While Oswald prepared to return to the U.S., distant groups were at work in the CIA and in New Orleans shaping the context of the forces that would engulf and eventually destroy him. In New Orleans, currents shifted among the anti-Castro Cuban exiles. This movement provides a useful contextual background against which we watch Oswald extricate himself, and his family, from the Soviet Union. That backdrop also brings to our story key characters whose paths would cross and double-cross Oswald’s, including the irrepressible Gerald Hemming.
Meanwhile, CIA security and propaganda elements were at work. Oswald was destined to collide with CIA operations against Cuba, especially those against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) which produced a long and tantalizing Agency security-propaganda thread involving two important CIA officers: James McCord and David Phillips. This thread begins when McCord and Phillips launched a domestic operation against the FPCC—outside the Agency’s jurisdiction. At the other end of this thread—in fall 1963—we find Phillips again, this time running the CIA’s anti-Cuban operations in Mexico. Mexico City is a subject to which we will return in the final chapters. Now we will turn our attention to the events that unfolded during Oswald’s return from the Soviet Union.
The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) emerged at the same time that the Agency began serious operations against Castro. A July 15, 1960, Hoover memo to the State Department Office of Security tied—with the help of a fertile imagination—the pamphleting activities of the FPCC at the Los Angeles Sports Arena to a Cuban government radio broadcast that “announced that Mexico should join Cuba in a revolution and reclaim Texas and New Mexico which rightfully belonged to Mexico.”1 CIA interest in the FPCC and the chief of its New York chapter, Richard Gibson, was underscored by Gibson’s active involvement with Patrice Lumumba, the premier of newly independent Congo. Lumumba was “viewed with alarm by United States policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet Union.”2 Gibson’s support of Castro and Lumumba put him in a special category at the CIA: Both of these leaders had been targeted for assassination.3
Gibson spoke to June Cobb about the work “his group” was doing for Lumumba, according to the notes she wrote the morning after their conversation. The previous evening, Gibson had paid a visit to Cobb’s hotel room for a chat. Before long, he had consumed half a bottle of scotch, and their dialogue reflected it. Cobb’s notes contain this entry:
At every possible opportunity he sought to turn the conversation to sex, particularly involving sex between Negroes and whites, for example: that Swedish girls are not kept satisfied by Swedish men since Swedish men are so often homosexual and that therefore there is a colony of Negroes and Italian[s] in Sweden to satisfy the erotic craving of the Swedish girls.4
But Gibson talked about more than Swedish cravings. He spoke about FPCC leaders, such as Bob Taber, and about the FPCC’s relationship with American Communists. Presumably, Gibson did not know that June Cobb’s hotel room was part of a carefully prepared CIA surveillance operation, with CIA technicians in the next room, eavesdropping. Cobb’s notes of this encounter, preserved in her CIA 201 file, undoubtedly were not the only material produced, and must have supplemented tapes, transcripts, and surveillance logs filled out by the surveillance team.
The CIA’s analysis of these materials is often entertaining reading, but for the individuals involved—Gibson, Cobb, and the surveillance technician on the other side of the wall—these were serious moments. Cuba had become part of the Cold War. A great deal was at stake. It was in the wake of Castro’s and Lumumba’s sudden emergence that Vice President Nixon had declared a crisis. It is not surprising that the CIA was interested in the FPCC and Richard Gibson. Ironically, their connection was destined to change: a few years after the Kennedy assassination, Gibson became an informant for the CIA. In 1960 and 1961, however, the CIA had its eyes on Gibson. Take, for example, this passage from a CIA report:
On the 27th [October 1960], Richard Gibson of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), spent the evening with Cobb (drank half bottle of scotch), and talked rather freely about the [FPCC] Committee. Said they “want to destroy the world.” In the beginning they received $15,000 from the Cuban government. Their expenses amounted to about $1500 per month—always feast or famine—trying to get money from Cuba. Once had to sit down with Dorticos and Fidel Castro to get $5000 the Committee needed. Gibson works closely with Raul Roa and little Raul—wanted Gibson to be Public Relations Officer for the Cuban Mission to the UN.5
Cobb was a valuable asset to the CIA because of her extensive knowledge about Latin American affairs and her personal relationships with many of the players and leaders. In this case, Gibson, already an intelligence target, seemed personally interested in Cobb, a weakness that had been turned to the advantage of the Agency. “As far as I’m concerned,” Gibson said to Cobb on the telephone the day after his visit, “I’m always awkward around pretty girls.” Cobb filed this remark on October 26, 1960.
Through Gibson, the CIA learned important details of the policy, personnel, and Cuban financial backing of the FPCC. The CIA had carefully evaluated his background and his activities, as this extract from an Agency report demonstrates:
Gibson apparently received a Columbia University fellowship from Columbia Broadcasting Company before he was ousted. Now they will not take it away from him because it would cause a scandal—he uses it as a cover for his work. FPCC is working in Africa and particularly with the Lamumba faction. Roa wants to send Gibson to Africa since money from Cuba promotes “the thing” in Africa. FPCC is also involved in the Algerian situation. Gibson and his French wife were in Paris after the war and also in Algeria. He has been to Russia and to Ghana. Robert F. Williams is also apparently instrumental in stirring up trouble (in the US over racial issues?). Gibson has no love in his heart for the US. The FPCC is stirring up the Negroes in the South—says their plans have lots of loopholes and they expect to be arrested but they intend to carry on war against the US.6
Remarkably, the CIA saw the FPCC and Gibson as the instruments for a Castro-financed effort to foment insurrection in America. This was as menacing a thought as Hoover’s July 15, 1960, allusion to a Cuban-inspired Mexican attack on Texas. While these threats were obviously exaggerated, knowledge about the FPCC and its activities was a matter of some urgency in the CIA in view of ongoing assassination planning for Lamumba and Castro. A counterintelligence officer in Phillips’ WH/4 Branch wrote this in a memo to Jane Roman (liaison for Angleton’s counterintelligence staff): “As you know, the FBI has expressed an interest in such information that Subject [Cobb] can provide concerning the Fair Play Committee [sic].”7
Not everybody at the CIA was happy about June Cobb’s association with the Agency. In particular, Birch O’Neal of Angleton’s mole-hunting unit, CI/SIG, did some sniping with his pen. On November 22, 1960, O’Neal wrote a memorandum critical of the “liberal press” in general and of June Cobb in particular for promoting an English-language edition of an old Castro speech “to show that Castro is not a Communist.” O’Neal’s memo said:
The first edition was paid for by Miss Cobb and the second edition was paid for by the Cuban Consulate in New York. As far as we know, Miss Cobb is a rather flighty character. She comes in and out and we have not been able to find out where she lives or where she is now. Perhaps she is tied up with the so-called Fair Play for Cuba Committee.8
The innuendo radiating from this last sentence illuminates O’Neal’s hostility toward Cobb, a view that may have had other adherents within the Agency’s counterintelligence staff. From their perspective, Cobb’s connections seemed to carry with them as many potential risks as awards.
