CHAPTER 2

Crisis and Cooperation

The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand slowly developed elements of strategic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region following crises in Malaya and Korea between 1948 and 1951. The extent of cooperation varied between states and rarely reflected purely strategic concerns. Whereas New Zealand supported the United Kingdom in the Malayan Emergency, the U.S. and Australia were initially far more cautious in offering assistance. Although the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand did support the United States in the Korean War, their efforts also reflected attempts to build closer strategic relations, generate diplomatic capital, and restrain their superpower ally from escalating the conflict. In both instances, all four states held different assumptions about the causes and management of conflict. Divergent national interests therefore weakened a coherent and united response to the Communist challenge from the Western powers.

In this period, Australia and New Zealand grew increasingly concerned by the absence of a security pact with the United States to safeguard their interest against the spread of Communism in the Asia-Pacific. The rapidly changing international situation would slowly help lessen resistance within Washington to the idea of a Pacific security pact. Alongside growing East-West tensions, including crises in Berlin and the surprise emergence of Soviet atomic power, U.S. concerns about the future of the Asia-Pacific also began to grow. The United States’ “loss” of China, which took place between events in Malaya and Korea and resulted in more than 500 million people being firmly placed in the Communist camp, fueled fears that Communism was on the march.1 When viewed together, events in Malaya, China, and Korea help explain progress toward closer cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific.

These concerns, however, proved insufficient to secure formal strategic cooperation between the Western powers. Despite these challenges in the region, and in contrast to the creation of NATO in 1949, the British and U.S. governments remained reluctant to enter into any formal Asia-Pacific security pact despite ongoing requests from Australia and New Zealand. Economic concerns about the ongoing costs of the Cold War, alongside doubts about the comparative strategic importance of the region, repeatedly undermined such ambitions throughout this period.

Malaya

British policymakers had afforded strategic priority to their interests in the Middle East and Europe following the end of World War II. Nevertheless, the potential Communist threat in the Asia-Pacific helped refocus their attention on the region. Although London assumed that the economic weakness of the Soviet Union would delay an attack on Western Europe until at least the mid-1950s, security planners believed that Soviet interference globally would persist and continue to damage their national interests. Moscow would likely view the Asia-Pacific region as a “soft” target given its relative unpreparedness in relation to, say, Western Europe. Of particular concern was Indochina, where French forces were engaged in a desperate struggle to retain political authority against the indigenous nationalist revolutionary group, the Viet Minh. The success of Communist-nationalist groups could encourage similar uprisings in other colonial territories thereby threatening British strategic and commercial interests. Moreover, according to the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Viet Minh’s success in Indochina could spread across into Siam, Malaya, and Singapore. British security planners evidently subscribed to elements of what later became known as domino theory, a concept that would dominate U.S. strategic planning.² Given the United Kingdom’s vast territorial holdings throughout Asia and Africa, such nationalist uprisings were most unwelcome. Thus, the British had initially supported French efforts to quell the Viet Minh in 1946 by providing much of the necessary logistical and political support.³

A combination of strategic and commercial concerns led the United Kingdom to become involved in fighting the Communist-backed insurgency inside Malaya. The Malayan Emergency of 1948, which developed into a lengthy guerrilla war fought between British Commonwealth armed forces and the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party, stoked suspicions about the Soviet Union’s global intentions. London believed that the Malayan National Liberation Army was a puppet of Moscow.4 A decision to put down the rebellion inside Malaya therefore held broader strategic consequences as the British government would now have to commit its entire military reserve stationed in the Far East theater as well as an additional brigade from the United Kingdom itself to manage this emergency. Fighting an insurgency inside Malaya with such resources would leave areas such as Hong Kong and Borneo lightly defended as well as reducing its European resources.⁵ As the JIC warned, “The Communist attack in Malaya is thus of far more than local importance.”⁶

The British government did not initially request assistance from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, or its other Commonwealth allies.⁷ Unilateral action in 1948 is curious on first inspection. Although Washington did not appear to have taken a direct interest in Malaya, believing it was the British Commonwealth’s responsibility, the insurgency assumed a high priority inside the halls of powers in Canberra and Wellington. Both remained committed to defending the British Commonwealth, and the Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya (ANZAM) understanding with the United Kingdom underlined antipodean interest in cooperation. The level of importance attached to Malaya by Australian security planners was especially high given its strategic significance during World War II. Japanese forces had struck the Malayan port of Kota Baharu several hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. When Malaya eventually fell, the Japanese air force was able to launch attacks against the Australian mainland. For Australia, keeping Malaya out of enemy hands was a top priority.⁸ Security planners were concerned that if the Communists took power inside Malaya it would produce a domino-like effect southward. In addition, as the Australian Chiefs of Staff reasoned, “By virtue of her geographical position, Australia should assume increased responsibilities in British Commonwealth matters in the Indian Ocean, South East Asia and the Pacific.”⁹

The United Kingdom’s decision not to seek immediate assistance from Australia and New Zealand is nevertheless understandable. The explanation rests on a mixture of British confidence in being able to defeat the insurgency alone and wider geostrategic considerations. If the United Kingdom requested significant support for operations inside Malaya, it could damage the chances of convincing Australia to follow New Zealand’s lead and commit to the defense of the Middle East in the event of a global war. The United Kingdom therefore had to demonstrate to Australia that it could provide the type of local security assurances with which Australian policymakers were now increasingly concerned.10

By early 1949, events in Malaya encouraged a change of opinion in London. The situation steadily worsened as Communist attacks against areas of economic significance increased in scale and frequency. British policymakers now deemed the benefits of support from Australia and New Zealand to outweigh any negative ramifications.¹¹ British officials thus made discreet overtures to determine whether Australia and New Zealand would dispatch forces to Malaya. The response from Canberra and Wellington was markedly different. Fraser responded positively to the British request due to his government’s commitment to check Communist expansion in the region. New Zealand would go on to support and serve in emergency operations from 1949 onward, just as it would be a founding contributor of troops, aircraft, and ships to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve based in Singapore a few years later.¹²

The Australian government was less supportive. As Chifley quietly informed London, if forces were requested to fight in Malaya, his government would “feel obliged to decline.” The British government therefore issued no request for Australian assistance.¹³ Despite the clear strategic case for intervention, Chifley faced increasing pressure from the left wing of his Labour Party to pursue a foreign policy that focused on the promotion of international justice rather than the challenge of international Communism. He was consequently reluctant to engage in military action that others could construe as directed not at the forces of international Communism but at an indigenous people that had a legitimate right to self-government. This was how the left wing of the ruling Labour government depicted British action, and Chifley, given his growing problems managing the party, had no desire to fuel such criticisms.¹⁴

