at home or foreigners of any hue.”⁶⁹

Whether the United Kingdom could retain its Asian empire in the longer term was questionable. Churchill may have hoped that the inhabitants of these territories would see the British as liberators, but the disasters of 1941–42 were difficult to erase from popular memory. The United Kingdom’s failure to provide the necessary security to these territories coupled with the brutality of the Japanese occupation in the war encouraged the growth of opinion that independence from the empire was preferable to continued British rule. The events of the war had encouraged nationalist movements throughout Asia to resist European colonial control. The British Empire, for many observers, appeared to be on borrowed time.⁷⁰

The economic consequences of World War II also presented a series of challenges to Britain’s continued hold on its Asian empire.⁷¹ The British government had become reliant on the continued assistance of the lend-lease program to support the UK economy in wartime. The Truman administration nevertheless abruptly canceled lend-lease following the surrender of Germany.⁷² As Truman would retrospectively admit, the cancellation of lend-lease had unintentionally hit the British the “hardest.”⁷³ At the end of the war, the British government owed approximately £31 billion to the U.S. Treasury, reflecting initial “cash and carry” lending and lend-lease debt.⁷⁴ Such agreements “left bills to be paid later.”⁷⁵ Following negotiations between London and Washington, the United Kingdom would agree to repay $650 million of the total $31 billion borrowed, and would receive additional loans in the post-war period, but the British economy remained in a perilous position owing to its weakened trade position and significant levels of external debt.⁷⁶ The British government could simply not afford to maintain a significant military presence all over the world.

Given the weakened state of British power, policymakers realized that they would struggle to afford another major military conflict in the near future. They believed that the likelihood of such an occurrence, however, remained low. The Grand Alliance now occupied Germany, which lay in ruins. A vanquished Italy also no longer posed a challenge to British interests in the Mediterranean. Japan, having been defeated and now occupied, posed no immediate threat to Britain’s Asian empire. The only viable challengers were now the United States and the Soviet Union. The British government never considered the United States a serious military threat, despite the U.S. taking decisions that undermined Britain’s position in Asia-Pacific, most notably its insistence on equal commercial access. Averell Harriman, who would become the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom in April 1946, accurately portrayed British thinking when he informed Washington that the British government has a “passionate desire for military and diplomatic co-operation with the U.S. coupled with the fear of [U.S.] economic power.”77

The Soviet Union presented a greater concern. Roosevelt’s decision at Yalta to allow the Soviet Union direct access into the Pacific enabled Stalin to threaten Britain’s Asian interests. Occupation of the northern half of Korea provided the Soviet Union with a strong foothold in mainland Asia. As Churchill reasoned, Stalin had achieved what his imperial ancestors had been unable to secure, namely access to the Pacific. With warm-water ports in Asia, the Soviet Union could now extend its influence into the Pacific if it chose to do so.⁷⁸ Many in the British government had seen the Grand Alliance as merely a means to an end. Cooperation entailed forgetting about the “bad blood” accrued in Anglo-Soviet relations since 1917 and focusing on the objective of defeating Nazi Germany.⁷⁹ This was manageable while Nazi Germany represented a common and supreme danger but would be difficult to maintain in the long term.⁸⁰ During the later stages of the war, Anthony Eden, Britain’s foreign secretary, confessed to a “growing apprehension that Russia has vast aims, and that these may include the domination of Eastern Europe and even the Mediterranean and the ‘communizing’ of much that remains.”⁸¹ The British military chiefs were especially alarmed about the growing power of the Soviet Union and the inability of the United States to recognize the menace posed by Stalin.⁸² Membership in the Grand Alliance can therefore be viewed as a hiatus in the Anglo-Soviet “Cold War,” which began with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.⁸³

In his memoirs, Churchill portrayed himself as the wise prophet that warned of the future menace posed by Stalin. His writing of history deliberately emphasized the growing likelihood of a Cold War. Churchill certainly did warn his peers of future trouble with the Soviet Union, and he was concerned that both Roosevelt and Truman remained hopelessly naive about Stalin’s real intentions.⁸⁴ The prime minister even ordered Britain’s military chiefs to devise a plan advocating that the Western Allies should not stop their advance across Europe until they had pushed the Soviet Union back to its pre-1939 borders. This was a fantastic policy; planning for such an operation was entitled “Operation Unthinkable.”85 Yet Churchill had also talked about how he believed he could “trust” Stalin and that Anglo-Soviet differences in the postwar world could be managed. The prime minister remained confident that he could maintain a workable partnership with Stalin into the postwar world. As Churchill put it, “Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don’t think I’m wrong about Stalin.”⁸⁶ Many key officials within the British Foreign Office shared such sentiments. For the likes of Eden, the central issue in international politics had to be resolving the “German question.” If a solution could emerge that adequately protected the interests of the Soviet Union, then there was no need for any geopolitical confrontation. All told, Churchill, along with senior policymakers inside the British Foreign Office, remained committed to working with Stalin in the postwar world.⁸⁷