In any event, the combination of Agency elements most closely associated with the “take” from Cobb at that time was O’Neal’s CI/SIG, CI/OPS/WH (Counterintelligence/Operations/Western Hemisphere), and WH/4/CI. As CI/Liaison, Jane Roman also had access to the results of the Cobb debriefs and surveillance operations.9
In early 1961, eleven weeks before the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA seized an opportunity to become more actively involved in running operations against the FPCC. CIA Security Office and Western Hemisphere elements had identified an Agency employee who knew Court Wood, an American student just returned from Cuba under the sponsorship of the FPCC. This opportunity to surveil Court Wood, which developed at the end of January, was irresistible in the judgment of the person in the CIA’s Security Research Service (SRS) of the Security Office who conceived and authorized the operation. That person was James McCord, the same James McCord who would later become embroiled in the scandal during the Nixon Presidency.
On February 1, 1961, McCord met with people from Western Hemisphere Division to discuss the “case” of an Agency employee who happened to be Court Wood’s neighbor and former high school classmate. At issue was whether to use this employee operationally to extract intelligence information from Wood. The employee, conveniently, worked in WH/4, the very branch that McCord wanted to run the illegal domestic operation he had in mind. The memo of record for this meeting states the following:
1. On this date Subject’s case was coordinated with Mr. McCord of SRS in connection with Subject’s operational use within the US by WH/4/Propaganda. The implications of a CI operation with[in] the US by this Agency and the possibility Subject might come to the attention of the FBI through association with Court Wood were discussed.
2. Mr. McCord expressed the opinion that it was not necessary to advise the FBI of the operation at this time. However, he wishes to review the case in a month. The file of the Subject, along with that of the WH man who is supervising the operation (David Atlee Phillips #40695) will be pended [suspended] for the attention of Mr. McCord on 1 March 1961.10
It is fitting that one of the Agency’s legendary disinformation artists, David Atlee Phillips, should have been in charge of the CIA’s CI and propaganda effort against the FPCC. Phillips would reappear in Mexico City at the time Oswald visited there, taking over the anti-Cuban operations of the CIA station in Mexico during the very days that CIA headquarters and the CIA Mexico City station exchanged cables on Oswald’s visit to the Mexican capital.
“At the request of Mr. Dave Phillips, C/WH/4/Propaganda,” wrote the fortunate CIA employee picked to spy on his neighbor, “I spent the evening of January 6 with Court Wood, a student who has recently returned from a three-week stay in Cuba under the sponsorship of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.” The employee said that Court and his father both were pro-Castro and “extremely critical” of American foreign policy. “I’ve been advised by Mr. Phillips,” the employee wrote, “to continue my relationship with Mr. Wood and I will keep your office informed of each subsequent visit.”11
Indeed, the employee did keep Jack Kennedy, Chief of Security for Western Hemisphere Branch 4 (C/WH/4/Security), apprised. The next occasion occurred on March 3, 1961, after which the employee had new information, as reported March 8:
Several months ago I wrote you a letter concerning the pro-Castro sentiments of Court Wood, son of Foster Wood, a local attorney. Since that time I’ve seen Court only once, on March 3, 1961, and he appears to be actively engaged in the organization of a local chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Little did Court Wood know that he was organizing his new chapter under the watchful eye of the CIA.
Our budding spy was beginning to blossom in his new assignment for David Phillips. Wood’s neighbor also had this to say in his March 8 report:
Complete with beard, Court has been meeting with “interested groups” and lecturing to students in several eastern cities. He specifically mentioned Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. Apparently there are a number of students envolved [sic] in this activity; I met David Lactterman from George Mason High School in Falls Church, Va. and Walt MacDonwald, a fellow student of Court’s, and both are obviously active. What action, if any, should I take in regard to my relationship with Court and his father?12
It seems comical, that a group of high school students, led by a college student who had grown a beard to emulate Castro’s appearance were the subjects of such CIA reporting. But it is actually sad.
Our spy now wanted more time to get additional intelligence. “Court Wood seems to be extremely naive about my position with the Agency,” said the neighbor’s next bulletin. Dated March 18, 1961, and, again, addressed to Mr. Jack Kennedy, the memo boasted that Wood “is very open and frank with me in all areas.” Phillip’s spy had spent “hours” with Court Wood and was sure his naivete could be further exploited. “I am certain that if given enough time,” the spy wrote, “I can obtain a great deal of information on the backgrounds and activities of many of his associates.” The report also contained this passage:
While visiting his apartment I observed that both Court and hisfather are interested in a large number of Communist publications. These included “USSR,” “The Worker,” and many prop. pamphlets that were obviously published in England. Court is an extreme Leftist in his political views and he believes fanatically in Castro’s Cuba.