In contrast to Australia’s subdued response, the U.S. met British requests for assistance rather more positively. While U.S. security planners remained reluctant to become directly involved in events inside Malaya, and had been initially unwilling to provide arms for the British, they soon recognized that the United Kingdom was resisting forces that also opposed U.S. interests.¹⁵ If the British were to lose control of Malaya they would subsequently lose its dollar earnings, which the United States believed would hurt Britain’s capacity to maintain its existing defense commitments for Europe and the Middle East. In addition, the consequent impact to strategic materials and balance of payment positions of the NATO countries could result in a serious setback for any rearmament program inside Europe.16 It was because of these broader strategic considerations that the Truman administration would eventually approve additional arms supplies to British forces and made available logistical support for British operations inside Malaya during the summer of 1949. U.S. assistance for British efforts in Malaya would steadily grow throughout the remaining years of Truman’s presidency.¹⁷

The election of Robert Menzies and his Liberal Party in December 1949 brought about a clear shift in Australian policy, reflecting the values of the conservative center Right that sympathized with U.S. foreign policy. Menzies had talked openly about wishing to defeat Communism inside Australia during the general election. Soon after taking office, the Australian prime minister honored his electoral promises by seeking to pass legislation that would ban the Communist Party from Australian politics. Menzies also stated publicly that it was imperative for Australia to improve the strength of the British Commonwealth so that it could adequately face the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This was welcome news in London, not least because the British government could potentially exploit the Australian prime minister’s rhetoric for assistance in Malaya and in underpinning its security interests in the Middle East.¹⁸ Although Menzies was keen to improve defense preparation and fit into U.S. and UK strategic planning, his economic policies were less complementary to British interests. The Australian prime minister sought to forge a new economic relationship with the United States, which he believed would facilitate rapid economic development and thereby allow greater defense preparations.¹⁹

In April 1950, appreciating the changing political climate in Canberra, London sent a formal request to the Australian government to provide military assistance for their ongoing campaign inside Malaya. The request was limited to the provision of a small number of aircraft. Although a modest appeal, the United Kingdom was critically short of the relevant aircraft needed to execute its campaign inside Malaya and felt that Canberra could provide such support without diverting Australian attention and resources away from areas of greater strategic importance, namely the Middle East. After deliberating on the request, the Menzies government approved the deployment of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) transport aircraft and Lincoln bombers to Singapore in June 1950 to begin immediate operations.²⁰ In addition to highlighting Menzies’s commitment to resisting Communism, helping in Malaya also deflected criticism away from Australia’s decision to withdraw from the British Commonwealth force stationed in Japan.²¹ Having received this positive reaction from Canberra, British officials hoped that they could soon secure a broader commitment from the Menzies government to commit forces to the defense of the Middle East in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.22

Political changes had also taken place in New Zealand. The narrow victory of Sidney Holland in the election of November 1949 brought the National Party to power by the end of the year.²³ The new government saw no reason to change the orientation of its predecessor’s efforts in Malaya or the Middle East, which had fashioned a defense policy that incorporated its forces into a collective Commonwealth defense system.²⁴ Nevertheless, New Zealand’s already significant commitments continued to grow. Wellington had agreed to commit a division and five air squadrons to the Middle East in event of a war with the Soviet Union despite the costs involved.²⁵ London, as well as Washington, believed that New Zealand’s commitment to deploying forces to the Middle East was vital if the British were to maintain their position there in the event of war.²⁶ This commitment was significant from New Zealand’s perspective as it would involve the deployment of the vast majority of the country’s armed forces, leaving little for home defense.²⁷ Although Holland sought to restore stability and sound finance by reducing government expenditure and borrowing, the country’s relatively healthy financial position allowed for extra spending on defense.²⁸ Nevertheless, the government could only make the promised military commitments by greatly increasing its manpower and material resources. Such commitments were expensive. By financial year 1952–53, the country spent some £107 million on defense, which accounted for the same amount it spent on state housing, education, and major energy infrastructure projects.²⁹

By the middle of 1950, all four Western powers were cooperating on military operations inside Southeast Asia. Such cooperation represents a subtle challenge to the extant Cold War historiography, which tends to assume that Mao’s ascension to power in China was the catalyst for all four powers to take Asia-Pacific security more seriously.³⁰ The Malayan Emergency nevertheless highlighted the difficulty of cooperation in the early Cold War period. Convergent perceptions of threat and overlapping national interests did lead to eventual cooperation but it was often limited and contingent.

Menzies and his cabinet were still concerned that a British failure in Malaya would precipitate a domino-like effect throughout the Asia-Pacific, bringing the Communist menace closer to Australian shores. Some in the Australian cabinet believed that the insurgency inside Malaya heralded the PRC’s intention to expand throughout the rest of Southeast Asia. A Communist-sponsored success in Malaya seemed to parallel how Japan had taken over Manchuria in 1931. A forward defense was therefore preferable to waiting until the problem intensified. The Australian government also calculated that if it refused this formal request for military assistance then it would hardly encourage the British to accept the Australian case for establishing a broader Pacific defense pact. If Australia wanted to argue that it could commit to a broader security arrangement, it would have to demonstrate that it could effectively deal with localized security problems. Australia’s commitment to Malaya was therefore an important element in its broader strategic ambitions in the region and not merely a response to the Communist threat.31

Racial considerations also informed the decision-making process for both antipodean powers in Malaya. David Lowe suggests that the long-held fear of the “yellow peril” clearly influenced Australian ministers. The recent Communist incarnation was but the latest threat posed by this perceived “Asian expansion.”³² Ideas about race were even more pronounced inside New Zealand policy-making circles. Ian McGibbon has noted that “underlying New Zealand’s attitude to Asia and Asians was a sense of racial superiority, deeply embedded in the national consciousness through more than a century of perceiving that part of the world throughout imperialist lenses.”³³ The archives help substantiate these claims. In a long and detailed memorandum, the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) explained that one of its “primary and vital objectives of our Pacific policy,” was “to protect ourselves from the threat of Asian racial expansion.”³⁴ Fears about expansionism, especially from Asian states no longer under European rule, were never the determining forces behind Australian or New Zealand foreign or security policy. Ideas about Asian states, race, and colonialism informed but rarely drove the development of foreign policy.³⁵ The aforementioned memorandum noted that cooperation with Asian countries should not undermine the country’s security interests, especially strengthening U.S. commitments throughout the Asia-Pacific or helping to obtain U.S. aid for New Zealand and Australia. Any agreements, however, should be “as vague and harmless as possible.”³⁶

The Malayan Emergency, which would continue until 1960, highlighted the limitations of British postwar power. The United Kingdom had been unable to quell the rising challenge to its position inside Malaya and had to seek the assistance of its British Commonwealth allies. Australia and New Zealand came to recognize that Britain’s diminished power in the region had serious implications for their own security interests. Both the Menzies and Holland governments would thus redouble their efforts at obtaining a pact with the United States to buttress their own security. As one report for the New Zealand prime minister noted, “Our main objective in considering a Pacific Pact is to strengthen United States interest and commitments in the Pacific and to obtain American aid for New Zealand and also (since we are so closely bound together) for Australia. The only moves we should make in the direction of a pact should therefore be with this end in view.”37 Antipo-dean appeals would gradually find a more receptive audience as the threat of Communist expansion throughout the Asia-Pacific appeared to grow.