British foreign policy would evolve following a change of political leadership. Prime Minister Clement Attlee came to office on July 26, 1945, following a decisive electoral victory for his Labour Party.⁸⁸ The Labour government now faced the myriad of foreign policy challenges that World War II had generated and exacerbated. The advent of nuclear weapons particularly concerned the prime minister, who noted in communication with Truman that these new weapons had the ability to “suddenly and without warning utterly destroy the nerve centre of a great nation.”⁸⁹ Fears of nuclear annihilation aside, Attlee and his foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, understood that they would have to make hard choices about Britain’s geopolitical position during their time in office. Policymakers and large swaths of the general public nevertheless clung to the belief that Britain remained a global power. Such a conclusion was reasonable given commercial interests spanning the globe, British forces stationed in over forty countries globally, and victory in World War II. Britain’s troubling financial status, however, made it more difficult to maintain such a global position. The rise of nationalist movements and increasing calls for independence throughout the British Empire presented further serious challenges to the maintenance of the status quo.⁹⁰

There were also growing challenges to the British Empire from external forces. When the Potsdam Conference ended in early August 1945, Attlee’s government found itself increasingly unwilling to continue the “appeasement” of the Soviet Union. As far as British policymakers were concerned, they had to oppose the Soviet Union resolutely.⁹¹ Even prior to the defeat of the Axis powers, British security planners had already begun to prepare for future threats around the globe. Eden, for example, had admitted that the British government held little confidence that the end of the war would usher in a system of international relations predicated on justice and negotiation rather than power.92 Bevin, Eden’s successor, largely agreed with such sentiments. Attlee, while less convinced about the danger posed by the Soviet Union, did conclude that the Soviet Union’s “ambitions were imperialistic” and it was essential for the United Kingdom to “balance Soviet influence.”⁹³

Limited financial resources coupled with war weariness restricted the options available to British strategists with which to address this perceived Soviet threat.⁹⁴ British policymakers had to maintain a global empire with fewer economic resources in a world increasingly dominated by two super-powers. One British official spoke for many when he informed Bevin, “Unless appearances are deceptive, the United States is also now groping towards a new order of things in which Great Britain, whilst occupying a highly important position as a bastion of Western European security and as the focal point of a far-flung oceanic system, will nevertheless be expected to take her place as junior partner in an orbit of power predominantly under American aegis.”⁹⁵ The United Kingdom’s role in the world was changing. The British government would now have to consider its position in a new global order.

When the British government sought to enforce their favorable prewar trade and commercial practices in China, for instance, they immediately came into conflict with the United States, which wanted the country committed to free trade.⁹⁶ British officials believed such policies would conveniently promote U.S. business and commercial interests that had secured Chinese markets when the United Kingdom’s influence had collapsed during World War II. U.S.-UK differences over the future of China would persist, but the Moscow Conference of December 1945 clearly demonstrated that Washington would have its way much to the chagrin of British policymakers. The U.S. largely ignored British complaints about commercial rights inside China and pressed ahead with its plans for fairer access for U.S. commerce in the country, overturning long-standing British trade treaties in the region.⁹⁷

Attlee and Bevin soon came to appreciate that the United Kingdom was no longer in a position from which it could face either the Soviet Union or the United States as an equal. In order to survive in this new postwar world, strategic prioritization was now essential. Such a solution would entail an uncomfortable scaling back of Britain’s global obligations. Even Churchill, who had talked on a number of occasions about his determination not to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, had come to recognize this problem.⁹⁸ His premiership recognized that while Britain retained global interests, the priority for strategic defense was now Europe and the Middle East. Europe remained an essential security and economic concern for the British government, not least because of its geographic proximity and valuable trade flows.99 Under Attlee, British policymakers also acknowledged the importance of the Middle East. The United Kingdom retained strategically important military bases throughout the region, most notably in Aden and the Suez Canal area. In addition, as Bevin put it, the Middle East was a “lake of oil” that had to remain in British hands.¹⁰⁰

Because of these factors, the British government scaled down the number of existing military bases throughout the Pacific with naval and aerial assets focused in Aden, Cyprus, Malta, and homeports.¹⁰¹ In the immediate postwar period, British Dominions, such as Australia and New Zealand, were encouraged to take a much greater share of the burden in British Commonwealth defense throughout the Asia-Pacific.¹⁰² As London informed Canberra, British planning in a global war was predicated on five key factors: securing the integrity of Commonwealth countries, mounting a strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union, holding the Soviet Union as far East as possible in Western Europe, maintaining a firm hold on the Middle East, and retaining essential sea communications.¹⁰³ It was clear in such planning that the defense of the Asia-Pacific in any global war was lower on the list of British priorities. As Attlee had earlier suggested, the United Kingdom should look at ways of directly limiting its imperial obligations by ceding ownership of certain portions of the British Empire.¹⁰⁴

As the British government prioritized its global commitments, it also sought to enhance the U.S.-UK “special relationship.” Sustaining and enhancing close relations between London and Washington now became a cornerstone of British security policy, which would aid British ambitions of containing the Soviet Union and allow greater influence over the United States to promote policies along lines more amenable to British interests.¹⁰⁵ By the end of 1946, Bevin had managed to establish an official intelligence-sharing agreement and staff talks with the United States. As Ritchie Oven-dale has noted, Bevin’s efforts led to the creation of “an informal military alliance” between the two states.¹⁰⁶ Security cooperation nevertheless remained limited in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. rebuffed British suggestions about stationing a liaison officer in Singapore and refused to open talks concerning Asia-Pacific security. Cooperation in either matter failed to serve U.S. interests.¹⁰⁷ As U.S. intelligence assessments rightly appreciated, the United Kingdom was a weakened global power and sensible British strategists would recognize that strategic priorities should lie much closer to the British Isles.¹⁰⁸