Mr. Wood mentioned to me that he and several of his friends are making plans to enter Cuba in June; illegally if necessary. He apparently wants to become a teacher for the Castro government and to make his permanent home there. Members of the “26th of July Movement” are in close contact with Court and they are involved in this proposed move to Cuba. Court does have some money and he seems to be very serious about this thing. Within the next few days I have to be able to get some names and specific facts concerning their plans.13
Not a bad bit of work for three weeks, especially considering that this kind of assignment was not in the fellow’s job description.
Ironically, just when our fledgling spy was about to acquire more intelligence, the matter came to the attention of the FBI, and his mission came to an abrupt end. In an October 7, 1961, memo to FBI Liaison Sam J. Papich, CIA Acting Director of Security, R. F. Bannerman wrote this about the case of Court Wood:
Reference is made to a 25 March 1961 and a 6 July 1961 investigative report on captioned Subject which have previously been furnished to this Agency.
[redacted] who is a current Agency employee, has recently been interviewed concerning his knowledge of Court Foster Wood whom [redacted] had known since mutual attendance in high school. Attached is a detailed report of the information furnished by [redacted] concerning his knowledge of Wood.
Since [redacted] personally has sufficient reason to question the activities of Wood and the activities of the associates of Wood, [redacted] has been advised to discontinue any further contact with Wood.
It would be appreciated if your Bureau would furnish this Agency any additional information brought to your attention concerning Court Foster Wood and of particular interest would be any information received by your Bureau concerning past association of Court Foster Wood with N-[redacted].14
Thus it would appear that the FBI had learned of Court Wood’s activities in March and again in July 1961, and had reported them to the Agency. The CIA then pulled its employee out of David Phillips’s CI operation against the FPCC.
What the operation tells us is that the Agency was sufficiently interested in countering the FPCC to engage in an illegal domestic operation. The fact that controversy would follow the two men in charge, McCord in connection with Watergate and Phillips in connection with the Kennedy assassination, causes this page in the Agency’s anti-Cuban operations to stand out in hindsight.
While the Court Wood operation was grinding to a halt at the CIA, the FBI was gearing up for its own operation against the FPCC. Fragments of an FBI document released by the Church Committee suggest that Cartha DeLoach, assistant director of the FBI, was in charge of a Bureau operation to compile “adverse” data on FPCC leaders. A handwritten note at the bottom of the FBI headquarters copy of the document includes this detail: “During May 1961, a field survey was completed wherein available public source data of adverse nature regarding officers and leaders of FPCC was compiled and furnished Mr. DeLoach for use in contacting his sources.”15
The fact that an assistant director of the FBI was collecting dirt on FPCC leaders underlines the extent of the Bureau’s interest. The “adverse” data in the FPCC files kept by DeLoach probably grew considerably as a result of another CIA operation in October 1961. As we have seen, this operation netted significant intelligence on the FPCC from the Gibson material collected in June Cobb’s room. This material included certain derogatory statements by Gibson which appear to be the sort of “data” DeLoach was looking for.
In December 1961, the FBI launched another operation, using the incendiary tactic of planting disinformation. The handwritten note discussed above contains this account:
We have in the past utilized techniques with respect to countering activities of mentioned [FPCC] organization in the U.S. During December 1961, New York prepared an anonymous leaflet which was mailed to selected FPCC members throughout the country for the purpose of disrupting FPCC and causing split between FPCC and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) supporters, which technique was very effective.16
These tactics dramatize the lengths to which the FBI was willing to go to discredit the FPCC, whose chapters in Chicago, Newark, and Miami were infiltrated early on by the Bureau. As we will see in Chapter Sixteen, during Oswald’s tenure with the FPCC, FBI break-ins to their offices were a regular occurrence.
Oddly, the day Patrice Lumumba’s death was announced, February 13, 1961, was the same day Snyder received Oswald’s letter about returning to America. As the FBI and CIA became engaged in a campaign to discredit the FPCC, Oswald was nearing his goal of having obtained all the necessary authorizations to return with his family.
Oswald wrote to his mother on January 2, 1962, telling her that he and Marina would arrive in the United States sometime around March and asking her to have the local Red Cross request that the International Rescue Committee (IRC) assist them.17. It would take longer than Oswald anticipated. Letters from Oswald18 and the American Embassy,19 both dated January 5, crossed in the mail. Oswald’s letter was a request that the U.S. government pay for his and Marina’s return to America, while the embassy’s letter said that because of “difficulties” in obtaining an American visa for Marina, he might want to leave by himself and bring his wife later. The replies also crossed in the mail. Oswald insisted (on January 16) that he would not leave alone,20 while the embassy (January 15) noted that Marina had no American visa, and suggested that a relative file an affidavit of support for her.21
Both responses were interesting. Oswald’s January 16 letter revealed more than he may have intended, “Since I signed and paid for an immigration petition for my wife in July 1961,” Oswald said with exasperation, “I think it is about time to get it approved or refused.” The most intriguing aspect of the letter was this declaration: “I certainly will not consider going to the U.S. alone for any reason, particularly since it appears my passport will be confiscated upon my arrival in the United States.”22 It is difficult to know his precise thinking; perhaps he was afraid he’d never see her again, or perhaps he viewed Marina as some form of protection when he returned to the U.S.23
On January 23, 1962, Oswald responded with characteristic dualism to the embassy suggestion. He complained about their January 15, 1962, request for a support affidavit for Marina,24 arguing that his two-year absence from the U.S. made this difficult. On the same day Oswald wrote to his mother asking that she file such an affidavit with the Immigration and Naturalization Service.25
The letter suggesting that Oswald leave without Marina had another noteworthy feature: It appeared to use Oswald’s request for a loan as a lure to get him to the embassy. “The question which you raise of a loan to defray part of your travel expenses to the United States,” the letter said, “can be discussed when you come to the Embassy.” By February 6, however, the embassy had a change of heart. On this day, American Consul Joseph B. Norbury sent Oswald a letter saying, “We are prepared to take your application for a loan.” Norbury instructed Oswald to provide twelve items of information, in triplicate copy.26
On February 1, 1962, Oswald again wrote to his mother.27 The State Department had notified her that it would need $900 to make the travel arrangements for Lee and Marina.28 Oswald dismissed his mother’s suggestion that she raise money by telling his sad financial story to the newspapers.29 In his February 9 letter to his mother,30 he reminded her to file the affidavit for Marina and to send him clippings from the Fort Worth newspapers about his defection to Russia. Oswald gave the same assignment to his brother Robert.31 Oswald told his mother that he wanted these clippings so that he could be “forewarned.”32 His January 30 letter to Robert included this passage: “You once said that you asked around about whether or not the U.S. government had any charges against me, you said at that time ‘no.’ Maybe you should check around again, its possible now that the government knows I’m coming they’ll have something waiting.”33
On the morning of February 15, 1962, Oswald took Marina to the hospital in Minsk, where she gave birth to their first daughter, June Lee, at ten A.M.34 That same day, Oswald wrote to his mother,35 and to his brother.36 On February 23, the Oswalds brought their baby home from the hospital.37 After the birth of June Lee, the health of the mother and baby obviated any sense of urgency over the date of departure for the U.S.38 Oswald wrote to his mother on February 2439 and his brother on February 2740 that he did not expect to arrive for several months.41 His return was just over three months away.
