Notes

In these notes I cite each interview in my data set by a document number specifically assigned to it; where others have taken the interview notes and I have not been present, I have given their name (e.g., “notes by Jan Berris”), and where I have taken the interview notes, I have used the abbreviation “DML” (David M. Lampton). In each citation I provide as much information as to the identity/category of the respondent, the place and time of interview, and other useful information as I have judged in each case to be consistent with prudence and the protection of my subjects. Where I have used notes by others (except government documents or interviews by journalists), I have treated them as “near verbatim” rather than exact wording.

INTRODUCTION

The epigraph from the secretary-general is Doc. 346 (DML). For the use of quotation marks here and with other interview material from my files, see the discussion below at the end of the section entitled “The Information Base.”

1. I start the era of reform with the restoration of Deng Xiaoping to the positions stripped from him in 1976 in the wake of Premier Zhou Enlai’s death and the first Tiananmen incident shortly thereafter. See also Li Lanqing, Breaking Through: The Birth of China’s Opening-Up Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hong Kong: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2009), p. 397. I use the date of July 1977 as the nominal start of Deng’s revolution because the Chinese people knew from his prior policy initiatives after the Great Leap Forward and from his brief return to power in 1974–76 what his policy proclivities were, even though formal adoption of his initial domestic and foreign policies had to await the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of December 1978 and the nearly simultaneous formal, mutual diplomatic recognition between the United States and China. Even after these landmark events, Deng acquired power gradually.

2. Guo Liang, Surveying Internet Usage and Its Impact in Seven Chinese Cities (Beijing: Center for Social Development, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, November 2007), p. iv, www.worldinternetproject.com/_files/_Published/_oldis/_China%20Internet%20Project%20Survey%20Report%202007.pdf.

3. Deng Xiaoping, interview by Mike Wallace of CBS News, September 2, 1986, Beijing, Doc. 860, p. 5.

4. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

5. Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of CPC, adopted December 22, 1978, and published December 29, 1978, www.bjreview.com.cn/90th/2011–04/26/content_357494_3.htm.

6. Cheng Li, “China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?,” Asia Policy, no. 6 (July 2008): 53–93.

7. See David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

8. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).

9. See Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); see also Zhang Wenmu, “Back to Yalta: A Roadmap for Sino-US Relations,” China Security, no. 19 (2011): 49–56, ZhangWenmu2011_CS19_Ch4–2.pdf.

10. Quoted in Nicholas Thompson, Hawk and Dove (New York: Henry Holt, 2009), p. 272.

11. Some other sources of interviews and memoranda of conversation generally have not been used here simply because they are widely available and have been studied by others; also, I mainly drew on interviews, conversations, and meetings in which I was personally involved, so that my knowledge of the setting, my observation of the body language, and my hearing of the discussion in both Chinese and English (often with consecutive interpretation) all inform my sense of what was being said. Moreover, in many instances I met with interlocutors periodically over several decades, and therefore our sense of mutual trust and ability to pick up one conversation where the prior one had left off gave me a sense of knowledge, confidence, and continuity that would have been lacking had I primarily relied on interviews conducted by others. Other sources available currently include the National Security Archives at George Washington University; The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top-Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, ed. William Burr (New York: New Press, 1998); and the U.S. Department of State series entitled The Foreign Relations of the United States. In addition, because of the number of agreements between agencies of the U.S. government and Chinese counterparts, the archival holdings of individual U.S. government departments undoubtedly also possess extensive notes and memoranda of conversations that gradually will be declassified and become available to scholars. Further, the Ford Presidential Library holds the oral history of Michel Oksenberg during his years in the Carter administration. And the archives of China’s Foreign Ministry also gradually are opening (with a substantial time lag for declassification and an unknown degree of selectivity in documents being made available).

12. I have been careful in citing my interviews to take into account the possible sensitivities and vulnerabilities of the delegation members meeting with a Chinese interlocutor, as well as those of the interlocutor him- or herself. Given that I am speaking from the viewpoint of the Chinese interviewee or informant, when I say “foreigner” I am referring to the non-Chinese participant.

13. This interview, because of its early date, was conducted by a delegation from the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). See CCAS, “Interview with Chou En-lai” [July 19, 1971], Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 3, nos. 3–4 (1971): 31–59, http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v03n03.pdf, abstracted in DML, Doc. 812.

1.EVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION

The second epigraph to this chapter (quote from Deng Xiaoping) is from a meeting with National Committee Board of Directors, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709. The mayor’s remarks in the third epigraph are from DML, Doc. 380, p. 2. The article by Li Shenzhi cited in the fourth epigraph is in Selected Writings of Li Shenzhi, ed. Ilse Tebbetts and Libby Kingseed (Dayton, OH: Kettering Foundation Press, 2010), p. 128. And the senior academic’s comment in the fifth epigraph is from DML, Doc. 838, p. 1.

1. Cheng Li, ed., China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

2. Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), ch. 6.

3. I say “yet again” because on two prior occasions Mao had turned on Deng (once in the 1930s in the base areas and again in the second half of the 1960s during the opening stages of the Cultural Revolution), only to recall him on each of these two prior occasions—finding Deng just too capable to throw on the scrap heap.

4. Hua Guofeng was eased out of power gradually, first being replaced as premier by Zhao Ziyang in September 1980; then being demoted to Communist Party vice-chairman from chairman in 1981 (replaced as chairman by Hu Yaobang); then having his post as vice-chairman of the party abolished in 1982, so that he was left with only the modestly dignified position of member of the Central Committee until November 2002. Hua died in August 2008, powerless, but with widespread gratitude for having exited gracefully.

5. The most thorough and scholarly account of Deng Xiaoping’s transformation of China is Vogel’s Deng Xiaoping.

6. Deng Xiaoping, “Heping he fazhan shi dangdai shijie de liang da wenti” [Peace and development are the contemporary world’s two big issues], Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 104–6.

7. It is of course true that this era was not entirely peaceful, with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s stirring up conflict to China’s west, and Deng’s own high-cost “defensive counterattack” against Vietnam in 1979.

8. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with the National Committee Board of Directors, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709, p. 2.

9. There is a meaningful debate over the actual size of the Chinese military budget and how much spending may occur either off budget entirely and/or under other budget categories. But there is little dispute over the shape of the curves and trends.

10. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with U.S. governors, October 17, 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 5.

11. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1961), ch. 1.

12. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with U.S. governors, October 17, 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 5.

13. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with the National Committee Board of Directors, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709, p. 3.

14. Unsurprisingly, Deng Xiaoping played a key role in pulling China out of its early 1960s economic slide—a calamity in which perhaps thirty (one source says forty) million people had perished. The policies he employed then to a considerable extent became the template for his efforts once he was the supreme leader nearly two decades later. See Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962 (New York: Walker, 2010).

15. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with U.S. governors, October 17, 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 3.

16. For the definitive study on China’s one-child policy as an ongoing campaign and preoccupation of Chinese leaders, see Tyrene White, China’s Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People’s Republic, 1949–2005 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), particularly p. 248. For a discussion of possible changes in population policy in 2013, see, Ted Alcorn, “China’s New Leaders Cut Off One-Child Policy at the Root,” Lancet 381 (March 23, 2013): 983.

17. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with the National Committee Board of Directors, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709, p. 3.

18. For example, one of Deng’s two sons, Deng Pufang, was pushed, fell, or jumped from a building in the Cultural Revolution at a time when he was under heavy Red Guard pressure. He became gravely disabled.

19. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with U.S. governors, October 17, 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 3.

20. For the number of Chinese students in the United States in 1978 and 1984, see David M. Lampton with Joyce A. Madancy and Kristen M. Williams, A Relationship Restored: Trends in U.S.-China Educational Exchanges, 1978–1984 (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1986), p. 30; for later numbers, see Institute of International Education, “Open Doors 2011: International Student Enrollment Increased by 5 Percent in 2010/11, Led by Strong Increase in Students from China,” press release, November 14, 2011, www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2011/2011–11–14-Open-Doors-International-Students; Institute of International Education, “International Student Enrollments Rose Modestly in 2009/10, Led by Strong Increase in Students from China,” press release, November 15, 2010, www.iie.org/Who-We-Are/News-and-Events/Press-Center/Press-Releases/2010/2010–11–15-Open-Doors-International-Students-In-The-US. See also Institute of International Education, “Open Doors Fact Sheet: China,” 2012, www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-Country/2012.

21. Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1990 [China statistics yearbook, 1990] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1990), p. 721; and Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2009 [China statistical yearbook, 2009] (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2009), p. 805. These figures are cited in Thomas G. Rawski’s “Human Resources and China’s Long Economic Boom,” Asia Policy, no. 12 (July 2011): 53.

22. “China’s Higher Education Students Exceed 30 Million,” People’s Daily Online, March 11, 2011, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/98649/7315789.html.

23. World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, Conference ed. (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), pp. 36–37; an original source is Center for World-Class Universities, Shanghai Jiaotong University, “Academic Ranking of World Universities,” www.arwu.org/.

24. Deng Xiaoping, “Senior Cadres Should Take the Lead in Maintaining and Enriching the Party’s Fine Traditions,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 213–14.

25. Ibid., p. 218.

26. Wei Jingsheng, “The Fifth Modernization: Democracy (1978),” in Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 through the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed., vol. 2, ed. W. M. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 497–500.

27. Deng Xiaoping, “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles,” People’s Daily Online, March 30, 1979, p. 4/15, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1290.html.

28. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with U.S. governors, October 17, 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 4.

29. Deng would have been concerned because in 1976 deliveries of oil fell short of the contracted amounts with Japan. For a thorough discussion of the role petroleum was to play in China’s development and turn outward, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making In China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), ch. 5, esp. p. 205.

30. Deng Xiaoping, meeting with the National Committee Board of Directors, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709, p. 4.

31. Li Lanqing, Breaking Through (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2009), particularly ch. 2.

32. Ibid., pp. 89–91.

33. Ibid., p. 93.

34. Robert S. McNamara, “Transcript of Interview with Robert S. McNamara,” interview by John Lewis, Richard Webb, and Devesh Kapur, April 1, 1991, World Bank History Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARCHIVES/Resources/Robert_McNamara_Oral_History_Transcript_04_01_and_10_03_1991.pdf. In one March 4, 1997, interview, Premier Li Peng acknowledged the importance of World Bank advice, saying, “Generally, World Bank projects have good return rates. At the same time, China has learned a lot about management and construction from the World Bank. For instance, feasibility studies, we adopted the capital system in China, and the practice of bids and tenders. We learned all this from the World Bank, so we hope our cooperation will continue.” Premier Li Peng, interview by author, March 4, 1997, DML, Doc. 414, p. 3.