The granting of independence to India in 1947 and the partition of Palestine in 1948 highlighted the decline of the United Kingdom’s role as a great power. Attlee decided against costly and potentially embarrassing military efforts to retain control of either state. He instead concentrated resources on Western Europe and the Middle East. Indian independence represented a particularly damaging blow for British strategic influence, undermining its capacity to maintain the armed forces necessary for the projection of international power.109

The gradual decline of the British Empire, the rise of U.S. power, and the strengthening of Asian self-determination movements represent an important mix of elements in explaining the events that unfolded throughout the region following World War II. Withdrawal from India increased the attention that British policymakers placed on their other assets throughout the Asia-Pacific, with a special focus on the Communist insurgencies developing in Malaya. British military bases remained in Singapore and Hong Kong, while commercial interests spread throughout the wider region.¹¹⁰ The maintenance of imperial preference trading practices throughout the Commonwealth also ensured that significant international markets remained open to British commerce on a preferential basis.¹¹¹ The British government consequently retained a keen interest in events throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Australia

The Australian experience of World War II in the Pacific was traumatic. The disasters of 1941–42, when the British army collapsed in Singapore and the United States retreated from the Philippines, had a major impact on policy-makers in Canberra and the broader public. Australia had been left strategically exposed to Japan, an expansionist rival with greater militarily strength, yet most of its own forces were committed to fighting in northern Africa against German and Italian forces because of long-standing agreements with the United Kingdom. Japan had subsequently been able to strike the Australian mainland in 1941 and 1942, bombing Darwin and sinking naval vessels in Sydney harbor with midget submarines. The brutality of the Japanese army, and their treatment of Australian prisoners of war, compounded such trauma.¹¹² During the conflict, the United Kingdom failed to provide adequate defense in the Asia-Pacific region, which sparked an ongoing controversy about whether the United Kingdom “betrayed” Australia in 1942.¹¹³ Churchill’s private but ill-tempered reaction to the Australian prime minister John Curtin’s appeals for assistance are revealing: “London had not made a fuss when it was bombed. Why should Australia?”¹¹⁴

The British government was unwilling to refocus its resources to help defend the Australian mainland at that time. Churchill’s insistence that the U.S. should dispatch forces for Australian mainland protection so that the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) forces could remain stationed in North Africa only exacerbated tensions between London and Canberra.115 The agreement between the United States and United Kingdom in 1942 to make the defense of the Asia-Pacific region the primary responsibility of the U.S. government represents a turning point in defense policy; Australia could no longer rely solely on its defensive alliance with the United Kingdom. During World War II, it was U.S. rather than British soldiers that had flooded the cities of Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane. Well over 1 million GIs would pass through Australia during the course of the war. As Prime Minister Curtin declared to the Australian people, “Without any inhibitions of any kind, I made it quite clear that Australia looks to America [for security], free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”¹¹⁶

Such rhetoric should not obscure the fact that the U.S.-Australian alliance was a “marriage of necessity” for both parties.¹¹⁷ It would also be a mistake to assume harmonious relations followed thereafter.¹¹⁸ As the war progressed, Australia sought a greater say in Allied strategy concerning the defeat of Japan. During British Commonwealth discussions, for instance, Curtin stressed that the other powers could not automatically assume Australian support for any Allied strategy.¹¹⁹ The United Kingdom and the United States would instead have to discuss the contours of strategy and reach agreement via consultation. Curtin expected Australia to receive a greater say in alliance decision making and to be treated as an equal rather than as a Dominion within an empire.¹²⁰

Australian diplomacy was even more forthright when it came to the terms of Japanese surrender in 1945. At the request of the United States, the British government was initially invited to sign the instruments of surrender on behalf of the Dominions of the British Commonwealth. Herbert Evatt, Australia’s minister for external affairs, reacted to Australian exclusion negatively, blaming the United Kingdom for the United States’ decision.¹²¹ Tensions within the British Commonwealth soon became public. British newspapers reported that Evatt had complained about the arrogance of the Foreign Office and claimed that the Dominion minister Lord Addison lied about how the Allies would handle the Japanese surrender. Ben Chifley, who succeeded Francis Forde’s brief period as prime minister following Curtin’s death in July 1945, followed suit by dispatching a scathing letter to London that accused the British government of acting in a fashion that had relegated Australia to a “subordinate status” and had treated Australia “not on a footing of equality.”122 The prime minister’s claim had some merit, considering the limited involvement of Australia in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences despite discussions concerning the Asia-Pacific.

