Operation Willi
Later that day, 10 July, Peter Russell, an Oxford don – later Professor of Spanish Studies at Oxford – who had been working for British Intelligence since the mid-1930s, flew out to Lisbon. He had been on stand-by throughout June and an earlier flight on 30 June had been aborted as a result of mechanical trouble to the flying boat, which suggests the authorities anticipated problems with the Windsors. A fluent Spanish and Portuguese speaker, his role was to monitor the couple and was supposedly ‘under orders to shoot them if they threatened to fall into German hands during their nightly visits to the casino at Estoril.’1
Russell stayed with the couple until 24 July. ‘There is . . . no doubt whatsoever in my mind that he had plenty of personal contact with them during this time,’ says his biographer Bruce Taylor. ‘He would talk about this quite freely while never giving up any very specific information as to time and place, nor taking any questions!’2
The Windsors remained at Santo’s country house, near the Boca do Inferno (the Jaws of Hell), whilst arrangements were made for them to leave for the Bahamas. It was a very comfortable house, set in several acres of walled gardens with a large swimming pool, with a staff of a dozen, including a chef with an international reputation. Wallis played bridge, the Duke golf. There were occasional visits to the British embassy and they were entertained by various friends of the Santos.
But the couple could not relax. Amidst concerns they might be kidnapped or speak indiscreetly to the press, they were virtual prisoners. There were patrols in the garden, they could only leave the compound with permission and an armed guard, and could walk only along the shore road where they could be observed. They were well aware that they were under surveillance from everyone and surrounded by informers. Bored, angry at the way his country had treated him, the Duke began to drink heavily and was vulnerable to any blandishment that might be offered.
On 10 July, Baron Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene, the German ambassador to Portugal, reported to Ribbentrop:
As Spaniards from the entourage of the Duke of Windsor have reported in strictest confidence during a visit to the Legation, the appointment of the Duke as Governor of the Bahamas is for the purpose of keeping him away from England since his return would greatly strengthen the position of English friends of peace whereupon his arrest at the instigation of his enemies could be counted on. The Duke intends to postpone his journey to the Bahamas for as long as possible, and at least until the beginning of August, in the hope of an early change in his favour. He is convinced that had he remained on the throne war could have been avoided and describes himself as a firm supporter of a peaceful compromise with Germany. The Duke believes with certainty that continued heavy bombing will make England ready for peace.3
The German foreign minister was determined to lure the couple, perhaps through an invitation from a Spanish friend, from Portugal, where they were heavily guarded, back to Spain, where it would be easier to deal with them. As Ribbentrop told Stohrer in a top-secret telegram dated 11 July:
At any rate, at a suitable occasion in Spain the Duke must be informed that Germany wants peace with the English people, that the Churchill clique stands in the way of it, and that it would be a good thing if the Duke would hold himself in readiness for further developments. Germany is determined to force England to peace by every means of power and upon this happening would be prepared to accommodate any desire expressed by the Duke, especially with a view to the assumption of the English throne by the Duke and Duchess.4
Amongst the friends seen by the Windsors was Don Javier ‘Tiger’ Bermejillo, who had been a friend of Ernest Simpson whilst serving in the Spanish embassy in the early 1930s and a regular visitor to the Fort. Aristocratic, light-hearted and a romantic, he had been recalled because of a scandal in 1935 and the Duke had been instrumental in a refugee exchange that had saved his life during the Civil War.
Bermejillo reported back to the Spanish authorities his conversations with the Windsors:
He said the appointment was offensive but had several advantages. First, official recognition of Her (his wife Wallis). (Second) not having to take part directly in the conflict, to which he had never been party. (Third) to have more freedom to exert his influence in favour of peace.5
The Germans now put their plan into action. Using as intermediaries Spanish friends of the Duke, he was invited to stay as a guest of the Spanish Government and offered the Palace of the Moorish Kings at Ronda.
The Duke asked ‘the confidential emissary’, ‘Tiger’ Bermejillo, ‘if a maid of the Duchess to be permitted to travel to Paris in order to pack up various objects there and transport them by van to Lisbon, as they were required by him and the Duchess for the Bahamas.’6 The Germans were only too happy to agree ‘since if necessary the maid’s journey to Paris and above all the return journey to Lisbon can be held up as required in order to postpone further his departure.’7
Wallis’s maid, Marguerite Moulichon, was given safe passage to Paris to collect various belongings, such as bed linen for the new posting.8 American diplomats also repatriated Wallis’s favourite Nile-green swimsuit, which she had left behind at La Croë, under what came to be called Operation Cleopatra Whim.