35. Robert S. McNamara, speaking during comments by participants at Kettering-Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Sustained Dialogue, Peace Hotel, Beijing, September 27, 2005, DML, Doc. 459, p. 1.

36. David M. Lampton, Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China (1986; repr., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1989).

37. Party secretary, District Party Committee, Shanghai, September 1, 2007, DML, Doc. 429, p. 1.

38. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

39. For a fascinating study of one transformational leader, see Jonathan D. Spence, God’s Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996).

40. Cheng Li, “China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?” Asia Policy, no. 6 (July 2008): 59–77.

41. World Bank, “Overview: China’s Challenge: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society,” draft document, August 2011, p. 17. This document was informally circulated for review; hence it is not publicly available and a complete citation for it is not possible. The subsequently published version of this draft report had negotiated language that dropped and revised language in the earlier draft document, including the figures cited here. The subsequently published version of this report is World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, Conference ed. (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association and World Bank, 2012).

42. “GDP Growth in China, 1952–2011,” information drawn from National Bureau of Statistics [PRC], China Statistical Yearbooks; National Bureau of Statistics Plan Report; and National Bureau of Statistics Communiqués, at Chinability, November 5, 2011, www.chinability.com/GDP.htm; for 2012 services percentage, see “China’s Non-manufacturing Sector Growth Picks Up Pace,” BBC, July 2, 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18684519.

43. David M. Lampton, “Presentation to National Academy of Sciences,” Washington, DC, February 7, 1977, based on data obtained from Steroid Chemistry Group to China, October 1976, DML, Doc. 623; see also David M. Lampton, “Administration of the Pharmaceutical Research, Public Health, and Population Bureaucracies,” China Quarterly, no. 74 (June 1978): 392.

44. Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), pp. 102–5.

45. Charles Duhigg and David Barboza, “In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad,” New York Times, January 25, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

46. Deng Xiaoping in a meeting with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Board of Directors, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709, p. 2.

47. New annual commitments to loans from the World Bank to China peaked in 1994 at $2.94 billion. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi-2012-ebook.pdf.

48. U.S. Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities,” www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfhhis01.txt; also U.S. Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities,” www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt.

49. Xiaotian Wang, “External Debt Highest since 1985: SAFE Report,” China Daily, March 22, 2003, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012–03/22/content_14893609.htm.

50. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “China/Trade,” www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/countries-regions/china/trade.aspx (accessed October 12, 2012).

51. Kevin Jianjun Tu and Sabine Johnson-Reiser, Understanding China’s Rising Coal Imports, Policy Outlook (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 16, 2012), Summary, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/china_coal.pdf.

52. Jonathan Anderson, “Is China Export-Led?,” UBS Investment Research: Asian Focus, September 27, 2007, p. 4, http://allroadsleadtochina.com/reports/prc_270907.pdf.

53. Mayor Xu Kuangdi, dinner conversation, January 14, 1998, DML, Doc. 319, p. 1.

54. First Party Secretary Li Yuanchao, Provincial Guest House, Nanjing, June 23, 2007, DML, Doc. 431, p. 2.

55. See “Revenues of China’s Customs Duties Top 1.6t Yuan,” China Daily, January 13, 2012, www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012–01/13/content_14438069.htm; also “China’s 2011 Fiscal Revenue up 24.8% to 10 Trillion Yuan,” Xinhua Wang News, January 20, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012–01/20/c_131370457.htm.

56. “China Urban Dwellers Exceed Rural Population,” National Health and Family Planning Commission, People’s Republic of China, January 19, 2012, www.npfpc.gov.cn/data/201202/t20120220_381737.html.

57. From Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Blue Book on Macro Economy, cited in Chen Chen, “China’s Urbanization Rate to Peak Soon,” China.org, April 15, 2010, China.org.cn/china/2010–04/15/content_19823645.htm; see also Clarence Kwan, “Urbanization in China: Another 280 Million People by 2030,” China Issues (Deloitte, Chinese Services Group), May-June 2010, www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/additional-services/chinese-services-group/8ad3bdb92e119210VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm.

58. Homi Kharas, “The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries,” Working Paper No. 285 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Centre, January 2010), p. 30. There are, however, many other estimates of the size of China’s middle class, some quite large, with definitional issues accounting for the variance. I have used one of the lowest estimates here. For another figure, see Li Chunling, Duanlie yu suipian—Dangdai Zhongguo shehui jieceng fenhua shizheng fenxi [Cleavage and fragmentation: An empirical analysis of social stratification in contemporary China] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), cited in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2010), p. 16.

59. World Bank and Development Research Center, China 2030, p. 34.

60. “China’s Urbanization Rate Expected to Reach 48 Percent in 2010,” People’s Daily Online, December 22, 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90778/90862/6848826.html.

61. On the change over time in the Gini coefficient, see World Bank and Development Research Center, China 2030, p. 13. The accuracy of Gini coefficient calculations in China may be distorted by the household registration system. On the urban-to-rural income ratio and the Gini coefficient, see Martin K. Whyte, lecture, to the seminar “China Briefings for Mid-career Military Officers,” February 12, 2013, transcript, p. 11. The statistics are from the China Household Income Project, not counting migrants; Terry Sicular, “Inequality in China: Recent Trends,” PowerPoint presented at the Rural Education Action Program’s conference “Will China Fall into a Middle-Income Trap? Growth, Inequality, and Future Instability,” December 2011, Stanford, CA, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6930/China_inequality_Sicular.pdf.

62. Martin Whyte, Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice in Contemporary China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

63. Yi Fuxian, “The Great Urgency to Scrap the Family Planning Policy,” China-US Focus, May 13, 2011, www.chinafocus.com/political-social-development/the-great-urgency-to-scrap-the-family-planning-policy/.

64. Ibid.

65. “Statistics on Social Organizations,” China Statistical Yearbook 2011, table 21–35.

66. Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, “China’s Foreign Aid,” April 21, 2011, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011–04/21/content_1849913.htm.

67. See, for example, Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, China’s Changing Outbound Direct Investment Profile: Drivers and Policy Implications, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief No. PB09–14 (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute, June 2009), www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1245; see also Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, “An American Open Door? Maximizing the Benefits of Chinese Direct Foreign Investment,” Special Report, Center on U.S.-China Relations of the Asia Society and the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, May 2011, www.ogilvypr.com/files/anamericanopendoor_china_fdi_study.pdf.

68. Ibid., Executive Summary, p. 8.

69. Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).

70. “35,860 Chinese Evacuated from Unrest-Torn Libya,” Xinhua, March 3, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011–03/03/c_13759456.htm. It is appropriate to note that China received some outside assistance in this endeavor.

71. On foreign students in China, see “Total Number Foreign Students,” www.sinograduate.com/international-student-statistics (accessed May 30, 2012); Chen Jia, “Expat Student Numbers Rise,” March 4, 2011, www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011–03/04/content_12112597.htm.

72. Miscellaneous notes, April 12, 2011, Alexandria, VA, DML, Doc. 779, p. 2.

73. Pew Global, “China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower,” July 13, 2011, p. 1, http://pewglobal.org/2011/07/13/china-seen-overtaking-us-as-global-superpower/.

74. Lydia Saad, “U.S. Surpasses China in Forecast for Economic Powerhouse,” Gallup Poll, February 16, 2009, www.gallup.com/poll/114658/Surpasses-China-Forecast-Economic-Powerhouse.aspx.

75. Senior Chinese foreign policy analyst, April 26, 2010, DML, Doc. 694, pp. 2–3.

76. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping.

2.GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP

The first epigraph, by Deng Xiaoping, is from Doc. 776 (notes by Jan Berris), p. 4. The second epigraph, by the bureau director, is from Doc. 728 (DML), p. 2. The third epigraph, by the governor of Sichuan, is from Doc. 766 (notes by Jan Berris), p. 1. The fourth epigraph, by President Jiang Zemin, is from Doc. 394 (DML), p. 2.

1. C. H. Tung, “Remarks at Carnegie Endowment in Washington, DC,” September 29, 2011, DML, Doc. 846, p. 1.

2. Senior Chinese economic leader paraphrasing Yao Yilin, August 2, 2010, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 705, p. 1.

3. Vice-Premier Li Xiannian, June 24, 1979, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, DML, Doc. 427, p. 3.

4. Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, January 11, 2000, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, DML, Doc. 589, p. 2.

5. Senior Chinese academic, September 20, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 577, p. 1.

6. I want to thank School of Advanced International Studies PhD student Ms. Lily Chen for this comment in reading an early draft of this chapter in April 2012.

7. Premier Wen Jiabao, April 1, 2005, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, Purple Pavilion, DML, Doc. 454, p. 3.

8. Sun Yafu, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, January 12, 2010, Beijing, DML, Doc. 672, p. 1.

9. Former senior official in State Council, July 16, 2012, DML, Doc. 862, p. 2.

10. For a good academic overview of these changes, see Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds., Chinese Politics: State, Society and Market (London: Routledge, 2010).

11. Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), “Interview with Chou En-lai” [July 19, 1971], Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 3, nos. 3–4 (1971): 31–59, http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v03n03.pdf, abstracted in DML, Doc. 812. An image of Zhou Enlai, the terrified underling in the Chairman’s presence, is clearly seen in Dr. Li Zhisui’s book, with the editorial assistance of Anne F. Thurston, The Private Life of Chairman Mao (New York: Random House, 1994), especially pp. 508–11. One of the more memorable descriptions of Mao’s relations with Zhou in this volume was “Mao demanded Zhou’s absolute loyalty, and had he not received it, Zhou would no doubt have been overthrown. But because Zhou was so subservient and loyal, Mao held the premier in contempt” (p. 510).

12. Dr. Susan L. Shirk, remarks at the symposium “The Week That Changed the World,” March 7, 2012, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC.

13. Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping), November 14, 1974, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, notes taken by National Committee (Jan Berris?), American University Presidents Delegation, DML, Doc. 769.

14. Ibid., p. 4.

15. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, October 23, 1977, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 709, pp. 1–2.