Evatt’s actions sparked a public relations row between Australia and the United Kingdom.¹²³ While some solace was taken in the fact that New Zealand’s prime minister Peter Fraser had “deprecated” in “round terms” the behavior of Evatt, the British government was increasingly concerned about the implications of such divisions. After further discussion, the U.S., largely as a gesture of goodwill, acquiesced to Australian demands that Canberra could sign the Japanese surrender instruments as a separate signatory. This concession was unpopular in London. Greater Australian independence and new foreign policy objectives were unwelcome developments. British officials feared this would set a precedent among other members of the empire to seek more independent foreign policies and thus contribute to the retreat of British global influence.¹²⁴

Australian confidence continued to grow on the international stage. The end of World War II had left the Australian economy in a comparatively favorable position. From the beginning of the war and in the decades that followed, the Australian economy performed ably on many indicators.¹²⁵ The Australian government made concerted efforts to address ongoing economic instabilities, strengthen national defense, and promote long-term development.¹²⁶ This latent power would also increasingly translate into military might. By the end of the 1940s, Australian defense expenditure was significant for a country of only 8 million inhabitants.¹²⁷

Chifley also prioritized economic development. He concentrated on the need to maintain full employment in face of deteriorating economic conditions abroad and the need to toe the sterling area line, especially in the light of chronic dollar shortages and doubts about U.S. support.¹²⁸ Thus, despite lingering diplomatic tensions, Australia remained largely committed to the United Kingdom in the economic realm during the immediate postwar period. Australia had vigorously opposed any efforts by the United States to dismantle the sterling bloc, which comprised the United Kingdom, its colonies, and the major Dominions with the exception of Canada, and maintained the system of imperial preference. The convertibility crisis of 1947 led Australia to tighten trading and financial connections with Britain and the rest of the sterling area. The Australian government agreed to devalue its currency in 1949 to remain a member of the sterling bloc despite increasing the price of domestic consumer items. Loyalty and self-interest explained this decision, especially as Australia generally benefited from imperial preference.129

Postwar economic cooperation with the United Kingdom contrasted with growing doubts about national security. The Australian government had been nominally independent in the conduct of foreign policy since 1931 as the Statute of Westminster provided Australia with the right to conduct foreign policy independently of the United Kingdom. The effect was delayed, however, as Canberra did not pass it into law until 1942. World War II served as the necessary catalyst for Australian policymakers to assume a more independent approach to national security.¹³⁰ The British Empire, as demonstrated early on in the war, was unable to ensure Australian security in the Asia-Pacific. As the Australian Chiefs of Staff concluded in one report, “The recent war has reduced the military and economic strength of the United Kingdom considerably, with the result that Australia can no longer rely, to the same extent, on the assistance previously provided by the United Kingdom in both these aspects.”¹³¹ Chifley and Evatt were certainly concerned with Britain’s future ability to uphold Australia’s security. The “United Kingdom has not the capacity and strength she formerly possessed,” Chifley informed his cabinet colleagues. Australia would have to assume a greater burden for its own security in the region.¹³²

Australian security planners attempted to diversify security cooperation with the creation of the ANZAC Pact in 1944, which sought to maintain and strengthen the close relations already shared with New Zealand. The Australian government also pressed its antipodean neighbor to establish joint planning forums so that regional security matters could be discussed in depth between them.¹³³ The 1945–46 Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya (ANZAM) understanding with the United Kingdom further demonstrates the growing independence of Australia in the postwar period.¹³⁴ Although never a formal defense treaty, there followed staff talks between the three British Commonwealth states, informal interchanges of global security assessments, and defense preparations and planning for the Asia-Pacific.¹³⁵

Australian officials were keenly aware that ANZAM planning was of limited value given that, without U.S. assistance in the event of a global war against the Soviet Union, there was little chance of success for the British Commonwealth powers.¹³⁶ In addition, the ANZAM understanding did not commit any of the countries to take action.¹³⁷ Nevertheless, from the perspective of Canberra, ANZAM ensured Australian leadership in conducting regional defense in the event of a war.¹³⁸ The ANZAM understanding therefore accepted that Australia had a “special role” in the region and Canberra would now take the lead in formulating and providing for its own regional security, which the British government largely welcomed.139

Canberra also led a concerted and ultimately successful effort to place Australia at the head of British Commonwealth defense planning for the West Pacific. Although the British were reluctant to surrender any control within the Commonwealth, there was little choice given the strategic and economic challenges facing the United Kingdom. As Evatt argued in discussion with the British, only by allowing Australia to take the lead in securing its own regional security could a repetition of the “embarrassments” of 1939 and 1942 be avoided.¹⁴⁰ Accordingly, Australian diplomats managed to convince their British counterparts that they, and not British planners, should take the lead in formulating the plans for Asia-Pacific defense.¹⁴¹

Australian efforts at securing formalized postwar military cooperation with the U.S. would prove less successful. The government looked to exploit the fact that the United States sought permission from Australia to build military bases on a number of Pacific islands. Canberra’s thinking was premised on the idea that they could use this U.S. ambition as political leverage to convince Washington to provide formalized military cooperation. As Evatt outlined to the prime minister, they should “see that if United States gets the use of facilities they will be required in return to give us definite and tangible benefits of a Defence character.”¹⁴² The Truman administration was determined to secure military base rights throughout the Asia-Pacific but was unprepared to offer defense commitments to interested parties as a quid pro quo. When Chifley visited Truman in May 1946 he did briefly raise the subject of creating a formal security pact for the Asia-Pacific, but he found little U.S. enthusiasm. Efforts by Evatt in the following year would prove equally unsuccessful.¹⁴³

