CHAPTER 7

The Costs of Compromise

The likelihood of U.S.-led military intervention in Indochina had waned by the summer of 1954. The United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand now sought to conclude the Geneva Conference on favorable terms with their adversaries and each other. To gather international support for U.S. plans, provide additional diplomatic advantage at the Geneva negotiations, and establish a visible deterrent to the Communist powers in Southeast Asia more broadly, the Eisenhower administration attempted to create a new security organization for the defense of the wider region. The pursuit of a collective security pact would produce serious divisions between all four powers. Progress toward the Manila Treaty or Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT), an agreement for collective defense in the region signed in September 1954, was often difficult as all four states sought to mold the final security organization in line with their own interests throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Compromises on all sides eventually produced agreement. After almost a decade since the end of World War II, the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand once again enjoyed a formal strategic alliance in the Asia-Pacific. The eventual creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in early 1955 complemented the short-term ambitions of all four Western powers in the region. Nevertheless, diplomatic bargaining preceding signature and ratification led to compromises that diluted the usefulness of the security alliance. The United States continued to limit commitments to joint planning after the implementation of the treaty. SEATO was therefore smaller, weaker, and less integrated than originally envisaged. The organization also lacked the necessary military and economic infrastructure to be effective, which helped encourage Australia and New Zealand to focus on regional rather than British Commonwealth interests, shifting focus away from the Middle East and Mediterranean and toward the “near north.”

The Joint Study Group

As the prospect of U.S. military intervention in Vietnam faded in the absence of international support, the talks at Geneva pressed ahead. Discussion among leading Western powers about the possibility of establishing some form of new organization for Southeast Asian security moved swiftly forward. Five Power talks—involving the U.S., UK, France, Australia, and New Zealand—convened in Washington to discuss the nature of any potential security alliance and the type of assistance that could be provided to the Associated States of Indochina, namely Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. All expressed willingness to provide additional assistance in the economic and military realm, but there was no agreement as to what this would specifically involve.1 As the U.S. summary of the discussions concluded, the “talks were amicable and polite but it seems questionable whether much constructive work was accomplished.”²

There was little agreement concerning exactly which countries should participate in the proposed Southeast Asian security alliance or the extent of security cooperation.³ London, Canberra, and Wellington were clear, however, that they preferred to retain the exclusive Five Power talks as the forum for resolving such questions so that they could maintain a significant degree of influence over proceedings. Privately, all three governments hoped that in time this forum would evolve into four-power talks following the French withdrawal from Indochina.⁴ British diplomats made clear to their U.S. counterparts that London and Washington should arrive at any understanding in private and subsequent planning documents needed to remain among the two sides. Canberra and Wellington were absent from the discussions. The United Kingdom would instead inform and consult both antipodean powers on any agreements as they affected the Asia-Pacific region.⁵ Australia and New Zealand both adopted a “wait-and-see” approach in the meantime, albeit reiterating their stance that no agreement should come at the expense of the ANZUS Treaty.⁶

The approach proposed by Britain was problematic for the United States. Both the Philippines and Thailand complained bitterly about their absence from the Five Power talks. As the Eisenhower administration had feared, excluding the Asian powers provided useful propaganda for the Soviet Union and PRC to use in their campaign to cast the United States as a racist power.7 Thai diplomats were unimpressed. They described the talks as “another example of the archaic idea of the white man’s burden.”⁸ The Philippine ambassador to Washington was also critical. He believed that this was a further example of the Western powers “drawing a color line in Asia.”⁹ Yet, in spite of such protestations, the U.S. continued to press ahead with the exclusive Five Power talks. The United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent the antipodean powers, provided valuable material support to the region and would help placate congressional demands that possible U.S. action in Indochina required international support. Washington could address complaints emanating from Thailand and the Philippines once the framework of the security alliance was in place. Racial considerations could complicate progress toward a new Southeast security organization, but as Washington recognized, Western powers were critical to the success of any new alliance.

Winning London’s support for the new alliance was therefore an important element of Washington’s plans. By June 21, 1954, it appeared that Eisenhower had won such support from Churchill. The British prime minister informed the president that his government would agree to establish a security alliance for Southeast Asia. The prime minister even went so far as to suggest that they should establish links between this new alliance and NATO.¹⁰ This was a notable shift in British policy after months of resistance to U.S. efforts. As the likelihood of intervention had decreased, the British now felt increasingly confident that their support for a new security organization in Southeast Asia was not a prelude to military action in Indochina that could lead to a calamity akin to the Korean War.¹¹

London had also grown steadily concerned that its continued opposition to Washington’s plans would engender an irrecoverable rift in transatlantic relations. Such a situation could encourage the United States to form an alliance in the Asia-Pacific without the United Kingdom. Such a scenario would undermine the efforts of British policymakers to act as a calming influence over U.S. foreign policy and limit their influence in the region. Ultimately, the British government concluded that it was preferable to seek inclusion in a new security alliance in the Asia-Pacific, however imperfect it may be, rather than to accept exclusion. Anthony Eden chose to speak publicly about the possibility of a new security alliance for Southeast Asia. Talking before the House of Commons, the British foreign secretary announced that his government was supportive of U.S. plans for a new Southeast Asian security grouping and had entered discussions with the United States to work out the details. The actual form of this alliance was still to be agreed, but Churchill’s forthcoming visit to Washington presented UK and U.S. leaders with an opportunity to thrash out the details.12

Churchill and Eden visited Washington in late June, for what the British prime minister believed to be his last official visit before retiring from politics. Despite ongoing U.S.-UK differences concerning Southeast Asia, the president and the prime minister agreed that a U.S.-UK Joint Study Group should convene to discuss how to establish a new security alliance in the region.¹³ Disagreements, however, persisted. Churchill, following the advice proffered to him by his intelligence and defense advisers, insisted that any new Southeast Asian alliance should include Thailand, the Philippines, and potentially Burma. For the British, these areas were more important than Indochina and, more significant, were defensible; Indochina was already a lost cause.¹⁴

In contrast, Eisenhower wanted to extend the alliance to include “whatever can be salvaged” of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The president also sought British approval for a public communiqué, noting that the crossing of a designated geographical line by Communist forces in Southeast Asia would bring about retaliation from this new alliance.¹⁵ As Eisenhower reasoned, if Communist forces crossed this line, it would legitimize any military action that would be undertaken in Southeast Asia and ensure international support for any subsequent military action.