16. Senior policy adviser, June 10, 2007, China, DML, Doc. 433, p. 1.

17. Tabitha Grace Mallory, “The Sea’s Harvest: China and Global Fisheries,” SAISPHERE, 2011–2012, p. 40, http://media.sais-jhu.edu/saisphere2011/article/sea’s-harvest-china-and-global-fisheries.

18. Denis Fred Simon, “Gradual Shift in S&T Funding,” draft paper presented at the Conference on the Structure, Process, and Leadership of the Chinese Science and Technology System, July 16–17, 2012, La Jolla, CA, graph 15.

19. Richard P. Suttmeier and Shi Bing, “A Frog on Steroids? The Chinese Academic Research System and the Challenges of Innovation,” working paper, Conference on the Structure, Process, and Leadership of the Chinese Science and Technology System, July 16–17, 2012, La Jolla, CA, p. 20. Note that the word business does not denote quite the autonomy the word may convey to a non-Chinese audience.

20. Former senior official in State Council, July 16–17, 2012, DML, Doc. 862, p. 2.

21. Department director, July 16–17, 2012, DML, Doc. 862, p. 1.

22. Huang Zhiling and Xin Dingding, “Air Traffic Grounded by Sky-High Towers,” China Daily, July 3, 2012, p. 3.

23. Sharon LaFraniere, “A Chinese Official Tests a New Political Approach,” New York Times, December 31, 2011, p. A5.

24. “Wukan Protesters End Action after Chinese Government Offers Concessions,” December 21, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/21/wukan-protesters-chinese-government-concessions.

25. Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

26. Feng Tianyu, He Xiaoming, and Zhou Jiming, eds., Zhonghua wenhua shi [Chinese cultural history] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 184.

27. Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, p. 6.

28. Wang Daohan, meeting with the editorial board of the Christian Science Monitor, January 9, 1997, Boston, DML, Doc. 371, p. 2.

29. Minister in Taiwan, July 6, 2011, DML, Doc. 830, p. 3.

30. Premier Wen Jiabao, press conference, March 16, 2007, Doc. 443, p. 4.

31. Zhou Enlai, meeting, June 15, 1973, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 750, p. 1.

32. President Jiang Zemin, November 22, 2002, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, DML, Doc. 521, p. 2.

33. David M. Lampton, with the assistance of Yeung Sai-cheung, Paths to Power: Elite Mobility in Contemporary China, No. 55 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1989).

34. Policy analysts and advisers, June 20, 1998, Shanghai, DML, Doc. 807, p. 3.

35. Deng Mao Mao, Deng Xiaoping: My Father (New York: Basic Books, 1995), ch. 30.

36. Premier Zhao Ziyang, meeting with U.S. governors, National Governors Association trip to China, December 5–18, 1983, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 763, p. 1.

37. First party secretary and mayor of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, November 20, 2002, Jin Jiang Hotel, Central Banquet Building, Shanghai, November 20, 2002, DML, Doc. 517, p. 2.

38. Figures from Alice Miller, “China’s New Party Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 23 (Winter 2008), p. 4, www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org. For additional data and analysis on elite change, see H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s ‘Third Generation’ Elite,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 127.

39. Alice Miller, “The New Party Politburo Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 40 (Winter 2013), p. 3, www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org.

40. White House, “Memorandum of Conversation,” Zhou Enlai [Chou En-lai] and Dr. Henry Kissinger, October 20, 1971, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, synopsis in Doc. 701.

41. James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

42. Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in Weber: Political Writings, ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 311–13.

43. “Highlights—China Premier Wen Jiabao’s Comments at NPC Press Conference,” March 14, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/china-npc-highlights-idUSL4E8EE11K20120314.

44. Cheng Li, “Shaping China’s Foreign Policy: The Paradoxical Role of Foreign-Educated Returnees,” Asia Policy, no. 10 (July 2010), p. 71.

45. Zhang Liang, comp., and Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese Leadership’s Decision to Use Force against Their Own People—In Their Own Words (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 191.

46. Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 17.

47. Deng Xiaoping, October 17, 1979, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 4.

48. Ibid., p. 3.

49. Senior Taiwan academic, June 30, 2000, DML, Doc. 598, pp. 1–2.

50. Senior Chinese professor, July 8, 2011, DML, Doc. 827, p. 1.

51. Senior Chinese diplomat, August 16, 2002, Beijing, DML, Doc. 538, p. 4.

52. Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012).

53. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, October 17, 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 5.

54. Vice-minister, November 6, 2002, United States, DML, Doc. 751, p. 2.

55. Former Shanghai mayor Wang Daohan, conversation with Christian Science Monitor editorial board, January 9, 1997, Boston, DML, Doc. 371, p. 2.

56. Senior Chinese policy analysts, June 20, 1998, China, DML, Doc. 807, p. 4.

57. Calculated from the World Trade Organization Statistics Database using total merchandise trade in current U.S. dollars, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language.

58. Calculated from the World Trade Organization Statistics Database using total merchandise trade in current U.S. dollars, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language.

59. “The Communist Party of China (CPC, CCP),” China Today.com (official party website), n.d., www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/ (accessed August 20, 2012).

60. Barry Naughton, “State Enterprise Restructuring: Renegotiating the Social Contract in Urban China,” in China Today: Economic Reforms, Social Cohesion and Collective Identities, ed. Taciana Fisac and Lelia Fernandez-Stembridge (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 3–27.

61. Table 2–13, “Contribution of the Three Strata of Industry to GDP Growth,” in China Statistical Yearbook 2011 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2011); see also, for slightly different figures, Economist Intelligence Unit Data Services, www.eiu.com (accessed June 3, 2012).

62. Jiang Zemin to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Board of Directors, May 9, 1992, Beijing, DML, Doc. 403, p. 2.

63. Ibid., p. 3.

64. Senior Chinese diplomat, August 15, 2002, Beijing, DML, Doc. 550, p. 1.

65. CCAS, “Interview with Chou En-lai,” 32–33, 35, 36, abstracted in DML, Doc. 812, pp. 3–4.

66. Cheng Li, “The Battle for China’s Top Nine Leadership Posts,” Washington Quarterly 35 (Winter 2012): 131–45.

67. R&D official, July 16–17, 2012, DML, Doc. 862, p. 2.

68. Chinese diplomat, December 21, 1998, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 579, p. 1.

69. Remarks of department director, July 16–17, 2012, DML, Doc. 862, p. 1.

70. Li Lanqing, Breaking Through: The Birth of China’s Opening-Up Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press; Hong Kong: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2009), p. 371.

71. Secretary, Minhang District Party Committee, September 1, 2007, Shanghai, DML, Doc. 429, p. 1.

72. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

73. Even if one corrects for the fewer interviews in the earlier period, the frequency remains overwhelmingly in the direction described.

74. Zhang Laicheng, Tong Xunyuan, and Zhang Meiwen, “Market Information Survey Industry: Maturing Rapidly,” Zhongguo Xinxibao, August 2, 2011, www.zgxxb.com/cn/xwzx/201108010008.shtml. Much opinion polling is aimed at market research germane to consumer preferences and marketing.

75. Chinese pollster, November 19, 2012, DML, Doc. 879, p. 1.

76. Adviser to nuclear power corporation, July 21, 2009, DML, Doc. 649, p. 4.

77. Niu Xinchun, “Eight Myths about Sino-U.S. Relations,” Contemporary International Relations 21, no. 4 (July/August 2011): 10.

78. Very senior person in foreign affairs system, August 15, 2002, Beijing, DML, Doc. 549, pp. 2–3.

79. Table 8–4, “National Government Expenditure and Ratio of Central and Local Governments,” in China Statistical Yearbook 2011 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2011).

80. For the 1978 figure, see Yang Jing, “Development of the Non-state Sector in China: An Update,” EAI [East Asian Institute] Background Brief, no. 606, March 10, 2011, www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB606.pdf; for the 2009 figure, see Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: Capital Trade, 2011), p. 13.

81. Ibid.

82. Regarding the corruption of military leaders, see “Crime Clubs: Clamping Down on Criminal Networks in China,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 24, no. 5 (April 12, 2012): 46–49; and John Garnaut, “Rotting from Within: Investigating the Massive Corruption of the Chinese Military,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2012, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/rotting_from_within.

83. Table 20–7, “Number of New Students Enrollment by Level and Type of School,” in China Statistical Yearbook 2011, www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/html/U2007E.HTM.

84. Table 20–2, “Basic Statistics by Level and Type of Education (2010),” in China Statistical Yearbook 2011, www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2011/indexeh.htm.

85. Cheng Li, “Shaping China’s Foreign Policy: The Paradoxical Role of Foreign-Educated Returnees,” Asia Policy, no. 10 (July 2010): 69.

86. Institute of International Education, “Open Doors Data: Top 25 Places of Origin of International Students, 2009/10–2010/11,” www.iie.org/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students//Leading-Places-of-Origin/2009–11.

87. Cheng Li, “Shaping China’s Foreign Policy,” 69.

88. Secretary, Minhang District Party Committee, September 1, 2007, Shanghai, DML, Doc. 429, p. 1.

89. Ma Jun, “NGOs and Environmental Governance in China: An Interview with Ma Jun,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 4 (Winter 2009): 87.

90. PLA senior officers, January 23, 2010, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 679, p. 3.

91. Ibid., p. 3.

92. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), pp. 26–36.

93. Very senior Chinese economist, August 2, 2010, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 705, p. 2.

94. First party secretary and mayor, November 20, 2002, major Chinese city, DML, Doc. 517, p. 1.

95. Senior Chinese scholar, August 2, 2010, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 705, p. 3.

3.POLICY MAKING

The first epigraph (the quote by the state planning commissioner) is from Doc. 741 (DML), pp. 2–3. The second epigraph (the quote by the trade negotiator) is from Doc. 802 (DML), p. 2.

1. Former mayor of Shanghai Wang Daohan, January 16, 1997, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 382, p. 2.

2. Principal leader of major Chinese university, April 9, 2012, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 859, p. 1.

3. The World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), pp. 55–56. Levels of government below the center account for 80 percent of total budgetary expenditure, but only 40–50 percent of their expenditure burdens are financed from centrally derived monies. Looking lower in the system, to counties/townships, where the revenue expenditure gap is greatest, particularly in poorer areas, David Bulman explains that “counties/townships only take in ∼20% of total revenue, but they are responsible for ∼40% of total expenditure.” See David J. Bulman, “Leaders and Economic Growth in China’s Counties: Characteristics and Consequences of Constrained Development,” dissertation prospectus (draft), Johns Hopkins—School of Advanced International Studies, May 29, 2012, p. 6, n. 19.