China

Between the onset of crises in Malaya and Korea was the emergence of Communist China in 1949. This geopolitical shift would encourage the United States, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to cooperate more closely to check the expansion of the Communist threat. Nevertheless, cooperation between all four powers remained limited. With the ejection of Japan from China in 1945, the problems facing the Chinese government escalated as an increasingly violent civil war between the Nationalist government’s forces, led by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT), and the Communist Party of China (CPC), led by Mao Ze-dong, raged on. Most observers had not deemed Mao the likely victor in the Chinese Civil War. Even Stalin had not thought much of his fellow Communist’s chances and provided limited assistance to the CPC’s cause. By early 1948, however, the CPC seized control of the northeast portion of the country, which resulted in the surrender of the New First Army of the Kuomintang.³⁸

The U.S. government had experienced a difficult relationship with China during World War II and its immediate aftermath. Officials viewed Chiang Kai-shek as a problematic associate given his authoritarian and often repressive rule.³⁹ Strategic calculations nevertheless overcame such concerns as the alternative was a Communist China that U.S. policymakers believed had the potential to “tip the balance” in favor of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.⁴⁰ A Sino-Soviet alliance was, according to Julian Zelizer, the “worst nightmare” for policymakers in Washington.⁴¹ As an interdepartmentally agreed intelligence assessment noted, the strategic importance of China was manifold and considerable because the “spread of Soviet influence and power would be inimical to United States strategic interests. A non-friendly China would allow the Soviet Union to place air bases in a region which would allow it to conduct neutralizing attacks against U.S. forces in Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines.”⁴²

In the minds of Washington’s policymakers, this nightmare was now turning into a reality. Sources in China warned the Truman administration in September 1947 that “the Soviet Union is proceeding, slowly and circumspectly, towards eventual domination of China.”⁴³ Reports supplied to Washington in the following year were just as gloomy, predicting a defeat for the Nationalist forces inside China.44 The Truman administration assigned Secretary of State Marshall the task of negotiating a ceasefire to the Chinese Civil War. Under Marshall’s leadership, the United States opted not to engage militarily and accepted that saving the Nationalist government was no longer possible.⁴⁵ Yet the Truman administration still sought a “friendly China” that would not be utilized as “an instrument of Soviet policy.”⁴⁶

After sustained fighting between April and September 1948, the KMT endured further heavy losses, and the CPC gained control of the majority of central China. With Chiang’s forces broken, Nationalist defeat was now all but assured. The Pingjin Campaign, which ran between November 21, 1948, and January 31, 1949, removed any doubts about the future of China. The campaign proved catastrophic for the KMT as the remaining backbone of its fighting forces were killed, wounded, or captured during the fighting. A series of tactical retreats served only to delay inevitable defeat, and the KMT eventually took refuge on the island of Formosa (modern-day Taiwan) as Mao assumed control of mainland China.⁴⁷

U.S. hopes of sustaining “friendly relations” with China were disappointed as Mao swiftly emerged as a committed Communist revolutionary. In December 1949, Mao visited Stalin in Moscow. Despite their difficult relationship, there followed the signature of the Sino-Soviet Treaty on February 14, 1950.⁴⁸ Domestic criticism of the Truman administration quickly followed as Republican opponents demanded an answer to the question “Who lost China?”⁴⁹ Truman’s political opponents certainly looked to exploit what they believed was a U.S. foreign policy failure. As John Foster Dulles, a leading Republican spokesperson on foreign policy as well as a consultant to the secretary of state, wrote in 1950, “China with its population of about 450,000,000 has already come almost wholly under a rule which takes its guidance from Moscow. In Asia and the Pacific there are about 600,000,000 more people whom Soviet Communism does not yet dominate, but whom it has a good chance of dominating. If it should win this further area, or any substantial part of it, Soviet Communism would control considerably more than half of the total population of the world.”⁵⁰ Senator Joseph McCarthy alleged that the explanation for U.S. diplomatic failure lay in the fact that Communist spies and subversive elements had infiltrated the U.S. government. McCarthy ratcheted up both his rhetoric and his investigations into subversives and Communist penetration of the U.S. government, even going as far as to suggest that George Marshall had designed his arbitration efforts in China to fail because he was in fact a Communist agent.⁵¹ After meeting with two senior Republican senators, William Knowland and Alexander Smith, Dean Acheson was left in no doubt that the Republican Party blamed the Truman administration’s “spirit of defeatism” for the “loss” of China.52

There was also growing alarm in Washington about the threat posed to the United States throughout the Asia-Pacific by Communist-backed forces, especially given U.S. weakness in the region. As Charles B. Deane, a Democrat in the House of Representatives, wrote to the president, “The United States is not prepared to meet a serious emergency in the Far East and the Pacific.”⁵³ Deane had a point. After World War II, the United States had rapidly demobilized and cut back its defense expenditure, and was consequently ill-equipped to deal with such challenges.⁵⁴ Following Communist success in China, the takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948, and the crises in Berlin of 1948–49, Washington saw Soviet-backed Communism as on the march. Assessments in Washington suggested that the “USSR has an overwhelming preponderance of immediately available military power on the Eurasian continent and a consequent ability to resort to war at any time as a means of imposing its will in that area.”⁵⁵ In the eyes of Washington’s policymakers, coupled with the revelation that the Soviet Union had exploded its first atomic bomb in August 1949, Communism was not only growing more powerful but was now spreading rapidly around the globe.⁵⁶

A mixture of domestic-political and strategic concerns therefore encouraged the Truman administration to respond to Mao’s victory in China in a strong fashion. The United States’ refusal to recognize the PRC was the first indication of this hardening in U.S. policy.⁵⁷ The rhetoric emanating from the Truman administration reflected the decision to pursue a firmer line vis-àvis the Communist powers and to be seen publicly pursuing such a course. Acheson, for example, gave a series of speeches throughout the first half of 1950, in which he lambasted both Soviet and Chinese global policies. During one such speech, Acheson noted that “we are faced with a system which denies the basis to our modern civilization, the belief in freedom, and that those who hold to the Soviet doctrine have picked out this country as their chief target…. [They seek] to change the balance of productive power in the world in their favor.”⁵⁸ Policymakers in Washington now sought to devise firmer policies to respond to these altered international circumstances. The president’s advisers provided him with a solution in the form of NSC-68.⁵⁹ This placed a much greater emphasis on the United States’ military prowess. Public opinion and congressional pressure had encouraged the president to take a bolder approach to the perceived Communist threat.⁶⁰