This proposal met with immediate opposition from both Churchill and Eden. Demarcating a specific line, which if crossed would result in military action inside Indochina, never appealed to London due to the risks and diversions of resources involved. The British government was opposed to fighting a war in an area it deemed of secondary strategic importance. Indochina was simply not the place in which military power should be concentrated. It was a sideshow, which had the potential to misdirect Western efforts against Communism. With the United States seemingly willing to undertake far-reaching commitments on the mainland of Asia, the British worried that the Americans would squander this historic opportunity for cooperation. London was anxious that Washington would direct its efforts solely into Indochina to the neglect of other British interests.¹⁶

In the Southern Hemisphere, policymakers in Australia and New Zealand were closely monitoring the course of U.S.-UK diplomacy.¹⁷ Canberra and Wellington sought to influence proceedings by informing Washington that their own support for a new security alliance was contingent on British involvement. Such a move would encourage Washington to further pressure London into joining this new alliance and thereby secure a more effective Southeast Asian security pact, although never to the detriment of the ANZUS Treaty. Moreover, if the United States failed to gain British acceptance, both antipodean powers had a legitimate basis for refusing to join the alliance themselves, thereby preventing a major showdown with either power and safeguarding Commonwealth solidarity.18 The Menzies and Holland governments were therefore ensuring that Australia and New Zealand would not be isolated from either their U.S. or British ally.

By the end of June, the chances of Washington achieving its ambition of establishing a new Southeast Asian security organization prior to the conclusion of the Geneva talks looked slim. London’s enthusiasm had waned following the disagreements that emerged in the talks at Washington. Australian and New Zealand support for the United States existed but was contingent on British cooperation. Washington came to understand that in order for any Southeast Asian security alliance to attract adequate international support, agreement would have to follow the conclusion of the Geneva talks. Negotiations had frustrated U.S. ambitions in the region and proven corrosive to the establishment of any new security alliance for Southeast Asia. As Eisenhower would later admit, Britain and the United States had suffered an “antagonistic” relationship in the region driven by competing strategic assessments of the Cold War: “The conclusion seems inescapable that these differences come about because we do not agree on the probable extent and the importance of further Communist expansion in Asia … your own government seems to regard Communist aggression in Asia as of little significance to the free world future.”¹⁹ Delay in this instance represents an example of success for British postwar diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. By refusing to accede to U.S. demands, and benefiting from the support of its Commonwealth partners, the British government had managed to ensure the failure of what it considered a problematic alliance in Indochina.

During their earlier talks in Washington, Churchill and Eisenhower had agreed that they would establish a joint study group, which comprised political and military officials from both countries that would discuss common problems in Southeast Asia. This outcome represented a further success for the British government, which had now secured high-level bilateral discussions with the United States. Six meetings of this joint study group subsequently occurred between July 7 and July 17, during which both sides discussed the nature of the proposed organization. The British repeatedly stressed the need for greater economic and political commitments to the region, whereas the U.S. desired a more military-based solution.20 Differences persisted on this front and delayed progress. In addition, they discussed the issue of membership for this new Southeast Asian security alliance at length. The central question now revolved around which other countries should join the alliance. Following lengthy discussions, it was agreed that membership should be extended to Australia, New Zealand, France, the Philippines, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Burma.²¹

Notable absentees from this alliance were apparent, including Japan, Nationalist China, and the Republic of Korea. This new security organization also excluded European powers such as Portugal and the Netherlands, which retained imperial holdings in the region. The limited membership of the organization reflected compromises based principally on the competing interests of the United States and the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand. By encouraging the United States to compromise on the scope of its desired Southeast Asian security pact, the result was a far more limited and inherently weaker alliance than the Eisenhower administration had originally intended.²²

The decision to exclude Japan is illustrative of such compromises. Despite Japan’s central position within overall U.S. strategy for Asia-Pacific security and the country’s growing industrial and economic power within the region, the United States conceded its exclusion.²³ U.S. officials consequently looked at avenues for incorporating Japanese economic muscle into the defense of Southeast Asia without formally tying it into a security pact.²⁴ To be sure, U.S. policymakers already harbored doubts about the diplomatic consequences of including Japan.²⁵ Its inclusion in a Southeast Asian security alliance could stir up resentment from Southeast Asian states that had not forgotten how the Japanese Empire had behaved during World War II. Yet it was British resistance, and more so that exercised by Australia and New Zealand, that ensured Japanese exclusion.²⁶

The Australian government informed the U.S. that it would view Japanese membership as “deeply provocative” given the still recent horrors of World War II, which made it politically difficult for the Menzies government to enter a formal security alliance with Japan. Menzies was concerned by the likely domestic opposition that this agreement would generate for the prime minister.²⁷ Privately, officials in the Australian government informed their counterparts in New Zealand that Japanese membership of SEATO would be an “impossible” condition for them to accept.²⁸ This was an opinion shared by the Holland government. Subsequently, New Zealand informed Washington that they too would not enter a new alliance that included membership for Japan.²⁹

Also significant were the strategic conclusions reached by Australia and New Zealand concerning the effect of Japanese membership on their standing within the proposed alliance. As both U.S. and British policymakers were well aware, Australia and New Zealand remained “anxious” that any new Southeast Asian security alliance had the potential to “submerge” ANZUS and downgrade their relationship with the United States.30 An organization with fewer powerful members was, in the assessment of the antipodean powers, preferable to a much broader alliance, as it would allow each antipo-dean power to exert greater influence over alliance strategy.³¹ As Canberra and Wellington emphasized in their communications with Washington, it was imperative that this new organization did not “weaken or supplant ANZUS.”³² When Dulles suggested that “he wanted to raise the question of the future of ANZUS in relation to SEATO,” the secretary of state was immediately met with the response that “the firm opinion [of Australia and New Zealand is] that ANZUS should be preserved whatever other arrangements might be made.”³³ As one New Zealand official noted later in the year, it was imperative to avoid the impression that ANZUS had been “swallowed up” by SEATO.³⁴ Such a stance was understandable given the importance that policymakers in Canberra and Wellington attached to ANZUS, not least as it was the only forum in which both antipodean powers could gain direct access to the strategic planning of Washington and thereby exact a level of influence over U.S. policy. The New Zealand Department for External Affairs believed the ANZUS Council was the only forum in which they could exert a degree of influence over “United States thinking on Far Eastern and other political problems.”³⁵