4. Richard L. Walker, China under Communism: The First Five Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 27.

5. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 4.

6. David M. Lampton, “Chinese Politics: The Bargaining Treadmill,” Issues and Studies 23, no. 3 (March 1987): 11–41; David M. Lampton, “Water: Challenge to a Fragmented Political System,” in Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, ed. David M. Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 157–89; Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

7. A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

8. One tends to see a resurgence of the factional model when elite strife becomes increasingly pronounced. In the run-up to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, for example, factional-type analysis emerged in the work of Cheng Li and others.

9. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974).

10. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

11. Yu Qing, YQ.People.com.cn, http://yq.people.com.cn, cited in Da Wei, “Has China Become ‘Tough’?,” China Security 6, no. 3 (2010): 99–100; see also James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp. 35–37, 220–26.

12. Andrew Mertha, “‘Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process,” China Quarterly, no. 200 (2009): 995–1012; also Andrew C. Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

13. Yun Zhou, “China Responds to Fukushima,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 28, 2012, http://thebulletin.org/china-responds-fukushima.

14. Nuclear law expert, August 5, 2011, Beijing, DML, Doc. 835, p. 2.

15. Bo Kong and David M. Lampton, “Whither the Atomic Energy Law in China?,” unpublished report prepared for U.S. National Nuclear Safety Administration, February 2012 (Report 6), p. 5.

16. For a detailed report on the story of the Atomic Energy Law, see ibid.

17. Nuclear law expert, August 5, 2011, Beijing, DML, Doc. 835, p. 3.

18. Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “The State Council,” October 25, 2005, http://english.gov.cn/links/statecouncil.htm. Note that in the spring of 2013 there was a modest reconfiguration of State Council organizations at the Twelfth National People’s Congress. These adjustments were rather unobtrusive in comparison to prior expectations for change, and the alterations do not materially affect the situation described here.

19. Senior official of the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC), July 28, 2009, DML, Doc. 641, p. 3.

20. Senior MOFTEC official, August 16, 2002, DML, Doc. 541, p. 2.

21. Senior security-related official, January 6, 2012, Beijing, DML, Doc. 856, p. 4.

22. Nicholas R. Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth: After the Global Financial Crisis (Washington, DC: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012), p. 145.

23. Shanxi planning and transport officials, Shanxi Province, May 16, 1985, Shanxi Province, DML, Doc. 721, p. 2.

24. Arms control expert, July 15, 2009, Beijing, DML, Doc. 642, p. 4.

25. Wen Jin Yuan, “China’s Export Lobbying Groups and the Politics of the Renminbi,” Freeman Briefing Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2012, p. 2, http://csis.org/files/publication/fr12n0102.pdf; see also He Xingqiang, “The RMB Exchange Rate: Interest Groups in China’s Economic Policymaking,” China Security, no. 19 (2011): 23–36.

26. Wen Jin Yuan, “China’s Export Lobbying Groups”; see also He Xingqiang, “RMB Exchange Rate.”

27. Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth, pp. 148–49.

28. Benjamin L. Read, “Benjamin Read on Homeowners’ Protests in Shanghai,” February 28, 2008, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/02/benjamin-read-on-homeowners-protests-in-shanghai/.

29. “Citizens Challenge New Maglev Route in Shanghai,” China.org, citing China Youth Daily, January 14, 2008, www.china.org.cn/english/China/239667.htm.

30. “Shanghai Residents Protest Controversial Maglev Project on Jan. 6,” China Digital Times, January 13, 2008, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/01/shanghai-residents-protest-controversial-maglev-project-on-jan6/. See also Chenzhong Xiaolu, “Shanghai Suspends Maglev Project,” Caijing, March 6, 2009, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009–03–10/110116802.html.

31. Zha Minjie, “Maglev Extension Given Green Light,” Shanghai Daily, March 14, 2010, www.shanghaidaily.com/article/print.asp?id=431107; see also “Shanghai-Hangzhou Maglev Plans,” Shanghaiist, January 19, 2011, www.shanghaiist.com/2011/01/19/shanghai-hangzhou_maglev_plans_swit.php; “Maglev Link Plan Is Suspended,” China Business News, January 19, 2011, http://cnbusinessnews.com/maglev-link-plan-is-suspended/#axzz2aSnQ8M2e; Geoff Dyer, “Protests Suspend Work on Shanghai Maglev,” Financial Times, March 6, 2008, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f2e3fc8-ebae-11dc-9493–0000779fd2ac.html.

32. Geoff Dyer, “Protests Suspend Work on Shanghai Maglev,” Financial Times, March 6, 2008, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f2e3fc8-ebae-11dc-9493–0000779fd2ac.html#axzz29mCfybKi.

33. President Jiang Zemin, March 20, 2001, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, DML, Doc. 772, p. 1.

34. “Top 20 Internet Countries By Users—2012 Q2,” Internet World Stats, www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (accessed October 14, 2012).

35. Senior military officer, June 27, 1999, DML, Doc. 757, pp. 2–3.

36. Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Hairong, July 28, 1976, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 748, p. 5.

37. Earthquake Geospatial Research Portal, “Overview of the Wenchuan Earthquake,” n.d., http://cegrp.cga.harvard.edu/content/overview-wenchuan-earthquake (accessed October 14, 2012).

38. “Former Head of China’s Drug Watchdog Executed,” Xinhuanet.com, July 10, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007–07/10/content_6353536.htm.

39. David M. Lampton, “Presentation to National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC,” February 7, 1977 (based on October 1976 trip to the PRC), Doc. 623, p. 1.

40. Premier Wen Jiabao, December 7, 2003, New York City, Waldorf-Astoria Towers, DML, Doc. 505, p. 1.

41. Senior Chinese economist, March 29, 2005, China, DML, Doc. 663, p. 1.

42. Jamil Anderlini, “Word on the Tweet Forces Bo Crisis into the Open,” Financial Times, April 12, 2012, p. 6.

43. Xiamen business leader, January 15, 2010, Xiamen, Fujian, DML, Doc. 671, p. 4.

44. Wu Lengxi, November 12, 1982, Beijing, DML, Doc. 734, p. 2. Parenthetically, Garrison’s Gorillas was the first American TV series to be shown in the PRC in the 1970s—it was wildly popular, and reportedly the crime rate nationwide dropped on nights it was broadcast.

45. Secretary-general of special project, July 14, 2003, DML, Doc. 346, p. 2.

46. Senior official of nuclear organization, August 5, 2011, Beijing, DML, Doc. 836, p. 3.

47. Senior trade official, April 12, 2002, Beijing, DML, Doc. 661, p. 2.

48. Chinese government researchers, December 6, 2011, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 853, p. 1.

49. David M. Lampton, “The Policy Implementation Problem in Post-Mao China,” in Lampton, Policy Implementation, pp. 3–24.

50. Senior Chinese economist, March 29, 2005, China, DML, Doc. 663, p. 2.

4.THE WORLD

The first epigraph (quote by General Jiang Youshu) is from Doc. 736 (DML), p. 2. The second epigraph (quote by high-ranking Chinese economic official) is from Doc. 738 (DML), p. 3. The third epigraph (quote by Wang Xuebing) is from Doc. 358 (DML), p. 2. The fourth epigraph (quote by senior Foreign Ministry official) is from Doc. 526 (DML), p. 1. The fifth epigraph (quote by senior foreign policy think tank leader) is from Doc. 695 (DML), p. 2. The sixth epigraph (quote by State Councilor Dai Bingguo) is from Doc. 819 (DML), p. 4.

1. Senior Chinese intelligence official, October 2, 2003, DML, Doc. 506, p. 1.

2. Ren Xiao, “Traditional Chinese Theory and Practice of Foreign Relations: A Reassessment,” in China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu, ed. Zheng Yongnian (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 102–16.

3. In speaking of Chinese thought in the realms of science and philosophy, Joseph Needham, in his Science and Civilization in China, called this “organismic” thought, arguing that Western science made progress by simplifying reality into linear, causal models but that in China there was an aversion to this simplification because it was difficult to assert straight-line causality when one started from the premise that everything influenced everything else in a single seamless, mutually influencing reality.

4. Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua, June 8, 1973, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 778, p. 5.

5. “Interview of Mike Wallace with Deng Xiaoping,” CBS News, Beijing, September 2, 1986, in Deng Xiaoping wen xuan, Di San Juan (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), pp. 167–75, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/dengxp/vol3/text/c1560.html.

6. Henry Kissinger and Premier Zhou Enlai, classified “Memorandum of Conversation” (“Exclusively Eyes Only”), White House, October 20, 1971, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, pp. 5–6, released by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (no date of release or other information).

7. In 2008, after a successful Olympics and the crash of Lehman Brothers, 41 percent of Chinese saw China as “the world’s leading economic power.” Four years later, after slowing growth, domestic scandal, and a not entirely smooth generational transition among leaders in Beijing, only 29 percent of Chinese saw the PRC in this light. Alarmingly from a U.S. point of view, 58 percent of British and 62 percent of Germans saw China “as the world’s leading economic power” in 2012. Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, “Growing Concerns in China about Inequality, Corruption” (Issued October 16, 2012), pp. 5, 14, www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/10/Pew-Global-Attitudes-China-Report-FINAL-October-10–2012.pdf.

8. Ibid., p. 4.

9. Premier Li Peng, April 3, 1993, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, DML, Doc. 396, p. 3.

10. Ambassador Seignious (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wenjin, January 8, 1980, Zhongnanhai, Beijing, declassified U.S. government document, DML, Doc. 696.

11. Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of China’s Extraordinary Rise (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons [Asia], 2011), pp. 21–24.

12. Henny Sender, “Dug In Too Deep,” Financial Times, June 25, 2012, p. 7.

13. David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 330; see also Alice Miller, “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 26 (2008): 8–10, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM26AM.pdf. Miller indicates uncertainty about when there was a shift in the leadership of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group.

14. The eight points from Jiang Zemin’s speech “Continuing to Strive toward Reunification of China,” January 30, 1995, are republished in “Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal,” Bridging the Straits, January 11, 2007, http://english.cri.cn/4426/2007/01/11/167@184028.htm.