Across the Atlantic, Mao’s rise to power also deeply concerned British policymakers. The UK’s relationship with China was complex, but many British officials believed that U.S. support for the KMT had been ill-judged.⁶¹ While they had limited enthusiasm for Chiang, there was far less respect for his successor. Early evidence that Mao would create considerable problems for British interests surfaced during the Amethyst crisis when Chinese Communist forces fired on a Royal Navy warship as it protected the British Embassy in Nanking in 1949. A rescue effort by HMS London saw it too come under fire, resulting in 125 casualties. Although subsequently blocked from sailing away, HMS Amethyst eventually managed to break out from port under Communist fire.62 Direct military provocation aside, London feared that Mao’s revolutionary ambitions would not be limited to mainland China and that he would seek to export his revolution throughout the rest of the Asia-Pacific. The British JIC, for instance, concluded that without preventative action and substantial material support, the countries of Southeast Asia might fall under Communist control by the mid-1950s. “Should Siam fall,” the report concluded, “a land threat to Singapore will develop. Should Burma fall it is likely that India would be so re-occupied.”⁶³ Senior elements within the British government shared these concerns and were early advocates of the domino theory that would become a motif of U.S. grand strategy later in the decade.

The British government nevertheless decided to recognize Mao’s Communist China on January 6, 1950, and applied pressure on Australia and New Zealand to do likewise, even in the face of considerable criticism from the United States.⁶⁴ This decision partially reflected growing concerns about the future of Hong Kong, which Bevin informed Acheson had assumed a position of “vital” importance, akin to that of Berlin for U.S. strategists.⁶⁵ Although Hong Kong was not of strategic significance per se, its loss would signal to Britain’s adversaries that the United Kingdom was not capable of maintaining its global interests, which could subsequently encourage further aggression. Hong Kong also represented an important link to China and an emerging center for regional and global trade.⁶⁶

In the months preceding the decision to recognize China, it gradually dawned on British policymakers that with the limited military resources now at their disposal it would be impossible to safeguard Hong Kong in the face of a Chinese Communist invasion.⁶⁷ London consequently concluded that its garrison required reinforcements.⁶⁸ The British government made tentative approaches about reinforcing the Hong Kong garrison to several Commonwealth powers, but all met with limited enthusiasm. Representative of such feeling was Chifley’s warning to Attlee that reinforcing the Hong Kong garrison would needlessly antagonize Communist China and actually increase the likelihood of confrontation. Evatt informed the British government that it would do better by reaching an accommodation with Mao that respected the sovereignty of Hong Kong.⁶⁹ After months of deliberation, and an absence of viable alternatives, London decided that some sort of accommodation with Mao’s China was essential if they were to retain Hong Kong. The British would officially recognize Mao’s rule and, in return, Mao would agree to leave Hong Kong in British hands. In order for this policy to work, a degree of mutual toleration with Communist China became essential.70

Australia and New Zealand looked at developments inside China and their ramifications for national security closely. Mao’s success only reinforced earlier antipodean assessments about the necessity of securing a formal security pact with the United States, as no other power was capable of resisting Communist expansion into the Asia-Pacific. The form of any such alliance remained unclear. An alliance with Washington could function on a tripartite basis or include British membership in the form of some sort of Pacific security pact. This latter option was preferable because it would create an alliance with two stronger powers thereby complementing existing security arrangements between London, Canberra, and Wellington and providing greater material support in defense of the Asia-Pacific region. Regardless of its final formation, Australian and New Zealand policymakers were clear that they wanted a formal security alliance with the United States.⁷¹

Early efforts by Australia and New Zealand to convince the U.S. to create such a Pacific security pact proved unsuccessful. The Truman administration had fought tremendously hard to pass the necessary legislation to ensure the creation of the NATO alliance and the National Security Act. Such legislation challenged the United States’ historical aversion to binding alliances and generated considerable concerns about the power of the federal government.⁷² Critics alleged that NATO would be the first of many “entangling alliances” into which the president would enter. Truman, already under considerable domestic pressure for his alleged foreign policy failures, wished to avoid stoking further criticism by entering into any new security pact for the Asia-Pacific.⁷³ As Acheson informed the press, “I have taken pains to make clear on several occasions, the United States is not currently considering participation in any further special collective defense arrangements other than the North Atlantic Treaty.”⁷⁴

U.S. plans focused on resisting Soviet influence in Western Europe and ensuring a functioning and credible security alliance inside Europe. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued, peripheral issues should not distract the United States from its central objectives. Forming a European security pact and equipping it with substantial military resources was presently the top priority of U.S. national security policy.⁷⁵ Given the economic weakness of Europe, the U.S. would have to help finance the enormous additional costs of this newly emerging security alliance via deficit spending and tax increases. As was estimated at the time, the United States would have to spend close to $40 billion to create a force still heavily outnumbered by Soviet forces brandishing superior equipment.76

Assistance programs for Europe took their toll as the U.S. economy lurched into recession in fiscal year 1948–49.⁷⁷ The president was aware that there were limited funds with which the United States could uphold international security. The U.S. therefore prioritized the economic and military rebuilding of Western Europe and upholding Western influence throughout the Mediterranean and Middle East. While the Truman administration was committed to furnishing support “to help to strengthen the free nations of the non-Soviet world in their effort to resist Soviet-Communist aggression,” such commitments required careful targeting.⁷⁸ The Asia-Pacific remained a secondary priority for the Truman administration. The “loss” of China was insufficient motivation to establish more formalized security cooperation with interested parties throughout the region. Tellingly, both Australia and New Zealand had been classed as an area “without priority” in late 1948.⁷⁹