There were a few setbacks, however. Oswald did not get as much money as he asked for. On February 24, 1962, he wrote to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow asking for his loan.42 The embassy received his letter on March 3. Oswald wanted $800.43 The embassy wrote back that they would lend him only $500.44 On February 26, Senator John Tower received an undated letter from Oswald asking for help in returning to the U.S.45 The same day, Senator Tower forwarded Oswald’s letter to the State Department.46 What happened there is hard to explain. In spite of the confusion that existed in the State Department in early 1961 over the legal question of whether Oswald had renounced his citizenship, it was no longer an issue by early 1962. Oswald had never signed the papers, a fact duly noted by U.S. officials in Moscow and Washington. Now, in February 1962, the U.S. State Department decided that Oswald had never attained Russian citizenship.47 Therefore the State Department might have some difficulty explaining why a November 25, 1963, New York Times story reported that the department had told Senator John Tower (in February 1962) that Oswald had renounced his citizenship. According to the article, Senator Tower then closed his Oswald file.48
Oswald’s correspondence with Texas picked up noticeably as he prepared for his return to America. On January 20, 1962, Oswald had written to his mother,49 and three days later wrote to her again.50 Marguerite responded, and it was from this correspondence that Oswald learned that the Marines had given him a dishonorable51 discharge from the reserves.52 This again provoked fears of prosecution, prompting Oswald to write his brother Robert asking for more information.53 On that day, Oswald also wrote to former Secretary of the navy John Connally54 to protest his undesirable discharge from the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves. “I ask that you look into this case,” Oswald’s letter said, and then added presumptuously, “and take the necessary steps to repair the damage done to me and my family.”55 Connally referred the letter to the Department of the Navy, and on February 23, 1962, Connally politely wrote to Oswald that his letter of January 30, 1962, had been turned over to the secretary of the navy, Fred Korth.56 The Navy sent Oswald a letter stating that the Navy decided “that no change, correction or modification is warranted in your discharge.”57
In a March 3, 1962, cable, four days before the Marine Corps mailed Oswald his undesirable discharge, the 921E2 section of the Office of Naval Intelligence sent a strongly worded message to the Navy Liaison officer in Moscow. Written by LTJG P. C. LeSourde (who also helped manage the Gerry Patrick Hemming case at this ONI office), the cable recalled Oswald’s acts during his defection, including his offer to share his military knowledge with the Soviets. The cable’s ominous tone was indicative of what was to follow: On March 7, 1962, the USMC sent Oswald his certificate of undesirable discharge.58 Oswald was incensed, and on March 22, 1962, he wrote back protesting their decision and insisting that his discharge be given a full review.59 The department promptly replied that it had no authority to hear and review petitions of this sort and referred Oswald to the Navy Discharge Review Board.60 Oswald filled out an enclosed application for review while in Minsk but did not mail it until he returned to the United States.61 More letters were exchanged—on April 2 from the USMC62 to Oswald and on April 28 from Oswald to the USMC63—but nothing was accomplished.