15. Senior Chinese foreign policy analyst, December 1, 1998, DML, Doc. 580, p. 1.

16. PLA officer, June 27, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 757, p. 3.

17. Director Xu Jiatun, September 20, 1989, Hong Kong, DML, Doc. 404, p. 2.

18. Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan with David Gergen, April 1991, Hong Kong, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 767, p. 3.

19. On April 16, 1988, an American delegation of which I was a member met with Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, who spoke about Hong Kong, among other things. He was dismissive of the idea that there were any reasons for the people of Hong Kong to be concerned about the 1997 reversion of Hong Kong to the PRC. “Why would we hurt it? There should be no problem with confidence.” Vice-Foreign Minister Zhou Nan, April 16, 1988, Foreign Ministry, Beijing, DML, Doc. 397, p. 1.

20. Governor Christopher Patten, September 1992, DML, Doc. 739, p. 1.

21. Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, trans. Bao Pu, Renee Chiang, and Adi Ignatius (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009).

22. Notes in interview file, May 2, 1992, DML, Doc. 599, p. 1.

23. Vice-foreign minister, June 28, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 351, p. 2.

24. “DCI Statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy Bombing,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Open Hearing, July 22 1999, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/dci_speech_072299.html.

25. Chinese vice-minister, June 28, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 352, p. 2. This was a retrospective comment, given that Clinton had been acquitted in his Senate trial the previous February.

26. Chinese office director, June 29, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 353, p. 2.

27. Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng, eds., with Danielle F. S. Cohen, Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 327–75.

28. PLA officer, June 27, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 757, p. 2.

29. Ibid., p. 3.

30. Chinese scholar, June 29, 1998, DML, Doc. 807, p. 7.

31. Senior Foreign Ministry figure, May 6, 1999, DML, Doc. 578, p. 2.

32. Premier Zhu Rongji, March 31, 1999, Great Hall of the People, Xinjiang Room, Beijing, DML, Doc. 369, p. 3.

33. Senior Chinese economist, March 29, 2005, Xian, China, DML, Doc. 663, p. 3.

34. PLA officer, June 27, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 757, p. 2.

35. Senior Chinese bank official, March 19, 2009, Beijing, DML, Doc. 635, p. 1.

36. Zhangzhou mayor Han Yulin, July 27, 1993, Zhangzhou, Fujian, DML, Doc. 610, p. 1.

37. Professor Pieter Bottelier, pers. comm., October 24, 2012.

38. Mayor Xu Kuangdi, January 14, 1998, Shanghai, DML, Doc. 319, p. 1.

39. Think tankers, June 27, 1999, DML, Doc. 707, p. 2.

40. Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, June 8, 1973, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 778, p. 6.

41. Ibid, p. 5.

42. Lu Chang, “A Lot on the Plate,” Chinadaily.com, March 30, 2012, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012–03/30/content_14950430.htm.

43. Senior adviser, August 19, 2002, DML, Doc. 547, p. 1.

44. Ibid.

45. Senior adviser to Hu Jintao, December 13, 2002, DML, Doc. 331, p. 2.

46. Chinese minister of finance Xiang Huaicheng, September 8, 2002, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 340, p. 3.

47. Senior Chinese economist, March 29, 2005, Xian, China, DML, Doc. 663, p. 3.

48. “US Will Never Default, Vice-President Biden Tells China,” BBC News, August 21, 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14605974?print=true.

49. AFP, “Clinton Wraps Up Asia Trip by Asking China to Buy US Debt,” Breitbart.com, February 22, 2009, http://www.breitbart.com/print.php?id=CNG.42a44b0f5d9cf5c9762e80574e79a3d5.831.

50. Senior adviser, August 19, 2002, DML, Doc. 547, p. 1.

51. President Jiang Zemin, January 13, 1998, Office 202, Zhongnanhai, Beijing, DML, Doc. 582, p. 2.

52. Vice-Chairman Zhang Wannian, September 6, 1996, Beijing, DML, Doc. 417, p. 3.

53. “David Gergen and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen,” April 1991, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 765, p. 5.

54. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, August 26, 1992, DML, Doc. 381, p. 2.

55. For an extensive discussion of “comprehensive national power,” see David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 20–25.

56. Pew Research Center, “Growing Concerns in China,” p. 14, www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/10/Pew-Global-Attitudes-China-Report-FINAL-October-10–2012.pdf.

57. Premier Zhou Enlai, late-night conversation with Michael Blumenthal, June 15, 1973, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 750, pp. 5–6.

58. Premier Zhao Ziyang, meeting with U.S. governors, National Governors Association trip to China, December 5–18, 1983, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 763, p. 3.

59. Deng Xiaoping, October 17, 1979, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 776, p. 2.

60. Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua, November 20, 1980, (Old) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 715, p. 6.

61. Senior PRC intelligence official, October 2, 2003, DML, Doc. 506, p. 1.

62. Chinese academics, July 21, 2009, DML, Doc. 651, p. 4.

63. Vice-Chairman Zhang Wannian, September 6, 1996, Beijing, DML, Doc. 417, p. 2.

64. Senior Chinese scholar, August 19, 2002, DML, Doc. 535, p. 1.

65. Jianmin Qi, “The Debate over ‘Universal Values’ in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 20, no. 72 (2011): 881–90.

66. Senior Chinese scholar, August 19, 2002, DML, Doc. 535, p. 2.

67. Pew Research Center, “Growing Concerns in China,” p. 4.

68. Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian, June 1979, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, doc. 775, p. 4.

69. Li Juqian, “Legality and Legitimacy: China’s ASAT Test,” China Security 5, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 51.

70. Chinese general, 2011, DML, Doc. 833, p. 3.

71. Keith Bradsher, “China Said to Bolster Missile Capabilities,” New York Times, August 25, 2012, p. A5.

72. Chinese strategic analyst, August 19, 2002, DML, Doc. 535, p. 2.

73. John Hickman, “Red Moon Rising,” Foreign Policy, no. 194, June 18, 2012, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/red_moon_rising (accessed June 28, 2012).

74. Katharina Hesse, “Interview with China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs: ‘The West Has Become Very Conceited,’” Der Spiegel, August 22, 2011, www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,781597,00.html. On another website, Susanne Koelbl is listed as the interviewer. See also DML, Doc. 840.

5.NIGHTMARES

The first epigraph (quote by Liu Binyan) is from Doc. 768 (Jan Berris), p. 1. The second epigraph (quote by Xiang Nan) is from Doc. 618 (DML), p. 2. The third epigraph (quote by Premier Zhu Rongji) is from Doc. 561 (DML), p. 2. The final epigraph (quote by director general) is from Doc. 456 (DML), p. 2.

1. “Missteps” does not quite capture the enormity of the tragedies Mao Zedong created. In Xin Shijie Shibao [New World Times], in an apparently signed article dated March 27, 2012, and carried in the paper July 13, 2012, under the title “‘Wen ge’ fansi yu zhengzhi tizhi gai ge,” Jiang Zemin’s onetime political adviser, Wang Huning, was reported to have revealed that three million persons had been “knocked down” as “rightists” in 1957; forty million had died of starvation in the late 1950s and early 1960s; and twenty-plus million had died in the Cultural Revolution. My efforts to verify the authenticity of this alleged Wang Huning article have been inconclusive.

2. Premier Zhao Ziyang, September 27, 1987, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, interview by Tom Brokaw, Doc. 803, p. 3.

3. “Portrait of Vice President Xi Jinping: ‘Ambitious Survivor’ of the Cultural Revolution,” confidential U.S. Embassy Beijing cable, November 16, 2009, reference ID 09Beijing3128, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09BEIJING3128.html.

4. Ibid.; see also Xi Jinping, interview by Carsten Boyer Thogersen and Susanne Posborg, Zhonghua Ernu [Sons and Daughters of China], summer 2000, DML, Doc. 866, pp. 6–7. For a compendium of short pieces written from 2003 to 2007 by Xi Jinping and published under his own name, see Xi Jinping, Zhi Jiang xin yu (Zhejiang: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, August 2007).

5. DML, Doc. 838, p. 2.

6. Premier Wen Jiabao, meeting with members of U.S. Congress, April 1, 2005, DML, Doc. 454, p. 3.

7. Sichuan governor Yang Xizong, December 1983, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 766, p. 2.

8. “Income Gap between China’s Urban, Rural Residents Narrows in 2011,” Xinhuanet, January 20, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012–01/20/c_131371091.htm.

9. Senior U.S. statesman, May 8, 2012, DML, Doc. 858, p. 1.

10. He Qinglian, “Why Have China’s Peasants Become the Major Force in Social Resistance?,” China Rights Forum, no. 2 (2009), www.hrichina.org/print/content/3790.

11. Jiangnan Zhu, “The Shadow of Skyscrapers: Real Estate Corruption in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 21, no. 74 (March 2012): 243–60.

12. He Qinglian, “Why Have China’s Peasants.”

13. Ibid.

14. Ministry of Finance, “Report on the Implementation of the Central and Local Budgets for 2010 and on the Draft Central and Local Budgets for 2011,” March 5, 2011, p. 11, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011–03/17/content_1826516.htm.

15. Wang Hairong, July 28, 1976, Beijing, U.S. Liaison Office, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 748, pp. 3–4.

16. Secretary Hu Qili, October 16, 1985, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 800, p. 2.

17. Bulletin of Activities [Gongzuo Tongxun], ed. J. Chester Cheng (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1966).

18. Vice-Premier Geng Biao, November 25, 1978, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 761, p. 2.

19. Xi Jinping, interview by Thogersen and Posborg, DML, Doc. 866, pp. 7–8.

20. Senior U.S. diplomat, May 8, 2012, DML, Doc. 858, p. 1.

21. “China’s Male-to-Female Ratio Declines for the First Time,” People’s Daily Online, June 4, 2010, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/7012887.html.

22. Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian, June 1979, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 775, p. 3.

23. Senior Chinese economist, March 29, 2005, China, DML, Doc. 663, p. 2.

24. For background, see Anita Chan, Wal-Mart in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Tim Pringle, Trade Unions in China: The Challenge of Labor Unrest (New York: Routledge, 2011); David Barboza, “In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay,” New York Times, January 5, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; see also “Trade Unions in China: Membership Required,” Economist, July 31, 2008, www.economist.com/node/11848496/print.

25. David Barboza and Charles Duhigg, “China Contractor Again Faces Labor Issue on iPhones,” New York Times, September 10, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/technology/foxconn-said-to-use-forced-student-labor-to-make-iphones.html?pagewanted=all.