Alec Cadogan was now briefed by one of his intelligence agents in Lisbon:
of the exceptional care with which the Germans have fulfilled all of the Duke’s desires. Special camions were sent to and fro, and a detailed inventory list was made of all the furniture and personal property of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, which was shown to the Duchess for approval, to give her an opportunity to say if there was anything missing. Some of the more valuable belongings were transported in limousines and special instructions were given for everything to be in perfect order. The desire of the Germans to please the Duke and Duchess of Windsor was absolutely marked and evident.9
A new issue now arose. The Duke wanted to take his chauffeur and valet to the Bahamas, both of whom had been called up for war service. The War Office took the view that this would set an ‘unfortunate precedent’ and had already refused Lord Athlone in Canada a similar request, but the Duke was adamant. After taking advice from Monckton and Lord Lloyd, the Colonial Secretary, Churchill’s assistant private secretary John Peck wrote to Churchill ‘that HRH had to be treated as a petulant baby, and that there was a by no means remote possibility that he was prepared to face a break on this subject.’10 Shortly afterwards permission was given for piper Alastair Fletcher to accompany the couple to the Bahamas.11
* * *
It was arranged that the couple would leave for the Bahamas on 1 August but, instead of going via New York as was usual and where Wallis wanted to have medical treatment, the British Government insisted they should sail via Bermuda, arguing that the Duke’s views and presence in the US might bring ‘harmful publicity’ before the November presidential elections. They also used the technicality that the Duke was Commander-in-Chief of the Bahamas and his presence would flout American Neutrality Legislation.12
The Duke was furious, writing to Churchill on 18 July: ‘Have been messed about quite long enough and detect in Colonial Office attitude very same hands at work as in my last job. Strongly urge you to support arrangements I have made as otherwise will have to reconsider my position.’13
There were good reasons for concern on the part of the British government. On 19 July, Alec Cadogan had received a ‘Most Secret’ telegram from the Lisbon Embassy: ‘We have now learned from a reliable and well-placed source in Lisbon that Silva and his wife are in close touch with the German Embassy, and that Silva had a three-hour interview with the German Minister on the 15th July 1940.’14
Herbert Pell, the American minister in Lisbon, sent a telegram to Cordell Hull on 20 July after dining with the Windsors: ‘Duke and Duchess of Windsor are indiscreet and outspoken against British government. Consider their presence in the United States might be disturbing and confusing. They say that they intend remaining in the United States whether Churchill liked it or not and desire apparently to make propaganda for peace.’15
Sir Robert Vansittart, former permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, reported a similar conversation to Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, three days later:
A very important and influential friend of mine has informed me that he recently sat next to the Duke of Windsor at dinner. My friend is very much perturbed at the prospect of the Duke’s activities. It is evident that he has formed a very low opinion of him. He said that he wished the Duke had been appointed to some post other than the Bahamas, for it was clear that the Duke and Duchess meant to spend a great deal of their time in the United States, where their presence and activities were certain to do our cause considerable harm.16
This was set against a backdrop of continuing peace feelers from Germany to Britain. On 19 July, the German chargé d’affaires had approached Philip Lothian, the British ambassador in Washington through Malcolm Lovell, the executive secretary of the Quaker Service Council in New York. The approach was taken sufficiently seriously for Lothian to call Halifax that night and for Halifax to circulate it to the War Cabinet.17
On the same day Hitler, in a speech to the Reichstag, ‘A Last Appeal to Reason’, had called for a negotiated peace to avert the ‘destruction of a great world empire’ and appealed ‘once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain . . . I can see no reason why this war need go on.’