Then Oswald’s situation improved. By February 28, the San Antonio office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service sent word to him that Marina’s visa petition had been approved.64 By March 28, he had received an affidavit of support on Marina’s behalf from his mother’s employer, Byron Phillips (a Texas landowner from Vernon, Texas),65 which Oswald filed even though it was no longer necessary to do so.66 In March 1962, Phillips had agreed to sponsor Marina as a U.S. immigrant.67 There followed several communications to Texas: letters to Marguerite on March 2868 and April 21,69 a card to Mrs. Robert Oswald on April 10,70 and a letter to Robert on April 12,71 in which Oswald wrote that only “the American side” was holding up their departure. Oswald added, however, that since the winter was over, he didn’t “really want to leave until the beginning of fall, since the spring and summer [in Russia] are so nice.”72
In fact, Oswald had nothing to complain about. From the available documents, a strong case could have been made—and Oswald knew and feared it—to prosecute him under military or civilian espionage laws. As things stood in the spring of 1962, he was lucky to be coming home without facing the consequences of his actions, and to have had all the U.S. bureaucratic obstacles removed, possibly too easily, so that he could be accompanied by his wife and child. Discussions with the embassy to complete financial and travel arrangements continued in April and May,73 and finally, on May 10, the embassy wrote to Oswald saying that everything was in order, inviting him to bring his family to the embassy to sign the official paperwork.74
At his request,75 Oswald was discharged from his job at the radio factory on or about May 18,76 an event he recorded in his workbook. 77 The final resolution of his trip plans led to a new round of mail. On May 21, Oswald wrote to his brother again,78 telling Robert that he and his family would leave for Moscow on May 22 and depart for England ten to fourteen days later, then cross the Atlantic by ship. Repeating a point he had made in an earlier letter to his mother, Oswald said that he knew from the newspaper clippings what Robert had said about his defection to Russia, and suggested that Robert had talked too much. Oswald now asked him not to offer comments to the newspapers.79
The Oswalds spent their last night in Minsk with Pavel Golovachev. 80 A “Minsk” exit visa was stamped in Oswald’s passport on May 22, 1962.81 His clearance procedures for departure included an interview with an official of the MVD.82 On May 24, 1962, the embassy in Moscow renewed Oswald’s U.S. passport, amending it to reflect June Lee’s birth.83 All three arrived in Moscow on May 2484 and, after filling out various documents at the embassy, Marina was given her American visa.85 The rest was up to the Soviets. On May 26, Marina’s passport was stamped in Moscow,86 and on May 30, Oswald wrote to his mother from Moscow, “We shall leave Holland for the USA on June 4.”87
On June 1, 1962, Oswald borrowed $435.71 from the U.S. State Department for his return trip,88 and on June 2 the Oswalds boarded a train for Holland,89 which passed through Minsk that night,90 crossed the Russian border at Brest,91 and transited Poland and Germany. 92 On June 3, Oswald’s passport was stamped at the Oldenzaal Station, in the Netherlands.93 Marina recalled having spent two or three days in Amsterdam.94 On June 4, 1962, the Oswalds’ steamship tickets were delivered to them in Rotterdam. On June 6, they departed on the Maasdam, a Holland-American Line ship,95 bound for New York.96 On board the ship, the Oswalds stayed by themselves; Marina later testified that she did not often go on deck because she was poorly dressed and her husband was ashamed of her.97 On the Maasdam, Oswald wrote some notes on ship stationery that appear to be a summary of what he thought he had learned by living under both the capitalist and Communist systems.98
On June 5, 1962, the New York Department of Health, Education and Welfare notified the New York Travelers Aid Society that the Oswalds were coming.99 The Maasdam landed at Hoboken, N.J., at one P.M. on June 13.100 The Oswalds were met by Spas T. Raikin, a representative of the Travelers Aid Society, which had also been contacted by the Department of State. Raikin said he had to chase Oswald, who tried to “dodge” him. Raikin had the definite impression that Oswald wanted to “avoid meeting anyone.”101 When they talked, Oswald told Raikin that he had only $63 and no plans for that night or for travel to Fort Worth. Oswald, says Raikin, accepted the society’s help “with confidence and appreciation.”102 They passed through customs and immigration, with Raikin’s help,103 without incident.104
The Travelers Aid Society handed the Oswalds over to the New York City Department of Welfare, which found the family a room at the Times Square Hotel.105 In one of the many different versions of his Soviet story, Oswald told both Raikin and the welfare department representatives that he had been a marine stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, had married a Russian girl, renounced his citizenship, and worked in Minsk; soon he found out, he said, that Russian propaganda was inaccurate, but he had been unable to obtain an exit visa for Marina for more than two years. He also said that he had paid the travel expense himself.106 Of course, Oswald had not been a marine stationed at the embassy, had not renounced his citizenship, had not worked for two-plus years on Marina’s visa, and had not paid for his or their travel himself. Oswald’s motives for telling these needless lies are obscure.
When the New York City Welfare Department called Robert Oswald’s home in Fort Worth, his wife answered and offered to help. She contacted her husband, who sent $200 immediately.107 At first Oswald refused to accept the money. He insisted that the welfare department should pay his family’s fare to Texas, and threatened, apparently thinking the welfare department would suffer from the publicity, that they would go as far as they could on his $63 and then rely on “local authorities” to get them to Fort Worth. The welfare department was not intimidated by such tactics and Oswald had no choice but to accept his brother’s money.108 On the afternoon of June 14, the Oswalds flew from New York to Fort Worth.109
Meanwhile, across the Mississippi River in Louisiana, events were unfolding in the underworld of Cuban exiles and CIA Cuban operations, the focal point of which was the port city of New Orleans. Oswald’s entanglement with this world was just months away. Eleven days after Oswald stepped off the plane in Fort Worth, an anti-Castro group from the Florida Everglades, including Gerry Hemming, came to New Orleans with the help of Frank Bartes, the AMBUD delegate there. AMBUD was the Agency cryptonym for the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), a CIA-funded and controlled organization that had extensive operations in New Orleans. It is to Gerald Hemming’s story that we now turn.
On January 30, 1962, an event took place that created a new batch of paperwork on Hemming, and something even more interesting. The trigger event occurred in Los Angeles, where the Sheriffs Office reported picking up a .45-caliber U.S. government pistol, serial number 1504981-SA, at 0200 A.M. Based on an anonymous tip, the police located and removed the pistol from a parked car.110 Thirty minutes later, Hemming walked into the police station. The resulting police report described the event this way:
At 2:30 AM, 1-30-62, a Gerald P. Hemming Jr. of 3843 East Blanche St., Pasadena entered Temple Station and informed us that the .45 automatic was his. Mr. Hemming stated the automatic was issued to him by the US Government Central Intelligence Agency in Miami, Florida approximately nine months ago and that he, Mr. Hemming, has been in training for a free-lance organization regarding Cuban invasion. Mr. Hemming stated he was a friend of Dodd’s and that he had left the pistol at Dodd’s Barber Shop and that it had disappeared from there. This detail contacted Central Intelligence Agency, a Mr. DeVanon, who said he could neither confirm nor deny the issuance of this pistol to Mr. Hemming; that he would appreciate no publicity be given the incident and that he would contact Lt. Wilber of this detail tomorrow morning with further information.111
Shortly thereafter, the Agency field office in Los Angeles notified CIA headquarters of the Sheriffs Office report containing Hemming’s claim that he was a “CIA agent,” and that he “was training people in Florida for another invasion.”