26. Premier Zhu Rongji, April 5, 2002, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, DML, Doc. 561, pp. 1–2. In this interview, Zhu mentions Han Dongfang being in the United States. Han’s organization, China Labour Bulletin, was founded in Hong Kong in 1994.

27. Andrew Jacobs, “Protests over Chemical Plant Force Chinese Officials to Back Down,” New York Times, October 29, 2012, p. A4; “Ningbo Defends Chemical Plant after Protests,” Xinhua, October 24, 2012, www.china.org.cn/china/2012–10/24/content_26896978.htm.

28. Engineers, September 9, 1982, Wuhan, Yangzi River Valley Planning Authority, DML, Doc. 785, p. 1.

29. The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Central Document Translation Department of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, July 2011), p. 12.

30. State Councilor Song Jian, Chairman, SSTC, April 15, 1994, DML, Doc. 664, p. 2.

31. Hu Qili, secretary, Central Committee, October 16, 1985, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 800, p. 3.

32. U.S. Department of State Reporting Cable, Foley and NPC Standing Committee Head Wan Li, May 23, 1989, Washington, DC, U.S. Capitol, DML, Doc. 698; Reuters, “China Inflation Slows,” New York Times, December 29, 1989, www.nytimes.com/1989/12/29/business/china-s-inflation-slows.html; Marcus Noland, Pacific Basin Developing Countries (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 151.

33. “China Inflation Rate,” Trading Economics, n.d., www.tradingeconomics.com/china/inflation-cpi (accessed July 26, 2012).

34. Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, June 12, 1996, Beijing, DML, Doc. 395, p. 2.

35. Wen Jiabao, premier, March 16, 2007, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, premier’s press conference, Doc. 443, p. 6.

36. President Jiang Zemin, May 9, 1992, Beijing, DML, Doc. 403, p. 2.

37. Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, June 12, 1996, Beijing, DML, Doc. 395, p. 2.

38. Yi-En Tso and David A. McEntire, “Emergency Management in Taiwan: Learning from Past and Current Experiences,” unpublished paper, p. 8.

39. “President Ma Ying-jeou’s Popularity Plunges to New Low, TVBS Poll Shows,” Taipei Times, July 6, 2012, p. 1, www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/07/06/2003537070; “Survey on President Ma Ying-jeou’s Approval Rating and People’s Views on the Unification-Independence Issue,” Global Views Survey Research Center, conducted April 13–17, 2011.

40. Ko Shu-ling, “Morakot: The Aftermath: Ma, Liu Approval Ratings Plummet in Morakot’s Wake,” Taipei Times, August 20, 2009, p. 1.

41. Keith Bradsher, “Collapse of New Bridge Underscores Worries about China Infrastructure,” New York Times, August 25, 2012, p. A4.

42. U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), “Earthquakes with 1,000 or More Deaths since 1900,” n.d., http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world_deaths.php (accessed July 28, 2012).

43. National Climate Data Center (NCDC), “Flooding in China, Summer 1998,” November 20, 1998, http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/chinaflooding/chinaflooding.html.

44. “The World’s Worst Floods by Death Toll,” n.d., www.epicdisasters.com/index.php/site/comments/the_worlds_worst_floods_by_death_toll/ (accessed July 28, 2012); Yi Si, “The World’s Most Catastrophic Dam Failures,” in The Dragon River Has Come! The Three Gorges Dam and the Fate of China’s Yangtze River and Its People, ed. Dai Qing (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 38.

45. United Nations Environment Programme, “The Songhua River Spill, China, December 2005,” field mission report, December 5, 2005, p. 7, http://unep.org/PDF/China_Songhua_River_Spill_draft_7_301205.pdf.

46. Ibid, p. 14.

47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Global SARS Outbreak, 2003,” in “Frequently Asked Questions about SARS,” July 2, 2012, www.cdc.gov/sars/about/faq.html. The CDC numbers on both total deaths and total cases are slightly lower than WHO figures, which are used for the country-specific data. World Health Organization, “Cumulative Number of Reported Probable Cases of SARS,” www.who.int/csr/sars/country/2003_07_11/en/# (accessed November 2, 2012).

48. President Chen Shui-bian, June 6, 2007, Taipei, Presidential Building, DML, Doc. 428, p. 2.

49. Meeting with senior Chinese analyst, February 24, 2009, DML, Doc. 632, p. 2.

50. Ibid.

51. Vice-Chairman Li Xiannian, June 1979, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 775, p. 3.

52. President Jiang Zemin, June 14, 1996, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, DML, Doc. 394, pp. 4–5.

53. Vice-minister, Beijing, Ministry of XX, June 28, 1999, DML, Doc. 352, p. 2.

54. “35,860 Chinese Evacuated from Unrest-Torn Libya,” Xinhua, March 3, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011–03/03/c_13759456.htm.

55. Jane Perlez, “Chinese Plan to Kill Drug Lord with Drone Highlights Military Advances,” New York Times, February 21, 2013, p. A5.

56. Premier Wen Jiabao, April 1, 2005, Beijing, Purple Pavilion, DML, Doc. 454, pp. 3–4.

57. “Xi Jinping’s Explanation of the Chinese People’s Dream,” Chinadaily.com.cn, January 16, 2013.

58. Senior foreign affairs figure, June 27, 2011, Beijing, DML, Doc. 833, p. 2.

6.SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS

For the first epigraph (Eisenhower’s farewell address), see http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm. The second epigraph (quote from think tank analyst) is from Doc. 807 (DML), pp. 4–5. The third epigraph (quote from senior Chinese diplomat) is from Doc. 550 (DML), p. 1. The fourth epigraph, from China’s National Defense in 2010, white paper (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 2011), can be accessed at www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm.

1. Division-level officer, July-August 1976, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 797, p. 1.

2. Chiou Yi-jen, March 28, 2000, Washington, DC, DML, Doc. 628, p. 2.

3. PLA major general, January 10, 2005, China, DML, Doc. 489, p. 2.

4. Senior Chinese scholar, August 15, 2005, Tokyo, Japan, DML, Doc. 758, p. 2.

5. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 13.

6. PLA general, January 11, 2005, China, DML, Doc. 334, p. 3.

7. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: IISS), annual volumes published in 1993, 2001, and 2012.

8. Tai Ming Cheung, ed., New Perspectives on Assessing the Chinese Defense Economy (La Jolla: University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2011); Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005).

9. Li Cheng and Scott W. Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 72–73.

10. Chinese general-grade officer, June 26, 2011, DML, Doc. 820, p. 5.

11. Tai Ming Cheung, New Perspectives; also senior think tank scholars, December 6, 2011, DML, Doc. 853, p. 1.

12. Hu Jintao, “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at the 18th Party Congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012–11/17/c_131981259_10.htm (accessed February 16, 2013).

13. Li Cheng and Scott W. Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 69.

14. Kenji Minemura, “China’s Senkakus Operations Overseen by Party Task Force Led by Xi,” February 4, 2013, Asahi Shimbun, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201302040089.

15. John Garnaut, “Rotting from Within: Investigating the Massive Corruption of the Chinese Military,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2012, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/16/rotting_from_within.

16. Li Cheng and Harold, “China’s New Military Elite,” pp. 65–70.

17. PLA colonel, September 2005, China, DML, Doc. 459, p. 3.

18. Senior Chinese scholar, August 19, 2004, China, DML, Doc. 502, pp. 1–2.

19. Senior Chinese scholar, August 19, 2004, China, DML, Doc. 500, p. 1.

20. Strategic analyst, August 19, 2004, DML, Doc. 502, p. 2.

21. PRC senior strategic analyst and others, January 18–22, 2003, United States, DML, Doc. 754, p. 2.

22. President Jiang Zemin, November 22, 2002, Hebei Room, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, DML, Doc. 521, p. 2.

23. Ibid., p. 3.

24. Senior military officer, January 6, 2012, China, DML, Doc. 856, p. 4.

25. Jeremy Page and Lingling Wei, “Bo’s Ties to Army Alarmed Beijing,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2012, p. A1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304203604577398034072800836.html.

26. Yin Fanglong, “Er pao zhengzhibu zhuren: Geren de xiaoqing xiaoyi fu cong dang de daqing dayi” [An individual’s emotions and causes must be subordinate to the party’s righteous cause], Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], April 13, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_04/13/13850516_0.shtml.

27. James Mulvenon, “The Bo Xilai Affair and the PLA,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 38 (August 6, 2012), www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org.

28. General-grade Chinese officer, May 9, 2001, DML, Doc. 564, p. 1.

29. Senior foreign affairs system official, August 20, 2002, China, DML, Doc. 536, p. 3.

30. Shirley A. Kan et al., “China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications,” Congressional Research Service, RL30946, October 10, 2001, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf.

31. Senior PLA officer, May 9, 2001, DML, Doc. 564, p. 1.

32. Chinese senior officer, January 6, 2012, DML, Doc. 856, pp. 2–3.

33. Senior Chinese foreign and security analyst, September 21, 2011, DML, Doc. 847, p. 3.

34. First vice-chairman, Central Military Commission, Liu Huaqing, May 26, 1994, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, DML, Doc. 612, p. 3.

35. Discussions of the PLA budget are tricky, and one needs to differentiate among measures. Here we are using the measure of defense spending as a percentage of GDP. Because of China’s rapidly growing GDP, one can have the phenomenon of rising absolute defense expenditures occupying a declining share of GDP. Another measure is defense spending as a percentage of total central government expenditure. By this measure, China’s defense expenditure in the Deng era never again reached the 17.7 percent it was the year Deng returned to power in 1977—by 2001, the percentage was 8.2 percent. See Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, pp. 188–89. Since 1989, there have been briskly rising absolute defense expenditures and a declining, and then generally low, defense expenditure-to-GDP ratio and a declining percentage of defense expenditure in total central government expenditure. This discussion pertains to official government figures; there is debate over the magnitude of spending occurring beyond the acknowledged figures.

36. James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978–1998 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), particularly ch. 3.

37. “GDP Growth (Annual %),” World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed November 10, 2012).

38. Chinese general, January 11, 2005, China, DML, Doc. 334, p. 2.

39. Senior Chinese general, May 24, 1994, Beijing, DML, Doc. 616, p. 2.

40. General Liu Huaqing, May 26, 1994, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, DML, Doc. 612, p. 3.

41. The inconsistency between this number and the one used in the preceding sentence was in the original DML interview document.

