^* Evelyn Anoya is the Registry Legal Adviser at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. From September 2001 to January 2010, she worked in the Registry of the ICTY where she was the Court Officer and subsequently the Pro Se Legal Liaison Officer for the Milošević trial. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICTY or the STL.

^* Self-representation is also referred to as pro se, propria persona(“pro per”), unrepresented litigant, or litigant in person. The wider debate surrounding the right of self-representation hinges on the divide between the inquisitorial and adversarial legal systems. Indeed, the question of whether to prohibit self-representation is more relevant in an adversarial system. In an inquisitorial system, the judge plays the investigative role, so the involvement of the accused in putting on his own case is minimized. In an adversarial system, such as the ICTY, imposing counsel on an accused who wishes to defend himself in essence prevents him from putting on his case as he sees fit. See OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 508 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).

^† The Milošević Trial Chamber evidently thought that the Statute reflected a customary right to self-representation. See Cerruti, Self-Representation in the International Arena: Removing a False Right of Spectacle, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 919 (2009) (arguing that the ICTY wrongly relied on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), in that a defendant’s autonomy and right to be self-represented was guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); Pros. v. Milošević (16), Initial Appearance (3 July 2001) (Judge Robinson states, “I do not consider it appropriate for the Chamber to impose counsel upon the accused. We have to act in accordance with the Statute and our Rules which, in any event, reflect the position under customary international law, which is that the accused has a right to counsel, but he also has a right not to have counsel. He has a right to defend himself, and it is quite clear that he has chosen to defend himself. He has made that abundantly clear. The strategy that the Chamber has employed of appointing an amicus curiae will take care of the problems that you have outlined, but I stress that it would be wrong for the Chamber to impose counsel on the accused, because that would be in breach of the position under customary international law.”).

^* A plain reading of the ICTY Statute entitles the accused the right “to defend himself in person.” Stat. ICTY, Art. 21(4)(d). See next section.

^* Milošević was a trained lawyer, but did not have courtroom experience in criminal or international law.

^* These were Momčilo Krajišnik (on appeal), Zdravko Tolimir, and Radovan Karadžić; Vojislav Šešelj accepted the services of the Pro Se Office only in May 2010.

^* This was also true of outside observers. An acquaintance of mine from New York City attended one of the hearings with a group of students who were observing the ICTY proceedings. I was glad to spot him through the bulletproof glass that divides the courtroom from the public gallery. After the hearing, I stepped out to greet him. All he had to say to me was, “I couldn’t do it, I don’t know how you can manage to work with that man.”

^* I supervised the office until June 2009.

^* Milošević’s Legal Associates were funded through private means.

^† In the Šešelj case, the Accused did not cooperate in disclosing the necessary records to establish indigency. As such, the Registry denied his request for Tribunal funding for his defense team. See Pros. v. Šešelj (9), Deputy Registrar’s Public Redacted Decision (6 July 2010).

^‡ The standards established by Judge May required Milošević’s legal advisers to submit their curriculum vitae and sign an undertaking, which was filed on the record. The legal adviser was then appointed or accepted by the Chamber. This was a temporary deviation from the normal practice set out in the Directive on Assignment of Counsel, which required the Registrar to issue a decision on the assignment of counsel to an accused. In later self-represented accused cases, the Registrar assigned Legal Advisers. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR DEFENCE COUNSEL APPEARING BEFORE THE INT’L TRIB., IT/125. See also Pros. v. Karadžić (6), Registry Submission regarding Accused’s Representation 40 (6 Aug. 2008).

^* In July 2009, Šešelj was found guilty of contempt for publishing the names and other details of protected witnesses in a book and was sentenced to 15 months of imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber upheld the decision. Pros. v. Šešelj (6), Appeals Chamber Judgement (9 May 2010). Šešelj was convicted on a second contempt charge in October 2011, and of a third set of charges of contempt in June 2012, both concerning publication of confidential materials in books on his Web site. See Pros. v. Šešelj (11), Public Redacted Version of “Judgement” (31 Oct. 2011); Pros. v. Šešelj (12), Public Redacted Version of Judgment Issued on 28 June 2012 (28 June 2012).

^† The Krajišnik Appeals Chamber decision saw no error in the Registry’s determination that Krajišnik was permitted to discuss confidential matters only with Legal Associates who were permitted to visit him at the UNDU unmonitored. The Registry’s rationale was that they were the only persons bound to the Code of Conduct. Although the Chamber recognized the difficulty for a detained accused who is required to conduct his defense from his cell—which necessitated discussing confidential matters with other members of the defense team by means other than face-to-face—it recognized the Registry’s efforts to strike a balance, as the Legal Associates were legal professionals who could ensure the appropriate use of confidential information. See Pros. v. Krajišnik (1), Decision on Krajišnik Request (11 Sept. 2007).

^* See Askin at 152-154 and Del Ponte at 140-142 on the role of the judges.

^† The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, formed in March 2009, established a Defense Office, and should this hybrid court be faced with the challenges of a self-represented accused, the Pro Se Office’s role and responsibility will be more appropriately placed with the Defense Office. See Special Trib. Leb., R. P. & EVID. 57(E) (as amended 30 Oct. 2009) STL/BD/2009/01/Rev.2.