This Los Angeles CIA cable drew attention to the remark by Hemming that the pistol had been “issued” to him by the CIA in Miami. The cable provided headquarters with this, possibly related, detail:
Meanwhile, Sixth Army-CID got in Act, but CIC got them out again. However, if weapon is not property of some other agency they want to recover on presumption it is Army property. We have prevailed on sheriffs office to keep it off blotter and away from press, denying all the time that we ever heard of a Hemming. Hemming called this office later in day to report pistol stolen but recovered by sheriffs office. Did not mention having previously claimed association with the agency.112
The Army’s stake in the matter was noted in the February 7 CIA headquarters response to the Los Angeles field office. “You were also informed that the local Army CID office had expressed an interest in the case on the presumption that said weapon may be Army property.”113 What was missing from the headquarters response was this question: For what reason and under whose authority did Army Counterintelligence get the 6th Army’s Criminal Investigation Division to back out of the case?
An internal CIA Headquarters memo of February 2, 1962, indicated that the culprit claiming the pistol was probably Hemming, “identical with the Subject of Security File # EE-29229,” but that he was not and had not been in the past of interest to Western Hemisphere Division, which maintained “information” on Hemming anyway.114 This internal memo, however, contained a slightly different variation of the incident. Written in the Operational Support Division of the Security Office, the memo contained this paragraph:
The sheriffs office contacted the OO/C [Domestic Contacts] Los Angeles office who, in turn, requested the sheriffs office to attempt to keep the matter out of the newspapers and that they would attempt to trace the identity of the individual. The local CID office of the U.S. Army also became interested in this matter; however, they also were requested to suspend any active investigation of this matter.115
Putting this together with information from the Los Angeles field office, we now have this picture: The Army Counterintelligence Corps requested the 6th Army Criminal Investigation Division to suspend any active investigation into the Hemming gun incident. Was the U.S. Army issuing, in Miami or elsewhere, sidearms to Cuban training groups subordinate to or associated with the Cuban Revolutionary Council? We know the Army was involved in training Cuban rebels. Was Hemming’s Interpen connected to the Army or to an Agency project to which the Army provided support?
The CIA response to the Los Angeles field office also mentioned Hemming’s statement “that he was a GOLIATH agent who was on a training mission in connection with an assignment aimed at Cuba. . . . Subsequently, this matter was brought to the attention of the overt GOLIATH field office in your area.”116 GOLIATHb was another way of referring to the CIA. GOLIATH headquarters, however, forgot to ask GOLIATH Los Angeles how Hemming got to the police station so fast. There is no record of the police having traced the gun’s serial number or having called Hemming. Who was the “anonymous” caller? Could the call and Hemming’s appearance shortly thereafter to lay claim to his weapon be connected? Did Hemming make that call?
Ernst Liebacher was chief of Operations at the CIA Los Angeles field office (LAFO) at the time, and he interviewed Hemming after the gun incident in Hemming’s office on 403 West 8th Street. Liebacher submitted his report of the details on February 15. In the report, Liebacher explained that Hemming had been known to the LAFO “since approximately October 1960 when he voluntarily contacted the office and furnished certain information concerning activities in Cuba.” The report added that, “from time to time,” Hemming had “furnished additional information which has been forwarded to Washington, DC in the form of reports of interest to the agency.”
Liebacher’s report also revealed who in the CIA LAFO had been Hemming’s point of contact. Liebacher said that for a long time it had been Paul R. Hendrickson, who “had many contacts,” and later, after Hendrickson was transferred to the Seattle office, Sergeant W. D. Pangburn had been “designated for contact.” Liebacher’s February 15 memo added this note:
Within the past two weeks, Subject furnished Pangburn with a large envelope marked “Cubana Revolucion,” or some such legend on it, and it contained all sorts of plans for training Cuban guerrillas. Subject claimed to have been working with the Office of Naval Intelligence and said that he had also been in contact with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Miami, Florida.117
According to Liebacher, Hemming never claimed to have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. This is correct. Hemming claimed only to be an informant, “a snitch,” as he said, for the Agency, and sometimes as a “singleton” for Angleton. The point here, however, is that the gun story led to other trails, to Cuban exiles and the counterrevolution against Castro.
We know that the gun incident illuminates only a portion of Hemming’s CIA activity which went back well before his October 1960 debriefing by the LAFO. What concerns us now are his corresponding ONI files in the first half of 1962. It is from those files that we catch a glimpse of Hemming’s associates and of who was processing his files in ONI. The above CIA documents and the ONI documents below are most valuable when viewed together, a combination that provides insights into otherwise shadowy parts of the Cuban exile underworld. From the time of the L.A. handgun incident in January 1962 to Hemming’s trip to New Orleans in June 1962, his ONI and FBI files cross-reference into an interesting tangle of names: Menoyo, Quesada, Seymour, Sosa, Bartes, and Wesley.
Three of these names, Seymour, Bartes, and, possibly Wesley too, would become involved with the Oswald story in important ways.
The CIA February 15 summary of events discussed above also noted the Pangburn interview of Hemming on February 6, 1962. Pangburn had obtained the following information from Hemming:
Subject claimed that he was issued the .45-caliber automatic pistol about 1½ months ago by a Cuban named Captain Sosa, who had obtained permission from one Arturo Gonzales Gonzales. Sosa was reported to have been with the “30th of November group” and to have spent considerable time in the mountains. It was Subject’s understanding that Sosa was known to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Two (or possibly three) guns were issued to Subject and his cohorts, one of them a former OSS-type, named Davis, who was also said to be connected with the “30th of November group.” Subject stated that these weapons had been issued to them because other underground Cuban groups in Miami had been “giving them trouble” by putting sugar in gas tanks and tossing small grenades in their quarters.118
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) file contained intelligence on the members and leaders of the 30th of November Group. Some, possibly much, of this intelligence was gained through an FBI informant in Hemming’s circle. The FBI, in turn, shared this information with ONI.