On 22 July, Eduard Hempel, the German minister in Eire, sent a telegram to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin:
The impression in the Ministry of External Affairs here about the situation is as follows: A speedy conclusion of peace on reasonably tolerable terms on the basis of conditions brought about by the German success to date would be favored (sic) in general by Chamberlain, Halifax, Simon, and Hoare, whose dispatch to Spain was noteworthy from this point of view, also conservative circles (the Astors, Londonderry, etc.), high officialdom (Wilson), the city, the Times. Prospects for continuation of the war are generally regarded with pessimism . . .18
Italy’s Gazzetta del Popolo had reported that day that the Duke wanted a government under Lloyd George and that Ribbentrop had received information from London that he had urged the King to appoint a pro-appeasement Cabinet. ‘There are now rumours,’ wrote George Orwell, ‘that Lloyd George is the potential Pétain of England.’19
‘Lord Lothian has offered his good offices,’ minuted Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary at the German Foreign Ministry, referring back to the approach of Malcolm Lovell, on 23 July. ‘If he is a normal British Ambassador, he must have had a high approval. We may proceed on the assumption that the Quaker is authorised to bring us together.’20
And what of the Duke? According to the Portuguese Secret Service surveillance records, the Duke, who asked for his police protection to be removed at one point, was ‘an active player in the plot – using his car to ferry the conspirators around, allowing them to meet at his house, engaging in a constant shuttle between the German, Spanish and British embassies in Lisbon – and portrays a man in a state of agitated indecision.’21
On 22 July, the Italian minister in Lisbon had radioed that the Duke had no intention of leaving Portugal until October.22 The next day the Duke rang Bermejillo saying he wanted to discuss an urgent matter with him. On 24 July, the Duke told the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, General Franco’s brother Nicolas, that he was ‘ready to return to Spain’.23 The following day, the Italian minister radioed to Rome that the Duke had applied for a Spanish visa and told a friend that the king had ‘demonstrated much feebleness’.24
The same day, Max zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg had reported a conversation about a negotiated peace with the Aga Khan to Walther Hewel, Ribbentrop’s liaison official with Hitler, that: ‘He had seen Windsor as late as in April and the latter was thinking just as he was and was on close terms with Beaverbrook.’25
On 25 July, the German Ambassador, Stohrer, reported to Ribbentrop that Don Miguel Primo de Rivera had returned from Lisbon, where he had had two discussions with the Duke, who claimed: ‘Politically he was more and more distant from the King and the present English government . . . The Duke was considering making a public statement and thereby disavowing present English policy and breaking with his brother.’26
On 6 July, the Duke had a two-hour meeting with Nicolas Franco. ‘The influence upon the Duke and Duchess exerted by the confidential emissaries is already so effective that a firm intention by the Duke and Duchess to return to Spain can be assumed as in the highest degree probable,’ reported Stohrer to the Foreign Ministry.27 He quoted the Duke calling the war a crime and that he was shocked by Halifax’s speech on 22 July, rejecting Hitler’s peace offer. He concluded, ‘The Duke is said to be delaying departure.’28
The Germans now put into operation a new plan, one of the strangest episodes of the Duke’s life – Operation Willi.
* * *
Walter Schellenberg was a clever and ambitious intelligence officer, fluent in French and English, who had read medicine and law at the universities of Marburg and Bonn, before joining the SS in 1933 and rising quickly within its ranks. Now the thirty-year-old Schellenberg was tasked by Ribbentrop to persuade the Duke to work for the Germans either through persuasion – he was authorised to offer 50 million Swiss francs – or by force.29
On Friday 26 July, Schellenberg arrived in Lisbon. That afternoon the Duke saw an Abwehr agent, Ángel Alcázar de Velasco, who operated under the code name ‘Viktor’.30 He brought with him a letter from Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, claiming that unless the couple left for Spain, they would be murdered by British Intelligence, and that they should agree to be escorted to Guarda, a village 150 miles north-east of Estoril on the Spanish border.
The Duke asked to have forty-eight hours to think about it. David Eccles ‘flew back to London with despatches furnished by Franco’s brother. These confirmed that the Duke was planning to return to Spain’.31 Eccles later reiterated, ‘They were trying to get him to agree and he would sort of play the hand for a peace conference in which the Germans would see that he got the throne.’32
The British, who were reading Abwehr codes, now decided to act and the trusty Monckton was despatched to Lisbon. He arrived on 28 July, bringing with him a letter from Churchill:
It will be necessary for the Governor of the Bahamas to express views about the war and the general situation which are not out of harmony with those of His Majesty’s Government . . . Many sharp and unfriendly ears will be pricked up to catch any suggestion that your Royal Highness takes a view about the war, or about the Germans, or about Hitlerism, which is different from that adopted by the British nation and Parliament.33
On 29 July, the Italian minister in Lisbon, Renato Bova Scoppa, reported to Ciano that the emissary de Velasco had told a colleague, ‘The Prince thinks like us.’ The message was sent on to Berlin.34 It had said that it looked like the Duke was ready to fall in with the plan, but Monckton’s efforts had been effective. The next day, Schellenberg wrote in his log: Willi will nicht (‘Willi says no’).
Later that day, Hoyningen-Huene sent a telegram to Ribbentrop stating that, though the Duke was still in favour of peace negotiations, he considered ‘the present moment as inopportune for him to manifest himself on the political scene’, adding ‘that his departure for the Bahamas need not imply a rupture, since he could return with 24 hours’ flying time via Florida.’35
At noon on 30 July, the Duke gave a press conference at the British embassy to say he was off to the Bahamas. Ribbentrop now decided that there was only one option – to abduct the couple.
