Chapter 14

 

“There’s nothing in the world that can be called good without qualification except good will. This is the crux of Kant’s moral philosophy. What it implies is that goodness of an action depends essentially on the intention or motive of the doer. Take an example from Kant himself: a person may give charity because he wants publicity or lacks the courage to turn down the request. In either case, an otherwise good action will be divested of its ethical character. Now I invite your discussion on the ethical criterion of our actions,” said Prof Najeeb.

 

“There’s a marked similarity between the Kantian view and the teachings of Islam. In Islam as well, ethical character of an action depends on intentions. So I fully agree with Kant’s view,” declared Riaz.

 

“Intentions or motives are important no doubt. But making them the sole criterion of judging the ethical character of actions is open to several objections,” Sara opined. “In the first place, it’s not always possible to know why an action was carried out even for the doer. And if Freud is to be believed, the motives which determine our actions are essentially unconscious and are rooted in either sex or aggression instinct. In that event, all actions are equally good or bad. Secondly, consequences of an action are also very important. If an action contributes to social good, it’s a moral action regardless of the intentions behind it. In a court of law, intentions are difficult to prove and the punishment mainly depends on the consequences.”

 

“I’m afraid Sara’s analysis is faulty,” Riaz objected. “For one thing, in a court of law, intentions are also taken into account. For instance, if Sara kills another person to save her honor, she may be acquitted. There’s a difference between cold blooded murder and killing in self defense. Similarly, there is clearly a difference between a premeditated murder and unintentional killing and between them the enormity of the punishment varies. As for the Freudian theory, it’s simply an over-simplification. While sexual and aggression instincts do play a part in out actions, human nature is too complex and impulses too several in number.”

 

Prof Najeeb intervening said, “Both Riaz and Sara agree that intentions and consequences bear upon ethical character of an action. However, they differ only in emphasis. Let’s move forward. We suppose that an action is good if it’s actuated by right motives and produces right consequences. There are then two questions: one, what is right action? Two, why should a person do what’s right. Granted that we agree on what constitutes the right action, the problem that we may consider now is why a person should perform that act.

 

“It depends on the psychology of moral action,” Naila opined. “We are actuated either by desires — conscious or unconscious — or by sense of duty. Sometimes, our desires and sense of duty are in harmony; at times they are in conflict. Even in presence of a desire to the contrary, a person will do what’s right if he has a strong sense of duty. While a serial killer may take people’s life to satisfy his drive for aggression or hatred, a terrorist kills people because he has a strong sense of duty.”

 

“Killing with a sense of duty! I don’t agree,” Sara remarked. “In fact, what is considered to be a sense of duty is disguised desire. For the terrorist, the so-called sense of duty is at bottom the desire to enter into paradise. Therefore, whether a person will do what’s right is contingent upon strength of his desires. And of course, right and wrong are relative terms. What’s right for the suicide bomber is wrong for society at large.”

 

“Relativity of right and wrong is nonsense,” Naila asserted. “An action is either right or wrong; it cannot be both. Nor can it be right for me and wrong for Sara. The terrorist does consider his actions to be right but this is a wrong perception on his part. Besides, I protest against equating sense of duty with unconscious desire. If everyone is actuated by desires only, what difference is left between a man of high ethical standards and one who is at a very low level of morality? In fact, the ability to transcend one’s desires and do one’s duty is the hallmark of a strong character.”

 

“Naila may be right but so far we have ignored the relationship between morality and freedom,” taking part in the discussion Ali said. “To me, the foremost ethical question is whether the individual is free. For if I’m not free to choose my actions and if they are predetermined or preordained, the whole discussion becomes devoid of meaning.”

 

“Ali has raised a very important question,” Prof Najeeb noted. “However, the question of freedom belongs more to metaphysics than to ethics. Even if man is not free, we can assess his actions to be good or bad depending upon their consequences and the circumstances. However, logically if man is not free, he cannot be held responsible for his actions, though the actions can still be categorized as right or wrong. There have been quite a few philosophers of note who believed in absolute determinism but held strong ethical views. The foremost among them is Benedict Spinoza and I’m sure you all are well familiar with him.”

 

“Yes sir I have had the privilege of reading Spinoza’s work,” Ali replied. “But to me freedom of choice is a necessary postulate for morality. If we can think, feel and act only one way either because God has willed this from all eternity or because the world is mechanically made like that, what’s the qualitative difference between the actions of a saint and those of a sinner? In that event, the suicide bomber is as helpless as his victims.”

 

“Ali you are disregarding the consequences of actions. Our actions produce some effects whether or not we are free. If the effects are good, the actions are also good,” Sara opined.

 

“But if the individual is not free, how can we credit him for good actions and discredit him for bad actions?” Ali insisted.

 

“Ethics is not essentially about crediting or discrediting people for their acts of omission and commission. It’s about understanding what’s good or bad conduct,” Prof Najeeb tried to answer Ali.

 

“Of what use is understanding if one cannot mould one’s character?”

 

“We can mould our conduct if we understand it,” the professor replied.

 

“We can mould our conduct only if we are free,” Ali was not willing to give in.

 

“Whether we are free or not is difficult to prove. In the ultimate analysis, as Spinoza said, freedom may be an illusion because we are not aware of the causes of our actions. However, this is no time to discuss the problem of freedom,” Prof Najeeb remarked.

 

“According to Islam, man has been given the knowledge of good and evil as well as freedom to choose between them. Man is therefore responsible for his deeds. Probably Christianity and other great religions have similar views. I agree with Ali that the possibility of ethics is based on the affirmation of freedom. For what is moral behavior if it is not responsible behavior and the notion of responsibility is meaningless without freedom,” Riaz re-entered the discussion.

 

“Ethics is a science and every science is based on a deterministic philosophy,” Sara said. “Every effect has a cause, which in turn is the effect of another cause and so on. Prima facie, the law of causation is antithesis of freedom. Is there a possibility that freedom and determinism can be reconciled?”

 

“Determinism is a fact of life,” Prof Najeeb remarked. “Events don’t occur out of nothing; rather there’s always a cause behind them. I didn’t want to discuss the question of freedom. But you have drawn me into this discussion. We’ll discuss this problem in detail some other time. All I can say before we sign off is that it is possible to reconcile freedom and determinism. We may be free to choose between alternatives but our choice is determined by antecedent factors, such as our character and our circumstances. Give two people the same alternatives in a similar situation but they may choose differently because they are different characters. Even the same person may choose differently in different circumstances. That’s why we have divergent doctrines, philosophies and schools: capitalism and communism, individualism and socialism, fascism and anarchism, liberalism and conservatism — each trying to solve the same set of problems in its own fashion, that is to say, choosing different alternatives.