On April 24, 1962, P. Carter, an ONI clerk working in Op-921E (Security, Espionage, and Counterintelligence Branch), prepared, as an enclosure to a cross-reference sheet, information on Hemming.119 This report contains a tiny detail on the final destination of the Robert James Dwyer file which seems worth making a note of—the appearance of the organizational designator “F5”—a detail we will return to when it crops up again. The other information entered into Hemming’s ONI files on June 11 said that, as of April 19, the 30th of November Group had “about” twenty-seven members, and its leaders included such former prominent Cubans as Jesus Fernandez, formerly Havana Province financial coordinator; Orlando Rodriguez, “who had no position in the movement in Cuba”; Guido De La Vega, transportation coordinator and known to Rodriguez as “anti-U.S.”; Joaquin Torres, formerly Matanzas Province coordinator; Osvaldo Betancourt, formerly Havana Province general coordinator; Manuel Cruz, Havana Province financial coordinator (succeeded Jesus Fernandez); and Horiberto Sanchez, brother-in-law to the founder of the 30th of November Group, David Salvidor. The leader at the time was named Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.
This information, placed on Hemming’s cross-reference sheet on June 11 by “jgr” in ONI’s 921E office, had apparently been picked up from Quesada by an FBI informant on April 19. The cross-reference sheet contains this useful passage:
Carlos Rodriquez Quesada, head of group, advised 4/10/62 he just returned from Washington, DC where he was gratified to find that a number of military leaders and some Senators disagreed with State Department policy with regard to Cuba, and that aid for Cuban exiles may be forthcoming. [Informant] MM T-2 advised a part of the 30th of November under Jesus Fernandez is still connected to CRC. . . . On March 26, 1962 [informant] MM T-1, an individual who has been active in revolutionary activity in the Miami area for the past 4 years, advised that 5 men from the 30th of November Movement went into the Everglades west of Miami on the previous weekend, where they practiced shooting M-1 carbines. An American adventurer named Jerry Hemming accompanied this group.120
As we will see, heat from summer fires would soon force Hemming and his friends out of the Everglades. For now it is important to note that Quesada led the 30th November Group when it joined other factions in the spring of 1963 to form a Cuban government-in-exile. 121
Another anti-Castro leader we meet in Hemming’s early 1962 ONI files is Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. A cross-reference sheet prepared on January 16, 1962, by P. Carter, the same clerk in the Programs section of the Espionage and Counterintelligence (SEC) branch of ONI (OP921E2), had the following story typed under the optional space on the form “Identifying Data”:
On 10/30/61, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo said that 2 of his men made a trip to Cuba in a small boat and an American went along. On 11/13/61, Roger Redondo Gonzalez said that in the middle of 8/61, he, Gerald Patrick Hemming, and others, went to Cay Guillermo, Cuba, on a fishing boat. The boat captain contacted an underground member and delivered a message. On 11/13/61, Rafael Huget Del Valle said that in the middle of 8/61, he, Hemming, and others left in a fishing boat for Cuba, and arrived five days later in Cay Guillermo, Cuba. They remained there for 3 days and then returned to Miami. Redondo said Hemming previously claimed to know the location of an arms cache located in British Bahama Islands, but when they were at sea, Hemming said he did not know where the arms were.122
This material was derived from an FBI report, the subject of which was Hemming’s Interpen.
On September 10, 1962, another interesting Hemming cross-reference sheet was prepared by the clerk “jgr”, in which we encounter William Seymour and Jose Rodriguez Sosa. The cross-reference sheet contains this story:
[Informant] MM T-1, who has been actively engaged in Cuban revolutionary activities for the past four years and who has furnished reliable information in the past, on June 11, 1962, advised that Larry J. Laborde called Miami, Florida the previous evening and said he expected the 67-foot schooner “Elsie Reichart” to arrive in Miami on or about July 14, 1962, Laborde said the boat would have four Americans and three Cubans aboard as crewmen.
[Informant] MM T-1 advised that the schooner “The Mariner” is still located in Ft. Myers, Florida, needs an anchor and other repairs. Both of these boats are reportedly being operated by their owners and crews without monetary remuneration from Laborde.
Bill Seymour, an American citizen who had previously been trained as a mechanic while serving in the United States Navy, has been residing in Miami and is closely connected with Gerald Patrick Hemming, an American soldier of fortune who is closely associated with persons in Cuban revolutionary activities in the Miami, Florida area. Hemming, who is a close friend and associate of Laborde, planned to send Seymour to St. Petersburg to work on the boat’s engine.
Captain Jose Rodriguez Sosa, a Cuban national residing in Miami and a member of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, a Cuban revolutionary organization, has been in close contact with Laborde and plans on sending another Cuban from Miami to join the “Elsie Reichart” which recently sprung a leak in the hull, and whose engine is still inoperative.123
Here, Hemming is connected to the DRE in Miami through Sosa. As we will see, Hemming was about to make his way to New Orleans. William Seymour is of special interest because his name later turns up in a bogus FBI story swallowed hook, line, and sinker by the Warren Commission. That story had Seymour as one of the three men who visited Silvia Odio on September 25, 1963,124 two days before Oswald arrived in Mexico City. These are subjects we will cover in Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen.