British officials argued that Japanese membership was unacceptable because of the likely negative reaction it would engender from other Asian states that still harbored wartime resentment toward Japan. Japanese membership simply risked alienating too many Asian states. Inclusion would therefore prove counterproductive. Self-interest also motivated London’s thinking given that the British were concerned that Japanese membership threatened to weaken their own influence within any new organization.³⁶ British officials were already anxious about Japan’s rising power in the region, especially its growing trade and commercial influence, a concern increasingly shared by Australian officials.³⁷

Membership for Nationalist China and the Republic of Korea was similarly problematic for the British Commonwealth powers, especially as both states desired a Pacific security pact.³⁸ London, Canberra, and Wellington agreed that the PRC would interpret extending membership to either state as an overtly hostile act, which could encourage it to crush the Nationalist Chinese government in Formosa. For all three states, it would be a grave mistake to establish an alliance that would see them drawn into such a war. Membership for both countries would also create an alliance that was too far-reaching geographically and would be underresourced, thereby placing greater burdens on the antipodean powers. As Richard Casey noted in his diary: “We do not want to see South Korea, Japan and Formosa in SEATO, because the addition of each of these countries would inevitably mean an extension of Australia’s responsibilities and obligations, in that we might be obliged to come to their defence if they got into trouble.”39 New Zealand agreed that membership should be similarly defined and strictly limited.⁴⁰

Dulles, desiring a swift resolution to the membership question, grudgingly accepted that Japan, Nationalist China, and the Republic of Korea could not be founder members of this new Asian alliance. Importantly, though, he managed to obtain agreement that the question of extending membership to the likes of Japan would be revisited in the future.⁴¹ From the very origins of the new Asian security alliance, British, Australian, and New Zealand opinions had managed to shape agreement to reflect their own national interests. SEATO was not therefore merely a U.S. construct, but rather a compromise between leading Western powers in the region.

None of this is to suggest the U.S. failed to pursue its own interests in these talks. The Eisenhower administration was equally selective about which states should be involved in this new Asian security alliance. Strategic calculations largely influenced such decision making, but they were also informed by broader ideological and racial factors. The United States did not invite Portugal to join the new organization because of the fear that Communist propagandists would cast the United States as an imperial power upholding European colonialism. The same logic applied to the Netherlands’ exclusion from the alliance.⁴² Although membership for the United Kingdom would certainly encourage similar criticisms, British inclusion brought considerable material benefits, which outweighed such criticisms. Eisenhower nevertheless appreciated the importance of involving regional powers. The president appreciated that other Southeast Asian states, especially Burma, were making the argument that any security alliance had to include Southeast Asian participation, as it would otherwise give the impression that the region would be exchanging “one imperialism for another.”⁴³

Such perceptions mattered to a president who was deeply concerned that the proposed treaty for Southeast Asian security was not solely between “the five white nations and left out Asian states.”⁴⁴ The fear of appearing to act in an imperial or racist fashion again influenced the course of U.S. foreign policy. As a National Security Council planning paper outlined, “the old taint of colonialism will offer new difficulties” in U.S. efforts to work closely with France in Indochina.45 Eisenhower emphasized this point in communication with Churchill, telling him that for Americans, “colonies” was a “naughty word.”⁴⁶ Consequently, the president told his National Security Council, “Small or not, such nations as Thailand at least provided the semblance of Asian participation” in a Southeast Asian security alliance.⁴⁷ This point was emphasized publicly as the president declared that “proper Asiatic nations” must be members of any new Pacific security pact.⁴⁸ In order to play down perceptions of imperialism or racism, U.S. officials also saw Indian membership as desirable, despite Jawaharlal Nehru’s continuing intransigence toward much of U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁹ The president realized that Indian inclusion would provide the new alliance with major political capital and would dampen possible criticism that the United States was building a “white man’s pact” inside Asia.

Establishing a new security organization that took account of all these divergent interests, especially concerning membership, would therefore be a complicated process that would necessitate considerable compromises on all parts. A “semblance of Asian participation” was a fitting choice of words. Many Asian states, including Burma and India, would never become members of SEATO. Ultimately, the participation of some Asian states was required less for practical military purposes than for a semblance of racial equality. The president was committed to secure Asian participation in some form, however superficial. Eisenhower concluded that if the United States was cast as a “racist power,” it would undermine efforts to win indigenous support from the peoples of the Asia-Pacific. Dulles made a similar point to the British ambassador to Washington, Roger Makins, informing him that “the United States had weakened her leadership and her mission in the world by supporting or appearing to support British and French policies in the Middle East and North Africa, thus incurring the charge of being an imperialist power.”⁵⁰ As Dulles had written publicly in 1950, “If the Communist parties in Western Europe feel that they can make political capital by charging the United States with intent to turn these countries [in the Asia-Pacific] into colonies, it is clear that we must be scrupulously careful in our relations with countries which, within the last five years, have in fact been colonial possessions of the West.”⁵¹

London was aware of such sensitivities in Washington. Makins took pains to remind Eden that for U.S. policymaking elites it was imperative not to appear as an imperialist or racist power: “Opposition and dislike of colonialism is, as I have said, deeply imbedded in the American mind. Because of their association with us and with the French, they have swallowed their scruples, and on the whole have used their influence to support the colonial system at all events to the point of being called the arch-imperialist power.”52 The UK needed to remain sensitive to these concerns. As the ambassador warned, “If they take on fresh commitments without participation, or, alternatively, move back towards ideas of peripheral defence, which is the likely alternative, they will with some relief be able to indulge their natural feelings against colonialism. With the growing pains in most of our colonies and with the French difficulties in North Africa, this, on the basis of a resentful or frustrated America, is not an attractive prospect.”⁵³

Agreement at Geneva

As the discussions about a new Southeast Asian security alliance continued, the British foreign secretary pressed ahead with his diplomatic efforts at the Geneva conference. Eden’s efforts at securing a diplomatic solution paid off. On July 21, all sides reached a settlement that brought a cease-fire to the war inside Indochina. Vietnam would divide into two separate zones along the seventeenth parallel with a demilitarized area on each side demarcating the partition. Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh would govern the northern zone, and the originally French-supported government of Bao Dai, the chief of state of the state of Vietnam (South Vietnam), would govern the southern zone. Outside military intervention also ended with neither half of Vietnam permitted to join any military alliances. Viet Minh and French forces were to evacuate their positions and regroup in their respective zones. National elections would take place in 1956 under international supervision, thereby illustrating that the partition of Vietnam was an intentionally temporary arrangement. The agreement, as Eden admitted, was “not completely satisfactory” but “had stopped an eight year war and reduced international tension to a point of instant danger to world peace.”⁵⁴ Given that many in the British government secretly believed that no agreement could be found in Indochina that would “adequately safeguard” Western interests, the Geneva settlement was simply making the best of a difficult situation.⁵⁵