Although domestic-political and strategic-economic concerns explain most of the United States’ reluctance to commit to a new Pacific security pact, broader ideological concerns also played a role. Communist propagandists claimed that the U.S. was a neo-imperialist power that supported European colonialism against the people of Asia, who strove for nationhood. Such accusations did not just emanate from the Kremlin. The prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, admonished the United States for its supposed neo-imperialism. U.S. policymakers were sensitive to such charges and sought a foreign policy that would retain support among the nonaligned states in the Cold War.⁸⁰ George Kennan warned that the Asia-Pacific was vulnerable to Communist expansion not least because the peoples of Asia were generally more sympathetic to the Communist ideology. As Kennan wrote, “Most peoples of area [Asia-Pacific] dangerously vulnerable to communist penetration by virtue of: (1) Political immaturity (2) General present state of flux and instability (3) Stubborn misconceptions about [W]estern nations, including ourselves arising out of past experiences with colonialism and imperialism.”⁸¹ Such stereotypes of the region ably demonstrate how racial and cultural assumptions influenced U.S. foreign policymaking and increased anxiety about any actions that might encourage Communist sympathies.⁸²

U.S. reluctance to provide additional security commitments to Australia and New Zealand despite the “loss” of China encouraged both the Menzies and Holland governments to look at ways in which the United Kingdom could improve security cooperation throughout the entirety of the British Commonwealth. Of the two antipodean leaders, Menzies was the more enthusiastic about improving security provision in the region because he believed that London had prioritized the defense of the Middle East and Europe to the point that it was dangerously neglecting security in the Asia-Pacific. The United Kingdom retained military bases in Hong Kong and Singapore and was engaged in fighting a Communist insurgency inside Malaya. British troops still formed a part, though dwindling, of the Occupation Force stationed in Japan. In the opinion of Menzies, the Western powers in the Asia-Pacific should replicate the collective security efforts undertaken in Europe, such as the WEU and NATO, throughout the region. Many in the Australian government also viewed collective security defense arrangements in Europe as having the potential to undermine national security as the antipodeans states’ principal allies focused their attentions elsewhere.83

Initial efforts by Canberra and Wellington to improve levels of security cooperation with London in the Asia-Pacific region soon encountered stiff opposition. In British estimations, antipodean security demands were both excessive and strategically misplaced. The British government was concerned that a Pacific security pact, especially one that could expand to include other Asian states, would divert valuable resources from European and Middle Eastern defense. Such thinking was clear in British planning for a global war as articulated in Plan SPEEDWAY, which served as the basis for joint U.S.-UK defense plans in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. The plan worked on the assumption that the Soviets would launch two major offensives into Western Europe and the Middle East, which would immediately throw the Western powers onto the defensive. The priority, then, was to deter Soviet aggression by improving the position of the Western powers in Europe and the Middle East. British efforts thus focused on securing British Commonwealth commitments to the defense of these regions. Antipodean ideas about creating a Pacific security pact were consequently discouraged.⁸⁴

The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand evidently held competing ideas about global security planning. These differing conceptions would clash at the Colombo Conference of Commonwealth ministers, held in Ceylon, modern-day Sri Lanka, in January 1950.⁸⁵ The conference was set to discuss a series of economic proposals tabled by the Indian ambassador to China, Kavalam Madhava Panikkar. Panikkar had argued for the creation of a multilateral fund to provide support for the economic development of countries throughout Asia. Events in Malaya and China only underlined the need for serious efforts to promote economic prosperity and thus fend off Communist expansion. During the conference, the attendees established a framework for encouraging such efforts. Canberra largely welcomed the idea because Percy Spender, the Australian minister for external affairs who was present at the conference, accepted the logic that development throughout Southeast Asia was essential to stop the region gravitating toward Communism and its promises of economic security.86 British and New Zealand officials were far more cautious. London and Wellington feared that they would have to provide the majority of the money for such a fund at a time of serious financial strain.⁸⁷

As the conference continued, British, Australian, and New Zealand concerns about global war planning came to a head. Given that New Zealand had already committed to the Middle East, Australia now became the focus of British diplomacy. Australia remained keen to avoid such commitments due to the risks of excessive military expenditure and limited resources for security needs closer to the mainland.⁸⁸ Spender argued forcefully that the United Kingdom’s prioritization of the defense of Europe and the Middle East left the Asia-Pacific region vulnerable to Communist attack. Because the NATO alliance and cooperative economic forums ensured European security, the Soviet Union would be encouraged to look toward the Asia-Pacific for its global advances. Spender stressed that the British Commonwealth powers had to improve strategic cooperation for the defense of the region and needed to encourage the United States to establish a Pacific security pact of some kind if he was to consider the possibility of making any commitments to Middle Eastern security. Spender even went so far as to outline possible membership of this new organization, which would have to include the United States, New Zealand, Canada, and India.⁸⁹

Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, deflected such demands by arguing, albeit disingenuously, that it had been economic cooperation inside Europe that had thwarted a Communist takeover of power. The Organ-isation of European Economic Co-operation, rather than NATO, was the organization that they should thus seek to replicate throughout the Asia-Pacific.⁹⁰ Bevin was evidently prepared to downplay the severity of the challenge posed by the mixture of Communism, nationalism, anticolonialism, and Chinese militarism throughout the region. He instead wanted the British Commonwealth to focus its attention on the Middle Eastern and European theaters. Agreeing to support calls for a Pacific security pact would have potentially undermined security networks in Europe and the Middle East by diverting limited British Commonwealth resources. Australian and New Zealand interests in securing a Pacific security pact therefore remained a secondary concern for the British government.⁹¹ In the absence of agreement, Australia would have to reconsider whether its commitments to the Middle East now served its own security interests better than concentrating on Southeast Asia.

Although the United States had not been directly involved in the negotiations in Colombo, U.S. assistance was of fundamental importance for any of the proposals to succeed. As a sign of the shifting power away from the United Kingdom in the region, Spender argued that whatever agreements they reached during the conference, all would require the full support of the United States.92 The realities of the postwar world meant that the United Kingdom and the wider British Commonwealth no longer possessed the necessary material power to undertake such bold political-economic initiatives alone.

The Korean War

Events in Malaya and China had encouraged a greater degree of strategic collaboration between the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, but formal security agreements were still absent. Events in Korea would help enhance cooperation.⁹³ On the morning of June 25, 1950, North Korean artillery covered a combined force of tank and infantry columns crossing the thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea. The North Korean invasion caught Western intelligence services by surprise. Acheson only first learned of the invasion by listening to a United Press news bulletin.⁹⁴ For Washington, such surprises invoked the memory of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor and reinforced preconceived ideas about the futility of appeasing dictatorships. Truman subsequently delivered a speech to the American people, damning North Korean actions: “I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act, it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen and twenty years earlier.”⁹⁵ Washington’s policymakers largely agreed as to the ambition of the invaders: “The north Koreans are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea.”⁹⁶ Washington was nevertheless unclear as to whether local factors or the Soviet Union’s desire to expand its interests throughout Asia drove the northern invasion. Some analysts even feared that the invasion was a diversion to disguise a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The conclusion reached by U.S. analysts, accurately, as the archives would reveal, was that the Soviet Union and PRC had sanctioned the North Korean invasion, which probably reflected a broader effort by Stalin to press Soviet influence into Asia. The Soviet Union was betting on the United States allowing Korea to become a “neutral” zone but was not seeking to engage the United States in a full-scale war.⁹⁷