The absence of any formalized security cooperation between the United States and Australia in the Asia-Pacific did little to help growing differences about the necessity of regional security planning and the nature of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The British and U.S. governments concluded that the Soviet Union presented the fundamental challenge to global security and undertook defense planning in response to this presumed threat. Accordingly, their efforts would focus on the defense of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. The Chifley government, however, remained focused primarily on regional security. When the British suggested that Australia should assume strategic defense responsibilities for British Commonwealth interests throughout the rest of the Asia-Pacific, the Chifley government refused.¹⁴⁴ Canberra did not accept that the Soviet Union posed the geopolitical threat that London and Washington claimed.¹⁴⁵ Such different interpretations about the nature of the Soviet threat resulted in uncooperative policies. In response to the Washington Conference of February 1946, Chifley made it clear that “if the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments feel they are committed to going ahead with the Washington conference, the Australian Government must reserve all rights in regard to conclusions which may be reached.”146

Indeed, Chifley’s position back in Canberra was one of increasing skepticism about the hardening attitudes of Washington and London vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Australian prime minister was determined to maintain a neutral position in what was turning into a global Cold War. Some Australian policymakers believed that international cooperation with the Soviet Union was possible and rejected U.S. and British assumptions about the emerging threat. Many in the Australian government deemed such attitudes overly aggressive, risking disaster for both Australia and the interests of the British Commonwealth.¹⁴⁷ Chifley and Evatt believed that the United Nations should assume a far greater role in the conduct of international affairs.¹⁴⁸ Under their leadership, Australian foreign policy sought to emphasize ideas of justice in the settling of international disagreements.¹⁴⁹

The Australian government consequently assumed an uncooperative attitude when it came to alliance building inside Europe. Chifley publicly and privately suggested that any European security alliance would justly be viewed as a provocation in Moscow and would actually destabilize the security situation in Europe. Such criticism from Canberra was clearly unwelcome in London. Officials inside the Dominions and Commonwealth office believed criticism of recent British alliance-building efforts within Europe to be “destructive,” “unpleasant,” and “inaccurate.” Chifley’s position certainly contrasted with the more positive attitudes of other Commonwealth states, including the governments of Mackenzie King of Canada and Peter Fraser of New Zealand.¹⁵⁰

When London sought public support for the Western European Union (WEU) concept, which would bring about a military alliance between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, Chifley’s government refused to oblige. Not only did the Australian leadership believe that the WEU was unlikely to prove helpful, but noted that the United Kingdom and United States had conducted their negotiations about European and Middle East security planning without any type of consultation with Australia. As Chifley complained, “We are very concerned to see developments in United Kingdom government policy … undertaken and practically crystallized before we were even informed.”¹⁵¹ The plans of the Truman administration to turn former colonies into “trusteeships,” as opposed to according them full independence, also attracted the opposition of the Chifley government. As Evatt informed Washington, he had predicated Australia’s rejection on “reasons of justice.”152

The Australian leadership rejected British Cold War strategies, accusing the Attlee government of forgetting its spiritual basis in foreign policy and of pursuing a foreign policy based solely on material and strategic concerns.¹⁵³ Canberra’s criticism of both British and U.S. Cold War strategy did not sit well in either London or Washington. Evatt was seen as an irritation in both capitals. One U.S. analyst speculated whether Evatt’s vocal opposition to U.S.-UK Cold War policies was genuinely driven by his appreciation of the threats posed by the Soviet Union or rather by his egotism, which meant he desired the publicity that such opposition generated to advance his own political agenda inside Australia.¹⁵⁴ Ultimately, Evatt’s criticism was of little consequence as both London and Washington pushed ahead with their alliance-building efforts in Europe.

Chifley’s position on other matters did have a far more direct effect on British interests, however, not least when it came to the security of the Middle East. British security planners desired commitments from British Commonwealth countries to either station forces in the Middle East or to dispatch them to the region in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. The Chifley government refused to commit, station, or dispatch Australian forces in the Middle East in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. It believed that such efforts would be a misdirection of resources and an unnecessary provocation of the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁵

Anglo-Australian relations failed to improve when the British government pressed ahead with its support for the Marshall Plan and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Evatt suggested that U.S. ambitions were motivated by “mercenary greed.” The United States, he argued, was becoming a global hegemon to which the British Commonwealth was becoming increasingly subservient. Evatt explained to the British that he had recently refused a loan from the United States in order to prevent Australia becoming a “slave to U.S. financers.” Instead of pursuing the alliance with the United States, the Australian foreign minister suggested that the three socialist governments of the Commonwealth—namely the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada—should seek to pursue a “third way” in the Cold War between Soviet Communism and U.S. capitalism. The Australian prime minister agreed with this “third way” approach to international affairs and encouraged Evatt to push his ideas in discussion with the British.¹⁵⁶

The Chifley government had also rejected the familiar method of acquiescing to British policy decisions in order to influence strategy from within. As a case in point, Evatt’s response to the issue of who should have veto rights in the Far East Commission, which governed Japan, is illuminating: “My Government desires to point out that the implication of the veto provision is that in relation to the Pacific and South East Asia, Australia’s status is to be regarded as in some way inferior to that of other powers.” The foreign minister explained, “Australia is not only a member of the Security Council but its sustained and decisive contribution to victory against Japan—fully recognized by your Government—entitles it to be regarded as a party principal in all Pacific affairs.”157 When the United States sought to move ahead with a Japanese peace treaty in the Asia-Pacific in 1949, it again brought a strong rebuke from Canberra concerning Washington’s apparent unilateralism.¹⁵⁸ The Australian government was determined not to be ignored in the postwar world.¹⁵⁹