The Australian and New Zealand governments were generally pleased with the outcomes arrived at in Geneva. In Canberra’s assessment, the French had mishandled the military situation in Indochina, and their inability to provide the Associated States of Indochina with any real political autonomy exacerbated current difficulties.⁵⁶ Casey noted that, given the circumstances, Eden had done about as well as could have been reasonably expected. Menzies subsequently issued a public statement that welcomed the agreement at Geneva.⁵⁷ Wellington would offer a similarly positive response. As the minister for external affairs Clifton Webb announced before the New Zealand parliament, “The settlement was probably the best that could be expected in the circumstances.”58 Several developments had also come out of the temporary resolution of the Indochina crisis, which could potentially advance the long-term strategic ambitions of the antipodean powers. Principally this included the possibility of a security alliance for the Asia-Pacific that would involve British participation and exist in addition to ANZUS.⁵⁹

The Eisenhower administration did not share such positive appraisals. Some in the cabinet believed that the Geneva accords had at least managed to buy the state of Vietnam a brief respite from Communist attack and therefore helped protect the wider Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, as many in Washington interpreted events, Eden’s diplomacy during the negotiations had continually cast the United States as the obstacle to finding a peaceful solution. Such diplomacy irritated the Eisenhower administration, not least because Eden ensured that if no agreement was reached, he would “place on [the] shoulders of [the] U.S.[,] responsibility for [the] failure of [the] Geneva Conference and [the] fall of [the] French Government.”⁶⁰ In the assessment of Dulles’s deputy Walter Bedell Smith, Eden’s diplomacy had failed to prevent the advance of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. As Smith remarked skeptically, “Diplomacy is rarely able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield.”⁶¹ Dulles was furious, likening Eden’s role at Geneva to that of Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938. Others, including the president, simply believed that Eden’s efforts had merely legitimized Communist control of the northern half of Vietnam.⁶² One National Security Council planning document was damning in its verdict of Eden’s Geneva diplomacy, concluding that “it completed a major forward stride for communism which may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia.”⁶³ Given such reservations, the United States refused to officially recognize the agreements reached at Geneva.

U.S. policymakers believed it was inevitable that the Viet Minh would eventually seek to consume its southern neighbor. As one U.S. memorandum from September 1954 made clear: “We agree that the Viet Minh represent a Communist force aggressively opposed to the ideals and the interests of the free peoples of the Associated States and of France and the United States. We will firmly oppose the extension of influence or control of the Viet Minh movement and will work toward political, military and economic goals in Indochina which will strengthen the Associated States’ Governments and which will enable them to maintain their independence.”⁶⁴ U.S. officials had simplified the situation in Indochina by viewing events through a Cold War lens. Competition for political control inside Indochina touched on a more complex set of factors, including nationalism, decolonization, regionalism, and religion. Policymakers, however, often downplayed these complexities.65 Resisting an apparently inevitable Communist attack became the administration’s priority for Southeast Asia. As Canberra learned, the prevailing mood in Washington was that South Vietnam was “going down the drain” and that significant action was necessary.⁶⁶ Improving the stability of the government of South Vietnam via direct and covert means was now undertaken with greater urgency. Financial and military assistance continued, and a comprehensive U.S. covert intelligence operation designed to support Saigon now began.⁶⁷ A key element of this resistance package also involved reaching agreement with Britain, Australia, and New Zealand for a new Southeast Asian security alliance.

With the Geneva talks concluded, British support for establishing a new security organization for the Asia-Pacific, and Southeast Asia in particular, had grown considerably. Growing support also reflected the British government’s confidence in achieving its broader economic and security ambitions in the Asia-Pacific. Senior officials would go on to suggest that a treaty could “provide an umbrella beneath which we can persuade the Americans to spend money” in the region, both in terms of military and economic investment.⁶⁸ Churchill went as far as to suggest in personal correspondence with Eisenhower that with the Geneva conference now settled, they should seek to establish a security pact with the “widest lines” of membership.⁶⁹ In an effort to construct an organization along British lines, Churchill wrote directly to Eisenhower, claiming that the time was ripe for “establishing a firm front against Communism in the Asia-Pacific sphere.”⁷⁰ Securing U.S. commitment remained a key element of Churchill’s approach to safeguarding British interests in the region. Eisenhower responded positively to Churchill’s overture and U.S.-UK talks convened to discuss the nature of the new alliance. On August 14, the U.S. issued a statement that the nation and like-minded governments would pursue a “collective security arrangement” and meet on September 6 to discuss the idea. The governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom signaled their support soon after.⁷¹

Progress toward international cooperation nevertheless remained difficult. Some U.S. policymakers remained suspicious of British membership demands, specifically the inclusion of the Colombo powers, fearing an attempt to stack the organization with countries supportive of British objectives. As Charles Wilson, the U.S. secretary of defense, warned Dulles, “I feel the British are playing their relatively weak hand in Asia far more shrewdly than we are playing our strong one.”⁷² The United States rejected British ideas about voting machinery within SEATO, noting that in the future when membership expands, a group of “neutrals” or a British Commonwealth bloc could “exercise a controlling voice” within the new alliance.73 As further evidence of such concerns, the U.S. swiftly rejected the Philippines’ suggestion that SEATO should establish a council that would be able to authorize action if three-quarters of the membership voted in favor because Washington “would not have a controlling voice,” which was “wholly unacceptable.”⁷⁴ The Eisenhower administration was evidently sensitive to any agreement that could curtail its freedom of action. In a similar fashion to its handling of the ANZUS Treaty, the United States wished to cooperate with interested parties but would only do so in a manner of its choosing. Limited commitments remained central to Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy, and he resisted any challenges to this objective.