On the evening of June 25, Truman hurried back from a vacation in his home state of Missouri to meet with his national security team at Blair House in Washington. It was here that his gathered advisers decided on their response to events in Korea.98 All present recommended a military reaction to the Northern invasion. Truman had already adopted the strategy of “symmetrical containment,” whereby the United States would oppose Soviet threats with equal and opposite reactions wherever they were encountered. The overall objective was to “restrict communism within its existing borders, then let it destroy itself through internal corrosion and decay.”⁹⁹ Reacting in a like-for-like fashion in Korea therefore accorded with the overarching strategic vision of the administration. The president’s advisers all believed that a nonmilitary response would only encourage future Communist aggression, which would increase the likelihood of a global war. As General Omar Bradley, the chairmen of the JCS put it, “We must draw the line somewhere.” The president concurred.¹⁰⁰

Strategic competition provides only a partial explanation of the United States’ decision to exercise military force in the defense of South Korea. Domestic-political pressure meant that a nonmilitary response would have been politically poisonous for a president that was already facing congressional and popular criticism about how he had “lost” China. On learning of the northern assault, Knowland told the Senate that “Korea today stands in the same position as did Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria and Czechoslovakia of an earlier date. In each of those instances a firm stand by the law-abiding nations of the world might have saved the peace.”¹⁰¹ As Truman believed, the best way to refute allegations of appeasement was to take decisive action against transgressors of international law. The opinion of leading newspapers further encouraged the president to do something, with public opinion generally stressing the need to take a stand against this latest Communist threat.¹⁰² Religious groups even weighed in on the debate. Billy Graham, the evangelical leader who had achieved celebrity status in 1949, chided the Truman administration for being “too soft” on Communism, which only invited further Communist aggression.¹⁰³ As the president had apparently informed Acheson on learning of the invasion, “We’ve got to stop the sons of bitches no matter what.”¹⁰⁴ Truman subsequently authorized General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, to immediately utilize available airpower against North Korean forces hindering the evacuation of civilians from the war zone and to support the resupply of ammunition to South Korean forces.¹⁰⁵

Truman sought to obtain wider international support to legitimize a military response as well as to share the potentially heavy burden of war. The U.S. government therefore looked toward the United Nations Security Council to authorize a UN effort to expel the northern forces from South Korea. International support was duly forthcoming. The Soviet Union, the one country that could have prevented the passing of a UN resolution by exercising its right of veto, happened to be boycotting the United Nations Security Council following differences concerning China’s role in the organization. The United Nations Security Council authorized a “police action” inside Korea, which equated to the removal of North Korean forces from the south of the country.106

The British ambassador to the United Nations Sir Gladwyn Jebb had roundly condemned the invasion and voted in favor of the UN resolution.¹⁰⁷ In London, however, there was considerable disagreement within the cabinet about whether to support Western military action. For the British chancellor the exchequer, Stafford Cripps, the North’s invasion of the south could not have come at a more inopportune time. Cripps had been determined to limit Britain’s defense expenditure to safeguard the building of the welfare state and the recovery of the British economy. He consequently argued that remaining neutral would best serve the United Kingdom’s interests. If a military response proved unavoidable, then the United Kingdom’s contribution should be limited to utilizing its existing naval vessels already stationed in the region.¹⁰⁸

Strategic imperatives, however, undermined economic caution. Anxiety about the Soviet threat and a fear that the United States might refocus its attentions away from Europe ultimately encouraged Cripps to authorize substantial increases in Britain’s defense expenditure.¹⁰⁹ Despite the recent devaluation of the pound and accompanying deflationary measures that followed, Cripps proposed an increase in defense expenditure from £2,590 million over the next three years to £3,400 million. Attlee accepted the need for such a marked increase and the consequent restrictions on social spending this commitment would entail.¹¹⁰

Yet the British government’s contributions to the war effort proved inadequate. Over the coming months, U.S. representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the level of British military assistance. On December 18, Attlee asked the cabinet for authorization to further increase defense expenditure, stressing the need to support their allies and protect the U.S.-UK partnership.¹¹¹ Following extensive discussions, the British cabinet concluded that “it was the clear duty of the United Kingdom Government to do everything in their power, in concert with other members of the United Nations, to help the South Koreans to resist this aggression.”¹¹² The defense budget subsequently increased to £4,700 million in January 1951.

Attlee’s decision would prove unpalatable for some within the cabinet as well as the wider Labour Party and led to the resignation of several ministers. Yet Attlee risked his own political fortunes for what he believed to be in the best national security interests of the United Kingdom. For both Attlee and Bevin, the northern invasion of South Korea had similar parallels to how Hitler had challenged the rule of international law in the 1930s. In their opinion, if the United Kingdom was to “appease” this blatant aggression of the North, then it would only encourage aggression from the Communist bloc in the future. Security concerns consequently swept aside political and economic considerations.113

Alliance considerations also influenced the prime minister’s judgment. Attlee was convinced that without Britain there to “guide” the United States, overzealous U.S. actions could precipitate a global war against the Soviet Union. The British government was evidently determined to exercise “power by proxy,” which had been a cornerstone of British grand strategy ever since the creation of the U.S.-UK “special relationship.”¹¹⁴ In addition, as Oliver Franks, the British ambassador to Washington, reasoned, the United Kingdom had to commit military resources to the conflict so that the United Kingdom could demonstrate “to the Americans that we were one of the two world powers outside Russia.” Matters of prestige were evidently of some concern for British policymakers. As such, if the United States was committed to repelling the North Korean invasion of the south, then the British prime minister believed it was necessary for the United Kingdom to do likewise. The secretary of state for defence Manny Shinwell’s comment during the cabinet discussions that British intervention was not “militarily desirable” but was “politically inevitable” summed up the predicament facing Attlee’s government succinctly.¹¹⁵

Australia and New Zealand would also come to play an important role in the Korean War. Though aware of the potential costs, both antipodean economies were in a position to commit resources to the conflict.¹¹⁶ More important, Canberra and Wellington concurred with the assessments of Washington and London that the North Korean invasion of its neighbor was an act of blatant Communist expansion. A response was therefore required, not least because a nonreaction could precipitate further acts of Communist aggression. Menzies was clear on this point in discussion with the British high commissioner in Canberra, E. J. Williams, arguing that if the United Nations did not resist Communist aggression in Korea, the “next stab” would be against Hong Kong, followed by further aggression against Malaya.¹¹⁷ Holland and his policy advisers all drew parallels with how appeasing Hitler in the lead-up to World War II had actually encouraged, rather than deterred, further aggression.118 While the diagnosis of revision-ist Communist ambitions and the risk of falling dominoes was clear, the remedy remained up for debate.