The governments of John Curtin and Ben Chifley ushered in an increasingly independent foreign policy based on an assessment of Australian rather than British Commonwealth interests. Nevertheless, Australia remained party to a number of agreements with the United Kingdom that tied the two countries together.¹⁶⁰ There were also no viable alternatives to continued reliance on the United Kingdom. As Australian policymakers well understood, the United States would not yet provide the type of security guarantees that Australia desired. Only the United Kingdom and New Zealand appeared willing to help uphold the existing interests of the British Commonwealth and, in turn, contribute toward Australian security.¹⁶¹

The Chifley government looked to sustain or enhance existing ties with Britain. For example, MI5 and its Australian counterpart, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), regularly exchanged intelligence. Work was also undertaken to establish an Australian version of the Joint Intelligence Bureau so that it could coordinate strategy for defending Southeast Asia with its British counterpart.¹⁶² Australia also undertook elements of cooperation that supported U.S.-UK strategic ambitions. The prime minister committed to missile testing inside Australia, for instance, and approved the building of new facilities. He did so without reaching agreement with London as to whether these tests or buildings were required or how they would be funded.¹⁶³ In addition, the Chifley government was determined to create formal and permanent security cooperation institutions between the United Kingdom and the Dominion powers. Between 1946 and 1949, Australian officials and the wider defense bureaucracy repeatedly pushed for such cooperation.¹⁶⁴

The Chifley government, which had been the most charitable in its assessments of Soviet intentions, had become increasingly alarmed about the threat posed by Stalin’s Soviet Union, not least following the Soviet-sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948. By now, Australian intelligence assessments stressed that the Communist threat to Australian security had become more pronounced because the Soviet Union was focusing its attention on Southeast Asia. As the Australian Joint Intelligence Committee argued, “A threat to the zone will be as a consequence of hostile moves in the Far East by the U.S.S.R. with the collaboration of communist controlled China and the pro-Soviet factions in French Indochina, Malaya and Burma.”165 Australian appreciation of the Soviet threat now aligned with the assessments of the U.S. and British intelligence communities. Indeed, there was growing cooperation between all three states.¹⁶⁶ Preventing Communist domination of Southeast Asia was now emerging as a major strategic ambition of Australian foreign policy.

Given the relative power differences between Australia and the Soviet Union, it was only natural that Canberra would look for multilateral solutions to its strategic dilemma. One solution was to establish some sort of Asia-Pacific security pact with which to bring both the United Kingdom and United States together in defense of the region. Australian diplomacy consequently centered on creating this new organization with Chifley pressing both his British and U.S. counterparts to formulate a comprehensive strategy for maintaining Asia-Pacific security. Such calls, however, fell on deaf ears. Both the Attlee and Truman administrations argued that they did not have the resources to enter such an Asia-Pacific security alliance. More to the point, as London and Washington stressed, they had accorded strategic prioritization to Europe and the Middle East. Such insights provide a subtle challenge to the existing interpretations concerning the nature of Chifley’s foreign policy. While often skeptical about the dangers posed by Communism, and often assuming positions that London and Washington deemed unhelpful, his actions nevertheless drew Australia into the Cold War. Thus, the coming to power of the Menzies government does not signify the beginning of Australia’s Cold War as often suggested.¹⁶⁷

New Zealand

New Zealand’s experience of World War II was in many ways unique among the Western powers.¹⁶⁸ The country never endured attacks on its home islands, and its air and ground forces were overwhelmingly committed to the European and Mediterranean theaters respectively; only the Royal New Zealand Navy committed the bulk of its strength to operations in the Pacific. Postwar calculations indicated that the ratio of killed per million of population was the highest of any country in the British Commonwealth.¹⁶⁹

Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia and the subsequent collapse of British forces in Singapore in 1942 sent a shockwave throughout the country, which would go on to experience an invasion scare later that same year. New Zealand’s worries were understandable, but Japan had never seriously considered an invasion at that stage of the war. Still, New Zealand warmly welcomed support from the United States against the Japanese. Some 100,000 U.S. troops would arrive between 1942 and 1944, and New Zealand became a base of operations for U.S. forces fighting in the Solomon Islands campaign of 1942–43. These experiences demonstrated the importance for New Zealand of securing a military alliance with the United States in the postwar period.

New Zealand’s postwar economic fortunes also represented somewhat of a contrast to Australian growth and British relative decline. Growth rates remained consistent with those of the prewar period, although the country faced ongoing balance of payments difficulties.170 New Zealand remained a relatively wealthy country. The war actually helped stave off a potential default to external creditors in 1939 and ultimately reduced national debt ratios dramatically.¹⁷¹ The government had funded its war effort via a mix of taxation, spending controls, and rationing. The consequence, however, was a fall in the terms of trade during the war years. Import costs rose but there was limited adjustment in the prices of goods sold to Britain. The country still depended on export industries to supply equipment and materials needed for an increasing population with high living standards. As such, New Zealand remained committed to existing trade practices established with the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth. Cooperation was also motivated by concerns regarding the growing economic importance of the United States and its influence over international finance.¹⁷²

Despite this strategic and economic context, New Zealand demonstrated increasing independence in foreign and security policy. In contrast to its entry into World War I, for instance, New Zealand independently declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Australia instead accepted that the king’s declaration of war applied to all of the Dominions. The decision between the United Kingdom and the United States to seek the unconditional surrender of Japan and the eventual public articulation of this in the form of the Cairo Declaration in December 1943 was a further case in point. Throughout 1942 and 1943, Wellington, as well as Canberra, demanded that London consult them on how to best wage the war against Japan.¹⁷³