The following day the Duke saw Don Nicolas Franco, who reminded him that: ‘The moment may come when England will feel the need to have you once more at her head, and therefore you should not be too far away.’36
On 31 July, de Rivera reported:
Yet the Duke declared he wanted to proceed to the Bahamas. No prospect of peace existed at the moment. Further statements of the Duke indicate that he has nevertheless already given consideration to the possibility that the role of an intermediary might fall to him. He declared that the situation in England at the moment was still by no means hopeless. Therefore, he should not now, by negotiations carried on contrary to the orders of his government, let loose against himself the propaganda of his English opponents, which might deprive him of all prestige at the period when he might possibly take action. He could, if the occasion arose, take action even from the Bahamas.37
Ribbentrop responded later that day by sending a ‘Most Urgent Top Secret’ telegram to the Legation in Portugal, stating that ‘Germany is now determined to force England to make peace by every means of power. It would be a good thing if the Duke were to keep himself prepared for further developments.’
He requested Santo Silva ‘make the most earnest effort to prevent his departure tomorrow, since . . . We are convinced that the Duke will be so under surveillance there that he will never again have the chance to come to Europe, even by airplane,’ adding:
Should the Duke in spite of everything be determined to depart, there is still the possibility that the Portuguese confidant might remain in touch with him and arrange some other way to transmit communications verbally, whereby we can continue beyond this present contact and, if occasion arises, negotiate . . . Please keep this telegram confidential and under your personal charge.38
The British authorities had no illusions about Santo. An intelligence officer, Desmond Morton, had filed a memo to Churchill, based on information from a source in Madrid and Lisbon:
Senhor Esperito Santo, head of the bank of that name in Lisbon, is very pro-German and a centre of peace propaganda. HRH the Duke of Windsor visited him in Lisbon and according to Senhor Espirito Santo, manifested extreme defeatist and pacifist sympathies. I find that Mr Jebb, Foreign Office, has heard similar reports about HRH. Senhor Esperito . . . is a crook. He is handling very large sums in bank notes and dollar securities from Germany via Switzerland to the Americas. These monies are almost certainly German loot from the captive countries.39
The psychological stress on the Windsors continued right up to departure. Pressure was put by Don Nicolas Franco on the Portuguese prime minister, António de Oliveira Salazar, to try and keep the couple on the Iberian Peninsula. In the small hours of Thursday morning, 1 August, Santo Silva was summoned by Hoyningen-Huene and he agreed to ask Salazar to intervene to try and keep the Duke in Portugal. Wallis was sent an anonymous gift of flowers with a greeting card containing a warning. One of their chauffeurs was bribed to refuse to go to the Bahamas, the car taking their luggage to the ship was sabotaged, and the luggage only reached the ship after an hour’s delay.
Primo de Rivera was also sent to try and dissuade the couple from leaving and told Stohrer, ‘The Duke hesitated right up to the last moment. The ship had to delay its departure on that account.’40 However, on the evening of 1 August, Schellenberg watched through binoculars from the tower room of the German Embassy as the Windsors steamed out of Lisbon on SS Excalibur. The same day, Hitler issued his Directive No. 17 ordering a full-scale attack on Britain.
On 2 August, Hoyningen-Huene sent a ‘Most Urgent, Secret’ telegram to Ribbentrop that: ‘Every effort to detain the Duke and Duchess in Europe (in which connection I refer particularly to Schellenberg’s reports) was in vain,’ but, ‘To the appeal made to him to cooperate at a suitable time in the establishment of peace, he agreed gladly . . . He would remain in continuing communication with his previous host and had agreed with him upon a code word, upon receiving which he would immediately come back over.’41
It was clear the Duke had not given up hope of returning to Europe.
1 Biographical Memoirs of Fellows X, Proceedings of the British Academy 172, BAA/FEL/10/585, British Academy Archive. Cf. obituary, Independent, 5 July 2006.
2 Bruce Taylor to the author, 27 April 2021.
3 DGFP, AA–B15/B002549, Vol. X, p. 152.
4 Ribbentrop to Stohrer, 11 July 1940, DGFP, AA–B15/B002549–51(GD D/X/152), No. 152, Vol. X, pp. 187–9.
5 Document 56, Fundacion national Francisco Franco, Documentos ineditos para la Historia del generalismo Franco, Vol. 11–1, Madrid, 1993, quoted Urbach, p. 214.
6 Stohrer to Ribbentrop, 16 July 1940, DGFP, B15/B002563.
7 Stohrer to Ribbentrop, 16 July 1940, DGFP, B15/B002563.
8 She was held up by the Gestapo as part of a negotiating ploy and finally reached the Bahamas in November.
9 ‘Most Secret’ telegram to Alec Cadogan, 26 September 1940, FO 1093/23, TNA. Parts remain redacted under 3(4) of the Public Records Act.