Canberra and Wellington approached the situation in markedly different manners. Menzies pursued a cautious line of action, whereas Holland offered to commit whatever resources were required. The New Zealand government was one of the first states to announce its intention to meet the call from the UN Security Council and dispatch forces to Korea. The initial idea of a contribution to the Korea campaign caused concern in New Zealand, to be sure, which was presently readying forces for the Middle East. Policymakers worried about how to meet its strategic obligations in both regions.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, the urgency of the situation and the potential rewards of cooperation encouraged swift action. As McGibbon has noted, “The traditional approach of supporting Britain in war was reinforced by aspirations to secure some form of long-term security commitment from the United States. The Korean situation offered an opportunity to advance this latter cause.”¹²⁰ Holland announced his commitment prior to any declaration from the British or Australian government.¹²¹ Consequently, HMNZS Tutira and HMNZS Pukaki left their port in Auckland on July 3, 1950, to join with other UN forces at Sasebo, Japan. The New Zealand government also supplied land forces, with recruiting stations overrun by volunteers seeking to join a British Commonwealth force. These were considerable commitments from the New Zealand government given that it provided, pro rata, the third-largest contribution to the UN police action behind only that of South Korea and the United States.¹²²

New Zealand’s commitment stood in stark contrast to the uncertainty demonstrated by Australia. Although such delays appear curious, given Australia’s newfound commitment to stemming Communist expansion under the Menzies government and its desire to secure a long-term security guarantee from the United States, such behavior is understandable. As the first foreign policy crisis to confront the new Menzies government, there followed a degree of indecision and procrastination from Canberra. While resolute in his denunciation of the North Korean invasion, and swift in his provision of naval and air assets to the UN police action, the Australian prime minister remained undecided about whether to commit further resources.¹²³ Menzies had arranged to visit London and Washington prior to the onset of the crisis. These meetings would now provide him with a forum in which to understand the direction of U.S. and British military action inside Korea, and thus the issue of escalation, as well as an opportunity to discuss other Australian interests.¹²⁴

Menzies arrived in England on July 13 and held a series of discussions with British officials throughout the week.125 Financial matters dominated the agenda, but the Australian prime minister eventually offered increased Australian support for the United Nations mission and committed two warships and a fighter squadron for immediate operations inside Korea.¹²⁶ At that time, neither the British nor Australian governments had yet reached a final decision on the subject of committing further resources to Korea but both agreed to keep each other fully informed. On July 22, Menzies departed for Washington aboard the Queen Mary, and it was during this five-day voyage that the British government decided to commit ground forces to the conflict in Korea following requests from the United States.

In Washington, Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson discussed how much pressure the U.S. should apply to the United Kingdom and other allied states to ensure that they committed additional resources to the war in Korea.¹²⁷ Canberra, in an effort to avoid being upstaged, decided to announce its own ground force commitment prior to London’s public announcement. The Australian cabinet did not want to harm Menzies’s negotiations in Washington by delaying a response, and consequently issued its commitment without first seeking formal approval from the prime minister, who remained out of reach aboard the Queen Mary.¹²⁸

Military cooperation between the four powers inside Korea evidently reflected a range of motives beyond merely opposing Communist aggression. All four states shared concerns about Communist expansion, but it is important to recognize the other motivations at play and not to exaggerate the scope of cooperation. The Korean War produced only an ad-hoc agreement between the Western powers. Despite a growing recognition of the importance of security in the Asia-Pacific and the increasing military commitments to the region, the four countries were still unable to find firm agreement for a Pacific security pact.

By the end of August 1950, the United States had led a united response to the North’s invasion of South Korea. The international coalition under MacArthur’s leadership managed to prevent South Korea’s collapse. The situation nevertheless remained hazardous. South Korean forces faced an enemy equipped with superior firepower and an apparent greater willingness to fight. The capital, Seoul, had already fallen to the North. Following further fighting the remnants of the South Korean army, along with the reinforced UN contingent, became penned into the Pusan perimeter, the southeastern corner of the peninsula, surrounded by Northern forces. Defeat and the fall of the Korean peninsula now seemed probable.¹²⁹

Given this predicament, Truman endorsed MacArthur’s plan for a counterattack against North Korean forces via an amphibious landing at Inchon. On September 15, UN forces landed ashore and caught the North Korean forces by surprise. Following brutal fighting, UN forces successfully managed to establish their position on the beachhead. MacArthur seized Kimpo two days later, allowing the UN to utilize tactical air support against North Korean forces, cutting enemy supply routes, and harassing enemy forces. The general’s decision to land at Inchon proved spectacularly successful as North Korean forces, now attacked from the rear and from reinforced UN units inside the Pusan perimeter, began to retreat northward. While the fighting was extremely bloody, the UN managed to liberate Seoul by the end of September 1950.130

The decision now confronting policymakers was whether to continue with the war. MacArthur’s position was unequivocal; U.S.-led forces should seek to reunite Korea. Opinion inside Washington was rather less decisive. In an effort to force policymakers to make a decision, MacArthur ordered his forces to begin the pursuit of North Korean forces across the thirty-eighth parallel. In Washington, there was considerable debate about the best course of action. The president and his national security team ultimately agreed with MacArthur’s ambitions in Korea and, as the military position looked favorable, authorized the general to press ahead with uniting Korea.¹³¹

The task of U.S. diplomacy was now to carry its allies in support of this new objective. The British government’s agreement that the war should now expand into North Korea swiftly put to rest any concerns that foreign support might not be forthcoming. Indeed, it was a British resolution carried by the UN General Assembly on October 7 that called on international forces to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, restore stability throughout Korea, and hold national elections in the country. Attlee and Bevin embarked on this path in the belief that it was Britain’s responsibility, in common with the United States, to safeguard democracy against the global threat from Moscow. The sending of troops to Korea would also enhance British influence over U.S. policy in the conduct of the war. Uppermost in British thinking was the idea that they alone could temper the more hawkish attitudes of certain policy-makers in Washington that might try to utilize this war as a good excuse to precipitate a war against Communist China. Just as the British decision to enter the war in June reflected in part concerns with their ally, so too did the decision to escalate military efforts in October.¹³²

Australia and New Zealand followed the U.S.-UK lead in committing to the unification of Korea and agreed to support the escalation of the United Nation’s war aims. Senior policymakers in Canberra and Wellington were anxious that the new objective of reunifying Korea could evolve into a broader war against China and the Soviet Union. Yet, as antipodean policymakers realized, their opposition would never prevent the United States and United Kingdom from expanding the war. The Australian and New Zealand governments therefore made the decision to support U.S.-UK efforts.133 Support was preferable because it potentially provided political capital with Washington and London that they could exploit to promote their own interests. It was not a coincidence that when Spender discussed Australian support for U.S. actions in Korea, he continually raised the twin issues of the Japanese peace treaty and the possibility of some form of a Pacific security pact.¹³⁴ Both antipodean states accepted the need for military involvement in Korea but retained a keen eye on exploiting this commitment for the furtherance of their broader objective of establishing a fuller security commitment from the United States.