New Zealand increasingly enjoyed strategic independence in the post-war world.¹⁷⁴ The ratification of the Statute of Westminster into law in 1947 allowed the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth to exercise their foreign policies independently of the United Kingdom. New Zealand soon exercised its independence over the question of a Japanese peace treaty. Although the eventual defeat of Japan allayed many immediate security concerns in Wellington, the onset of the Cold War and U.S. efforts to reindustrialize Japan stirred anxieties about a resurgent rival in the region. New Zealand, as an independent signatory to the Japanese instruments of surrender, resisted the idea of a lenient Japanese peace settlement.175

Given the inadequate security commitments to the Asia-Pacific region provided by the United States or the United Kingdom, New Zealand policymakers believed that the continued occupation of Japan was essential for regional security so as to prevent a repetition of the military disasters of 1941–42. The brutality with which the Japanese military conducted itself toward Allied troops operating in the Pacific theater, especially toward prisoners of war, only magnified these concerns. Policymakers and the public in New Zealand were strongly opposed to the reindustrialization of Japan without adequate economic and security safeguards in place.¹⁷⁶ Strategic concerns coupled with domestic pressure help explain why successive New Zealand governments placed the future of Japan at the forefront of their thinking.

The New Zealand Department of External Affairs (DEA) summarized its position clearly: “The history of Japanese preparations for aggression, the evidence that militarist projects won almost unanimous support of Japanese politicians, businessmen and workers, and the record of Japanese atrocities upon uniformed soldiers and defenseless civilians, makes it imperative that our primary aim should be to impose the most rigorous security control upon Japan.”¹⁷⁷ The DEA held little hope for cooperation between these two different countries: “The lesson that we must draw from our experience is that no action we might take is in itself likely to make the Japanese feel goodwill for us, and any trust we put in Japanese promises or good faith or peaceful intentions is likely to prove misplaced.”¹⁷⁸ Yet recent events provide only a partial explanation for anxiety about a resurgent Japan. Underlying New Zealand’s attitude to Japan and the wider Asia-Pacific, and much in keeping with Australia, Britain, and the United States, was a sense of cultural superiority, deeply embedded in the national consciousness through more than a century of imperialism, comparative prosperity, and racial exclusiveness.¹⁷⁹

The concept of a broad Asian security pact remained unappealing to New Zealand.¹⁸⁰ In July 1948, London had informed Wellington of its intention to establish under the United Nations Charter a series of regional pacts that would provide a global system of collective security.¹⁸¹ New Zealand’s prime minister Peter Fraser was clear that he did not envisage how this would act as a solution to New Zealand’s security concerns. In the same month he said, “Any regional association intended to include New Zealand should consist of countries having full confidence in one another, as is happily the case with those northern powers…. There are countries in Asia with which our relations, though we hope they will always be friendly, cannot be expected to have the intimate character necessary for a genuine security grouping.”182 Fraser’s clear preference was for an alliance with the Western powers in the region. “In order that a regional association might effectively contribute to our security,” he concluded, “it should in our view comprise the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, ourselves and only such other countries having interests in the Pacific area as may seem to us (and we to them) deserving of full confidence.”¹⁸³ Attlee informed Fraser that a Pacific pact would “develop” but, crucially, only if the “need arose,” which the British prime minister suggested it would not for the time being.¹⁸⁴

In addition to disagreements about security planning between New Zealand and the United Kingdom in the Asia-Pacific, there were also subtle but important strategic tensions between Australia and New Zealand. Fraser and his foreign minister, Alister McIntosh, shared concerns that Australia’s growing power would force New Zealand into assuming strategic policies that did not support its best interests. As the New Zealand high commissioner in London warned: “Australia [has] just come of age and throwing her weight about and likely to get us into more trouble than she gets us out of.”¹⁸⁵ Fraser also took great personal delight in pursing opposite policies to Australia at times, so that Wellington could “embarrass” Canberra.¹⁸⁶ The antipodean powers were evidently not always united on security issues.

It would nevertheless be a mistake to exaggerate Wellington’s differences with Canberra, London, or Washington. Maintaining close cooperation with these Western powers remained the central objective of New Zealand security policy. New Zealand policymakers, often in contrast to their antipodean neighbors, were largely in agreement with U.S. and British interpretations of the dangers posed to Western interests by the Soviet Union. New Zealand’s relative economic and military weakness meant that it remained reliant on existing security arrangements with both the United Kingdom and Australia if it was to assure its security vis-à-vis the revival of Japanese or Asian militarism, the latter in the guise of Soviet-sponsored Communist threats.¹⁸⁷ In addition, New Zealand’s policymakers were aware that the country’s economic vitality relied on continued access to British Commonwealth markets. Good relations with the United Kingdom were thus crucial for New Zealand’s economic prosperity and future security.¹⁸⁸ As one New Zealand official noted, New Zealand was “tied to the coat-tails of Britain and Australia.”189 New Zealand policymakers were also increasingly concerned about the superpowers’ growing influence on the global stage. The British Commonwealth needed to be strengthened so that it could stand on par with both the United States and Soviet Union and thus safeguard New Zealand’s long-term security and economic interests.