In contrast to previous negotiations in the Asia-Pacific region, however, the U.S. had shown that it was willing to accommodate some British demands concerning membership. This altered stance reflected the difficulty of Washington’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis London. If it refused to give in to any British demands, London would likely refuse to sign up to the new security organization for Southeast Asia, which meant that Australia and New Zealand would also likely do the same. International cooperation remained essential to placate Congress and to provide necessary material support against further Communist advances throughout the region.

During the talks, Washington stressed to London that the focus of the new organization had to be on Southeast Asia and resisted suggestions to broaden the organization’s coverage. This undermined British efforts to have their Asian assets, particularly their interests in Hong Kong, protected by a new U.S. security umbrella. In return, however, London extracted a number of concessions from Washington. If the new organization focused on Southeast Asia, then its remit could not stretch to include Formosa, the security of which the British government remained unwilling to guarantee. In addition, the British remained opposed to the Associated States of Indochina gaining membership, as this would directly violate the terms of the Geneva Accords. Washington grudgingly acquiesced to London’s wishes.⁷⁵

The nature of U.S.-UK diplomacy was frustrating for the Eisenhower administration. The British government’s insistence that the new organization be regionally focused and exclude membership of Nationalist China deeply irritated many U.S. policymakers.⁷⁶ The U.S. subsequently pursued a further bilateral alliance, creating the U.S.–Republic of China security treaty in December 1954.⁷⁷ The proposed SEACDT treaty, Dulles complained, “leaves us in a weak position,” but he feared there was no alternative for we “can’t afford to hand the other side complete victory in both quarters on a silver platter.”78 As such, any alliance was preferable to no alliance at all. Dulles admitted privately that the member states of this new security organization “are so weak and feeble, one wonders if it is good to have a treaty with them.”⁷⁹ Competing national interests—as well as competing conceptions of Cold War strategy—had once again exerted a significant influence on both the nature and scope of this emerging security alliance.

Negotiations on a wide variety of issues continued throughout August and September 1954. Officials from each state debated the wording of the final treaty, the types of military cooperation to be undertaken, and the socioeconomic roles the new organization would assume. U.S. officials accepted that significant economic assistance was important for the stability of the region but were vague on the details of funding. The British did not dispute the merits of this idea yet looked to ensure that it would be Washington, and not London, that would provide the majority of this support.⁸⁰ Debate rumbled on regarding what would actually precipitate a military response. Dulles’s inclusion of the phrase “Communist aggression” sparked considerable differences of opinion. Washington argued that this phrase was required to send a clear warning to the Soviet Union and PRC to deter further incursions into the state of Vietnam. London, Canberra, and Wellington argued that the term was simply too broad and had the potential for the new organization to be manipulated into military action. Following resistance from many other potential members of the treaty, Dulles eventually conceded that the phrase be struck from the final wording of the proposed treaty.⁸¹ On September 6, all sides reached agreement over a draft version of the security treaty.⁸² Each member—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—accepted these agreements would be ratified by their respective domestic authorities and the treaty obligations would enter into force in the New Year.

The British, Australian, and New Zealand governments had managed to secure a new defense pact on seemingly favorable terms. The ratification of SEATO represented the United States’ first formal commitment to work with all three British Commonwealth powers for the collective defense of Southeast Asia. The resultant organization would enter into force on February 19, 1955. This agreement meant that eight independent states dotted around the world would work together to resist the threat of Communism in the region.⁸³ As John Lewis Gaddis contends, the creation of this Asian security alliance allowed the United States to construct a “geostrategic great wall” around both the Soviet Union and PRC.⁸⁴ It also had benefits for the antipodean powers, given that it would involve the participation of the United Kingdom and did not appear to supersede ANZUS. As W. David McIntyre explains, “The advantage of SEATO for the Tasman neighbors was that it involved them with the United States in a wider arrangement than ANZUS, and where the link with Britain was also retained.”85

The signatories of the Manila Treaty nevertheless recognized the limitations of the agreement. The organization would have no unified command and no specifically allocated forces, thereby diluting its power and weakening its contribution to regional security.⁸⁶ The United States continued to resist pressure to station ground forces in Southeast Asia, instead preferring to rely on nuclear armaments. As one New Zealand official later noted, “It was clear that no practicable defence of South East Asia [was] possible without the use of nuclear weapons.”⁸⁷ Economic, domestic-political, and strategic concerns convinced Washington that the deployment of U.S. ground troops to secure Southeast Asia was not in the best interests of the United States.⁸⁸ The United States also remained opposed to the establishment of any formalized body of advisers within SEATO that would discuss military planning, fearing that such a body would be too unwieldy to manage, too large to reach concrete military agreements, and too insecure to avoid information leaks.⁸⁹ The United Kingdom shared these concerns but felt that if military planning within SEATO was to proceed then it should occur on a four-power basis with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.⁹⁰ Such an arrangement would provide the British government with a greater opportunity to influence proceedings away from public scrutiny.

Although SEATO’s military shortcomings are well documented, its socioeconomic ambitions also fell short of initial expectations. In conversation with senior Australian policymakers, British officials made clear that they believed it was likely that Indochina would “be Communist within 18 months,” and that they should direct their attention to building support for non-Communist political actors throughout the rest of Southeast Asia and improving the socioeconomic situation in the region.⁹¹ As such, Casey and Munro had emphasized the need for the organization to concentrate on the “economic aspects” of regional security.⁹² Nevertheless, the United States largely ignored antipodean preferences, and neither Australia nor New Zealand proved willing to push the matter. Although all signatories to SEACDT sought to improve levels of investment and trade more broadly, budgetary limitations, and domestic pressures made SEATO an inappropriate framework with which to assist economic development in the wider region. The Colombo Plan instead became the primary vehicle for an Asian economic aid program. The U.S. remained keen to avoid any suggestion that is was creating a Marshall Plan for Asia.93 Formal commitments to any bolder economic organization therefore ceased from this point onward.⁹⁴