10 John Peck to Churchill, 20 July 1940, CHAR 20/9A–B/96, Churchill College Archives.
11 Churchill to the Duke, 24 July 1940, CHAR 20/9A–B/103, Churchill College Archives.
12 The cost of diverting a ship via Bermuda was $7,500 at a time when every available cruiser was needed to protect Britain.
13 The Duke to Churchill, 18 July 1940, CHAR 20/9A–B/87, Churchill College Archives, and CO 967/122, TNA.
14 Lisbon to Alec Cadogan, 19 July 1940, FO 1093/23, TNA.
15 Herbert Pell to Cordell Hull, 20 July 1940, NA 844 E 001/52, NARA.
16 Robert Vansittart to Lord Halifax, 23 July 1940, CO 967/122, TNA.
17 See John Costello, Ten Days That Saved the West (Bantam, 1991), p. 347, and FO371/24408, TNA.
18 Eduard Hempel to Foreign Ministry, 22 July 1940, Telegram 201, B15/B002577, Vol. X, p. 262.
19 Stephen Dorrill, Blackshirt (Penguin, 2006), p. 517.
20 Diary note, 23 July 1940, in Weizsäcker Erinnerungen (Freiburg, 1950), p. 294, quoted Costello, Ten Days, p. 348.
21 Observer, 12 November 1995; Report of the PVDE on the Visit of the Duke of Windsor to Portugal, PT/TT/AOS/CO/NE-1A/17, Arquivo Nacional, Torre do Tombo, Lisboa.
22 Bova Scoppa to Count Ciano, 22 July 1940, Italian Foreign Office archives, quoted David Irving, Churchill’s War, Vol.1 (Veritas, 1987), p. 375.
23 Stohrer to Joachim Ribbentrop, Nos. 2474 and 2492, both unpublished, Churchill’s War, p. 375.
24 Bova Scoppa to Count Ciano, 25 July 1940, Italian Foreign Office archives, Churchill’s War, p. 375.
25 DGFP, No. 228, 1504/371063–6, quoted James Graham-Murray, The Sword and the Umbrella (Times Press, 1964), pp. 239–241.
26 Stohrer to Ribbentrop, 25 July 1940, DGFP, B15/B002582–3.
27 Stohrer to Foreign Ministry, 26 July 1940, DGFP, AA–B15/B002591–3, Telegram 235, pp. 317–18.
28 Hoyningen-Huene to Berlin, 26 July 1940, DGFP, No. 749, B002597, unpublished, Churchill’s War, p. 375.
29 In 1940, 50 million francs would have been the equivalent of £3 million, almost £172 million today.
30 De Velasco operated as a German spy in Britain from 1941. See his Ml5 file KV2/3535, TNA, and his memoirs, Memorias de un Agente Secreto, Ed Plaza & Janés, Barcelona, 1979.
31 Bloch interview with Eccles, 1983, Churchill’s War, p. 375.
32 Lord Eccles interview, BREN 2/2/5, p. 14, Churchill College Archives.
33 Churchill to the Duke, 27 July 1940, CHAR 20/9A-B, Churchill College Archives, and Monckton Trustees, Box 18, Folio 51, Balliol College.
34 Bova Scoppa to Count Ciano, 29 July 1940, Italian Foreign Office archives, Churchill’s War, p. 376.
35 Hoyningen-Huene to Ribbentrop, 30 July 1940, DGFP, AA–B15/B002609 (unpublished), No. 783, marked most urgent. De Rivera reported the next day exactly the same: ‘He could, if the occasion arose, take action even from the Bahamas.’ DGFP, B15/B002619–20, quoted Donaldson, p. 373.
36 Neill Lochery, Lisbon: War in the Shadows of the City of Light 1939–45 (Public Affairs, 2011), p. 82.
37 de Rivera, 31 July 1940, DGFP, B15/B002619–20.
38 Ribbentrop to Portuguese Legation, 31 July 1940, DGFP, AA–B15/B002617–18, Vol. X, No. 265, pp. 378–9.
39 Desmond Morton to Winston Churchill, 4 August 1940, FO 1093/23, TNA.
40 Stohrer to Ribbentrop, 3 August 1940, DGFP, B15/B002641–2, Vol. X, No. 285, pp. 409–10.
41 Hoyningen-Huene to Ribbentrop, 2 August 1940, DGFP, B15/B002632-3, Vol. X, No. 276, pp. 397–8.