As New Zealand’s Joint Planning Committee observed in May 1947: “The strategic interests of New Zealand in the Pacific area cannot be disassociated from those of the British Commonwealth since N[ew] Z[ealand] is not an independent entity in affairs of world security. She could not, if standing alone, defend herself against a major invasion, nor unaided keep open those sea communications upon which her vital export trade depends.”¹⁹⁰ New Zealand policymakers believed that the antipodean powers would have to accept a greater burden of providing for regional security in the postwar world. As noted in discussion with Australian security planners, “Both Australia and New Zealand were in agreement that the Dominions would have to afford more assistance for Commonwealth defence than in the past.”¹⁹¹

New Zealand sought the centralization of foreign policy and strategic planning alongside the pooling of resources to ensure its long-term security, but other members of the Commonwealth opposed increased levels of coordination and cooperation.¹⁹² Given the lack of common British Commonwealth strategy, New Zealand remained reliant on the United Kingdom’s security guarantee despite reservations about its effectiveness.¹⁹³ Wellington was keen to retain close ties with London and there were few viable alternatives, especially as the framework of a truly global organization that could arbitrate international disputes failed to materialize due to the escalation of the Cold War. Ultimately, the Fraser government concluded that “until the United Nations could be made effective, the Commonwealth would have to seek self-defence through traditional means.”¹⁹⁴

Ongoing cooperation came at a cost. The United Kingdom requested that New Zealand continue to commit military forces to the defense of the Middle East. The United Kingdom, the traditional protector of Australia and New Zealand, saw the “front line” in any global war involving the Soviet Union as existing in the Middle East and Europe.¹⁹⁵ The British Chiefs of Staff accepted that New Zealand should ensure its own defense first, but in the absence of any serious threats, the bulk of the army and air force should be sent to the Middle East in war, while the navy would guard the sea routes. British requests exceeded the size of New Zealand forces at the time. The Labour government of Peter Fraser, as well as the successor national government of Sidney Holland that took office in December 1949, were nevertheless willing to meet these requirements. Both of New Zealand’s major political parties stressed the importance of good relations with Britain and the Commonwealth throughout the early Cold War.196

New Zealand was eager to retain close ties with the United Kingdom but also identified most imperial interests as its own. Much of the country was suspicious of perceived attempts by Australia, Canada, and South Africa to weaken the bonds of empire.¹⁹⁷ New Zealand committed significant resources to the defense of the Middle East, which included the introduction of compulsory peace-term military service following a referendum in early 1949 and an agreement to dispatch forces within seventy days.¹⁹⁸ As Ian McGibbon has noted, “The attention of all three [military] services was inevitably focused on the Middle East.”¹⁹⁹ Policymakers in New Zealand believed that Australia’s focus on the ANZAM region did not necessarily better promote their interests than committing to the Middle East.²⁰⁰ As noted by senior New Zealand officials, the vital theater of operations would be in the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Western Europe in the event of a global war. In essence, New Zealand policy planners agreed with British assumptions about the strategic importance of the Middle East and were prepared to provide the necessary assistance for helping to maintain British Commonwealth interests in these areas.²⁰¹

New Zealand’s security relationship with the United States was patchy in the absence of any formal mechanisms for the exchange of military information, joint planning, or staff talks.²⁰² As Fraser candidly admitted, onlookers could hardly expect his country to compel the United States to enter a security alliance with New Zealand. Australian efforts to convince the Truman administration to do just that had proven unsuccessful. If Canberra could not extract improved security cooperation with Washington, then Wellington was unlikely to fare any better.²⁰³ The United States was simply uninterested in entering either a bilateral or a trilateral security pact at that time. Consequently, New Zealand was fully committed to maintaining its existing security cooperation with the United Kingdom via expensive commitments to the Middle East and Mediterranean.²⁰⁴

Nevertheless, New Zealand remained interested in forging a security relationship with the United States. A U.S. State Department assessment of antipodean defense policy ably captures this shift. “The impact of the war,” the document stressed, “has brought an awareness of the strategic dependence of New Zealand and Australia upon the U.S. for defense in the Pacific and of the importance of maintaining close and friendly relations with the U.S. and furthering cooperation between the two countries in matters connected with the Pacific area.”²⁰⁵ A Pacific security pact thus became a pressing concern. New Zealand’s position on the matter was clear by August 1949: “Our main objective in considering a Pacific Pact is to strengthen United States interest and commitments in the Pacific and to obtain American aid for New Zealand and also (since we are so closely bound together) for Australia. The only moves we should make in the direction of a pact should therefore be with this end in view.”206

The end of World War II revealed, and in some cases intensified, tensions and misunderstandings between the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. America now occupied Japan, one of its main prewar rivals to strategic hegemony of the Pacific, and the United Kingdom no longer had the resources to contest strategic leadership of the region. These powers had contested strategic leadership of the Pacific for the past five decades, but the competition was now over.²⁰⁷ Washington and London’s prioritization of the European and Middle Eastern theaters, however, meant that such geostrategic shifts remained secondary concerns at that time. In turn, Canberra and Wellington had to adjust to these new strategic real-ties. In the immediate postwar period, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand held different ambitions throughout the wider region. Competing national interests would come to weaken and confuse their response to the rising Communist challenge in the Asia-Pacific.