42. Senior Chinese general, May 25, 1994, DML, Doc. 617, p. 2.

43. Ibid, p.3.

44. Senior Chinese general, September 25, 1997, DML, Doc. 407, p. 2.

45. Defense Minister Chi Haotian, March 19, 2001, August 1 Building, Beijing, Notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 774, p. 2.

46. General-grade officer, mid-2011, DML, Doc. 826, p. 2.

47. Chinese general, January 2010, DML, Doc. 679, p. 3.

48. Shaun Tandon, “Clinton Uses Warship to Push Philippines Alliance,” DefenseNews, November 16, 2011, www.defensenews.com/article/20111116/DEFSECT04/111160306/Clinton-Uses-Warship-Push-Philippines-Alliance; see also David M. Lampton, “China and the United States: Beyond Balance,” Asia Policy, no. 14 (July 2012): 40–44.

49. Senior Chinese foreign policy scholar, January 23, 2013, DML, Doc. 883, p. 3.

50. Calculated from the China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press), 2007–11: table 8–4, “Government Expenditure by Main Item” (yearbook for 2007); table 7–6, “Main Items of National Government Expenditure of Central and Local Governments” (yearbooks for 2008 and 2009); table 8–6, “Main Items of National Government Expenditures of Central and Local Governments” (yearbooks for 2010 and 2011).

51. Former senior U.S. intelligence official, October 2011, DML, Doc. 851, p. 1.

52. One of the last officially reported numbers on “public order disturbance cases” was eighty-seven thousand, and by all qualitative reports that number has continued to rise since. “China Handles 87,000 Public Order Disturbance Cases,” People’s Daily Online, January 20, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/20/eng20060120_236813.html. Tsinghua university professor Sun Liping was reported to have asserted that in 2010 the number of protests, riots, and mass incidents was 180,000. Tom Orlik, “Unrest Grows as Economy Booms,” Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903703604576587070600504108.html.

53. President Jiang Zemin, May 9, 1992, Beijing, DML, Doc. 403, p. 2.

54. Vice-Premier Zhu Rongji, June 12, 1996, DML, Doc. 395, p. 3.

55. Former senior U.S. intelligence official, October 2011, DML, Doc. 851, p. 1.

56. Senior Chinese individual, January 2013, DML, Doc. 868, p. 3.

57. Senior analyst in foreign policy system, July 24, 2009, China, DML, Doc. 645, p. 4.

58. President Jiang Zemin, March 5, 1999, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Beijing, DML, Doc. 368, p. 4.

59. Senior Chinese scholar, June 10, 2007, China, DML, Doc. 434, p. 1.

60. Senior person in foreign affairs system, May 6, 1999, DML, Doc. 578, p. 1.

61. Senior Chinese security analyst, September 21, 2011, DML, Doc. 847, p. 3.

62. Former senior U.S. intelligence official briefing members of Congress, October 2011, DML, Doc. 851, p. 2. In this briefing by the former senior intelligence official, one member of Congress interjected the comment reported in the text.

63. Senior foreign policy adviser, August 19, 2002, China, DML, Doc. 547, p. 3.

64. Senior Chinese diplomat, September 26, 2002, DML, Doc. 529, p. 1.

65. Senior Chinese scholar, January 3, 2011, China, DML, Doc. 717, p. 2.

66. John Pomfret, “China Tests Stealth Aircraft before Gates, Hu Meet,” Washington Post, January 11, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/11/AR2011011101338_. There is a more benign interpretation of this development than a PLA attempt to embarrass or surprise the visiting American defense secretary. That explanation is that Hu Jintao, of course, knew there was a stealth aircraft program, but knowing the test schedule of an aircraft is more to expect of a national leader than is reasonable. The test schedule was probably worked out at a level sufficiently low in the system that no one connected the dots between the test and the visit of the secretary.

67. Former senior U.S. intelligence official, October 2011, DML, Doc. 851, p. 2.

68. Robert A. Caro, The Passage of Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), p. 340.

69. Yang Yi, “China Must Have a Strong Navy,” China Defense Blog, December 5, 2011, http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2011/12/rear-admiral-yang-yis-latest-oped.html.

7.NEGOTIATION CHINESE STYLE

The first epigraph (from Huang Hua) is from notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 715, pp. 2–3. The second epigraph (from Li Peng) is from Doc. 396 (DML), p. 3. The third epigraph, from an interview of a senior Chinese scholar, is from Doc. 535 (DML), p. 1.

1. Zhou Enlai, “The Past Year’s Negotiations and the Prospects” (December 18, 1946), in Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, vol. I (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981), p. 288.

2. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), pp. 97–112.

3. Ibid., pp. 101–2.

4. Prominent Chinese businessperson, March 11, 2003, DML, Doc. 514, p. 1.

5. Senior adviser to Chinese leaders, September 20, 1999, Beijing, DML, Doc. 577, p. 1.

6. Lucian Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 1982), p. 51.

7. Chinese general, July 16, 2009, DML, Doc. 646, p. 4.

8. David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

9. Lucian Pye, Chinese Commercial Negotiating Style (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, January 1982), Doc. R-2837; Carolyn Blackman, Negotiating China: Case Studies and Strategies (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1997); Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, 1967–1984 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995); and Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953–1967 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

10. Peking’s Approach to Negotiation: Selected Writings, Compiled by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

11. Fred Charles Ikle, “American Shortcomings in Negotiating with Communist Powers,” in International Negotiation, memorandum prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970).

12. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and introd. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 63–64.

13. Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe, trans. Edmund Ryden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

14. Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars [CCAS], “Interview with Chou En-lai” [July 19, 1971], Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 3, nos. 3–4 (1971): 48, http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v03n03.pdf, abstracted in Doc. 812, pp. 9–10.

15. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 189.

16. Ren Xiao, “The Moral Dimension of Chinese Foreign Policy,” in New Frontiers in China’s Foreign Relations, ed. Allen Carlson and Ren Xiao (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 3–23, esp. pp. 15–20.

17. Ambassador Yu Qingtai, March 20, 2009, Beijing, Foreign Ministry, DML, Doc. 637, p. 2.

18. Sun Tzu, Art of War, p. 69.

19. Very senior Foreign Ministry official, January 28, 2005, Beijing, DML, Doc. 342, p. 3.

20. Senior university strategic analyst, July 20, 2009, DML, Doc. 638, p. 3. The same strategic analyst put it as follows sometime later, with Foreign Ministry officials present: “‘We are manipulating them.’ Taiwan is central. ‘China is manipulating the DPRK for its narrow Taiwan core interests.’” June 28, 2011, Beijing, DML, Doc. 833, p. 5.

21. Foreign Minister Huang Hua, October 2, 1977, Beijing, notes by Lucian Pye, Doc. 710, p. 2.

22. Pew Research Center, “Growing Concerns in China about Inequality, Corruption,” October 16, 2012, www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/10/Pew-Global-Attitudes-China-Report-FINAL-October-10–2012.pdf, p. 37.

23. Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 48.

24. Vice-Premier Li Lanqing, July 21, 1993, Beijing, Purple Pavilion, Zhongnanhai, DML, Doc. 379, pp. 1–2.

25. Very senior foreign affairs official, September 16, 1997, Beijing, Diaoyutai State Guest House, DML, Doc. 410, p. 3.

26. President Jiang Zemin, June 14, 1996, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, island in the Southern Lake, DML, Doc. 394, p. 2.

27. Ibid., p. 1.

28. National Assembly member, March 21, 2006, Hanoi, Vietnam, DML, Doc. 451, p. 1.

29. Lan Lan, “Airline Carbon Tax Talks with EU Stall,” China Daily, July 23, 2012, p. 1.

30. Senior leader in Taiwan affairs, January 11, 2005, Beijing, DML, Doc. 341, p. 2.

31. Senior Chinese academic, July 17, 2009, Beijing, DML, Doc. 652, p. 4.

32. Minister Fang Yi, June 22, 1979, Beijing, DML, Doc. 426, pp. 1–2.

33. Senior foreign affairs official, August 4, 2011, DML, Doc. 837, p. 3.

34. Defense Minister Chi Haotian, January 12, 1998, Beijing, Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, DML, Doc. 329, p. 2.

35. President William Clinton, “Statement by the President On Most Favored Nation Status for China,” Office of the Press Secretary, May 28, 1993, http://china.usc.edu/(S(boflmn2ijuzcks3tmakvrx45)A(nNB4Ey0wywEkAAAAODZiNWE0MjItMzk0MC00OTMzLTg1OWItYTU2N2I5OTYxOTlhbvg6UVVONxiw6UYZv5sOCboevw1))/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=736&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1.

36. Often American flagship companies that produce high-value exports to China (e.g., Boeing for aircraft and Westinghouse for nuclear power plant technology) are mentioned, giving some specificity to their threats.

37. Vice-Minister Zhou Nan, April 1991, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 767, p. 3.

38. Premier Li Peng, April 3, 1993, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, DML, Doc. 396, p. 4.

39. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, April 1991, Beijing, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 765, p. 2.

40. Mayor Han Yulin, July 27, 1993, Zhangzhou, Fujian, DML, Doc. 610, p. 2.

41. Wang Wen and Huang Fei, “Interview with Admiral Yang Yi,” Huanqiu [Global Times], April 23, 2010, Doc. 852, p. 3.

42. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, April 1991, notes by Jan Berris, Doc. 765, p. 3.

43. Former Chinese university president, August 26, 1992, DML, Doc. 422, p. 1.

44. Keith Bradsher, “China Is Blocking Minerals, Executives Say,” New York Times, September 23, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/business/energy-environment/24mineral.html.

45. Andrew Higgins, “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of South China Sea Dispute,” Washington Post, June 10, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/in-philippines-banana-growers-feel-effect-of-south-china-sea-dispute/2012/06/10/gJQA47WVTV_story.html.

46. Agence France-Presse, “Japanese Exports to China Drop 14.5pc in November,” December 20, 2012, www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1108586/japanese-exports-china-drop-145pc-november.

47. Senior Chinese general, January 2010, DML, Doc. 679, p. 2.

48. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 413.