It is remarkable how many threads of information eventually weave themselves into a part of the Oswald story. The FBI had an informant in Hemming’s Interpen group, and much of his reporting was naturally cross-filed into Hemming’s ONI files. An example of this was the obscure but engaging piece of filing information we set aside earlier in this chapter—that an April 24, 1962, FBI report on Robert James Dwyer in Hemming’s file showed that the final ONI destination for this document was “F5.”125 Perhaps this was routine in the Navy, but it rarely appears elsewhere in the JFK collection.
This office might have been in 923F, the Personnel Branch of ONI’s Administrative Division (923), but if so, it was not listed in the documents consulted for this study.126 It was probably an F5 branch in the same general part of ONI—Administration and Security (921)—that was handling the job of excerpting the Hemming material for final filing. This would make the full designation “921F5,” which is worth mentioning because the only other document in the JFK files from 921F5 has an intriguing person’s name on it. The document makes a brief reference to a discussion by “M. Wesley” of a “complete file” and “case history” on Interpen. 127 Even though it may be only a coincidence, it is an intriguing fact that there is a mysterious person by the name of “Wesley” who shows up in Mexico City after (or perhaps during) Oswald’s visit there and makes his way into Oswald’s FBI file.
In June 1962, Hemming connected with another anti-Castro Cuban leader: Frank Bartes. According to a July 2, 1962, CIA memorandum from the Agency’s New Orleans office of the Domestic Contacts Division, Frank Bartes provided the CIA with this information:
On 25 June 1962 Laurence Joseph Laborde and two other men had called on him [Bartes]. He had met Laborde earlier in Miami. The men said that they wanted to train Cuban refugees as guerrilla fighters and demolition experts who would then go to Cuba. The other men were Gerald P. Hemming, Jr. and Howard Kenneth Davis.128
Bartes added that Laborde was “anti-CIA,” which the New Orleans office said it had “confirmed.” Bartes reported that he had “reached an agreement” with Laborde. Possibly related to such an agreement were documents that Laborde gave to Bartes, one of them a letter of recommendation from 30th of November leader Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.129
There is further documentary corroboration of the assistance Bartes provided in getting Hemming, Laborde, and Davis into a training camp near New Orleans. According to a CIA “internal component” (presumably Task Force W or Branch 3 or 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division), a proposal had been made to a New Orleans “Cuban refugee group,” probably the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), for military training of another Cuban refugee group, possibly the 30th of November Group. This the Agency learned on June 28, 1962, when Bartes, “one of our sources among the Cuban refugees,” the CIA memo said, “asked for an appointment so that he could give us some interesting information.”
Bartes explained how it was that his activities in New Orleans became known to Laborde. Bartes and the other “Cuban refugee from New Orleans” had been in Miami “a month or so ago” and met Laborde. At that time Laborde had told them of his interest in working with the Cuban refugees. Laborde lamented that “he had previously been connected with a training camp in the Everglades in Florida, but that that camp had to be abandoned because of fires in the Everglades.” The CIA memo explains what happened then:
When Bartes returned to New Orleans, according to him, he contacted the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and asked them if they could, in his words, “clear” Laric Laborde. The Bureau told him that while they could not give him an official clearance, they would look into the situation and would contact Bartes and Mr. Ravel, who is the nominal head of the Cuban refugee movement in New Orleans.
Bartes says that sometime later the Federal Bureau of Investigation did contact Ravel and told him that as far as Laborde was concerned it was “hands off.” Curiously enough, both “source” [Bartes] and Ravel took this to mean that this was a clearance of Laborde by the FBI, so that when Laborde and the other two US citizens contacted Ravel and Bartes in New Orleans they had no hesitancy in dealing with them.130
The CIA memo said that the Agency Domestic Contacts office in New Orleans had told Bartes that “all of this” was out of their jurisdiction, that the CIA “had absolutely nothing to do with such matters,” and that they “could not give him any advice” about what “he seemed to be seeking.”
Bartes countered with the remark that the reason he was providing the CIA with this information was that “these three men hate CIA and they said that CIA is doing nothing and is preventing other people from doing anything and they are anxious to do something to help the Cubans without the help of CIA.” Bartes added, defensively, that since he had furnished the CIA information in the past, “he thought that we should know about the present situation.”
The documents that Hemming, Laborde, and Hall gave to Bartes were turned over to the CIA by the latter. They were a “clipping” from the June 3 Denver Post castigating the CIA and CRC leader Miro Cardona, and an undated document. The second (undated) document was signed by Luis del Nodal Vega, “who styles himself Military Coordinator” of the 30th of November Group, and Hemming and Davis, both instructors for Interpen. The document was “approved” by Quesada. Hemming told Bartes that this document “had been presented to CIA in Miami last year but that nothing had come of it.” When Bartes passed this on to the Agency, they said they would be glad to “have copies of any of the documents which he had,” but reiterated that they “could not and would not advise him in any manner, shape, or form in connection with any such operation.”
“He seemed to understand that we could not help him,” the CIA memo said of Bartes, “and when he left he said that he thought he would tell the three men, Laborde, Hemming, and Davis, that he could not go along with them.” The CIA memo went on to disclose that they had learned from another source who was a “close friend” of Bartes’s, that he had seen Bartes with Hemming, Laborde, and Davis and that “they looked like a bunch of thugs.” The friend also said that Bartes had said, “confidentially,” that he was dealing with the three men “as a representative of the New Orleans Cuban Refugee Organization,” meaning the CIA-backed CRC. Bartes added, said the friend, “that these three men were armed and therefore potentially dangerous.”131
CIA files on Bartes show that on January 4, 1961, the Operational Approval and Support Division asked the Security Office for a check on Bartes for use in a “contact and assessment” role in the area “WH [Western Hemisphere] Cuba.”132 By September 1965, Bartes was working for the CIA’s Special Operations Division.133 In between, he had a date on television with Oswald. That event, however, would not transpire until August 1963, and will be discussed in Chapter Seventeen. Before his Cuban escapades in New Orleans, however, Oswald spent almost ten months in Dallas. It is to that part of the story that we now turn.