Strategic Reassessments

The months between the completion of the Manila Treaty negotiations and the emergence of SEATO highlight the ongoing difficulties of strategic cooperation in the early Cold War. When Canberra and Wellington pushed Washington to reconvene military discussions within the ANZUS forum, the United States rejected the proposal. Exchanges within the U.S. government reveal that “in order to not offend Asians, it was preferable for the U.S. to wait until [the] Manila Pact organization was underway” before looking to engage in any further military discussions with non-Asian states.⁹⁵ As Eisenhower explained in early September, “any indication to our Asian partners that the white members of the Manila Pact are engaging in secret military planning under the Treaty, to the exclusion of the Asian members, would have the most profound political and psychological repercussions and might result in the disintegration of the Manila partnership.”⁹⁶ It was at this point that the Eisenhower administration proposed that military planners for all eight powers should convene to discuss strategic planning.⁹⁷ Casey hinted in his diary that the creation of the organization, which included the participation of Asian states, was good for public relations reasons because it ensured that it “gets away from the resistance to Communism in Asia being regarded as a white man’s preoccupation.”⁹⁸

Anxieties still existed in the United States over the threat posed to Southeast Asia from Communism, not least the ongoing violence precipitated by Viet Minh forces that threatened to undermine Bao Dai’s control of South Vietnam.⁹⁹ When Dulles liaised with political leaders of Southeast Asian states in early 1955, he received the same message. In sum, better security provisions were necessary to prevent continued Communist infiltration and subversion.¹⁰⁰ Washington subsequently agreed that SEATO should begin military planning. A desire for progress, however, presented a challenge to equality in planning. Many officials in Washington and London believed that it might be more effective to convene an exclusive group—namely, four-power talks between the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—given that the major military and economic resources for SEATO’s defense would come from only these members and that the necessary forums for security cooperation already existed.

Eden had previously recognized the predicament posed by these four-power talks, noting that “in practice the real planning would have to be done on a 4-power basis by ourselves, the Australians and New Zealanders with the Americans. But great caution will be needed if this is to be done without offence to the French and to the Asian parties to the Manila Treaty.”101 Yet private talks were a huge boon as they provided London, as well as Canberra and Wellington, with a private forum in which to discuss strategic planning in Southeast Asia. All three governments sought to exploit the SEATO agreement as a way in which to increase their access to U.S. thinking for the defense of the entire Asia-Pacific and for establishing formal channels for military planning.

Casey and Munro put this case to Dulles during talks at an ANZUS Council meeting in October 1954. They claimed that Australia and New Zealand did not desire to “leave everything to the United States,” but in order for both countries to “pull [their] full weight” they would require “proper access to the United States mind on the planning side.”¹⁰² Casey even proposed that strategic planning should continue “under the counter” as ANZUS would “serve as a cover for what would in effect be SEATO strategic planning—its true purpose not being known—and that ‘make believe’ planning be undertaken bilaterally by the U.S. with each of the other four countries.”¹⁰³ Munroably supported such claims, suggesting that the three ANZUS powers and the United Kingdom already had established practices for sharing sensitive intelligence material so could press ahead with joint planning for the region in confidence of maintaining secrecy.¹⁰⁴

Antipodean efforts proved ineffective. Dulles provided no response to suggestions of secret planning and rebuffed the idea that Canberra and Wellington needed additional access to U.S. military planning. The failure of the talks to generate substantial agreement, the ongoing instability of Indochina, and the increased defense obligations associated with the Manila Treaty encouraged the Australian prime minister that his earlier inclination to shift focus away from the defense of the Middle East had been correct.¹⁰⁵ When Australian military officials met with their British and New Zealand counterparts in October and November 1954, they informed them that Australia would now prioritize the defense of Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁶

In contrast to the talks held in Melbourne in the previous year, in which Australia had only discussed prioritizing regional defense, these talks now confirmed a clear focus on Southeast Asia. These changed strategic circumstances also encouraged New Zealand to reconsider its strategic planning and policies. As Macmillan informed Churchill: “The Manila Treaty has been signed under which New Zealand has accepted increased defence obligations in South East Asia. In these new circumstances, the Chiefs of Staff consider that it would be only natural if the New Zealand government should consider that the right place for their land forces to be deployed in global war would be Southeast Asia rather than the Middle East.”107 Policymakers in London were disappointed by the strategic adjustment of the antipodean powers but appreciated that they could not provide adequate security assurances to Australia and New Zealand. As such, the United Kingdom reluctantly acceded to antipodean strategic realignment.¹⁰⁸ All that British officials and policy-makers could do now was to criticize the decisions taken by Canberra and Wellington.¹⁰⁹

In early 1955, Churchill, Menzies, and Holland agreed that Australia and New Zealand’s primary aim in a general war would be the preservation of the security of Southeast Asia, focusing on rapid deployment to the Malayan area, and the creation of a strategic reserve in Malaya as a deterrent to Communist expansion.¹¹⁰ Menzies subsequently informed Holland that “the Australian Government has accepted the principle that the main aim of Australia should be to assure the safety of South East Asia in a general war.”¹¹¹ The Australian prime minster would formally announce his decision to participate in the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (BCFESR) in April 1955.¹¹² Although Evatt and the Labour Party had criticized these plans, a public opinion poll in February earlier that year showed that a majority of Australians would support the deployment of Australian troops to help garrison Malaya.¹¹³

Recent events inside Indochina had encouraged Australian policymakers to take a more forthright approach to regional threats. Following a visit to Indochina, Casey warned Menzies in March that the situation was so precarious that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could all “fall into communist hands” within the year.¹¹⁴ Ultimately, Canberra’s decision makers confirmed that they would have to focus their priorities on their near north if they were to safeguard their own security.¹¹⁵ In addition, the Australian Treasury was keenly aware of, and increasingly concerned by, the level of commitment required by Australia to sustain any obligations to the Middle East and Mediterranean.¹¹⁶

In the same month, the New Zealand Department of External Affairs produced a long report titled “ANZAM Planning for the Defence of Malaya and South East Asia.”¹¹⁷ It noted that the defense of the ANZAM region was fundamentally linked to retaining control over Malaya in the event of a war: “The defence of the ANZAM Region depends on the security of Malaya, which initially hinges on the integrity of neighbouring countries for defence in depth. Conversely, Malaya is the keystone of the defence of adjacent countries, and provides a base for operations in war. Malaya also gives defence in depth to Australia and New Zealand, and is the key to air and sea communications in South East Asia. It is also a source of important raw materials.”118 As the report went on to argue, “Communist successes in Indochina have brought the threat much closer. Consequently, in war, the time available for external reinforcement of Malaya has been reduced. The threat to Malaya would increase were there any further deterioration of the situation in South East Asia.”¹¹⁹ The report endorsed Canberra’s view that both antipodean powers should squarely focus their resources and strategic focus on defending the ANZAM region.