49. Ibid., p. 414 n.

50. Senior information official, January 12, 2005, Beijing, DML, Doc. 339, p. 3.

51. Zhang Wenjin and Ambassador Seignious, January 8, 1980, Beijing, Zhongnanhai, declassified document, DML, Doc. 696.

52. Very senior Taiwan official, June 25, 2008, Taipei, DML, Doc. 389, p. 3.

53. General XX, May 25, 1994, Beijing, DML, Doc. 617, p. 3.

54. Very senior foreign policy leader, June 26, 2011, Beijing, Diaoyutai, DML, Doc. 819, p. 3.

55. Wu Bangguo, August 28, 2007, Beijing, Great Hall of the People, DML, Doc. 430, p. 2.

56. Senior professor, February 24, 2009, Beijing, DML, Doc. 632, p. 2.

57. Chinese strategic analyst, July 20, 2009, DML, Doc. 638, p. 3.

CONCLUSION

The first epigraph (quote by Li Peng) is from Doc. 788 (notes by Jan Berris), p. 4. The second epigraph (quote by the Chinese intelligence analyst) is from Doc. 847 (DML), p. 2. The third epigraph (quote by Xi Jinping) is from Doc. 861 (DML), p. 1.

1. Pollution numbers at this level carry with them the U.S. government warning that “everyone should avoid all physical activity outdoors; people with heart or lung disease, older adults, and children should remain indoors and keep activity levels low.”

2. Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Margaret M. Pearson, China’s New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

3. Senior Chinese scholar, February 24, 2009, DML, Doc. 632, p. 3.

4. A senior adviser to China’s most senior leader, September 28, 2009, Beijing, DML, Doc. 654, p. 2.

5. Two observations illustrate why I believe the Chinese assertion of American decline may be mistaken. First, the United States now is able to exploit shale gas, which holds the promise of reducing dramatically the burden of energy imports to the United States, a reduction that, in turn, will change not only balance-of-trade realities but the cost of manufacturing in America. These developments will, in turn, boost U.S. competitiveness and presumably reduce the need for involvement in conflicts elsewhere. Second, if the United States takes greater advantage of its legacy as a nation able to attract and keep skilled and enterprising immigrants, it will preserve an advantage that virtually no other nation possesses.

6. “Diaoyu: Islands in a Stormy Sea,” China Daily, September 17, 2012, p. 6.

7. Hu Jintao, “Hu Jintao shibada baogao” [Hu Jintao’s report at the Eighteenth Party Congress], section 12, part 7, November 8, 2012, Zhongguo wangluo dianshitai (China Internet Television Network) (from People’s Daily), http://news.cntv.cn/18da/20121118/100674_12.shtml; see also “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” Xinhua, November 17, 2012, http://newsxinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012–11/17/c_131981259_13.htm (accessed December 3, 2012).

8. Xi Jinping, “Zai shiba jie zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju di yici jiti” [Xi Jinping at the first session of the Eighteenth CPC Politburo Meeting], Xinhua, November 17, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2012–11/19/c_123967017.htm# (accessed November 30, 2012); see also Edward Wong, “New Communist Party Chief in China Denounces Corruption in Speech,” New York Times, November 19, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/asia/new-communist-party-chief-in-china-denounces-corruption.html.

9. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1953), pp. 93–126.

10. For the 4 percent estimate, see Minxin Pei, “Will China Become Another Indonesia?,” Foreign Policy, no. 116 (Fall 1999): 96–100, and Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), various discussions of corruption throughout the volume. For the 13.3 to 16.9 percent estimates, see David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 236–38; see also Wu Jinglian, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Economic Reform (Australia: Thomson, 2005), pp. 391–98, esp. p. 394. For the much higher estimates of other scholars, see Wu Jinglian, Understanding and Interpreting, p. 394.

11. Evan Osnos, “Corruption Nation: Why Bo Xilai Matters,” New Yorker, April 16, 2012, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/04/chinas-public-servants-why-bo-xilai-matters.html.

12. Cui Liru, “Some Thoughts on China’s International Strategy,” Contemporary International Relations 21, no. 6 (November/December 2011): 1–7.

13. For more on this debate, see Chu Shulong, “Is America Declining?,” Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, no. 54 (November 30, 2011).

14. I made this argument in two lectures at the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies in the summer of 2010, lectures simultaneously published in Chinese and English in Dawei Lanpudun [David M. Lampton], “Zhong mei guanxizhong di liliang yu xinren” [Power and trust in U.S.-China relations], Guoji zhanwang [Global Review], no. 4 (July-August 2010): 42–58.

15. Conversation with Chinese foreign policy analyst, July 20, 2009, DML, Doc. 648, p. 3.

16. Ren Xiao, “Traditional Chinese Theory and Practice of Foreign Relations: A Reassessment,” in China and International Relations: The Chinese View and the Contribution of Wang Gungwu, ed. Zheng Yongnian (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 107.

17. Senior adviser to Chinese leadership, September 17, 2012, Beijing, DML, Doc. 863, pp. 2–3.

18. Senior public opinion analyst, November 19, 2012, DML, Doc. 879, p. 3.

APPENDIX

1. Allen Carlson, Mary E. Gallagher, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Melanie Manion, eds., Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), particularly the introduction and chapters by Xi Chen, Victor Shih and colleagues, Peter Hays Gries, Calvin Chen, Benjamin L. Read, Lily L. Tsai, and Kenneth Lieberthal.

2. Maria Heimer and Stig Thogersen, eds., Doing Fieldwork in China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006).

3. Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

4. Benjamin L. Read, “More Than an Interview, Less Than Sedaka: Studying Subtle and Hidden Politics with Site-Intensive Methods,” in Carlson et al., Contemporary Chinese Politics, p. 150.

5. Lily L. Tsai, “Quantitative Research and Issues of Political Sensitivity in Rural China,” in Carlson et al., Contemporary Chinese Politics, pp. 260–63.

6. Robert A. Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People’s Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972); Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), and “The Central Committee, Past and Present: A Method of Quantifying Elite Biographies,” in Carlson et al., Contemporary Chinese Politics, pp. 51–68; see also www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org for fine quantitative and qualitative looks at China’s elite.

7. These numbers do not always add to 558. Sometimes the number is less because I don’t have the necessary data to categorize some respondents; at other times the number is greater than 558 because people occupy more than one category in the coding scheme; and in still other interview settings there is more than one respondent.

8. This category includes scholars, researchers, and think tank personnel, unless they head an institute or university.

9. I did not take down most of my conversations with Chinese ambassadors and their equivalents over time (though the ambassador often had a note taker), generally because they had businesslike purposes, they often were short, and their content was private and understood as such at the time.

10. The nine categories of rank utilized here were Supreme Leader, Rank01; Politburo, Vice-Premier, State Councilor, Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman, Rank02; Provincial First Party Secretary, Governor, Minister, and First Party Secretary or Mayor of a Provincial-Level Municipality, Rank03; Deputy Party Secretaries, Vice-Governors, Vice-Ministers, and Deputy Mayors in the units specified immediately above, Rank04; Bureau Director or equivalent, Dean, Institute or University President, Province-Level Ministry Head, Subprovincial City Vice-Mayor, Prefecture-Level City Mayor, Rank05; Lower-Level “Miscellaneous,” a category that includes academics and researchers, Rank06; Ambassador, Rank07; Institute Deputy Director, Deputy Department Director, Rank08; and CEO, Chairman of the Board, Executive Vice President, Rank09. This categorization is not strictly rank in the narrowest hierarchical terms. Ambassadors, for instance, by any fair reckoning, are not literally Rank07, and CEOs of a large, strategic state corporation (e.g., China National Offshore Oil Corporation or CNOOC), are by no means literally Rank09; indeed, they often carry the rank of minister. This categorization of rank simply is intended to provide a parsimonious indicator of the distribution of interviews within the Chinese hierarchy and to take account of the emergence of corporate leadership in China. Further, any rank categorization schema is incomplete because it cannot take into account informal lines of influence in the system and because people wear multiple “hats,” some of which are unseen or unknown to the outsider. Moreover, in many cases I have interviewed the same person over time, so as his or her rank has changed over time, so has their assigned rank for each interview changed when warranted and known.

11. An important exception to this generalization is a substantial set of interviews I conducted in Hubei Province in 1982 on the topic of management and planning in the Yangzi River Valley. This project took me to rural water conservation and construction sites throughout the province. Some of these interviews are in this data set and others are not.

12. Senior Chinese academic, January 23, 2013, DML, Doc. 883, p. 4.

13. For instance, General Liang Guanglie was, in 2011, minister of national defense and state councilor (state posts), member of the Seventeenth Central Committee and the Central Committee’s Central Military Commission (party posts), and a general in the military.

14. Cheng Li, in “China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?,” Asia Policy, no. 6 (July 2008): 64, points out that in 2007–8 there were thirty-five non-CCP members then holding vice-ministerial and vice-governor level or above jobs. So things may gradually be changing in this respect.

15. Most notable and informative have been my interactions with the environmental and social organization activist Dai Qing; the Tiananmen-era dissident Liu Binyan (in a joint appearance at the University of Michigan); and the editor of the World Economic Herald in Shanghai, Qin Benli, who was fired from his position by Jiang Zemin, providing some of the background to Jiang’s rapid rise in Beijing thereafter. I had a minor interaction with Chai Ling in the aftermath of the Tiananmen debacle of 1989.

16. That these statuses are not mutually exclusive with the above three is shown by the fact that, for instance, scholars could be in the military (e.g., at the Academy of Military Sciences), journalists often are in the party, and NGO leaders often have close ties with various state organizations.

17. Cheng Li, “China’s Fifth Generation.”

18. Cheng Li, in ibid., p. 62, finds that females constitute only 11 percent of Fifth Generation leaders.

19. For a thoughtful discussion of interviewing in China, see Dorothy J. Solinger, “Interviewing Chinese People: From High-Level Officials to the Unemployed,” in Heimer and Thogersen, Doing Fieldwork in China, pp. 153–67. Solinger’s “four fundamental rules” of interviewing are an appropriate place to begin: (1) get appropriate approvals; (2) keep track of people you meet and enlarge your network over time; (3) “be both aware and uninitiated”; and (4) “Keep the subject’s safety at the center of your consciousness” (pp. 166–67).

20. Deputy Chief XX, Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric Power, November 4, 1982, Beijing, China, DML, Doc. 811, pp. 5–6.

21. Former vice-premier Gu Mu, March 31, 1993, Beijing, Diaoyutai State Guest House, Building 15, DML, Doc. 400, p. 1.