Under MacArthur’s leadership the UN continued to push the North Korean forces farther north and rapidly advanced toward the Yalu River in late October. By now, Chinese “volunteers” had engaged in fighting against UN forces.¹³⁵ The PRC leadership was evidently unwilling to tolerate the outright defeat of its North Korean ally or allow UN forces so close to its own border. MacArthur nevertheless downplayed the likelihood of Chinese intervention in a number of dispatches to Washington. Even if Chinese forces did intervene, the general believed that U.S. airpower would be sufficient to deal with them. On November 25, the PRC launched a full-scale counteroffensive against UN forces. U.S. airpower proved unable to stop the Chinese advance. MacArthur now declared that the United States faced “an entirely new war.” Overwhelmed by Chinese forces in November and December, UN forces swiftly retreated, allowing Seoul to fall once again.¹³⁶

The situation looked bleak. MacArthur publicly suggested that it was now necessary to utilize nuclear weapons to help reverse the course of the war. He also claimed that nuclear strikes against the PRC would help destroy the war capacity of the enemy. MacArthur’s detractors would suggest that he had underestimated the likelihood of Chinese intervention and was now looking to rectify his mistake by any means.¹³⁷ MacArthur did believe that nuclear weapons were the best option for helping to reverse the military situation, however, and reasoned that by not utilizing nuclear weapons the United States was prolonging the war and effectively appeasing both Communist China and the Soviet Union.¹³⁸

Public discussion concerning the use of nuclear weapons inside Korea or against the PRC unsettled opinion in London, Canberra, and Wellington. Attlee was so concerned that he flew to Washington to speak with Truman directly about the escalating situation. Following a long discussion, the president promised the prime minister that the United States would not utilize nuclear weapons without first consulting with the British government but bluntly refused to provide Attlee with any written assurance.139 Moreover, Acheson had rejected British suggestions about brokering a possible peace agreement with the North Koreans and the PRC, noting existing cooperation in Europe. As Acheson reported: “[I] informed the British that we could not separate our foreign policy into two compartments—the Far East and the European. The Secretary went on to say that Americans would not accept a surrender in the Far East in accord with the desire of some of our Allies and then cooperate in Europe with the same Allies who have urged us to be conciliatory in the Far East.”¹⁴⁰

London informed Canberra and Wellington of the unofficial agreements that Attlee had reached with Truman but made no mention of the strong resistance he had encountered from Acheson. Nor did it make mention of the quite alarmist rhetoric that the president and his key national security advisers had used on numerous occasions during their talks. Such information could have proven problematic because opinion in Australia and New Zealand remained highly apprehensive about the possible course of U.S. actions in Korea.¹⁴¹ The seriousness of recent events had an almost paralyzing effect on policymaking in Wellington. The first secretary of foreign affairs Alister McIntosh informed New Zealand’s minister to the United States Carl Berendsen in Washington that there was an almost “unreal” attitude displayed in the cabinet and a clear lack of leadership shown by either Holland or the minister of external affairs Frederick Doidge.¹⁴²

More worrying, a major military disaster, which could precipitate the utilization of nuclear weapons, seemed ever more likely. By the end of December, it appeared as if Communist forces would drive the UN from the Korean peninsula as the U.S. Eighth Army began to make a disorganized retreat toward the Pusan perimeter.¹⁴³ As the military historian Thomas Fleming noted, an “American Dunkirk loomed.”¹⁴⁴ Such was the turnaround in the military position of the United Nations inside Korea that Truman requested an additional $16.8 billion for Defense appropriations and approved significant increases to the size of the U.S. military.¹⁴⁵ On December 16, he declared a “national emergency” that “require[d] that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security.”¹⁴⁶ Acheson would justifiably term events as “December Despondency” within his memoirs.¹⁴⁷ Many in U.S., British, Australian, and New Zealand policy-making circles shared the opinion that the future looked bleak. As the former British diplomat Harold Nicholson wrote in his diary, “The year closes in a mist of anxiety. We shall be lucky if we get through 1951 without a war.”148 Before a meeting of influential congressmen, Acheson, perhaps engaging in hyperbole to help win the needed congressional funding for sustaining U.S. presence in Korea, explained that the Soviet Union was engaging in an “all-out attack” against the “power position of the United States.”¹⁴⁹

By the end of February 1951, a semblance of stability had returned to the war. Under General Matthew Ridgeway, who replaced MacArthur as overall commander later that year following his dismissal for insubordination, the Eighth Army fought tenaciously to slow down the advance of Communist forces. Aerial support and much-needed infantry had reinforced UN forces, which helped stop the Communist advance. From here, UN forces were able to force their Communist opponents back to around the thirty-eighth parallel and stabilize the frontier. While nearly three further years of bloody fighting were yet to come, the broad front on which this war would continue was now set.¹⁵⁰

The global situation remained tense. Policymakers in Western states had grown concerned that they were finding themselves in an increasingly unfavorable position in the Cold War.¹⁵¹ It is telling that the likes of George Kennan, who, at the beginning of 1950, had argued that “we are holding our own,” left office in favor of more hawkish advisers such as Paul Nitze.¹⁵² The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were encouraging the president to approve further, radical increases in U.S. defense expenditure to account for the fact that U.S. planning had to justify a “long and difficult undertaking” in the Asia-Pacific theater whereas previously U.S. commitments were to be “comparatively short-term.”¹⁵³

Successive crises in Malaya, China, and Korea had encouraged closer cooperation between the four powers. Cooperation was nevertheless motivated by much more than merely shared perceptions of a common threat. Moreover, these ad-hoc efforts contrasted with the formal security alliance that existed for Europe in the form of NATO. These crises had proved insufficient to motivate formal security arrangements. As Acheson at the time noted, there had been no “organized effort … to pool information, skills and techniques among the friendly nations who have a common interest in defeating [Communist] activity” throughout the Asia-Pacific.¹⁵⁴ The president remained unwilling to authorize extended global security commitments throughout the region for fear of overstretching and misappropriating the United States’ finite resources.¹⁵⁵