The prime minister endorsed this assessment and the New Zealand Defence Department ushered in the necessary changes to Wellington’s strategic planning and policies. In March 1955, New Zealand plans now reflected that “in global war, all three New Zealand services may be committed to the defence of the Malayan area as well as other parts of the ANZAM region. In cold war, some naval and air forces will be based there as part of the strategic reserve and it is likely that the Army will also provide a force.”¹²⁰ This pivot toward defending the ANZAM region was confirmed in April by the New Zealand Defence Department: “In the event of global war, and unless there is any major change in the strategic situation as now forecast, New Zealand land and air forces will be employed in the South East Asia region, instead of in the Middle East. Naval Forces and the maritime squadrons of the Air Force not required for local defence will be deployed elsewhere in the ANZAM region.”¹²¹ Although Malaya’s strategic significance evidently drove New Zealand’s security planning, so too did changes in strategic outlook more broadly. Many policymakers believed that the advent of thermonuclear weapons had made outright war less likely, but limited war outside of Europe now seemed possible, especially following the events of the Korean War.¹²² In addition, New Zealand’s commitment to Malaya reflected a still strong attachment to the United Kingdom and Holland’s belief that cooperation would ensure assistance from the British in the event of a future emergency.¹²³

New Zealand’s strategic pivot away from the Middle East and Mediterranean toward the ANZAM region was now agreed. The urgency shown in Australian diplomacy in bringing about this change, however, had caused immense concern and irritation in the inner circle of the Holland government.¹²⁴ Canberra’s enthusiasm risked making errors that could have been mitigated by more thorough planning, especially concerning the placement of strategic priorities. Furthermore, Australia’s eagerness meant that it had sometimes failed to inform Wellington of the changes it was proposing to Washington. There was a clear sense that Canberra was sidelining Wellington from decisions that would have a critical effect on New Zealand’s external policies.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, policymakers in Wellington decided to follow Canberra’s lead in large part because cooperation with Australia would promote New Zealand’s own security interests. In the subsequent months, Wellington informed Canberra privately that it would bolster its military contingent in Malaya. These efforts would include the dispatch of the New Zealand Special Air Service and a public announcement of its decision to prioritize the defense of the ANZAM region, which would involve it withdrawing its air force from bases in the Mediterranean.126 The New Zealand division intended for the Middle East would now go to Malaya, and existing air squadrons withdrew shortly afterward. This signaled a radical change in the defense relationship of Australia and New Zealand.¹²⁷ As Christopher Pugsley has noted, the defense of Southeast Asia would be the “central concern” of New Zealand’s strategic policy for the next thirty-four years.¹²⁸ By the middle of 1955, the British government could no longer count on Australian and New Zealand contributions to help uphold its interest in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

The antipodean powers’ prioritization of regional security alone does not fully account for the United Kingdom’s eventual withdrawal from the Middle East. To be sure, broader strategic and economic circumstances, U.S. influence, and Arab national pressure all played a role.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, Britain’s position in the region became increasingly untenable without the material and political support provided by Australia and New Zealand. London, as well as Washington, believed that the antipodean powers’ commitment to deploying forces to the Middle East was vital if the British were to maintain their position there in the event of war. Strategic planners in both the United States and United Kingdom believed that Britain had to “hold the line” in the Middle East, and New Zealand’s contribution would be important if this was to be achieved.¹³⁰ There were clear requirements for additional land forces in the Middle East, which the antipodean powers had traditionally fulfilled and which no other state was willing to provide. This strategic shift also marked the end of a coordinated British Commonwealth security planning system focused on the Middle East and the end of efforts to share the cost of imperial defense.¹³¹

Inner-Circle Planning

Almost from the advent of the SEATO alliance, planners in London, Canberra, and Wellington wished to establish what they called “inner circle” planning, namely four-power staff talks between the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. U.S. plans to push forward with its military preparations inside Southeast Asia, such as building new runways in Thailand and equipping the South Vietnamese government with armaments, convinced planners in all three countries that they needed to know what U.S. plans were so that they could add realism to their own planning.132 The Australian Defence Committee argued that “while ANZAM has most important functions, however, its work will be ineffectual unless it is linked with United States plans for the overall defence of the Pacific area.”¹³³ Practical security considerations also influenced thinking. As the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand all recognized, “the Non-Asian members of SEACDT are not willing to discuss Top SECRET plans for the defence of South East Asia with the Asian members” given that the latter were perceived to have insecure systems for transferring information throughout their bureaucracies.¹³⁴ Without the exchange of military information then, broader alliance preparations would always be hindered, perhaps fundamentally so.

Of the three Commonwealth powers, Australia took the lead in trying to establish “inner circle” planning.¹³⁵ Internal assessments for the Menzies government had indicated that there were already large gaps in the military resources required to uphold the defense of the ANZAM region in a time of war.¹³⁶ Inner-circle planning offered an opportunity to address these material and strategic concerns. Menzies had made this point clear in his communication with Holland in February 1955. The Australian secretary of the Department of Defense Frederick Shedden informed his New Zealand counterpart that Australian efforts to convince the Eisenhower administration to enter into these talks would begin soon.¹³⁷ Establishing formal agreements between the ANZAM members and the United States on what exactly their military response would be to certain eventualities was vital if credible security planning was to take place.¹³⁸

Australian efforts to convince the United States of the need for inner-circle planning once again proved ineffective. The United States remained unwilling to commit additional and already scarce resources to the defense of Southeast Asia. The crisis of 1954 had passed, and the reduced likelihood of conflict in Vietnam had marginalized the military purpose of SEATO. Furthermore, the PRC had become a far more pressing concern, not least following the Taiwan Strait Crisis, whereby Mao began military operations against the ROC.¹³⁹ Rad-ford himself believed that “this was a moment for a showdown with Communist China.”¹⁴⁰ U.S. attention had begun to shift northward to China. As such, appeals from even the closest of allies for inner-circle planning with a view to committing additional resources to SEATO were never likely to succeed. Even when Casey assured Washington that this four-power planning could remain “completely secret,” the Eisenhower administration remained reluctant to commit more fully to strategic planning.141

Casey had previously feared that the institutional opposition posed by the Pentagon to alliance planning for the defense of Southeast Asia would prove too high a hurdle to overcome.¹⁴² As one report supplied by Casey to the Australian cabinet noted, “no spectacular results” had emerged from the recent meetings with the SEATO members regarding revisions to military planning and provisions.¹⁴³ Menzies was initially more confident that increased cooperation between the four powers would soon come to fruition, a confidence that reflected his recent talks with Eisenhower and Dulles in Washington. He was soon to be disappointed, however, when Canberra learned that Radford had vetoed the idea of four-power talks about Malayan defense.¹⁴⁴ As Rad-ford informed Canberra, “It is most inappropriate to conduct consultations outside the framework of SEATO.”¹⁴⁵

Canberra and Wellington’s hopes of a stronger United States commitment to Southeast Asian security, and hence antipodean security more broadly, were ultimately disappointed. As Australia and New Zealand complained in subsequent years, the United States’ interest in supporting SEATO appeared fleeting and limited. The new security commitments promised by the alliance ultimately failed to alleviate antipodean security concerns much closer to home.¹⁴⁶ Australian and New Zealand ambitions to establish “an arrangement whereby the United States and the ANZAM partners can be associated in military planning in South East Asia” failed to materialize from the Radford talks in August 1955.¹⁴⁷

All that Radford proposed was further discussions between all of the treaty members of SEATO, which the Menzies government deemed “unrealistic.”¹⁴⁸ Australian defense planners received a disappointing response to their suggestion for further strategic planning for the region.¹⁴⁹ In the New Zealand estimation, Radford had responded coolly to the idea of four-power talks.¹⁵⁰ Events in Southeast Asia failed to convince Radford to change his long-standing objections to providing U.S. support for defending Malaya, which he considered a secondary concern.¹⁵¹ As the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff informed both Canberra and Wellington, “I feel defence of Malaya lies to [the] North and further that greatest threat to Malaya stems from internal subversion rather than from overt external aggression. Therefore I feel strongly that planning efforts most likely to result in successful defence of Malaya are those directed towards maintaining security and sovereignty of northern countries.”¹⁵²

Such a response was, in the view of one highly influential New Zealand official, most unsatisfactory.¹⁵³ When the Australian ambassador to Washington, Percy Spender, pressed the case for an additional U.S. commitment to be made for Malayan defense in the framework of this new Southeast Asian security alliance, he again found little enthusiasm on the part of Radford.154 While willing to dispatch a U.S. officer to Melbourne to meet with the ANZAM planners, Spender sensed that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs remained opposed to preparing for the defense of the ANZAM area. Radford remained wedded to the logic that defense of the ANZAM region would be served by ensuring security “further north,” namely striking China in its homeland. As the chairman informed both the Australian and New Zealand governments, the United States did not possess “sufficient resources to be adequately strong in every potentially threatened area.”¹⁵⁵ Radford did not speak for the president or his cabinet, to be sure, but he did oversee planning for SEATO, and thus his position on the matter was of considerable significance. Hard choices were required, but he believed that focusing resources on mainland China would best serve U.S., Australian, and New Zealand security.

Following talks with Dulles at the annual ANZUS Council meeting in September, it was evident that the U.S. secretary of state was not interested in entering detailed staff talks with Canberra and Wellington about Southeast Asia or the ANZAM area. As Casey noted of the meeting, Dulles never even opened his briefing material, which would have allowed him to discuss in detail the types of security planning that both Canberra and Wellington desired.¹⁵⁶ The Eisenhower administration’s position was therefore frustrating and, more important, was perceived in Australian and New Zealand policymaking circles as undermining any hopes of improving antipodean security beyond existing agreements. As Wellington admitted, “As we know nothing of United States military plans for defence of the wider area it is only common prudence for us to prepare plans for the defence of the area for which we are responsible.”¹⁵⁷

SEATO had failed to deliver the type of security cooperation and planning between the four Western powers that policymakers in the British Commonwealth states had envisaged.¹⁵⁸ By October, policymakers in Canberra and Wellington noted that inner-circle planning was “non-existent at present.”¹⁵⁹ Such planning was more important than ever as antipodean planners feared that the situation in Southeast Asia was becoming ever more dangerous. One New Zealand Staff Planning report in October 1955, for example, estimated that the position of South Vietnam remained precarious, and if this fell to Communist control, then the probability of Communist success throughout the rest of Indochina would significantly increase.¹⁶⁰ In these circumstances, the antipodean powers accepted that they would have to look beyond Malaya and eventually cooperate with wider SEATO planning, which they had initially considered to be of secondary importance.161

Washington’s unwillingness to discuss its plans had a knock-on effect on London’s willingness to make plans for defending Southeast Asia. As the British Joint Chiefs informed both Canberra and Wellington, “In absence of knowledge of any United States plans for counter action in the event of overt Communist aggression in South East Asia it would be unrealistic for Commonwealth countries alone to make plans for Allied military action.”¹⁶² Although SEATO had allowed the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand to participate in abstract discussion concerning security in the Asia-Pacific, the absence of detailed planning limited any prospect of a coherent or united response to the Communist threat.

The United States seized on a familiar excuse to legitimize the limitations of four-power talks. Following the ANZUS Council meeting, the U.S. reported that it was “strongly opposed to anything which could be interpreted by the Asian members of the Pact as being a ‘hard white core.’”¹⁶³ Such concerns had been encouraged by the first large-scale meeting of African and Asian states in Bandung in Indonesia earlier in the year, whereby representatives of twenty-nine states discussed the role of the Third World in the Cold War and openly opposed colonialism.¹⁶⁴ Although racial and imperial considerations did play a role in U.S. foreign policy, they existed alongside more pressing strategic concerns. Radford had already noted that the U.S. was unwilling to discuss top-secret plans with any Asia-Pacific members through the framework of SEATO, allegedly for fear of security leaks.¹⁶⁵ In addition, only two months earlier, Radford had explained that the United States could not undertake more serious security cooperation because it lacked the material resources necessary to make detailed planning credible.¹⁶⁶ The language of racial equality therefore once again served as a convenient explanation with which to downplay the pursuit of U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific, much of which came at the expense of its allies. These events echoed the United States’ earlier efforts to justify British exclusion from ANZUS. Revealingly, documents intended for exclusive use by the National Security Council candidly admitted that U.S. strategy to “block Communist expansion” would be “less influenced by European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs.”¹⁶⁷ The United States evidently preferred a more independent approach to the pursuit of security in the region. While SEATO had ostensibly brought the four Western powers together in the defense of the Asia-Pacific, strategic disunity persisted.